Congressional Hearings
NATO AT 70: AN INDISPENSABLE ALLIANCE
Congressional Hearings
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[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NATO AT 70: AN INDISPENSABLE ALLIANCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 13, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-13
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Flournoy, Michele, Co-Founder and Managing Partner, Westexec
Advisors....................................................... 7
Chollet, Derek, Executive Vice President and Senior Advisor for
Security and Defense Policy, The German Marshall Fund of the
United States.................................................. 13
Lute, Douglas, Senior Fellow, Project on Europe and the
Transatlantic Relationship, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs.......................................... 22
Brzezinski, Ian, Resident Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security
Initiative, Atlantic Council................................... 27
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 74
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 75
Hearing Attendance............................................... 76
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Statement submitted for the record from Representative Cicilline. 77
Materials submitted for the record from Chairman Engel........... 79
Materials submitted for the record from Chairman Engel........... 90
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Question submitted from Representative Wagner.................... 106
NATO AT 70: AN INDISPENSABLE ALLIANCE
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2019
House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Mr. Engel. The hearing will come to order. Let me first of
all welcome our witnesses and members of the public and the
press. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Today's hearing takes place just a few weeks from the 70th
anniversary of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization known as NATO. There are many pressing issues
facing NATO today, but for us to really assess where the
alliance stands in the year 2019, we need to take a step back
and look at the history of this great political and military
relationship.
The first half of the 20th century was marked by periods of
widespread suffering, instability, and fear. And at the start
of both World Wars, the United States stayed out of the fray,
grateful that the Atlantic Ocean kept us far away from the
terrors in Europe and the rest of the world. By putting our
heads in the sand and trying to stay away from the conflicts,
those wars grew into direct threats to our own economy,
security, and very way of life. Not to mention the immense
suffering that happened while we waited on the sidelines,
including the unprecedented horror of the Holocaust.
So after World War II, American leaders understood that it
was in our strategic interest, and also our moral obligation,
to band together with countries that shared our commitment to
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. We joined with
European democracies to form NATO, an organization built on the
principle that we are stronger when we stand together.
Now, 70 years later, NATO is widely recognized as the most
successful political-military alliance in history. Its
achievements include facing down Soviet communism and winning
the cold war, advancing freedom and democracy in Europe,
stopping genocide and bringing peace to the Balkans, and
fighting the international threat of terrorism. And in the
United States, across the decades, our transatlantic
partnership has consistently won overwhelming bipartisan
support.
But a few years ago things started to change. Since before
he even came into office, President Trump has taken
opportunities to denigrate our allies and undermine NATO in his
personal dealings with European leaders, his policy proposals,
and rhetoric. I witnessed that personally when I attended the
Munich Security Conference last month and heard from leader
after European leader that America's word and security
guarantee underpinning the transatlantic alliance is now being
questioned, while President Trump often depicts the NATO
partnership as some kind of one-way street where the United
States bears inordinate cost with little benefit, and that is
just not true.
Our European partners have contributed immensely to our
shared missions and they have come to America's defense when we
were most in need. After September 11th, 2001, our allies stood
with us. The only time, I might say, in NATO's history that
Article 5, the principle that an attack on one is an attack on
all, has been invoked. And in recent years, Europeans,
Canadian, and American troops have fought bravely together side
by side to defend the national security of all allies.
One of President Trump's most frequent criticisms is that
allies habitually free-ride and that allies hosting American
military forces do not pay the United States enough money.
Earlier this week, we learned about his latest proposal to
address this concern, the so-called cost plus 50 plan. In this
system, allies would pay the full cost of stationing American
troops on their territory plus an outlandish additional 50
percent.
This whole scheme reveals just how little the President
seems to understand about how our alliances advance our own
strategic interests. When we base troops in a NATO country, we
are not just providing that nation with free security. Our
presence strengthens the alliance's position in Europe and
extends America's strategic reach. And our alliances,
especially NATO, directly benefit the United States by
enhancing our military power, global influence, economic might,
and diplomatic leverage.
That is not to say I expect our allies to not provide any
financial contribution at all. NATO countries have already
agreed to pay 2 percent of their GDP on defense by the year
2024. And I agree with President Trump when he said that they
should fulfill that obligation. We should hold them to that
obligation.
But the conversation should be more than only financial
burden sharing. Instead, we need to see the big picture of how
our allies contribute to our collective goals. But the
President's constant denigration of our allies presents a real
threat to our foreign policy and national security objectives
and, frankly, it is just baffling. President Trump is much more
critical of our European allies, societies that share our
commitment to core values, than he is of brutal dictators such
as North Korea's Kim Jong-un or Russia's Vladimir Putin, and
that is why it is so important that we in Congress take a
leadership role on this front.
I am pleased that in this body, support for our European
allies and partners continues to be bipartisan. You can see
that in a resolution that the ranking member and I are
introducing that would reaffirm the House's support for
America's alliances and partnerships around the world. Simply
put, NATO is one of our most precious geopolitical assets and
should stay that way. It is important that we stand together to
send this message because the NATO alliance is needed now as
much as ever before.
We are seeing a rise in authoritarianism, continued threats
from international terrorism and extremism, and aggressive
attempts by Putin to invade Russia's neighbors and attack
democratic elections throughout the world. It is by working
with our NATO allies, standing side by side that we can
successfully face these challenges head on.
So it is critical that we have a full understanding of the
current state of the alliance. We need to explore the role that
NATO plays in America's foreign policy and discuss ways we can
improve the organization, including efforts to make sure our
allies follow through on all their obligations.
I am eager to hear from our witnesses about these issues,
but first I will recognize our ranking member, Mr. McCaul of
Texas, for his opening remarks.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO was created
on April the 4th, 1949. This was an historic moment. At that
time, the international community was still recovering from the
most devastating conflict the world has ever seen. Born out of
the chaos of World War II, my father's war, NATO was formed to
protect European democracies against Soviet totalitarianism and
prevent a Third World war. Seventy years later, the greatest
military alliance ever created has proven that the free peoples
of the world are the strongest when we stand together.
From that confrontation with communism during the cold war
to the defeat of Milosevic in Kosovo to the battlefields of
Afghanistan, American soldiers and those of our NATO allies
have fought and bled together. In fact, the only time that
Article 5, as the chairman said, has ever been invoked was
after 9/11 terror attacks.
This collective defense agreement and acknowledgment that
an attack on one is an attack on all is a cornerstone of the
alliance and we must keep it that way. NATO has enhanced our
military capability, increased our intelligence collection, and
created a bulwark against international terror. It is critical
to our national security and solidifies our friendships with
member States.
NATO continues to grow as countries in Europe meet
important objectives. And as I was pleased to see that North
Macedonia will be joining the alliance as its newest member.
However, friends must also be honest with each other. Some of
our allies have not been living up to the decision at the Wales
Summit in 2014 to spend 2 percent of their GDP on national
defense.
Thankfully, under pressure from the administration, member
countries have begun to spend more. NATO's Secretary General
recently announced that by the end of next year an additional
$100 billion will be contributed by our European partners. This
is bad news for Vladimir Putin, but good news for the future of
NATO's common defense.
And over the next 70 years we will be challenged again and
again. We have already seen a resurgent Russia attack its
neighbors from cyber attacks in Eastern Europe to military
conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. It is clear that Putin wants
to reclaim the superpower status of the Soviet Union. We can
meet our challenges if they are confronted with unity and
strength. Division and weakness will only tear us apart.
Each of today's witnesses have served our country well and
I know all of you personally. You have developed an expertise
on foreign policy and national security affairs. I look forward
to having a thoughtful and bipartisan discussion and hearing on
their thoughts on how to maintain a strong and effective NATO.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses. Michele
Flournoy is co-founder and managing partner of WestExec
Advisors and a former co-founder and CEO of the Center for New
American Security. She previously served as the under secretary
of defense for policy and co-led on President Obama's
transition team at the Department of Defense.
Ambassador Douglas Lute is a senior fellow with the Project
on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard
University. He was formerly the United States' permanent
representative to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's standing
political body. He also previously served as deputy director of
operations for United States European Command.
Derek Chollet is the executive vice president of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States. He was formerly assistant
secretary of defense for international security affairs where
he managed U.S. defense policy toward Europe and NATO, the
Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. Previously, he
was special assistant to the President and senior director for
strategic planning on the National Security Council's staff.
Finally, Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with
Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for
Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He was
previously the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe
and NATO policy. He also served as the senior professional
staff member on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations--we
will not hold that against you, Mr. Brzezinski--implementing
legislative initiatives and strategic strategies concerning
U.S. interests in Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central
Asia.
We are grateful to all of your service and your time this
morning. You can see it is a very prominent panel that we have.
Our witnesses' testimony will be included in the record of this
hearing, and I would like to now recognize our witnesses for 5
minutes each.
Let's start with Ms. Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF MICHELE FLOURNOY, CO-FOUNDER AND MANAGING PARTNER,
WESTEXEC ADVISORS
Ms. Flournoy. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
the opportunity to testify this morning about the importance of
NATO and our alliances more broadly for U.S. national security.
At the end of World War II, the United States had a
remarkable foresight to establish a set of alliances in Europe
and Asia as a means of protecting and advancing U.S. interests
and also as pillars of a new rules-based international order.
These alliances have underwritten 70 years of unprecedented
prosperity, economic growth, security, and stability. They are
without precedent in history and they are of great strategic
value to the United States and the American people.
Our NATO alliance as well as our bilateral alliances in
Asia provides the United States with enormous strategic
advantages. Our allies are our most reliable partners in
confronting a host of shared challenges from proliferation to
climate change, challenges that no single nation no matter how
powerful can address alone.
Our allies tend to be our closest trading partners. Look at
the U.S. and Europe with more than a trillion dollars in trade
every year. Our allies contribute to U.S. national security as
our closest military partners, going into harm's way shoulder
to shoulder with American troops, providing essential basing
and support to military operations overseas, enhancing the
familiarity of U.S. forces with their overseas theaters of
operation, and cementing military to military relationships
that are the human foundation for interoperability and
effectiveness in coalition operations. Perhaps most
importantly, these allies help us underwrite deterrence,
prevent conflict, and address persistent threats like
terrorism.
Our allies can also be incredibly powerful partners in
advancing our shared values, our commitment to democracy and
human rights. Our transatlantic alliance is particularly
valuable. Over its 70-year history NATO has provided a number
of strategic benefits to the U.S. that are, frankly, too often
forgotten in today's political discourse. Thanks to NATO we
were able to contain the Soviet Union, prevent the spread of
communism, deter a potentially nuclear confrontation, and
ultimately win the cold war.
Thanks to NATO, when the Berlin Wall fell we were able to
create a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Thanks to NATO, we
were able to conduct military operations that helped end the
war in Bosnia and enforce a negotiated peace. Thanks to NATO,
America was not alone in fighting al-Qaida in Afghanistan and
globally. NATO, as was noted, invoked Article 5 for the first
time in its history on our behalf after 9/11.
Our NATO allies sent and sustained a rotational force of
some 40,000 troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside us. They
took a lead in providing stability and security in the north
and saved the U.S. an estimated $49 billion in the process.
They have contributed 2.3 billion to the support of the Afghan
National Army. They are still with us today with 17,000 troops
in resolute support providing training and support to the
Afghan forces now leading the fight. Most importantly, we
should never forget that more than 1,000 non-U.S. NATO troops
lost their lives in Afghanistan, making the ultimate sacrifice.
Today, our NATO allies remain among our most critical
partners in dealing with 21st century challenges. Many of our
NATO allies are our closest partners fighting terrorism
globally. Think France in the Maghreb or the U.K. in Iraq and
Syria. In Iraq, NATO has provided 350 trainers, AWACS aircraft
for surveillance, and so forth.
The European allies have also been among our closest
partners in combating nuclear proliferation. After Russia's
illegal annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Eastern
Ukraine, it was our European allies who stood up and helped us
impose the harshest sanctions against Russia in history and
they have borne the brunt of the cost. More than 90 percent of
the costs of those sanctions have been borne by Europeans,
including the loss of hundreds of thousands of export-related
jobs across Europe.
NATO has also stepped up to strengthen deterrence vis-a-vis
Russia particularly in the Baltics, Poland, and the front line
States with the enhanced former presence involving 4,500 NATO
troops and initiatives to enhance NATO readiness. They have
stepped up to prepare for cyber attacks, other shared missions
like counter piracy, humanitarian relief, and so forth.
So my point is, there are many other factors besides just
measuring defense spending to assess that we have to weigh in
assessing the value of these alliances. We should implore our
NATO allies to spend more on defense, but that should not be
the only metric of our burden sharing especially given their
shared sacrifice. That would be disrespectful, shortsighted,
and wrong. I think given our allies' track record of invaluable
contributions, the President's persistent disparagement of NATO
and our partners there, our allies there, constitutes foreign
policy malpractice and undermines our U.S. interests. Most
disturbingly, the continued bad-mouthing of our NATO allies has
created uncertainty in the mind of our closest partners, has
opened up a serious debate in Europe about whether the U.S.
remains a credible partner and a reliable leader.
So after 70 years of shared sacrifice and success, I think
it is appalling that we are in this position today. We should
be honoring and celebrating that 70 years of success. We must
take stock of the many ways in which our allies have
contributed to our security. Now is not a time to disparage or
abandon or nickel-and-dime NATO. It is a time to double down on
our shared, and make the shared investments that are necessary
to deal with an era of strategic competition. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Ms. Flournoy.
Mr. Chollet.
STATEMENT OF DEREK CHOLLET, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR
ADVISOR FOR SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY, THE GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Chollet. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members
of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today. This year marks a pivotal moment for NATO
commemorating landmark anniversaries in the alliance's history,
yet also confronting fundamental questions about its future.
For an alliance forged in the rubble of the Second World War,
NATO stands today as the most successful security partnership
in history.
I believe a strong NATO remains essential to advancing U.S.
national security interests. It is an indispensable force
multiplier for American power. If NATO did not exist today we
would be racing to invent it. Yet, at a time of significant
turbulence at home and abroad, many are asking about whether
the U.S. still believes in NATO. They watch our debates or read
our Twitter feeds and wonder how committed the U.S. remains.
That is why Congress is essential to affirming and bolstering
U.S. leadership in NATO.
Now taking stock of the alliance today, one could easily
depict things only in dire terms, focusing on discord and
disagreement. Yet, the alliance is also exhibiting renewed
energy. This can be measured in at least four ways.
First, in the area of territorial defense, where member
States are stepping up deployments, adapting to evolving
threats, and spending more on their militaries; second, in the
alliance's commitment to some of its basic principles such as
the open-door policy bringing new members into the
organization; third, this renewed energy can be measured by
public opinion where support for NATO remains very high
throughout Europe and particularly in the United States; and
fourth, it can be seen in NATO's enduring commitment to common
security especially in places like Afghanistan.
For these reasons, NATO continues to show that it is a
unique asset to the United States. However, NATO faces no
shortage of challenges. These include threats from rival
powers, especially Russia's efforts to test, divide, and weaken
the alliance as well as China's rising military threat which is
getting greater attention among our European partners. These
include such challenges as cyber threats and hybrid warfare,
enduring challenges along NATO's southern flank where State
failure, violent extremism, and refugee flows pose the primary
threats.
And finally there are internal tensions that undermine
alliance unity. This last challenge is perhaps the most
worrying. NATO faces a growing crisis within its ranks. NATO is
about much more than armaments and military capabilities. It is
an alliance rooted in common values. The preamble of the 1949
Washington Treaty stipulates that the alliance was founded on
the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law. Yet, democratic backsliding and nationalist politics
are on the rise in too many places. This makes it harder to
maintain allied unity. It raises questions about common
commitment to NATO's future. Across European capitals and here
in Washington too many are wondering whether the U.S. would
fulfill its commitment to collective defense.
For this reason, Congress has an especially urgent and
important role to play in maintaining U.S. leadership in NATO.
Continued support for funding of the U.S. military and
diplomatic efforts in Europe will remain essential. So will the
continued willingness of so many Members of Congress to travel
to NATO headquarters and other European capitals to show
support for the alliance and press for its continued reforms.
And your legislative efforts such as the recent passage of the
bipartisan NATO Support Act are indispensable.
We must rekindle the spirit that helped energize U.S.
leadership in NATO in the first place and also recall that
sustaining this leadership over decades has never been easy. We
would be wise to remember history's lessons. Allow me to
conclude on one of them. Exactly 68 years ago, a similar debate
about NATO gripped Washington and specifically the U.S.
Congress. Back then, the many major political figures doubted
the wisdom of NATO claiming that deploying American troops to
Europe was not in the Nation's best interests. It fell to
General Dwight Eisenhower a year before he became President to
come out of retirement and galvanize American support to send
troops to Europe. In February 1951, Eisenhower came here to
Capitol Hill to make his case. Speaking before both houses of
Congress he passionately argued for what he called the
enlightened self-interest of American leadership in NATO.
Congress embraced Ike's call to action.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the
committee, at a moment when we hear echoes of the same doubts
about NATO's value to U.S. national interests, we would be well
served to recall Eisenhower's wisdom. And as we approach NATO's
70th anniversary this spring, we must again look to Congress to
embrace this mission as it did seven decades ago. Thank you and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chollet follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chollet.
Mr. Lute.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS LUTE, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT ON EUROPE AND
THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Mr. Lute. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you
for bringing us together today to discuss the NATO alliance, a
cornerstone of American national security policy for the last
70 years but a cornerstone that I think we all too often take
for granted.
The topic of today's session is NATO at 70: An
Indispensable Alliance. Coincidentally, just last month,
Harvard University's Belfer Center published a report that I
co-authored with Ambassador Nicholas Burns and the title of our
report was ``NATO at 70: An Alliance in Crisis.'' So as NATO
approaches its 70th anniversary in just a few days both
descriptions strike me as accurate. NATO is both indispensable
and in crisis.
Our report outlines ten major challenges facing the
alliance. These challenges are diverse, complex, and happening
simultaneously. That is why we conclude that the alliance is in
crisis. The report identifies four challenges from within the
alliance, and others have already mentioned some of these:
reviving American leadership of the alliance; restoring
European defense strength that is defense spending; upholding
NATO's democratic values; and streamlining NATO decisionmaking.
Another four challenges come from beyond NATO's borders:
containing Putin's Russia, ending the Afghan war, refocusing
NATO's partnerships, and maintaining an open door to future
members. Finally, the last two of the ten challenges are
challenges that loom on the horizon; winning the technology
battle in the digital age and competing with China.
I would like to highlight just a couple points out of this
report, and request that the full report be entered into the
record. First, NATO's single greatest challenge today is, for
the first time in NATO's history, the absence of strong,
committed U.S. Presidential leadership. Every previous
President since 1949, both Democrats and Republicans, has
understood the value of NATO. Most fundamentally, allies today
are unsure of this President's commitment to the Article 5
collective defense commitment. This shakes the core of the
alliance. Here, the U.S. Congress can play a role to reassure
allies and check and balance the President, as the House did in
January this year by approving the NATO Support Act. More
specifically, on a bipartisan basis Congress should reaffirm
regularly the U.S. commitment to NATO, should continue to fund
the European defense initiative, and should pass legislation
requiring congressional approval should the President attempt
to alter our treaty commitments or to leave the alliance
altogether. Approval of the NATO treaty in 1949 required two-
thirds majority in the Senate. The same should be required to
leave the alliance.
Second, Europeans must contribute more to their defense.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned this in your opening comments. I
was the U.S. Ambassador to NATO in 2014 when allies committed
to the 2-percent pledge. It is an appropriate and necessary
metric. Today, only seven allies reach that level of defense
spending. This administration is right to hold allies to the
pledge.
At the same time, however, 2 percent was never intended to
be the only meaningful measure of an ally's contribution, so
NATO should broaden its metrics. Most important, spending on
capabilities to counter hybrid tactics including cyber attacks,
disinformation campaigns, and interference in our democratic
processes should be taken into account as these may represent
NATO's greatest vulnerability.
Third, a challenge on the horizon, NATO needs to pay more
attention to China's increasing influence in Europe, and I will
leave that for now. But as it, in my view, in the coming
decades NATO's importance will only grow because of the U.S.
competition with China.
And, finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to point out a false
narrative that ignores the values and erodes the cohesion of
NATO. This false narrative claims that NATO is an anachronism,
outdated and obsolete, that our allies are ripping us off
taking advantage of our generosity. This is simply not true.
The truth is that U.S. created NATO and has maintained the
alliance for 70 years because NATO is in America's vital
national security interest. America benefits economically,
politically, and militarily from the alliance.
NATO and our other treaty allies are the single greatest
geostrategic advantage we hold over any peer competitor. Russia
and China have nothing to compare. In short, NATO is
indispensable. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lute follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Lute.
Mr. Brzezinski.
STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW,
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY INITIATIVE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Brzezinski. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul,
distinguished members of the committee, as we approach NATO's
70th anniversary thank you for conducting this hearing and
allowing me to participate in this stock-taking of the
alliance.
NATO is an invaluable alliance. The transatlantic security
architecture it provides has transformed former adversaries
into allies and deterred outside aggression; European allies
that are secure and at peace are inherently better able to work
with the United States addressing challenges beyond Europe.
NATO has been a powerful force multiplier for the United
States. Time and time again, European, Canadian, and U.S.
military personnel have served and sacrificed shoulder to
shoulder on battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere
around the world.
The alliance provides the United States with the ability to
leverage unmatched political, economic, and military power.
NATO's actions benefit from the political legitimacy unique to
this community of democracies. Its economic power, a combined
total of some $40 trillion in GDP, dwarfs that of any rival. No
other military alliance can feel the force as capable as NATO.
These assets only become more important in today's
increasingly challenging security environment. That environment
features, one, the return of great power competition featuring
Russia's revanchist ambitions and China's growing
assertiveness; second, a disturbing erosion of the rules-based
order that has been the foundation of peace, freedom, and
prosperity around the globe; third, a growing collision between
liberal democracy and authoritarian nationalism.
Another significant dynamic is what some call the fourth
industrial revolution. It features the advent of hypersonic
weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other
technologies. These capabilities portend to radically redefine
the requirements of military stability and security. These are
reasons why NATO has only become more important.
But as we look forward, NATO's agenda must include the
following five priorities: First, the alliance must accelerate
its efforts to increase its preparedness for high-intensity
conflict. After the cold war, NATO's force posture shifted
toward peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. These were the
demands generated by operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere. Today, Russia's military aggressions and
sustained military buildup have reanimated the need to prepare
for high-intensity warfare, the likes of which we have not had
to face since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is a
matter of real concern.
It is notable--it is deeply concerning that the commander
of the United States European Command last week testified that
he is not yet, quote, ``comfortable with the deterrent posture
we have in Europe''. He warned that, quote, ``a theater not
sufficiently set for full spectrum contingency operations poses
increased risk for our ability to compete, deter aggression,
and prevail in conflict, if necessary'', end quote.
This reality underscores a second NATO priority. Canada and
our European allies must invest more to increase their military
capability and readiness for these kinds of contingencies.
Their investments must address key NATO shortfalls including
air and missile defense, intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance and long-range fires, among others. Time is long
overdue for these allies to carry their share of the security
burden.
Third, NATO must reinforce, must further reinforce its
flanks in North Central Europe, the Black Sea Region, and the
Arctic. These are foci of Russia's military buildup,
provocations, and aggression. In North Central Europe the
challenge is acute. The alliance has four Enhanced Forward
Presence battalions stationed in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia. They are positioned against divisions of Russian
ground forces backed by sophisticated aircraft, air defense,
helicopters, ships, and missiles.
Fourth, the alliance must more substantially embrace and
support the membership aspirations of the Ukraine and Georgia.
NATO enlargement is one of the great success stories of post-
cold war Europe. It expanded the zone of peace and stability in
that region and strengthened the alliance's military
capability. But the alliance needs to provide Ukraine and
Georgia a clear path to membership, recognizing it will take
them time to meet the alliance's political and military
requirements.
There is a clear lesson from Moscow's invasions of Ukraine
and Georgia. NATO's hesitancy regarding membership aspirations
of these two nations has only animated Vladimir Putin's sense
of opportunity to reassert Moscow's control over what has been
allowed to become a destabilizing gray zone in Europe's
strategic landscape.
Finally, the alliance needs to actively consider the role
it will play in the West's relationship with China. I agree
with Doug. While China is not an immediate threat, military
threat to Europe, its actions against the rule-based
international order affects Europe as it does America. NATO can
play a constructive, if not significant role in the West's
strategy to shaping a more cooperative relationship with
Beijing.
As the United States confronts the challenges of the 21st
century, there is no instrument more essential, indeed, more
indispensable than NATO. The political influence, economic
power, and military might available through this community of
democracies cannot be sustained in the absence of a robust U.S.
military commitment to the alliance. That is the price of
leadership and it is one whose returns have been consistently
advantageous to the United States. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski.
Let me ask this question and let me have, starting with Ms.
Flournoy, let me have each of you answer this.
NATO has been called the most successful political-military
alliance in history. Yet, as we have all mentioned, some
critics have claimed that NATO is obsolete or that the U.S.
shares too large of a burden within the alliance. The
architects of the alliance--Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and
Eisenhower--would be incredulous to learn that their creation,
NATO and the lasting Atlantic partnership, is now in question.
Let me ask each of you, in your previous positions, would
you have been able to execute our foreign policy and national
security objectives without the support and contributions from
our allies in NATO?
Ms. Flournoy, let's start with you.
Ms. Flournoy. No. The short answer is no. NATO was a
critical partner in enabling us to surge forces in Afghanistan.
They were a critical partner in bolstering deterrence in Europe
in the face of a more assertive and aggressive Russia. And NATO
members individually have been critical partners in other
operations like counterterrorism the world over.
So NATO, in my experience, remained absolutely critical. It
is the first place we would turn to for partners to accomplish
shared objectives.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Chollet.
Mr. Chollet. Mr. Chairman, I completely agree with that. In
my capacity at the Pentagon serving for the Secretary of
Defense, three times a year we would travel to NATO
headquarters in Brussels to meet with his minister of defense
counterparts. Secretary of State has their own meetings with
their counterparts. And this became a way for us to coordinate,
to plan, and to talk about crisis response and also issues over
the horizon.
NATO was absolutely our partner of first resort and much of
what we have been able to accomplish in Europe and elsewhere is
unimaginable without having such a strong, enduring alliance.
Mr. Engel. Mr. Lute.
Mr. Lute. Mr. Chairman, I can only agree. I would argue
further that as Ms. Flournoy mentioned in her opening comments,
if we did not have NATO today when we confronted the kind of
challenges that the panel has outlined, we would actually be
racing to discover NATO and to invent NATO. So it is, in fact,
indispensable.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Brzezinski.
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur with my
colleagues. We would not have been able to execute what we have
done in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Balkans without our NATO
allies. Sitting in the Pentagon, I saw firsthand how absolutely
invaluable it is to have other countries whose militaries are
not only fully interoperable, but have deep personal
relationships among their commanders, among their NCOs. That is
the reason why when we have a contingency that requires
multinational support we turn to our NATO allies first. NATO is
indispensable to U.S. security and too often to U.S. military
operations beyond our border.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Mr. Brzezinski, let me just stay with
you and expand on something that you mentioned. I could not
agree with you more when you spoke about NATO enlargement. I
think NATO, frankly, missed the boat back in 2008 when they did
not expand to include Ukraine and Georgia. I think that gave
Putin the idea that he could do whatever he wanted and that we
would not stand up to him, including all his things in Crimea
[and all his other belligerent actions.]
So I do not know if you wanted to expand on that. I just
wanted to say that I agree with your comments.
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, sir. You know, when we look at
the Black Sea Region, that is a zone of increasing
confrontation with Russia. I do agree with you that if we had
provided Ukraine and Georgia a more robust commitment to their
transatlantic aspirations it is less likely that Putin would
have made his move against Georgia and it is even less likely
they would have made its move against Ukraine.
Putin thrives on weakness and he exploits hesitancy and
uncertainty. And unfortunately the West's posture toward these
two countries has created a de facto gray zone in European
security and that just whets the appetite of someone like
Putin. He sees an opportunity or senses there is a lack of
commitment to support another country along its border in the
former Soviet space. He sees that as an opportunity to
reanimate the hegemony that Moscow exerted during the cold war.
That is what he is about and unfortunately that is the position
that we have put these countries in.
And it is sad, because these countries seek NATO membership
and more often than not they have actually sent troops to
support our operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. I
remember the dramatic footage of a Georgian platoon fighting in
Afghanistan defending our embassy and doing a really good job
of it. They need more support than we are providing them.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Flournoy, let me ask you this. What would be the
consequences of pulling our troops home or reducing the size of
the U.S. presence in Europe? How would it impact our ability to
project power globally and could an ad hoc coalition take the
place of our NATO basing and alliance network? If not, why not?
Ms. Flournoy. As we saw during the surge in Afghanistan and
our combat mission there, our basing in Europe was absolutely
critical as a hub for our rotational forces going in and out of
that conflict. In addition, the fact that we had been in Europe
working with our allies in exercises and training and
constantly working on interoperability, we experienced the
benefits of that when we had to deploy together whether it was
in the Balkans or Afghanistan or elsewhere. So that basing has
been a critical hub.
Now that there is a returned threat to Europe itself with
Russia's behavior that those bases become absolutely critical
as a both a symbol of the U.S. commitment and resolve to defend
Europe and our interests there, but also, a caution, a blinking
yellow light to Vladimir Putin to say, if you come into NATO,
cross NATO's borders, you are immediately declaring war not
only with Europe but with the United States.
So I think it is very important to maintain and
strengthen--there are things I would do to strengthen that
infrastructure in Europe, but I think it is very important to
maintain it as a starting point.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
A few of you have mentioned China as a country that we need
to be looking at very carefully for its aggressiveness and what
it might do in the future. I am wondering if any of you would,
Mr. Chollet or Mr. Lute, would you want to comment on that?
Mr. Chollet. Well, I can take a first crack. I think China
is something that NATO members need to begin to engage more
seriously. I think there is more talk in Europe about looking
at China as a security threat. Of course there has been a lot
of news recently about disputes between the United States and
some European partners on China's investment particularly in
the technology space within Europe, but we are seeing China
invest in infrastructure in Europe, ports, critical
technologies, engaging more in the high north, and China
engaging much more with Russia.
Last year, there was a very large exercise in the Far East
called Vostok-18 that involved hundreds of thousands of Russian
troops, thousands of Chinese troops, and this is something that
got a lot of attention by our military commanders in Europe and
in Asia. It is evidence of greater cooperation between Russia
and China, cooperation that our intelligence community has
testified publicly before Congress as something they are
watching.
So although there are many aspects to the China challenge
and the security piece is just one, I think this is something
that I see NATO engaging much more deeply in, in the coming
five to 10 years and I think that there is a willingness in
Europe to do so.
Mr. Lute. Mr. Chairman, I am not so concerned about China's
military impact on Europe, but I am concerned about, as Derek
Chollet mentioned, China's increasing commercial influence. It
is buying its way into transportation infrastructure, IT
communications infrastructure and so forth. We have seen early
signs that those commercial investments are leading to
political influence. They expect a political return on their
commercial investment.
And even more I think strategically important over the next
two to three decades, it is clear that the U.S.-Chinese
competition will be at the forefront of world politics. And we
should ask ourselves as Americans, do we wish to compete with
China alone or would we favor an arrangement where we have 29
like-minded allies on our side as we enter into this
geostrategic competition that is going to define the rest of
our lives? I would clearly prefer to go in with a NATO team.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
I am going to go to Mr. Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say unequivocally, I believe the value
of NATO is absolute or as near absolute as it gets to mitigate
war, to deter, and when there is a problem to act decisively as
a team to thwart any potential adversary. I do not think it is
at risk. I think there is a lot of hyperbole about NATO's
continuance being thrown about. I do not think it is at risk at
all. I have been in Congress for 39 years. There is bipartisan
support for it. There is White House support for it. So I think
there is a lot of hyperbole about that issue.
I led a delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. We
had a bilateral with the Germans with members of the Bundestag
as well as other people in their defense establishment there
last July, and I came away profoundly disturbed by their
unwillingness and inability to meet that 2 percent GDP target.
As a matter of fact, it is at 1.24 percent now and their excuse
is--and I would appreciate perhaps Mr. Lute or others who might
want to speak to this where--well, their population just will
not go along with that kind of defense increase.
It is OK for the U.S. to do it. I am glad we do. But to
step up and say they cannot do this politically I thought was
as weak as it gets, if you could speak to that.
Second, to Michele Flournoy, during the 2012 Presidential
election you appeared in a political commercial in reaction to
Mitt Romney's statement ``that Russia was our No. 1
geopolitical foe.'' You stated in the commercial that it is
really a curious statement given that the cold war has been
over for some time, indicating that Russia was not the threat
that Mr. Romney had suggested and that he was stuck in the
past.
In your testimony before us today, however, you term Russia
``revisionist,'' and cite Moscow's continued aggression in the
region. I was in Tbilisi a week after they invaded South
Ossetia. Anyone who had any thoughts that Putin was somehow
matriculating from dictatorship to democratic leader--I will
sell you the Brooklyn Bridge if you believe that.
And they might have even gone further if there was not at
least some strong statements coming out of the administration
at that point, but I was wondering if you could tell us which
of those statements should the committee believe today.
Third, let me ask with regards to INSTEX, many of us are
very concerned about the roundabout efforts that are being made
by many, including Germany, France, and the U.K., to undermine
our ability to sanction, whether it be Global Magnitsky or
whether it be our efforts against Tehran. When you find some
other way of circumventing what the U.S. is doing with often
very strong support of the Congress, I think it undermines our
ability to promote Iranian regime sanctions that in my opinion
are very justified as well as again the Global Magnitsky Act.
Mr. Lute, if you could maybe start on that first, what
about Germany? I mean 1.24 percent is weak and it is, in my
opinion, indefensible.
Mr. Lute. Congressman, I can only agree with you. Germany
was present at the Wales Summit. Germany agreed as all allies
did on the 2-percent pledge and Germany is underperforming at
1.24 percent. It is the largest, strongest economy in the
alliance next to ours. It is a political ally that aspires to
European and maybe even global leadership, and leadership comes
with a price.
And this is simply a matter of German political leaders
coming together and forming a coalition as their system
requires and building political support for this. Political
support does not fall from trees. It has to be built as the
Congress obviously knows. So I can only agree with you. There
is no excuse.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, Congressman. So I did make that
statement and it was at a time when we were actually having
some success in cooperation with Russia. This is before Putin
sort of increased his more aggressive behavior. We were
negotiating New START arms control. We were policing up nuclear
materials, and cleaning out proliferation risks. We had Russian
agreement to allow us to transit Russian territory and their
near abroad----
Mr. Smith. I understand. But----
Ms. Flournoy. So I am just saying it was a moment in time.
I think now looking back, knowing what we know now and how
Putin has behaved and where Russia has gone with its
aggression, I think that I would revise that statement or I
would not have made that statement.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate it.
Ms. Flournoy. I would have thought that now, you know,
Romney had a certain degree of foresight that I think was not
apparent at the time.
Mr. Smith. OK. And Romney was not alone in that. Many of us
strongly objected to those kinds----
Ms. Flournoy. Right, but I think we can all agree that
Russia is----
Mr. Smith. Matter of fact, I am glad Secretary Albright
said it as well----
Ms. Flournoy [continuing]. Very much a threat today.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. That we underestimated Russia.
And that last question, if anybody can speak to it,
circumventing our sanctions regimes with and working actively
against us and there are members of NATO doing it with INSTEX.
Mr. Chollet. Well, it--yes, on the Russia or on Iran and
the JCPOA, obviously that has not been a NATO issue although
NATO members are very much party to this dispute. And of course
this issue has been incredibly divisive between the U.S. and
Europe and will remain divisive. Europe is indeed trying to
find a way to maintain the integrity of the JCPOA with this new
mechanism. I have my doubts, frankly, whether this new
mechanism is going to get anywhere. They just launched it,
whether it will prove successful or not.
Nevertheless, whether that exists or not there will still
remain a profound disagreement with our U.S. and European
partners on the JCPOA and how to handle the threat from Iran's
nuclear program. That is not a subject--the JCPOA specifically
is not a subject that NATO talks much about within the councils
of Brussels. However, the threat from Iran is something that
NATO talks about around the table in Brussels and thinks quite
a bit about from a military planning perspective.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of
the witnesses.
You know, NATO has undoubtedly been one of the most
successful alliances in history promoting peace, security,
democracy since its inception. And at the signing of the
original Washington treaty 70 years ago, President Truman
remarked that NATO would, and I quote, ``would create a shield
against aggression and fear of aggression, a bulwark which will
permit us to get on with the real business of achieving a
fuller and happier life for all of our citizens.'' To me those
words are truer now than ever before. And prior to this
administration, it would have been unimaginable to question the
value of our NATO alliance and pass resolutions prohibiting the
President from pulling out of this strategic partnership of
which he has threatened to do and yet that is exactly where we
are here, why, where we are today.
And when I was recently in attendance at the Munich
Security Conference, I was deeply concerned that at that time
not just a few weeks ago, that the President went on to Twitter
to threaten the release of 800 captured ISIS fighters on the
streets of Europe. Just think about that for a second. Today,
we are here in agreement on the importance of NATO, a point
that I think our President disregards.
And the only thing I will say also in regards to Germany, I
understand that they need to step up. But they are not talking
about building a wall, they are letting millions of refugees in
and spending money on that. Not building a wall to separate
themselves, but accepting many individuals and trying to make
sure that there is better integration into the European--and
they do not get credit for that.
And just think about that cost to the German people and
what the Chancellor is subjecting herself to by just doing
that. And those things should be taken into consideration at
all times, I think, and we do not talk about that enough where
we are building a wall and separating people and dividing
people and not supporting our NATO.
So let me ask Ms. Flournoy that how has President Trump's
questioning of the value of our NATO allies affected our
ability to effectively push back against Russia's aggression?
And I agree with you because I too was fooled. I started,
that is the reason why I was a supporter of PNTR right before
Putin came back. I thought that we were moving in a post-cold
war and Putin came back and we are where we are. But how
effectively did we push back against Russia's aggression, and
address other security challenges that is now confronted in
Europe.
Ms. Flournoy. So for all the strength of our military to
military cooperation with our allies, I think the statements
coming from the President questioning not only our allies'
contributions but the U.S. commitment to NATO and the value of
the alliance, I think that has frankly played right into
Vladimir Putin's hands. If you look at Russia's objectives,
Putin is trying to reassert Russia as a great power. He is
trying to recreate a sphere of influence.
And he is going to try to undermine democracy as a model of
government. There is nothing that makes him happier than to see
division inside the alliance, to try to so division and weaken
the transatlantic relationship, and so this is playing right
into Putin's hands.
He is--this is far more effective than the disinformation
campaigns that he has been launching that the meddling in our
elections and European elections has resulted in. So I think
we--I am very worried that at the strategic level the lack of
U.S. clear commitment and resolve and consistency and
leadership in the alliance is frankly strengthening Putin's
hand and undermining our own.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
Mr. Chollet, let me ask you, because NATO has an open-door
policy and we now look that maybe North Macedonia, a new ally
and part of the NATO. Now what would you say to those who argue
against NATO's enlargement, and are there any real concerns
that newer, smaller members of NATO could drag us into a
conflict, and can you elaborate on why enlargement has
benefited NATO?
Mr. Chollet. Well, as my fellow panelists have said, NATO
enlargement, in my view, is one of the great success stories of
the NATO alliance. It was just yesterday that we celebrated the
20th anniversary of NATO's first round of post-cold war
enlargement letting in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Something that the United States--it is important to
remember a process U.S. drove and brought these countries into
the alliance working with our partners. I think, first, having
more capable partners serves the U.S. interest and the process
of getting into NATO just does not happen overnight. This is a
long, rigorous process that requires many, many political and
military reforms from member States.
So I think it is very, very important that to achieve our
goals of having more capable partners and ensuring that we have
a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace, that we keep this
door open. That is why I think we should celebrate the fact
that North Macedonia appears on the cusp of entering the
alliance later this year.
And I want to concur with my colleague, Mr. Brzezinski,
that it is very important for the alliance to clarify a pathway
for it, for those allies that has already said 1 day we will be
in the alliance and that is Georgia and Ukraine, and I think it
is time to try to take the next step in our articulating more
concretely how that will happen.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, Russia has been in violation of the INF Treaty
for many years. Putin has indicated his intent to build new and
more sophisticated missiles to threaten our allies. I agreed
with the President's decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty
and I commend our NATO allies for supporting that decision
unanimously.
Mr. Brzezinski and I guess Mr. Chollet, what can NATO do
now to prevent this and deter this Russia missile development
program?
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, sir. You know, the Russians have
been in violation of INF Treaty for some at least 10 years. And
when you have one party of a treaty not abiding by it, its
utility diminishes and maybe even becomes counterproductive if
you are not willing to directly address that digression, that
violation.
Mr. McCaul. OK.
Mr. Brzezinski. I think the administration made the smart
move in pulling out or announcing its intent to withdraw from
the INF Treaty. I think it has wisely signaled to the Russians
that if they are ready and demonstrate that they will destroy
the existing inventory of intermediate range missiles they have
built--and I think it is about a brigade's worth--that we will
go back. I think that is the right thing to do.
The goal is to now figure out how we can avoid another
destabilizing arms race, so to speak, an arms race with two
sides building nuclear-capable, intermediate range missiles
ground launched. That is what the INF pulled off the table, so
to speak.
Looking forward, I think the following things: One, it
would be useful for--if the Russians will not take up the
administration's offer, we might consider proposing to the
Russians an agreement in which we would agree that we will not
deploy nuclear-capable, ground launch, intermediate range
missiles. We could complement that maybe with limits on the
number of missiles each side can have, and of course this would
have to include also very, very robust inspection regimes. We
could consider joint renunciation of not--renunciation of
deploying nuclear INF range missiles.
Our response also has to figure out what would we do as the
Russians move forward with these deployments, and there are
conventional responses we can take into account, the deployment
of more robust air and missile defense systems.
If there is one thing that it lacking in the
administration's response, I think it is as follows: They have
not publicly stated what are the implications of this
violation. They have just said basically they are in violation
and so therefore we are going to get out of it.
To me, but it is clear this can be potentially extremely
destabilizing and the administration should be articulating in
how is it destabilizing, what are the military implications of
this. I am wondering if they tasked the alliance or NATO's
military commander to do an assessment of what happens if the
Russians deploy a hundred, 200, 500 of these systems. What are
the implications for the alliance's posture? What should be the
response? Such an assessment and such a public articulation of
such an assessment would do a lot to help garner a more public
and international support for the administration's position.
Mr. McCaul. In the remaining time I have I want the other
three to comment. Turkey has become a precarious ally in many
ways. Their rejection of the Patriot missiles and now
willingness to buy the Russian S-400 missile system is a
challenge for NATO members, and the NATO Supreme Allied
Commander said that if they went ahead with this purchase that
the United States should not follow through with selling them
F-35s.
Could Michele and Mr. Chollet and Mr. Lute, could you
comment on that?
Mr. Chollet. Congressman, I completely agree with your
assessment of the concern of Turkey's purchase of the Russian
air defense system. This has been something that going back to
the Obama Administration has been made clear to Turkish
counterparts the mistake this would be both in terms of what we
believe is their cooperation within NATO and the fact that
there would be real consequences beyond NATO, as you mentioned
the F-35, for example, and so one would hope that the Turks
change their minds on this.
I am doubtful, having had conversations with some Turkish
officials recently that they are going to do so. They feel
quite defiant about it. I think this would be a mistake. It
would weaken alliance unity. This is one of those issues that
is an irritant in alliance debates.
And Turkey is a front line partner. I mean Turkey has been,
we should not forget, been living with a hot war on its border
for quite some time. And so there many ways NATO has come to
Turkey's support as it has dealt with the ramifications of the
Syria crisis. But----
Mr. McCaul. My time is--if I could just get a quick
response from Ms. Flournoy and Mr. Lute. And I apologize.
Ms. Flournoy. I was not fully supportive of General
Scaparrotti's testimony in terms of it from a technical and,
you know, intelligence risk perspective. It is impossible if
they go ahead with the deployment of this for hundreds and
integrate that into their systems, it will mean, it will create
very real constraints on what we are able to do with them in
terms of any kind of advanced defense cooperation or future,
provision of future systems including the F-35.
And so I think this is a real problem, and what Turkey
needs to understand is that they are making not just tactical
choices, systems choices, but strategic choices and this will
limit their ability to cooperate effectively within the
alliance.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Lute.
Mr. Lute. I agree this is a tactical bad choice on behalf
of Turkey. But the broader, more strategic issue is Turkey's
significant slippage from the democratic values of the
alliance. There is no ally among the 29 who has slipped further
and faster from the founding core values of the alliance and
has moved toward authoritarianism. So that is the big strategic
issue.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to get back to the earlier remarks about China.
You know, 2 weeks ago I was in Munich and in Brussels talking
to political and security leaders as well as NATO leaders, and
came away with the strong feeling that in the longer term that
China could be our greatest challenge right now. If we were
going to look back 25 years from now if things stay the same,
that is where I think we might be showing we have the greatest
concern.
So I would just like to go further with this. There is so
much Chinese activity investments. They just purchased a
robotics company in Germany. They are working with Hungary with
proposed rail lines through Serbia. Bulgaria, they are doing
investments in ports, all with strings attached. And we are
hearing in North Africa some of the buyers' remorse from some
of the countries that have been dealing with China, but in
Europe this is a real threat.
So what can our NATO members do to insulate members from
this? What can the U.S. do? I know I am involved in
alternatives in terms of energy investment, alternatives in
Europe to provide more options and to help our exporting now
that we are in there, but what kind of things can we do to
insulate ourselves and to deal with what I think is the
greatest long-range threat that we have through China and these
investments?
Ms. Flournoy. If I may, sir, I think it is an excellent
question. I do think the strategic competition with China will
be kind of the pacing issue for our national security going
forward. Europe is sort of a back door to get in to get Western
technology for China. If they cannot--if they are thwarted in
their intellectual property theft from us, they will try to get
it through our European allies.
They are making infrastructure investments. The case of the
port in Italy is just the most recent example. Not because of
some economic driver, but because they are trying to get
political influence, they are trying to gain leverage. And
ultimately they are also, with their companies like Huawei and
others, trying to put in networks an infrastructure that could
be used by the State for intelligence and espionage purposes in
the future if it came to that. So we have to be very clear-
eyed. I think we want to intensify our discussions with each of
our NATO partners in Europe and the EU. We want to encourage
them to put in place CFIUS-like regulation, meaning they need
to be very careful to review foreign investment in their
countries from a national security perspective and be very
clear-eyed. We need to be doing better in sharing intelligence
about, what we see China doing.
But to Doug's point earlier, Ambassador Lute's point, we
are missing an opportunity. The best way for the U.S. to
compete with China is, first of all, to invest at home in our
domestic drivers of competence, but also to band together with
our European allies and our Asian allies. Together we are 60
percent of the world's GDP. If we were taking China on not in a
bilateral tariff tit-for-tat kind of dispute, but banding
together with the EU, Japan, Korea, all of our allies in Asia,
we would have so much more leverage to force China into to
address some of the unfair practices that it has had on trade
over the years.
Mr. Keating. I could not agree with you more. I think we
are talking just the opposite approach. Tariffs are divisive
and if we ever move on the automobile tariffs it will be more
divisive. It is a lose-lose proposition.
But we share the same values with our European Union allies
and it is those values that are in competition right now with
China and why not deal from a position of strength and move
forward for free trade agreements there and then really be in a
strength position to deal with China? So I could not agree
more.
Just one quick question, you know, the elections are coming
in Europe and we are seeing, you know, I think democracies more
a threat with autocratic leaders and autocratic. How is that
backslide a concern and what can we do with the NATO countries
and our European allies to try and help in that regard?
Mr. Chollet. Congressman, I can take a crack at that. It is
a big concern. The democratic backsliding we are seeing in many
countries in the alliance is something that is becoming
increasingly divisive within the alliance and making it harder
to maintain alliance unity. There is not just disputes between
the U.S. and European partners, there are disputes within
Europe over the direction of politics on the continent.
That is why I think it is important to remember NATO's
core, which is the values. It is a military alliance, but it is
about much, much more than capabilities. And I think that is
why it is so important for NATO to remain strong, for the U.S.
to uphold those values and remain committed to its leadership
in the alliance. A lot of these issues have nothing to do with
NATO, but NATO as that core of the transatlantic partnership
will be an absolutely indispensable tool in helping us address
some of the democratic backsliding in the European Union.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. I would just say it has
everything to do with it too, if you look at it from that
perspective. I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much, Chairman Engel and
Republican leader McCaul. What extraordinary time to have
recognition of the 70th anniversary of NATO and I want to thank
each of you for being here. And as I think of the 70th
anniversary of NATO, we now have the broadest spread of freedom
and democracy than in the history of the world. Particularly
with the former Warsaw Pact members now members of NATO, how
exciting this is and the success of NATO needs to be
recognized.
Mr. Brzezinski, Secretary General Stoltenberg has actually
praised the President for his efforts to have all of the
members of NATO increase their participation financially. What
is your view about the financial contributions by our NATO
allies?
Mr. Brzezinski. I think those contributions are still
short. They are making improvement. Secretary General
Stoltenberg likes to emphasize that since 2016 we have had a
$41 billion increase in their defense spending and it is on
track to be $100 billion by 2020. That is good and it should be
recognized.
I think it is actually eight countries now that are going
to be this year at the 2-percent mark and ten have pledged to
meet that by 2024, which is progress, but there are about to be
30 members in the alliance, so we are just over 50 percent of
the alliance living up to the 2-percent pledge. It is urgent,
because challenges that we face today are growing increasingly
ominous. I mean the risks posed by Russia's military buildup in
North Central Europe in the Black Sea Region require more
robust investment.
We were talking about Germany. It is appalling the German
spending levels particularly in the light of the readiness of
their forces. I am not convinced they really have the
capability to even generate two brigades in 30 days to
reinforce NATO's Eastern frontier and they are in the backyard,
so to speak.
So yes, there is progress being made. I think the
administration can be commended for prodding that process in
sometimes undiplomatic way, sometimes even a counterproductive
way, but the progress is happening but a lot more needs to be
done. Fifty percent meeting 2 percent is not sufficient. That
is not the instate we see. We need a hundred percent commitment
to 2 percent and we need to kind of, think more broadly about
how we measure the outputs of that 2 percent.
I would like to see a return to inspections of committed
allied forces. That is, during the cold war I think it was
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, would do
inspections of the forces that NATO members committed to
alliance operations or alliance contingency plans. Those
inspections ought to be reinstated.
They could be conducted by SHAPE or Allied Command
Transformation, and they ought to be reported to the ministers.
And I think there ought to be a public dimension of that
reporting because that is a good way to increase the pressure
on governments and also to get public's confidence that their
money is being well spent.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Another, to me, extraordinary
achievement has been NATO forces being placed in the Baltic
republics-Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania-the presence of American
troops in Poland. For each of you, how significant is this as a
deterrent, and in particular in Poland--I had the opportunity
to meet with President Duda in New York last summer and it was
so exciting to hear him explain how he would like to have
actually a permanent American military presence that they would
pay for, they would provide, and the relationship that we have
with Poland has just never been better.
But Secretary Flournoy, everyone, what is the significance
of having these troops as a deterrent, peace through strength?
Ms. Flournoy. I think having NATO troops, including U.S.
troops, in the Baltics is essential to signal to Vladimir Putin
that if he comes across the border he is not just attacking
Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania, he is taking on the United
States and the full force of NATO.
I do think there are things we can do to strengthen our
presence along the front line States including pre-positioning
more heavy equipment, including readying more bases to be able
to receive forces if it came to that in a crisis. I think the
question of whether any additional presence in Poland should be
permanent versus rotational deserves further study. But I
really applaud Congress' support and this committee's support
for the European Reassurance Initiative and the continued
funding that DoD is providing.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. We are arguing that they should spend 2
percent on their national defense. We are also trying to argue
to the American people that if they hit 2 percent they are
doing enough. So we have the foreign policy establishment is
arguing in both directions. Tell the American people settle for
what you get and tell the NATO countries to spend more. Two
percent is a benchmark that needs to be compared with what
percent are we spending, and what is the commonly used figure
that we use to talk to the Europeans about what percent of our
GDP we are spending? Do we typically say something like 3
percent or three and a half percent?
Which of you is most familiar with what number we use? I
see Mr. Chollet--oh, Mr. Lute.
Mr. Lute. So we have consensus here. We typically cite 3.5
percent.
Mr. Sherman. Right. And the fact is that is our effort to
lie to the American people because we have a two-angle here. We
do not spend--we spend much closer to five and a half percent.
Now how can you lie to the American people to tell them what
Europe is doing is adequate? Well, what you do is you exclude
veterans benefits as if the pension costs--you know, I am an
old CPA. If you had a company that in not listing the costs of
product excluded its pension costs, they would go to jail. That
is how big of a violation it is of accounting principles.
So you exclude veterans. You exclude the Coast Guard. You
exclude the CIA. And that helps with one part which is trying
to tell the American people Europe is doing enough, but it
undercuts our efforts to get Europe to do more because they
say, well, you know, if we hit 2 percent, you guys are three
and a half percent, we are in the ballpark. Why is it in
arguing with Europe that we decide that the Coast Guard does
not count, the CIA does not count, and veterans benefits does
not count?
Mr. Lute. So I think I can address that. So NATO actually
has rules about what counts and what does not count, so
typically the shorthand.
Mr. Sherman. And why have we agreed to rules that all lie,
that massively understate what any reasonable accountant would
say we are spending?
Mr. Lute. So I am not sure, Congressman, why we agreed to
that.
Mr. Sherman. OK.
Mr. Lute. But the standard has been for decades that
basically ministry of defense----
Mr. Sherman. I understand. Europe's--there is Article 5 and
there is Article 5. No one in the world knows what the U.S.
response would be to an attack on an Eastern European country.
We would clearly do something. There is an image that as long
as we are legally in NATO we will respond as we did in World
War II and/or with the full force of our nuclear weapons.
Is there any discussion in Europe that goes along the lines
of, hey, if the American people think that we are only doing 2
percent or we are doing less than 2 percent, we are on the
front lines and that is all we did that maybe the U.S. response
would not be any greater than NATO's response that when America
was attacked by the Taliban and al-Qaida.
That is to say, the U.S. might send a few hundred troops, a
few thousand troops, but would not reinstitute the draft,
endanger American cities. Is there any discussion in Europe
that Article 5 compliance could be anything between a few
hundred troops on the one hand and massive nuclear war on the
other, or do they just assume that they get a World War II-
level response?
Mr. Lute. So, Congressman, NATO actually conducts war games
often with our secretary of defense participating and they go
through scenarios.
Mr. Sherman. But it will ultimately be a political
decision. That you do war games in 2019 that does not mean that
the United States in 2029 will allow the--use tactical nuclear
weapons against a Russian army.
Mr. Lute. Right. But these exercises reflect your point,
which is that there is a lot of ambiguity in Article 5 and
there is a range of potential national response.
Mr. Sherman. Is there any discussion in Europe that the
ultimate political decision within that range to their defense
and, more importantly for them, the image to Russia of what
that would be is dependent upon the American people's view as
to whether they are carrying their own weight.
Mr. Brzezinski. Sure, if I could share my perspective. What
I think Europeans who are in decisionmaking capacities do is
they look at what our footprint is in Europe, how much we spend
on Europe, and what kind of operations we do in Europe. So when
they look at our footprint, they have seen actually a return of
U.S. forces to Europe, and not only just a return of U.S.
forces, but a forward deployment of those forces in North
Central Europe.
Mr. Sherman. I understand that the elites of Europe look at
what the establishment in the United States does which is
engage in those war games. But ultimately the decision in 2029
or 2039, or God hope this never happens, will not be made in
Washington. It will be made in Peoria, in Wichita, and the
American people will decide.
And I know that had the decision been made in Washington by
the establishment we would have responded robustly to Assad's
use of chemical weapons. And then we heard from constituents
when President Obama asked for congressional support and I got
four calls saying go bomb Assad and 500 calls on the other
side.
So are the Europeans--and I realize I have gone over time.
But it seems like the Europeans are focusing on whether they
are meeting Washington standards and not whether they are
meeting the American people's standard. And I will yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the panel
for being here.
I do not personally believe that the American people think
that there is a threat to the NATO alliance. And I think they
certainly appreciate the value to the free world and that it is
better to stem the tide of totalitarianism, communism,
socialism, and violence on those borders as opposed to having
come to our shores.
So I kind of reject and I completely reject the straw man
argument that this President is flirting with leaving NATO
legitimately even in the face of the fact that only eight of
the NATO countries as you, Secretary Brzezinski, have pointed
out have met the requirement and while 21 are falling well
short, including Germany. And the American taxpayer, they
understand that as well. They do not mind making the
investment, but they do not want to be used and abused to
defend Europe wholly and completely from here.
But let me ask a couple of questions. Secretary General
Stoltenberg just last month at the Munich Security Conference
said, ``I am saying that President Trump's message has been
very clear and that his message is having an impact on defense
spending and this is important because we need fair burden-
sharing in the NATO alliance.''
Secretary Flournoy, is he wrong? Was he wrong to say that?
Ms. Flournoy. No. I think that President Trump's pressure
and Secretary Mattis' pressure along with their predecessors
Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta, others, we have been at
imploring the allies to do more.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Flournoy. And that is correct. I think the objection is
to using the 2-percent as the sole criteria for evaluating
allied contributions----
Mr. Perry. But nothing has worked in the past, right? Let
me move on here. This is a statement we have heard recently.
Ms. Flournoy. I think the Ukraine and Crimea has had
something to do with the increased spending as well.
Mr. Perry. And it should. But these are some other
statements. This is a statement we have heard recently. ``If we
have got collective defense it means that everybody has got to
chip in. And I have had some concerns about a diminished level
of defense spending among our partners in NATO, not all but
many.'' And then another statement, ``One of the things that I
think medium and long term we will have to examine is whether
everybody is chipping in.''
Secretary Brzezinski, do you know who said those two
things?
Mr. Brzezinski. No, sir.
Mr. Perry. That was President Obama that said that.
And so my question for you is, to many people he made
disparaging comments about our NATO allies going as far as
calling them free-riders. And if that is the case, why is it
that President Obama, who seemed to have some of the very
similar rhetoric toward our allies, was not successful in
getting them to try and meet their obligation but also was not
criticized for it? Why do you suppose that is?
Mr. Brzezinski. I think it is politics.
Mr. Perry. Sounds fair to me. I mean, but we are talking
about international and national security and it does not seem
to be the place for politics. I mean, Secretary Gates under
President Obama said that in 2011 in Brussels that NATO had a
dim, if not dismal, future unless more member nations scaled up
their participation in alliance activities.
Let me ask you this, Secretary Flournoy. In your testimony
you say that using the 2-percent GDP goal as the only measure
of burden sharing ignores other critical contributions and,
most importantly and unforgivably, their shared sacrifice.
Moving on, this is disrespectful, shortsighted, and wrong.
Now your former boss, Secretary Gates, criticized NATO
members for not meeting their commitments. Would you say that
he was disrespectful, shortsighted, and wrong as well?
Ms. Flournoy. No, because he was not using the 2-percent
metric as the only metric of NATO contribution. I helped write
the speech that you are referring to from Secretary Gates. We
have bipartisan support from Bush, Obama, and Trump trying to
get the allies to do more and that is a correct policy. But it
should not be the only metric by which we judge their
contributions to our security.
My point was they have fought and died alongside us. We
should never overlook that in the way that we address our
allies in terms of their contribution.
Mr. Perry. So then let me just ask you this, rhetorically,
if that is the case. And, OK, I will have an open mind about
it. Will our NATO partners and allies be upset and be critical
of the United States if we reduce our contribution lower than 2
percent saying, well, look, we do a whole lot of other things
as well and we do not want to only be measured by this 2
percent because we do a whole lot of other things as well that
are not included in the 2-percent. Is that going to be fair?
Ms. Flournoy. Again, no. Again I think the 2-percent metric
is important and valid and should be met. It is just not the
only metric that we should use to browbeat our advocate.
Mr. Perry. But it cannot be a one-way street. It cannot be
a one-way street. The American taxpayer realizes----
Ms. Flournoy. Now that is true, absolutely. It should not
be a one-way street.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Respects the investment.
Ms. Flournoy. We are in violent agreement.
Mr. Perry. But we demand our NATO partners and allies meet
their obligations as well.
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, but we should do it without calling into
question their ability to rely on us as the leader of the
alliance----
Mr. Perry. We are not calling into question----
Ms. Flournoy [continuing]. And our commitment to work with
them.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Their ability to rely on us, but I
would say that past administrations had demanded the same thing
as this President and gotten zero results. And with that I
yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Listening to my colleagues' line of questioning and I think
in a bipartisan way we would like our NATO allies to step up
and carry more of the burden. I think the difference between
prior administrations and the current administration, I do not
think we disagree with President Trump asking the question and
pushing for greater contribution. I do think many of us are
uncomfortable and disagree with the premise that we should pull
out of NATO and even that rhetoric, I think, is very dangerous
and sends the wrong signal to our friends and allies.
We can modernize what this alliance looks like. We share
values. And, you know, if our allies across the world are
listening as well as our adversaries, I think this body, when
we passed the NATO Support Act 357 to 22 in a broad bipartisan
way saying that we would not be pulling out of NATO, is
speaking loudly and that is what Congress should be doing. I
urge my colleagues in the Senate to take this act up and send
it to the President and I would urge the President to sign this
because that is the message of this body.
You know, in that light as we start to think about
Congress' role in supporting our alliances and sending the
message, you know, many Members of Congress will be here longer
than 4 years and from one administration to the next. And I
think NATO has served us incredibly well in the post-World War
II environment. We are not suggesting that we do not need to
modernize those alliances and look at it, but these are
institutions that have served us well.
You know, maybe starting with Ms. Flournoy and just going
across, what would you like to see Congress' oversight role be
and how can we best provide that?
Ms. Flournoy. I would welcome, as Mr. Chollet recommended,
a strong congressional vote, both houses, in support of NATO
and the value of NATO to U.S. national security and the
continued U.S. commitment to the alliance. Beyond that in terms
of your oversight role, I think it is important we get beyond
the--you know, yes, the 2-percent metric is important. I
acknowledge that and fully support it. I spent a lot of time in
my previous capacity pushing our allies on this issue.
But I think it is much more important to ask how is that
money being spent? How is NATO really investing to be prepared
for a different set of future challenges than the ones that
have defined our operational focus over the last two decades?
That is the key question. It is a question of the type of
readiness. It is the type of posture and positioning. It is the
technology investment. It is all of those things and so getting
beyond the just the 2-percent to say, how are we actually
spending money and is that going to bolster deterrence and
prevent conflict in the future.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Chollet.
Mr. Chollet. Congressman, three ways that Congress' role is
indispensable, first, on the oversight obviously ensuring that
the United States maintains robust funding for its security and
diplomatic efforts in Europe is something that we are going to
look to Congress to ensure. I took note that in the
administration's budget request this week there is a $600
million cut in the European defense initiative and that is
something I know your colleagues on the Armed Services
Committee will take a close look at what is behind that.
No. 2, efforts that as Ambassador Lute has mentioned for
Congress to not just show its support, but help protect NATO in
some ways and U.S. leadership in NATO by ensuring that there is
a very high bar that the executives should get over if there is
a desire to pull out or diminish in some way the U.S. role in
NATO.
And then third, as has been mentioned by many members of
this committee, just your personal engagement in these issues,
traveling to NATO headquarters, traveling to Europe not just to
listen and talk about your support, but also to press NATO on
the important reforms that we all agree in a bipartisan fashion
it needs whether that is on defense spending or defense
modernization, I think that is a very critical role that you
all can play.
Mr. Lute. Congressman, I would only cite the 50-some
Members of the Congress both on the Senate and the House who
went, as some members of this committee did, to Munich just
within the last month. That is the largest congressional
delegation in the 55-year history of the Munich Security
Conference. That sends a very important message. So Congress to
parliamentary engagement is really important and I would not--
aside from that I would echo everything my colleagues have
said.
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I will just quickly reiterate what my
colleagues have said. I would start by saying thank you for the
resolutions that this body has passed in real time to
demonstrate congressional support for the alliance. That was
incredibly important last summer. I would second Derek's call,
whatever can be done to kind of ensure this continued funding
for the European Deterrence Initiative, it is important in
light of the threat scenario as we face in Europe.
And in terms of oversight, I would recommend that you look
into on a regular basis what are the readiness levels not just
for the United States but for our allies. Do a deep dive on how
ready are German, French, U.K., Polish battalions, brigades,
aircraft, how sustainable and how deployable they are. Then I
would also do a deep dive into what kind of contributions are
our allies making to military operations?
And you will get a mixed picture from such oversight, but
it will be helpful because it will help prompt our allies in
the right direction.
Mr. Bera. Great, thank you. And I will yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here today. I appreciate it.
We all know that NATO is an important institution. And it
is not just--I think it is important to remember that it is not
just a benefit to Europe. I think we get as much of a benefit
out of NATO as Europe gets out of it, out of our involvement.
We all know the invocation of Article 5 after 9/11, the
importance of that, NATO's role, including some folks that are
not in NATO when you think of the Nation of Georgia, for
instance, helping us in Afghanistan is important to keep in
mind.
But I think we all understand the importance of NATO, but I
do not think there is anything wrong with us or an
administration pointing out weaknesses in an alliance. In fact,
I think that is essential. And sometimes in our fervor to
reaffirm NATO we skip over the reality that--I remember hearing
about one European country that I will not mention that in the
Balkans was unable to muster any combat power for that conflict
because they realized the vast majority of their defense budget
was actually just being spent on paying salaries, which makes
it just a jobs program and not a military at that point.
The importance of our job in that so reaffirming that is
important, but I think you also have to give the administration
some flexibility in terms of calling NATO out on their weakness
like that. Congress can play an important role, but I think
Congress can overplay our hand sometimes too in consistently
saying that you know, we are going to affirm NATO no matter
what, regardless of their percent of GDP they are spending, as
an example.
This committee later today is going to hear a bill to
prohibit military action or authorization or action in
Venezuela, which out of nowhere I found out we are doing, and,
you know, where in the world? How do you--you take away the
power of an administration to use military as even a carrot in
terms of a diplomatic negotiation. And the first thing this
committee did was already de-authorize the administration's
involvement in Yemen.
So I think empowering an administration is extremely
important, but we all realize the importance of NATO today.
So Ukraine I want to talk specifically about. They continue
to face, as we know, significant challenges from Russia, from
Russian meddling and aggression as Vladimir Putin seeks to
rebuild the former Soviet Union. And I think the best way to
push back against Russia is to give the Ukrainians what they
need to defend their sovereignty such as anti-tank Javelin
missile systems that we delivered last year and any further
support that they need in that. Back in November, Russia
violated Ukraine's sovereignty yet again when it seized three
Ukrainian vessels along with its 24 sailors as they passed
through neutral waters in the Kerch Strait.
Mr. Brzezinski, General Scaparrotti, the current Supreme
Allied Commander of NATO, recently testified that the
administration is looking to deliver more lethal weapons to
Ukraine. Do you believe this will help to defer actions,
further conflicts between Russia and Ukrainian forces?
Mr. Brzezinski. Absolutely. I think while our support has
improved to Ukraine in providing lethal assistance, we need to
do more so that Ukraine is better able to defend itself. Right
now it remains very vulnerable. I would add to the list that we
have--and we are doing things that are useful like helping the
Ukrainians train their forces and such, but the only lethal
assistance we have provided have been the Javelins.
We should complement that with more capable ISR systems
they can use. We may even want to do our own ISR flights over
Ukraine just to keep the Russians on notice that we are
watching. We should give them air defense assets and we should
also give them anti-ship missiles like the harpoon, so that we
do not have events occurring like we saw in the Sea of Azov
again.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. You know, and I think the
important thing to note is, well, I do not always agree with
the administration's words or lack of words on Russia and I
call that out every time I can, but words versus actions are
really significant. I think this administration's actions
against Russia and actions Ukraine are far different than what
we have seen in the past.
I am not a point back to the past kind of guy, but when you
look at the prior assistance to the Ukrainian military it was
basically blankets. That really does not do a lot in terms of
pursuing allowing Ukraine to defend its territory. And there
are reports that Germany and France declined the United States'
request to exercise freedom of navigation drills through the
Kerch Strait last year. While both countries were willing to do
a single maneuver, they were unwilling to navigate those waters
out of fear of provocation.
Mr. Brzezinski, how can we help to entice our NATO allies
that we so strongly believe in to join us in showing Vladimir
Putin that we will not accept his illegal activity in the
Crimean Peninsula?
Mr. Brzezinski. I think in that case you always find allies
that will be in disagreement with you and so you have to move
forward without them sometimes. That is why I think it was very
important for the administration to move forward by providing
lethal weapons, the Javelins, to Ukraine and to Georgia. If we
are going to lead our allies we actually have to lead by doing.
And so the recommendations I outlined for you would be
actions that I would take that would benefit the Ukrainians, it
would help deter the Russians, and would also, I think, help
lead some of our European allies to recognize our actions are
sound rather than unwise.
Mr. Kinzinger. I think Vladimir Putin is a smart guy, but I
do not think he is eager to cross red lines. I just think we
need to paint those red lines brighter with our allies. So
thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since we are at a Foreign
Affairs hearing I just thought it might be appropriate to
announce that today is day 26 of our national emergency. I note
for the record that the President played golf in the middle of
our national emergency.
But I want to talk about a real emergency right now which
is the destabilization of NATO by Donald J. Trump and his
enablers. And we know based on various news articles and public
reports that in 2018 Donald Trump talked about withdrawing from
NATO.
So Ms. Flournoy, let me ask you. If the U.S. were to
withdraw from NATO would that help U.S. national security?
Ms. Flournoy. No. I believe it would be catastrophic.
Mr. Lieu. Would it help Russia?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, as I have said, I think any weakening of
the transatlantic alliance it plays into Vladimir Putin's hand,
weakens deterrence, and strengthens Russia's ability to meddle
in our affairs and to advance their objectives.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
Donald Trump also questioned Article 5 of NATO which is the
core of NATO's alliance. If the United States were to not abide
by Article 5 would that help U.S. national security? Any of you
can answer that.
Mr. Chollet. It would be devastating.
Mr. Lieu. Would it help Russia?
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely.
Mr. Lieu. All right. I also want to just quote from the
national security strategy of the Trump administration. Quote,
``experience suggests that the willingness of rivals to abandon
or forego aggression depends on their perception of U.S.
strength and the vitality of our alliances'', end quote.
Another quote, ``we will redouble our commitment to establish
alliances''. And then a third quote, ``the NATO alliance of
free and sovereign States is one of our greater advantages over
our competitors and the United States remains committed to
Article 5 of the Washington treaty''. I hope the President
reads his own national security strategy.
So, Ms. Flournoy, you had mentioned about this 2 percent
metric and that it might not make a lot of sense, so I agree
that clearly our NATO allies ought to do more. But one reason
the United States does more that we have a higher percentage of
military spending on GDP is because we are a global superpower
that responds to threats all over the world, not just Europe
and Russia. Is that not right?
Ms. Flournoy. Right. I do not think the 2-percent is an
appropriate standard for the U.S. because we have global
responsibilities that other European nations do not.
Mr. Lieu. Right. So, in fact, we have bases in Japan and
Korea in a way that Belgium does not, right?
Ms. Flournoy. Correct.
Mr. Lieu. Now the metric itself also does not make a lot of
sense, because for example Germany could say, hey, we are going
to increase our defense spending by giving higher pensions to
our military officers. That does not somehow help reduce U.S.
defense costs, correct?
Ms. Flournoy. That is correct. It is also why NATO has said
a certain portion of the money needs to be spent on actual
capability development and modernization, not just personnel.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. And it seems like there is also, at
least the way the President talks about it that somehow all
these countries should be super grateful that the United States
has some military forces in their countries. I just believe
that it is really mutually beneficial to both the U.S. and
these other countries.
So, in fact, in one of the NATO countries, Turkey for
example, it is true, is not it, that we launch airstrikes from
Incirlik Air Base to go after ISIS targets in Syria?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, that is true.
Mr. Lieu. And these NATO countries, having our forces there
allows us to project force in a way that we otherwise could
not; is not that right?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. The forward basing is very much in
service of U.S. interests in addition to benefiting NATO.
Mr. Lieu. One of my colleagues asked, well, why did not the
media also sort of talk about this when the Obama
Administration made similar statements about NATO? Well, let me
just suggest Presidents Obama and Bush never talked about
withdrawing from NATO. They did not disparage Article 5 of
NATO. They did not beat up on our allies the way that Donald J.
Trump has.
I previously served on active duty in the United States
military. I believe our military is one of the greatest forces
in the world. However, we are only stronger when we have our
allies working with us and I think Donald Trump is hurting our
national security with his sort of bizarre view of NATO. And it
also seems to me that he does not quite understand how the
funding works with NATO, because whether or not France decides
to increase its military spending does not mean that somehow
U.S. defense spending through appropriations committees makes
any difference at all. And with that I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this
hearing and thank you to our witnesses for their time.
As a former United States Ambassador having served in
Western Europe, I understand just how central the NATO alliance
is to safeguarding peace and prosperity and security in Europe
and around the world.
General Lute, I understand that inadequate and
unstandardized transportation infrastructure in Europe could
make it difficult to move troops and equipment across the
continent curtailing NATO readiness. At the same time, China is
seeking to invest billions of euros in infrastructure projects
in Eastern Europe as part of its Belt and Road Initiative that
we have all heard about.
How is NATO incorporating China's growing infrastructure
footprint into its plan to correct the mobility problem, I will
say, in Eastern Europe?
Mr. Lute. So it is responding insufficiently. In my opening
comments I made the point that I think NATO needs to pay more
attention to these Chinese investments.
Mrs. Wagner. Right.
Mr. Lute. Particularly in transportation and communications
infrastructure, because with those commercial investments they
expect a return in terms of political influence. And at the
same time, the Chinese investments do not necessarily help the
NATO mobility problem because they are not taking place in the
areas we need. We need investment in transportation
infrastructure. So we have problems today moving troops from
the depth of NATO to the front lines.
Mrs. Wagner. Correct.
Mr. Lute. That is the transportation challenge we need to
take on.
Mrs. Wagner. And what are we doing in this and what is the
U.S. bringing forward? I will ask Mr. Brzezinski.
Mr. Brzezinski. I would like to raise one important
initiative that merits U.S. support and that is the Three Seas
Initiative. It refers to a Central European initiative to
accelerate the development of cross-border infrastructure, the
three seas being the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea, and the
Black Sea. This initiative has received rhetorical support from
the administration. It is all about roadways. It is all about
highways. It is all about railroads, energy pipelines, and
such.
And it is interesting to me the point you made about the
Chinese. Both the Chinese and the Russians are trying to pull
the Central Europeans away, in part, through gaining control
over infrastructure.
Mrs. Wagner. Right.
Mr. Brzezinski. The Chinese announced $17 billion
commitment to the upcoming Helsinki-Tallinn Tunnel. We need to
get in that game. And we ought to support the Three Seas
Initiative because it would have direct implications for
military mobility because these roads and these highways would
enable the alliance to move more directly to its Eastern
frontiers. We ought to think about how we can financially
incentivize Western capital to invest in the Three Seas
projects.
Mrs. Wagner. I appreciate that and thank you for that
testimony and for that input.
Ms. Flournoy, Russia has increasingly focused on waging
hybrid rather than conventional warfare to undermine the West
without incurring decisive countermeasures. We have seen this
in Russia's cyber attacks on Estonia and other NATO members and
in its creation of frozen conflict zones in Moldova, Ukraine,
and Georgia, I believe, too. How should Russia's reliance on
hybrid warfare change the way we think about collective
defense?
Ms. Flournoy. I think this is--you are right to highlight
this because it is one of the areas where NATO is currently
weakest and needs to get much stronger both member States and
as an alliance. I think one step in the right direction is some
of the cyber infrastructure NATO has put in place with a new
Centres of Excellence and incident response capability, a smart
defense initiative on cyber capacity building, and so forth.
So the alliance is starting to take the kinds of steps we
need to see, but that more needs to be done and it needs to be
done more urgently.
Mrs. Wagner. And to that point, is our recently enhanced
forward-deployed presence in Poland and the Baltics improving
NATO's ability to deter hybrid warfare, would you say?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. I do think that presence is a very
important sign of commitment. I think a lot of the capacity
building that we do with the Baltic States to make them look
like indigestible porcupines to the Russian bear, I mean those
kinds of----
Mrs. Wagner. Indigestible porcupine. That is exactly the
right term.
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. I think that is very, very important.
But I would like to see our posture in Europe continue to
evolve with more emphasis on these infrastructure and
transportation issues, more pre-positioning of heavy equipment
and so forth, to really look at what would it take to deter
Russia in an actual crisis.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank you. I am out of time. I have
additional questions that I am going to submit for the record.
I appreciate the chairman, thank you, and all of your
testimony.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner.
Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the
witnesses for coming today and for your testimony.
I wanted to ask you a question to begin, Ambassador Lute,
about withdrawal from the INF Treaty. I think President Trump's
withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
represents a huge mistake for both America's security and for
global peace. I do not think we should accept or be quiet about
Russia noncompliance. I think we should redouble our push for
full implementation of this and other treaties to keep Russia
moving in the right direction on arms control.
This move on the other hand takes us backward. To make
matters worse, the official withdrawal date is August 2d and
the Trump administration still has not laid out a diplomatic
plan for how the U.S. together with allies will pressure Russia
to come back into compliance. So my question is whether there
is any viable path forward either to save the treaty or to
better ensure that the U.S. and Europe are in lockstep in
sustaining arms control with Russia. In other words, what is
next here?
Mr. Lute. Well, Congressman, I think the good news here is
that the administration deliberately went to the NATO alliance
and secured consensus at 29 for condemning the Russian
violation, and apparently the allies are in support of the
administration's move to move away from the treaty. I think
that the 6-month period between this announcement and August
when we actually withdraw should feature every diplomatic
opportunity, every diplomatic effort to try to cause Russia to
come back into compliance so that in fact we can preserve the
INF Treaty. I say this because the INF Treaty itself is a very
stabilizing influence in Europe. That is why we have an INF
Treaty.
Mr. Levin. Right.
Mr. Lute. But also because just beyond next August is the
renewal of the New START agreement and I am concerned that if
we take one cornerstone out of the arms control structure that
you begin to erode trust and confidence in the whole structure.
So this is not just about INF. I think it could have a carry-on
effect----
Mr. Levin. So how do you prevent an unraveling like that?
Mr. Lute. Well, I think, first of all, you preserve, you
make every effort to preserve the treaty, hold Russia
accountable, and then make sure you do so in alliance with the
other 29 members of NATO. I would, frankly, have not left the
treaty. I think our position is stronger and continues to focus
on Russia, the violator of the treaty, if we stayed into the
treaty. By the way we have apparently no intent to deploy INF-
capable systems ourselves, so we left the treaty----
Mr. Levin. Then why walk? It does not make any sense to me.
Mr. Lute. That is my position as well.
Mr. Levin. OK, thank you. Let me ask you about another
matter. In your testimony you say that so-called hybrid tactics
like cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, and interference
in our democratic process pose the greatest threats to NATO.
Would you talk a bit more about why you feel that these sorts
of threats pose perhaps even more of a danger than a military
threat, say?
Mr. Lute. Because I think the red lines established for
nuclear aggression or conventional force aggression are quite
clear and bright and I think Putin understands that. I think he
would prefer to play in the cloudy, ambiguous arena of hybrid
warfare where he complicates attribution of impacts, he uses
cyber and these other tools. So it is in that part of the
deterrence spectrum from nuclear, conventional to hybrid, where
we need to actually spend the most, pay the most attention.
And candidly, most of the capabilities in the hybrid arena
do not count today against the 2-percent pledge. So there is a
disconnect here between what we are requiring allies to do, how
much they spend, and what they actually spend it on.
Mr. Levin. And I guess the question for today's hearing
particularly is, do you feel like NATO helps our European
partners, and for that matter us, to combat these kind of
threats, you know, these hybrid threats?
Mr. Lute. So the U.S. has been a leader in highlighting
cybersecurity in particular to the NATO alliance, but I think
there is much more we can do. I mean, and another significant
hybrid tactic is interference in our electoral processes. And
now with our 2016 experience here in the United States we have
some experience in what it is like to face that kind of
interference.
So there is more we can do in this hybrid arena and that
should be of real focus for us. That is where we are
vulnerable.
Mr. Levin. All right, thank you. My time has expired. I
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Mast.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. I would take the opportunity
to answer a question with a question that was asked a moment
ago, why walk from a treaty, and I think the answer is
relatively simple to state and not simple in terms of
geopolitics. But if you have a partner in a treaty that is year
after year, decade after decade not being a good partner in
that treaty, then that is an answer why you walk from that
treaty. And I think that is the answer that President Trump
came to as well.
Now I want to speak on a different issue. I am certainly
willing to acknowledge that sometimes caution can be the better
part of valor. I would say that the work of a statesman and
work of policymakers in the U.S., it should not be conducted by
those that are so cautious that they are viewed as scared. I am
very thankful that we do not have a President that is so
cautious that he is viewed as scared.
And I would say that NATO will better enable itself to
address today's challenges if, in fact, it does shake itself to
the core.
Ms. Flournoy, you said that NATO in some of your remarks is
being shaken to its core. I think NATO is better off being
shaken to its core for a number of reasons. The Soviet Union no
longer exists. Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is still a
massive threat, but it is not the Soviet Union. China is
different today in 2019 than it was in 1989 and 1969, and China
is not the Soviet Union.
The attack of today, it is different. It is a cyber attack.
It is a currency attack. It is financial markets. It is trade.
China is not acting yet today in the same kind of global
military that the Soviet Union was. They do certainly act as a
global cyber threat. They are trading with all. China is
trading with all. They are not isolating themselves from all in
the West. China, you know, they are not yet exporting
communism. My friend and I, Mr. Yoho, were speaking about this
yesterday. China is not yet exporting communism, but they are
certainly spreading their own brand of Chinese socialism around
the world.
So I believe that NATO in order to enable itself for the
future, they should shake themselves down to the core. They
need to shake off the rust. I think they probably should have
done this after Germany was reunited many years ago. They
failed to do it at that time. They probably should have done it
at that time.
So I want to ask in that line to any of you--and probably
certainly to you, sir--how do you suggest that we shake that
rust off to ensure that NATO has strength through its relevancy
to the current threats both beyond conventional military that
exists today that are different, they are different types of
direct attacks, how do we shake NATO to its core to recognize
that a cyber attack is a cyber attack on all and get that kind
of recognition so that we go out there and attack in the same
way that we would expect through conventional military forces
coming against us?
And to go beyond that can you give an estimate of costs as
we constantly speak about the 2-percent, give an estimate of
costs that are associated with a robust cyber defense as an
alliance as well as having that ability to have a robust cyber
attack ability as a NATO alliance. What is the difference in
costs that are associated either up or down related to that?
Sir?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I cannot give you an answer on cyber
cost. It is just out of my area of expertise. But your point
about shaking up the alliance, I have a great degree of
discomfort with much of the President's rhetoric. It can be
divisive in an unhelpful way. It can communicate a lack of
commitment that is not healthy to the alliance and maybe even
animate some of the aspirations of the likes of Putin.
But he has brought and with almost like a sledgehammer a
longstanding concern that has been bipartisan and has been
shared by multiple administrations over the lack of, or the
inability or lack of willingness of our allies to spend the
money they need to do in order to meet their not just their 2
percent because it is not just 2 percent, it is their
commitment to be ready to live up to the responsibilities they
have in execution of Article 5. And when the President hits
them hard on that it does shake them up.
I think when you have hearings like this, I think when the
alliance has public reports that report on the readiness of
allied forces that helps shake them up. You know, when I think
about the German move to higher levels of defense spending, it
is true they are not yet committed to 2 percent fully, even
though they say they have done it through the Wales Summit.
But they have not put their idea into a plan on how to get
there, the fact is they are making progress. Part of it is from
U.S. direct pressure, part of it is from looking East and
seeing what is happening, and part of it is because of news
reports and parliamentary inquiries into the embarrassing state
of readiness of the German military. When you have exercises
being conducted with broomsticks as opposed to rifles and
tanks, the German taxpayers do not like to see that. They are
uncomfortable with it; it is a pride issue.
So the more the alliance can do, the more you can do to dig
into and bring out the facts and figures about the readiness of
our allies and relate that readiness to kind of the contingency
plans we are planning for will help shake up the alliance in
the way you wish.
Mr. Mast. My time is long expired. Thank you for your
comments.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses today.
In an article last year, the Atlantic Council highlighted
not only the defense and security benefits of NATO, but also
the economic importance of the alliance in securing and
protecting European economies and incentivizing European
acquisition of U.S. military equipment and platforms. And in a
recent congressional Research Service report, they added the
point of information that the EU, of which 22 member States are
also NATO allies, the EU is the United States' largest trading
and investment partner and through the promotion of security
and stability in Europe NATO protects the extensive economic
partnership that accounts for 46 percent of global GDP.
So my question for you all today is what are the economic
impacts of the NATO alliance and are there benefits and, if so,
could you speak to them to the U.S. economy and our own trade
relationships that are tied to the existence and the continued
strength of NATO?
Mr. Brzezinski. I will take a quick shot at that. NATO
provides a transatlantic security architecture that over the
last 70 years has provided for peace among its members and
defended them against external aggression. And I would say that
is a core criteria for robust and sustained economic growth and
that is how NATO contributes to the economic well-being of the
transatlantic community.
Mr. Lute. I would only add that first I agree with your
data. I mean 46 percent of the world GDP, if you combine the
United States and our European allies, is a substantial weight
which is useful on our side if we are going to compete with
China. So I think that is obvious. And then very much agree
with Ian's point that the security architecture that secures
that 50 percent of world GDP is NATO. So this is simply a
matter of securing our investments.
Mr. Chollet. And just to build on that, when we talk about
a Europe whole, free, and at peace it is often thought of in a
political context. But of course one of the great triumphs of
the post-cold war era has been the economic dynamism and growth
of Europe. That has helped Europe a lot, which is why all of us
have concerns about Europe's lack of spending on defense
because Europeans are more able to spend on their defense than
they were 25 years ago.
But that is also a huge benefit to the United States.
Europe's success also can equal American success.
Ms. Flournoy. I would just add, in addition to modernizing
and adapting NATO for the future, the most important thing we
could do to shore up the transatlantic community for all the
reasons you described is to negotiate a free trade agreement
with the EU. That would give us tremendous leverage vis-a-vis
China and tremendous additional prosperity for Americans here
at home.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much. And to buildupon the
answers that you just provided and the prior line of
questioning from my colleague from Florida, we are speaking a
lot about moving into the future but he referenced the fall of
the Soviet Union. He referenced the fall of the Berlin Wall.
And I am curious if you could comment on what impact you
think the stabilization and strength that was provided to
Europe as a whole, to the United States and our relationship
with our fellow NATO countries, were in fact how the strength
of NATO perhaps played into those changes that we saw shifting
with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of communism.
Mr. Lute. Well, I think the image, the aspiration to join
the alliance but also to join the EU was a great motivation for
these newly freed, former Warsaw Treaty members and also some
Soviet republics, the Baltics, for example, so it created for
them an incentive to move toward. And when the wall came down,
the Soviet Union broke apart, they voted with their feet. They
were now free to make a choice and they voted to join NATO and
they voted to join the EU.
So it has been a real inspiration and an incentive and I
think it remains that way today, which is why a number of us
have highlighted the importance of sustaining the open-door
policy because it continues to serve as an incentive for the
kind of political, economic, and military reforms that we
favor.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you so much for your comments on this
topic related to economic strength that NATO brings or
stabilization that NATO allows for the economic growth for the
United States and also NATO member countries. I appreciate your
time today. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Pence.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member
McCaul, and the witnesses for being here today.
I am a strong supporter of NATO and believe our shared
security interests are and should remain a feature of the
transatlantic relationship. I will continue to support the
President and his administration in strengthening NATO.
As you know, since the late 1990's, the EU has been working
with limited success to form a unified European defense policy
complete with independent EU defense capabilities. These
efforts appear to have gained momentum in the past year or two.
I want to rattle off a series of questions which are really
basically the same, if you could each answer these.
What is your assessment of these efforts? Could the
development of a more robust and independent EU defense
capability benefit NATO and the United States? And is there a
risk that EU efforts could undermine NATO's effectiveness and
diminish its capabilities?
Ms. Flournoy. Congressman, I think that the intensification
of this discussion within the EU on an independent defense
capability is, in part, a result of the greater uncertainty
they feel about the U.S. commitment to NATO. That said, I think
if EU defense efforts spurs additional European defense
spending, we should count that as a plus. What worries me is if
the EU were to develop a sort of view of strategic autonomy
that would sort of have Europe go its own way without really
coordinating with, working closely with the United States in
addressing shared challenges, I think that would be a loss for
us and for our security.
Mr. Chollet. Congressman, I concur with that. I think on
the one hand discussions within Europe which are only
increasing about developing some sort of independent capability
is a reflection of uncertainty about the U.S. and hedging about
U.S. behavior, but it is also a response to an increase by all
of us to urge them to spend more on their defense.
And it is also a recognition that--and I think this part is
positive--that there are going to be things they do in the
world where the U.S. is not going to do that, for example, in
West Africa where the U.S. may not be as engaged as France and
other EU partners. I think it is important though as they
embark on this--this is not a new story. Twenty years ago we
were also dealing with Europeans talking about developing a
more independent defense capability.
Three rules to keep in mind or three principles, the three
Ds: the Secretary of State, then Secretary of State Albright
enunciated no duplication between what the EU is going to do
and what NATO is going to do, to make sure this is
complementary; no discrimination, so making sure that as Europe
develops this capability they are not discriminating against
those few countries that are members of the EU, but not of NATO
or vice versa; and no duplication, so--sorry, no decoupling,
meaning that this is not about Europe separating itself from
the United States fully so it can go on its own.
I think as long as we keep in mind those core principles we
should be supportive of Europe trying to make itself stronger
on defense.
Mr. Lute. Congressman, I think we can have it both ways. We
can on the one hand say you must do more, and then when the EU
comes up with incentive programs or ways to create efficiencies
among EU members then we critique those as well. So I would err
on the side of applauding the EU initiatives to try to generate
capabilities.
I very much agree with no duplication and so forth. But
quite candidly, in my view we are decades away from being in a
position where we have to actually compare EU capabilities to
NATO capabilities and worry about duplication. They have a long
way to go.
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I would just add on the duplication
point, my concern is that there is a drive to create an
independent command structure that would be duplicative of
NATO. That is what the French are driving. That would be
unhelpful. And when we look back at the history of EU defense
initiatives it has not been that impressive. They have created
battle groups that have never been used. They have talked about
being a driver of increased defense spending. I have not really
seen any evidence that the EU has been an effective driver of
defense spending.
But if they are willing to talk about leveraging the EU and
its economic capacities to increase the capacity to invest and
the development of technologies and capabilities and capacities
for defense operations, then I am kind of interested and I
would make these recommendations to the EU. One, I would focus
less on autonomy and more on the European pillar, because when
we talk about the European pillar we are talking about European
capability within the transatlantic framework.
I would urge them through projects like the European
Defence Fund that they are standing up, a $13 billion fund and
the PESCO initiative, to focus on things that are substantive,
that are real NATO shortfalls. It would be far more useful if
we could see the EU be a driver of increased air and missile
defense capabilities within our European armed forces, more
airlift, more air refueling capability, more in air and missile
defense. If these EU initiatives were used to drive forward
those capabilities I would be highly, highly supportive.
Then I would note that there is one area where they are
actually, potentially, on the cusp of doing something useful.
The EU will be directing in its next big 7-year budget 6.5
billion euros to help improve military mobility. That is,
investing the infrastructure, the roadways and the highways and
the airports and the ports that will help facilitate the more
ready movement of heavy equipment for military operations. That
kind of infrastructure investment is something that the EU is
perfectly positioned to do and I encourage you to encourage
them to move, you know, with dispatch on that.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start with you, Ms. Flournoy, back to the 2-percent
of GDP target. That is, the whole point of that target is to
get our allies to invest more in their actual military
capabilities so that they can partner with us. If they spent
that money on uniforms or increased salaries for their troops
it would defeat the whole purpose of the 2-percent. Is that a
fair assessment?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Malinowski. If we were to demand that NATO allies pay
us billions of dollars for the so-called privilege of being
allowed to base our forces overseas that presumably could count
against their 2 percent but it would not be investing money in
their own defense capabilities. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Flournoy. That is correct. And, you know, I think the
truth is our allies already do defray much of, you know, a
substantial portion of the costs of our basing overseas. It
varies from country to country, but those are negotiated
agreements. But we are there for our own interests. Our real
interest on the 2-percent is to ensure that money is going into
the capabilities we will need for the future, be it high-end
military readiness capabilities or capabilities for the gray
zone that Ambassador Lute talked about.
Mr. Malinowski. Exactly. And they would have less money to
invest in those capabilities if we were somehow to force them--
--
Ms. Flournoy. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. To spend billions for
hosting----
Ms. Flournoy. And I also do not think they would accept
that deal.
Mr. Malinowski. Indeed.
Ms. Flournoy. I think we would be invited to bring all of
our forces home, which would be both detrimental to our
security and very, very costly to the American taxpayer.
Mr. Malinowski. Exactly. So would we save any money if we
brought our forces home where we pay----
Ms. Flournoy. No, it is generally in most cases it will be
far more expensive to bring those forces home and rebase them
in the United States.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
Mr. Lute, I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about
Afghanistan. A number of us, and you have heard this I am sure
from our colleagues, were in Munich. We had an opportunity to
engage with our allies on these decisions potentially to
withdraw from Syria and from Afghanistan. We are all very
keenly aware of the anxiety that this has caused our allies who
have been with us all the way in these deployments. They have
no idea what we plan to do.
Let me ask you about one particular angle related to
Afghanistan. If we were to follow through on the publicly
stated plan to withdraw our regular forces from Afghanistan,
assuming that there are still terrorists in Afghanistan's
future, al-Qaida or ISIS, is it fair to assume that we would
still have special forces, units operating in Afghanistan?
Mr. Lute. I am sorry. That is the topic of the ongoing
negotiations led by Ambassador Khalilzad. So how is it that we
could by way of this negotiation with the Taliban and
eventually the Taliban with the Afghan Government buy some
insurances that the Taliban pledge that they will not allow
ISIS or al-Qaida is actually enforced, so the nature of this
enforcement mechanism is exactly what Ambassador Khalilzad is
working on.
Mr. Malinowski. Yes, I am just trying to bear down on what
realistically will happen because the American people are being
told we are leaving and my expectation is we will still have
special forces operating in Afghanistan. We may not talk about
it so much. We will still have CIA bases as we currently do in
Afghanistan in the hinterlands. We may not talk about it as
much.
And if I am right about that then the result of the
withdrawal will be that we will still be in Afghanistan, but
instead of partnering with our allies, instead of partnering
with an elected Afghan Government that has some legitimacy, we
will be partnering with warlords who are raping little boys and
girls and doing things that actually will make the long-term
mission harder to achieve. Bottom line, we will still be in
Afghanistan. So is this really an honest conversation that we
are having?
Mr. Lute. So it is very hard for me to comment on
negotiations that I am not participating in, but I know for
sure that this question of how you sustain a Taliban pledge and
how you enforce it if we were to withdraw, how it is actually
done in practice. And so, you know, we are talking about
conjecture----
Mr. Malinowski. But in a future in which there is still al-
Qaida and ISIS there, pledge or no pledge, we would not ignore
that.
Mr. Lute. I think we have to assume that al-Qaida and the
Islamic State in that region would have some residual presence
and we need to buy some insurance against that.
Mr. Malinowski. OK, anybody else, thoughts on that?
Mr. Chollet. I would just say although I am not privy to
the negotiations either, your assumptions are reasonable about
what sort of presence we would seek to keep in Afghanistan
given the threats that I think we all agree will remain there.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panelists. I
appreciate you being here and going through this long hearing.
We are at 70 years of NATO and it has been good. You know,
there has not been another world war since NATO. Here we are 70
years later, yet the world is going through a challenge in
world powers we have not seen since World War II, and a big
part of that reason we have not is again because of NATO. It
has been effective in that.
But things are changing. And if you look back--I am 64 and
I have changed a lot in the last 64 years. And so things get
stale after a while and they have to be updated. And, you know,
I think, you know, the testimoneys we have heard today, the
comments, you know, whether NATO is paying their fair share or
not, I mean it has been hashed over and over again. President
Obama said that. President Bush said that the people are taking
advantage of us or free-riding.
At what point--and Ms. Flournoy you said that this is not
the time to nickel-and-dime NATO. When would be the time? You
know, do we wait another three to 5 years? Keep in mind we are
at $22 trillion in debt, 5 years we are going to be about $30
trillion in debt. Our interest that we owe at that time will be
equal what we are spending on our military. So when do we get
other people to pay and, you know, pony up?
Ms. Flournoy. I think we should continue to press for our
NATO allies to pay their fair share, but my focus would be on
what else are they doing to shore up deterrence against Russia.
Mr. Yoho. Sure.
Ms. Flournoy. What else are they doing to contribute to
counterterrorism globally? What else are they doing to help us
build gray zone?
Mr. Yoho. All right. But can we wait another 5 years before
people do that?
Ms. Flournoy. No, and we are not and we should not.
Mr. Yoho. OK.
Ms. Flournoy. And no administration in recent memory has
waited. They all pressed.
Mr. Yoho. All right. And as we look at the results, it was
interesting. I went to the Cleveland Convention when it was
Candidate Trump going into the Convention, and I spoke to a
group of Ambassadors from around the world on energy. And it
was interesting because there was a reception after that. They
came up to me--I had my wife with me and our deputy chief of
staff--and they says, we want to introduce ourselves, we are
members of NATO but we have not been good members.
And this was when President Trump, Candidate Trump was
talking about NATO is not paying their fair share. This is what
happened. They told me they had been bad members but they were
looking to increase their payment to 2 percent as was the
pledge, in addition to pull up the arrears that they owed. So
the rhetoric that he spoke, whether you liked his tactic or
not, the results I think we are all in agreement was pretty
effective. And, you know, people are not used to that kind of
rhetoric, you know, we could say things better maybe.
But I would rather look at the results and get the positive
results because it does get people to pay attention and kind of
reorganize what NATO--and I think what my colleague, Mr. Mast,
brought up, you know, we need to update this into the 21st
century for the cyber attacks. I mean I just read today that
China is hacking into our naval intelligence and our
construction and all the new weapons that we are creating. Is
that an attack on us? And when do we all come together
collectively to do that?
And, Mr. Brzezinski, you were talking about Putin thrives
on weakness indecisiveness--hence, Georgia; hence, Crimea. They
walk into and they take over. We see that the freedom of
navigations are not happening in the Azov Sea or the Baltic
Seas and so Putin, as Xi Jinping, sees weakness so they
aggress, Xi Jinping in the South China Sea. Putin is going to
aggress unless we stand up definitely as a bloc.
And if they know we have been ineffective that members are
kind of stale, yes, we are in this NATO thing but we do not
really have to pay, it just shows weakness. And I think that is
one of the reasons Putin did what he did. Am I wrong in that?
Mr. Brzezinski. Yes, sir--no, sir, you are not wrong in
that.
Mr. Yoho. I was hoping you would say no.
Mr. Brzezinski. Just a quote on burden sharing in talking
about decades, my favorite quote goes back to 1953 when
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threatened, quote
unquote, an agonizing reappraisal of the U.S. commitment to
European security if its allies do not step up. I think it is
interesting. It shows how long a debate we have had on this,
but at least we are making progress.
Mr. Yoho. You know and that is a great point because that
has come up over and over, and through my notes I read it has
come up over and over again. I mean some of this goes back, it
says, two decades ago they were talking about this.
Mr. Brzezinski. It is time for a----
Mr. Yoho. I was going to say, well, damn it, when do you
stand up and do it? But I should not say that. So dang it, when
do you stand up and do something?
And I am thankful this President had the backbone. You know
and he will admit, I am not your typical politician, but he is
looking for the results and I think we should applaud the
results that he is getting to get people to come forward
because it makes us all collectively stronger. I mean would you
agree in that?
Ms. Flournoy. I think that we should applaud the burden
sharing results, but the other result has been this sort of
existential doubt that has been created on the part in the
minds of our allies about whether they can count on the U.S.
That is also a result of the same rhetoric. So there has been
positive, but there has also been a negative and we need to
take account of that as well.
Mr. Yoho. All right. Well, you go back to the criticism of
NATO burden sharing have been articulated by both Republican
and Democratic Presidents, and you go on and it says--I think
you wrote this. It was Secretary Gates'.
It said President Obama called a number of American allies
free-riders toward the end of the administration and also
Secretary Robert Gates did a hard line against NATO's inability
to share more of the burden during the farewell speech. The
blunt reality is there has been a dwindling appetite patience,
and it goes on.
And the end result is the General now, Stoltenberg, also
said that President Trump is helping us adapt the alliance and
has made these people pay up. So I think the results are good.
Let's look forward and what we are going to do on the
cybersecurity.
And I am way over. Sorry, Mr. Chairman and members.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Trone.
Mr. Trone. Thank you all for coming here today.
My first question, let's go back to Turkey again. The case
right now, they are working to look at buy the Russian defense,
the S-400. They have already ordered, we have not delivered
yet, the F-35. It is unacceptable that they buy this system and
have the F-35. What is the response that Congress should have?
What can we do here to make that crystal clear that we cannot
go down this road?
Ms. Flournoy?
Ms. Flournoy. Well, I think as you review foreign military
sales, I think you will have your opportunity to send signals
to Turkey. But I would encourage delegations to go visit and to
talk to, you know, Turkish, the Turkish President, his
administration, other members of Parliament there, to let them
know that this will really complicate our ability to provide
the kind of U.S. defense capabilities that they like to have as
part of the alliance.
And I think the backsliding on democracy needs to be part
of the conversation. We have not been raising that issue enough
with our Turkish counterparts. We need to press them on this
issue. We need to connect what goes on in that sphere with what
we can, you know, the degree to which we can cooperate in the
security sphere.
Mr. Trone. There is no question I think we need to connect
that plus the democracy and the Kurds and the treatment we have
had there and the potential for more atrocities in the Kurds as
we pull out Syria.
Ms. Flournoy. Absolutely.
Mr. Trone. Is there any point at all that you have to
reconsider this, them being part of NATO? Are we going to reach
that point at some point?
Mr. Lute. So if I may, so unlike the EU treaty, which has
provisions for sanctioning member states who drift from core
values, the NATO treaty has no similar provision. In fact, the
only thing that the Washington Treaty says is that if you wish
to leave NATO you have got to give 1 years' notice.
So I think there are ways that we could pressure Mr.
Erdogan and his political elite to come back into line, closer
into line with U.S. interests, for example, the S-400 and F-35
debate. But also to underline Michele Flournoy's point about
values, they need to understand that there is no NATO ally
today which has slipped further from the founding values of the
alliance than Mr. Erdogan's Turkey. And that is simply
unacceptable.
Mr. Trone. Agreed. The Baltics, lots of hybrid warfare
there, cyber capabilities happening through the small Baltic
States. Is this an area where these small NATO partners are
innovating in any way that we could learn and that would be an
advantage to us as we look to more problems with cyber and
hybrid warfare from Russia down the road?
Mr. Brzezinski. Absolutely. I mean if you look at the
Baltics they are on the cutting edge when it comes down to
combating hybrid warfare. There is a reason why NATO has a
Cyber Centre of Excellence in Estonia, because they have been
most forward-leaning. They are the ones who experienced the
first kind of nationwide cyber attack in 2007, so they are
thinking in very innovative ways how to deal with cyber
attacks.
You go to Lithuania, they have one of the more
sophisticated public response teams that deal with social media
attacks. For example, when a NATO unit was deployed over there,
there was false accusations made of a rape conducted by NATO
soldiers. They, in real time, responded to dissipate the impact
of that story. So there are many lessons we can learn from our
Baltic allies.
Mr. Chollet. And if I can just add, what NATO is doing in
the Baltics today is a great example of the distributed
responsibility that the alliance can bring. This is not a U.S.-
only effort in the Baltics to try to defend the Baltics and
bolster them. This is something where there are four battalion-
sized battle groups there: one led by the U.S., one led by the
Brits, one led by the Canadians, and one led by the Germans.
So this is an example of how a strong alliance of capable
allies willing to step up and lead can share the responsibility
for the common good.
Mr. Lute. I would just cite another dimension of this, and
this is an effort to break the energy dependence that the
Baltic States have on Russia. So, most important, there is an
example of a recently opened LNG terminal in Lithuania which
now opens them up to the potential of importing LNG energy gas
from the world marketplace and not be wholly reliant on their
ties to Russia.
Mr. Connolly [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time
has expired. The gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Watkins, is now
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Watkins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to
the panel for being here.
I would like to talk about the Arctic, questions are open
to anybody. Obviously the Arctic has geopolitical
ramifications. What is the NATO's strategy with regard to the
Arctic?
Mr. Lute. It is very light on strategy, Congressman. I
would say that there has been especially with regard to the
climate, impacts in the Arctic and the potential that a sort of
a northern tier transit route from China into the Atlantic
becomes more and more a possibility over the coming years that
NATO is paying more attention here. I would also highlight the
Arctic though as an example of engaging with Russia.
Even though we have, the hearing has suggested many ways in
which we compete with Russia, right, one effective way to
engage with Russia is exemplified by the Arctic Council--I
think that is the correct name--which brings together the seven
Arctic nations to include other NATO allies, with Russia, to
discuss about the climate but also security implications in the
Far North. So this is becoming more important in climate here
intersects NATO strategy.
Mr. Watkins. Thank you. And I know we talked a lot about
China today, but would NATO describe China as a threat to
transatlantic security?
Mr. Lute. Not today and not, I think, in the foreseeable
future. But NATO needs to wake up to China as a competitor and
in particular in the commercial investment space,
transportation and information systems, and increasingly in the
political space. They tend to buy their way into influence on
the commercial side and then expect political payoff.
Mr. Brzezinski. If I could add on that, I mean NATO does
have a foundation to work with when it comes down to dealing
with China. Over the last decades it has developed partnerships
with countries like Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
This provides a foundation upon which it kind of deep and a
more elaborate, a more substantive set of engagements in the
region.
It is something the United States should be encouraging
NATO to do as we try to develop a more comprehensive strategy
to dealing with an increasingly assertive China. And I think if
we make the case to our Europeans we will find them somewhat
more receptive than before because they are beginning to feel
the pressure from China themselves in the economic and the
cyber domains.
Ms. Flournoy. The other thing I would just add, sir, is
that I think China watches U.S. behavior very carefully,
globally, and that includes how we interact with our allies. So
if there are troubles or tensions with our NATO allies, they--
it often makes our Asian allies very nervous as well and China
looks for ways to divide and exploit that.
Mr. Watkins. Well, let me ask about then what strategy, and
if not strategy, roles, responsibilities, do NATO have with
regards to North Korea?
Mr. Chollet. Other than these partnerships that Mr.
Brzezinski mentioned, none.
Ms. Flournoy. But I think as politically, you know, the
NATO allies become very, very important allies to stand with us
politically to press for the objective of denuclearization and
to make sure that North Korea and provocative behavior is
deterred if not answered. So I agree there is no military role,
but politically they can be very important.
Mr. Watkins. Sure.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Allred, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
distinguished panel for being here today.
I am of the opinion that NATO is the most successful human
alliance in history and that with this being the 70th
anniversary of this historic alliance I want to make sure that
we are doing everything we can in Congress to be a
counterweight to some of what we have seen from obviously our
President.
And I just want to talk to you a little bit about I try to
drill things down for folks in my district, folks in Texas, I
represent parts of Dallas, of what the impact of our foreign
affairs and our foreign policy has on us at home and, you know,
obviously NATO's ability for us to maintain kind of this era of
post-World War II peace has been critical in that.
But, Ms. Flournoy, if you could just talk a little bit
about our trade with that NATO empowers and enables, how that
interaction with our allies is good for our economy and how
this is really a critical relationship for us across more than
just some of the things that might be people need to be more
aware of.
Ms. Flournoy. So NATO has provided the foundation of
stability on which the transatlantic economic relationships
have been built, more than a trillion dollars of trade and
goods and services between the U.S. and Europe every year. That
accounts for, you know, a significant percentage of our GDP. It
also accounts for a number of export-related jobs in the United
States. I do not have the figures for your district in Texas,
but I guarantee you there are some jobs in your district that
are dependent on our trade with the Europeans.
So it is really, that trade relationship is an engine for
the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. And as we all have
said before, as a matter of strategy it would be very
beneficial for the United States to leverage that in pushing
back on China when we talk about its unfair trade practices or
its theft of IP or its denial of our market access. We are much
stronger when we push back together with our European-Asian
allies than when we do it by ourselves.
Mr. Allred. Absolutely. I agree with you. The rules-based
order that NATO and our transatlantic alliances have allowed to
enforce, I think we underestimate its importance for our
economy.
We had Secretary Albright in here recently, and in addition
to being just an incredible person she said that this was
Article 1 time and that it was time for the Congress to
reassert itself in our foreign policy.
And I would just ask each of you, if you could, to touch a
little bit--I am sure you have been asked this previously here
in the hearing--about what you think Congress can do, what we
can do and what I can do individually as a member and what we
can do as a body to make sure that our allies understand our
commitment.
We obviously had a vote a couple weeks ago that was
overwhelmingly bipartisan showing our support for NATO, but
what we can do to make sure that the rest of the world
understands that we are committed to this alliance and that we
are not going to let us backtrack?
Mr. Lute. So three quick things, Congressman. First of all,
the NATO Support Act is a big step in the right direction. And,
you know, it may seem like something that does not sort of have
an impact outside of Capitol Hill; our NATO allies read that
and appreciate it. So that is step No. 1. Step No. 2 is fully
fund the European defense initiative which promotes the kind of
work that we have talked about here this morning.
Step No. 3, I think Congress needs to go one step further
and that is to pursue bipartisan legislation that prohibits the
President from unilaterally withdrawing from our most important
alliance. And as I said in my opening statement, it took two-
thirds of the Senate under advise and consent, a constitutional
requirement, to approve the NATO treaty; should not simply be
an executive move to depart.
Mr. Chollet. Congressman, if I could just add, I concur
with those three points and the fourth, which has come up
several times so far this morning, which is having you all
engage directly. The incredible show of support by the size of
the delegation in Munich was widely noticed throughout Europe.
There is going to be another opportunity obviously in less
than a month when the Secretary General of NATO comes to speak
before a joint session of Congress. And also many NATO
ministers will be here in Washington and I know will be anxious
to interact and hear from all of you about your views not just
on the U.S. role in the alliance and the importance of U.S.
leadership, but also ways the alliance needs to get sharper and
needs to reform. And I think that is an important message that
comes from Congress as well.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
And before I call on Mr. Zeldin, I just, Mr. Chollet, to
your point we had the largest delegation in living memory both
at the Munich Security Conference--I think there were 55 of us
there--and at the first, the opening session of the
Parliamentary Assembly and the North Atlantic Assembly meetings
in Brussels. It was also the first time ever a speaker of the
House attended both meetings and which having the third ranking
member of the U.S. Government there to reinforce. And then as
you know, subsequently we have invited Secretary General
Stoltenberg who I believe may be the first Secretary General of
NATO ever to be invited to address a joint session of the
Congress.
So I think we are making statements and we certainly, I
think we will followup legislatively, Mr. Lute, on what you
cited as well. But I think on a bipartisan basis, Senate and
House, statements could not be clearer in terms of where we are
in our support for this alliance.
And with that I call on the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Well, thank you. And as someone who was also at
the Munich Security Conference I would echo Mr. Connolly's
point. I believe that it was important to have such an
important bipartisan showing there. And the support for this
alliance should not just remain strong, but as Mr. Chollet just
pointed out we need to find ways to make it even stronger.
I wanted to talk briefly about Turkey and Syria, but as two
different topics. And like can we go into a little bit more
into detail, I believe, Mr. Lute, you started to get into it as
you were discussing with Mr. Trone the dynamics of Turkey
purchasing an S-400 surface-to-air missile from Russia,
purchasing F-35s from the United States, I believe the S-400
acquisition would be made by Turkey before the F-35s are
scheduled to be delivered.
If you could just--and I would hate to see that S-400
operating in that particular airspace whether it is our F-35s
or anything else as far as the United States military and our
allies go. So you can just get--and the question is open to all
four of you. If you could talk a little bit more about what
this means and why this is problematic.
Mr. Lute. So the original challenge here is the Turkish
decision to buy the S-400. That is important because that
Russian-based system will never be integrated into the overall
air and missile defense system in NATO. And we will simply
block that integration because integrating the Russian system
would open vulnerabilities to the whole NATO integrated system.
So Turkey is essentially spending money to buy a national-only
system which from the outset they have been told will never be
integrated.
So it is a very sort of selfish nationalist sort of
decision which is shortsighted and will never be used. It will
never contribute to NATO. It is further complicated if we were
to proceed with an F-35 purchase, because now you would have
under one national command structure the premier Russian-built
air defense system against our premier aircraft. And you can
imagine that we would never be certain enough to ensure that
these did not game one against the other and open up
vulnerabilities for the rest of the F-35 fleet. So this is a
two-part story and they are both bad news.
Mr. Zeldin. Anybody like to add anything?
Mr. Chollet. If I could just add, just to complicating this
further on the F-35 side, my understanding is that part of the
Turkish purchase of F-35 involves some co-production, so which
means part of the plane would actually be built in Turkey. And
so I know that our EUCOM commanders are talking through with
the Turks about how that in itself would be extremely
problematic. Let alone them acquiring but then producing the F-
35 at the same time they also are trying to stand up a Russian
system on their own territory will, I think, make it even
harder to see how that would go forward.
What I can say is my sense is this administration, really
actually going back two administrations now as this has been on
the table, it has been very consistent and very clear with the
Turkish Government about the mistake we believe this would be
and the fact that it will jeopardize other elements of our
military partnership with them.
Mr. Zeldin. It seems like there is some kind of a game of
chicken going on here between Turkey and the United States to
see who blinks first. And I think the United States needs to
remain resolute in insisting that if Turkey wants to acquire F-
35s that they are not going to be able to proceed with their S-
400's. Either of the other two witnesses want to add anything
else on this topic?
Shifting gears to Syria, at the Munich Security Conference
there was a discussion of what our European partners thought
about taking on a bigger role in Syria. I would like you, if
any of you could comment on what that would look like from a
NATO standpoint, please.
Ms. Flournoy. I do not foresee NATO taking on a much larger
role because I do not think there is consensus across the
alliance for that. But I, you know, we have had key allies
individually step up sort of relying on the backbone of U.S.
Special Operations Forces and our enablers and our Command and
Control to contribute as whether it is as trainers or in
reconstruction or in ISR overhead combat air missions.
I think if the U.S. were to withdraw or sharply reduce our
presence, the backbone that they rely on would--those
capabilities would not be there and you would see a
commensurate reduction if not complete withdrawal of our
European allies. So I do think the U.S. posture is critical as
kind of the linchpin to the coalition posture against ISIL.
Mr. Zeldin. And then real briefly----
Mr. Brzezinski. I could add to that. I agree with what
Michele has said. It is also a little bit of issue in getting
the cart before the horse. You are not going to get NATO
involved----in Syria until there is a real clear path toward
peace and stability and reconciliation in that war-torn
country. So when thinking about NATO and Syria I would look at
the example set by NATO and Afghanistan, where an ally went in
with some other allies and took control of the country, and
when things reach a certain point with a certain degree of
confidence that an alliance contribution would be part of a
coherent strategy toward peace and reconciliation in the
country, then the alliance would be more prepared. And actually
I would say those are the circumstances under which we would
want the alliance to get engaged.
Mr. Zeldin. My time has expired. I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
And just another footnote, Mr. Lute, the resolution denying
the President unilateral authority to pull out of the agreement
is actually H.J. Res. 41 here in the House and that was
introduced by Mr. Gallego and myself. And we have a companion
bill in the Senate introduced by Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia,
so we will work on that and with the help of the chairman we
will get it before our committee.
I want to followup a little bit on Turkey too. Mr. Lute,
you kind of, I think you said something that I would call
provocative. Not necessarily bad, but here is a NATO ally, one
of the staunchest historically and yet they seem to be testing
almost everything. They seem to be testing the common values
that presumably unite NATO members, not just what we are
against but what we are for, what we stand for.
They are challenging us with respect to the Kurds who are
the only group that consistently, successfully, fought by our
side and won territory from the ISIS. And yet, the Turks would
have you believe that all of those Kurdish fighters in Syria
are, in fact, terrorists or affiliated with terrorists and we
need to force them to give up territory they won with their own
blood and our support and create some kind of cordon sanitaire,
I guess, between Syria and Turkish border that presumably would
be patrolled by the Turks. One does not know what the fate of
the Kurds would be in that set of circumstances.
Purchasing Russian equipment almost in defiance, maybe not
almost, maybe in defiance of any kind of norm in terms of
standard-setting by NATO, a crackdown on freedom of press,
crackdown on opposition, on and on, using the coup maybe as a
pretext to do all of that, what is one to conclude and what do
you think ought to happen? Because there are other NATO members
that are sliding too, Hungary and Poland come to mind, and it
seems to me we have to have a current message or we become this
disparate groups of 28 or 29 members that the only thing we
have in common is, I guess, resisting Russian aggression in
Central Europe.
Mr. Lute. Congressman, I could not agree more. I think the
values that are in the second sentence of the Washington
Treaty, well before you get to Article 5 you have passed
through the values, right, and that was agreed by all 29. So I
think it is right for us both within the alliance, largely led
by the Secretary General, to have quiet, diplomatic engagement
with Turkish leaders about what they are placing at risk with
their behavior.
I also think though there is some introspection here for
us. I mean we have no U.S. Ambassador in Turkey. We have a
vacancy in the European bureau of the State Department. Who
will do this engagement with Turkey if we have only people in
acting positions? So we have to sort of vote with our own time
and space and get senior level diplomats in place and then
engage relentlessly with the Erdogan regime. But they are
heading in the wrong direction.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chollet, you are shaking your head yes.
Mr. Chollet. I could not agree more. I mean Turkey is, as
Ambassador Lute said, the one member of NATO that has gone the
furthest, the fastest in terms of its democratic backslide and
that is only going to be a continuing irritant in the alliance.
And, in fact, as you suggested, Congressman, could, you know,
undermine the second sentence of the preamble of the Washington
Treaty which is all about democratic values. And we are not,
frankly, in a good position right now to address this issue and
deal with the Turkish Government on this issue.
So beyond the military challenges we have which are
significant with them with the acquisition of the Russian
system, these political challenges of which NATO has an
important role to play are going to be paramount.
Mr. Connolly. I want to give Ms. Flournoy and Mr.
Brzezinski an opportunity also to comment and it is primarily
about Turkey, but it also, feel free to include our concerns
about Hungary and Poland, and then I would yield back with the
indulgence of the chair.
Ms. Flournoy. I agree with what my colleagues have said. I
just think that one of the things that has gone missing in our
diplomacy is an emphasis on democracy and human rights and the
protection of minority rights. It is so much about who we are
as a Nation, it is so much about who we are as an alliance that
that has to be part of the hard conversation we have with
allies who demonstrate some degree of backsliding.
You cannot have it both ways. You cannot be, you know, a
member in good standing in an alliance that was formed to
protect democracy and be in the process of obliterating
democracy in your own country.
Mr. Brzezinski. I concur with my colleagues. I would just
add it is interesting to me the forward edge of the Russian
sword is social media and hybrid attacks designed to undercut
the commonality of values we have in the alliance that is
binding it. By attacking those values and by attacking the
unity around those values, our adversaries are actually trying
to weaken one of our strongest assets which is the NATO
alliance.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you.
Just to followup, when you talk about Turkey, nobody has
mentioned the relationship with Greece and what is happening in
Cyprus. Those are kind of sidelines to the main event, I guess.
Also, I would say it is very difficult for us to take some of
the members to task when we set such a bad example ourselves
and I go back to the comment you made.
You know, we heard a lot of praise for the President and
getting the NATO countries to pay more of their share, but
Ambassador Lute, you said that our single greatest challenge is
the lack of real leadership now. I just want to put on the
record the tweets, and I will use their word, the President's
words, not just my paraphrasing of them.
In July 2018 he said, ``While I had a great meeting with
NATO raising vast amounts of money, I had an even better
meeting with Vladimir Putin of Russia. Sadly, it is not being
reported that way. The fake news is going crazy.'' Then he
followed up and said, ``While the NATO meeting in Brussels was
an acknowledged triumph with billions of dollars more put up by
member countries, the meeting with Russia may prove to be in
the long run an even greater success. Many positive things will
come out of that meeting.''
So what are our fellow members of the alliance supposed to
think, do as I say or do as I do, or you do something different
from the message that we are putting out? I can understand your
frustration and I share it.
I would like to talk about the contribution they make
besides arms and besides dollars when you look at the countries
of NATO. I serve on the House Democracy Partnership and we meet
with a lot of new democracies trying to have exchanges between
legislatures to buildup democratic institutions, whether it is
parties, whether it is the media, whether it is the courts and
the rule of law. You mentioned Ukraine and Georgia. Those are
two partners.
Would you just talk about how being part of NATO helps to
either create, buildup, or strengthen democratic institutions,
because I think that is one of our greatest successes,
potentially.
Ms. Flournoy. I will say just a few words and then hand it
off. When we went through the first round of NATO expansion we
had the Perry principles from Secretary Perry and there were
certain criteria that we laid out for new, for NATO aspirants.
One of them was you have to be a functioning democracy that
protects minority rights. You had to be a free market economy.
You had to make certain, meet certain milestones in terms of
interoperability in your military capabilities and so forth.
But democracy and has always been, whether it is at the
founding of the alliance or the expansion of the alliance, it
has always been a key criteria. And I will defer to others to
add.
Mr. Chollet. I agree with that. And I think that is a
further reason for why enlargement in the open-door policy of
enlargement has been so important and I think remains so
important, because NATO serves as a kind of a magnet, an
incentive system for countries to make those transition in
countries in the post-Soviet space, the post-communist
countries to make the kinds of decisions in terms of their
political system, and also the way the role their militaries
play within their governments because many of these countries
coming out of the Soviet system, the military and the security
service has played an outsized role in the governance of those
countries.
And so ensuring that their ministries of defense reform and
that they are budgeted in a way with transparency is also
critical to democratic health. So I think NATO, the values at
NATO's core we need to keep them there, and NATO operationally
by serving as a magnet and incentivizing countries to maintain
their democratic core values will remain indispensable.
Mr. Lute. So I applaud focus on this. You know, yesterday
was the 20th anniversary of the welcoming of the first three
post-cold war allies to the alliance, so Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic. Today, 20 years later, they are allies,
right, and Poland and Hungary are among the worst in terms of
slippage or backsliding on democratic values, which they signed
up to when they joined the alliance.
So going back to basics here and remembering what it takes
to become a member of the alliance and then quietly,
diplomatically, with discretion holding allies accountable is
really a very important initiative both for the Secretary
General, but ideally from the United States because we would be
doing so from a position of example, of good example. And I am
actually as an American citizen concerned today that we are not
maybe as strong an example on these core principles as we have
been in the past.
Mr. Brzezinski. The alliance has been extremely effective
in helping particularly transitioning countries to understand
the value and importance of civilian control over the military
and that has been its most direct contribution to democratic
principles. As an alliance, as members, we contribute to
democratic principles that Doug and others have talked about,
not necessarily through NATO but more bilaterally.
So when I think of NATO, I think of a political military
organization whose primary mission is putting lead downrange,
but as part of its contributions it helps governments more
effectively do that by helping them institutionalize the
culture and practices of civilian control of the military.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you very much. I think this brings
the hearing to an end. I want to thank our four excellent
panelists. And you notice we had so much interest in it, so
many people kept coming and leaving when they had to but making
sure that they came back and it really was, I think, one of the
best panels we have had and I want to thank all four of you for
doing that.
I want to remind the committee that at 2 o'clock we have a
meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan over in the Capitol, so I
would hope the members of the committee would attend that. And
again I want to thank our witnesses and the hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]
| MEMBERNAME | BIOGUIDEID | GPOID | CHAMBER | PARTY | ROLE | STATE | CONGRESS | AUTHORITYID |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr. | S000244 | 8218 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | WI | 116 | 1041 |
| Smith, Christopher H. | S000522 | 8046 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | NJ | 116 | 1071 |
| Meeks, Gregory W. | M001137 | 8067 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | NY | 116 | 1506 |
| Sherman, Brad | S000344 | 7832 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | CA | 116 | 1526 |
| Wilson, Joe | W000795 | 8142 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | SC | 116 | 1688 |
| Costa, Jim | C001059 | 7825 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | CA | 116 | 1774 |
| McCaul, Michael T. | M001157 | 8166 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | TX | 116 | 1804 |
| Sires, Albio | S001165 | 8055 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | NJ | 116 | 1818 |
| Chabot, Steve | C000266 | 8091 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | OH | 116 | 186 |
| Titus, Dina | T000468 | 7493 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | NV | 116 | 1940 |
| Connolly, Gerald E. | C001078 | 8202 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | VA | 116 | 1959 |
| Deutch, Theodore E. | D000610 | 7891 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | FL | 116 | 1976 |
| Bass, Karen | B001270 | 7838 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | CA | 116 | 1996 |
| Kinzinger, Adam | K000378 | 7931 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | IL | 116 | 2014 |
| Keating, William R. | K000375 | 7975 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | MA | 116 | 2025 |
| Cicilline, David N. | C001084 | 8139 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | RI | 116 | 2055 |
| Bera, Ami | B001287 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | CA | 116 | 2102 | |
| Vargas, Juan | V000130 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | CA | 116 | 2112 | |
| Yoho, Ted S. | Y000065 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | FL | 116 | 2115 | |
| Wagner, Ann | W000812 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | MO | 116 | 2137 | |
| Perry, Scott | P000605 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | PA | 116 | 2157 | |
| Castro, Joaquin | C001091 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | TX | 116 | 2163 | |
| Lieu, Ted | L000582 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | CA | 116 | 2230 | |
| Buck, Ken | B001297 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | CO | 116 | 2233 | |
| Zeldin, Lee M. | Z000017 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | NY | 116 | 2261 | |
| Mast, Brian J. | M001199 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | FL | 116 | 2322 | |
| Rooney, Francis | R000607 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | FL | 116 | 2323 | |
| Espaillat, Adriano | E000297 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | NY | 116 | 2342 | |
| Fitzpatrick, Brian K. | F000466 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | PA | 116 | 2345 | |
| Gonzalez, Vicente | G000581 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | TX | 116 | 2349 | |
| Curtis, John R. | C001114 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | UT | 116 | 2363 | |
| Wild, Susan | W000826 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | PA | 116 | 2374 | |
| Pence, Greg | P000615 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | IN | 116 | 2401 | |
| Watkins, Steve | W000824 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | KS | 116 | 2402 | |
| Trone, David J. | T000483 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | MD | 116 | 2406 | |
| Levin, Andy | L000592 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | MI | 116 | 2408 | |
| Omar, Ilhan | O000173 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | MN | 116 | 2414 | |
| Guest, Michael | G000591 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | MS | 116 | 2416 | |
| Malinowski, Tom | M001203 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | NJ | 116 | 2421 | |
| Houlahan, Chrissy | H001085 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | PA | 116 | 2433 | |
| Reschenthaler, Guy | R000610 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | PA | 116 | 2436 | |
| Burchett, Tim | B001309 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | TN | 116 | 2440 | |
| Wright, Ron | W000827 | H | R | COMMMEMBER | TX | 116 | 2446 | |
| Allred, Colin Z. | A000376 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | TX | 116 | 2451 | |
| Spanberger, Abigail Davis | S001209 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | VA | 116 | 2456 | |
| Engel, Eliot L. | E000179 | 8078 | H | D | COMMMEMBER | NY | 116 | 344 |
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