Congressional Hearings
DATA SECURITY AND BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE UBER BREACH AND SECURITY RESEARCHERS
Congressional Hearings
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| AUTHORITYID | CHAMBER | TYPE | COMMITTEENAME |
|---|---|---|---|
| sscm00 | S | S | Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation |
[Senate Hearing 115-656]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-656
DATA SECURITY AND BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE UBER BREACH
AND SECURITY RESEARCHERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION,
PRODUCT SAFETY, INSURANCE,
AND DATA SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, PRODUCT SAFETY, INSURANCE, AND
DATA SECURITY
JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Chairman RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE LEE, Utah MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 6, 2018................................. 1
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 1
Letter dated November 17, 2017 to Dara Khosrowshahi, Chief
Executive Officer, Uber Technologies, Inc. from Hon. John
Thune, Hon. Jerry Moran, hon. Orrin Hatch and Hon. Bill
Cassidy, M.D............................................... 2
Response letter dated December 11, 2017 to Hon. John Thune,
Hon. Jerry Moran, hon. Orrin Hatch and Hon. Bill Cassidy,
M.D. from Dara Khosrowshahi, Chief Executive Officer, Uber
Technologies, Inc.......................................... 5
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 7
Prepared statement of Kathleen McGee, Chief of the Bureau of
Internet & Technology, New York State Office of the
Attorney General........................................... 37
Letter dated February 5, 2018 to Hon. Jerry Moran and Hon.
Richard Blumenthal from Representatives Jan Schakowsky and
Ben Ray Lujan.............................................. 41
Letter dated February 5, 2018 to Senator John Thune and
Senator Bill Nelson from Marc Rotenberg, President, EPIC;
and Christine Bannan, Administrative Law and Policy Fellow,
EPIC....................................................... 46
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Statement of Senator Cortez-Masto................................ 48
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 51
Witnesses
John Flynn, Chief Information Security Officer, Uber
Technologies, Inc.............................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Marten G. Mickos, CEO, HackerOne................................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Katie Moussouris, Founder and CEO, Luta Security................. 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Justin Brookman, Director, Privacy and Technology Policy,
Consumers Union................................................ 27
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to John Flynn by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 57
Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 58
Response to written questions submitted to Marten G. Mickos by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 63
Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 68
Response to written questions submitted to Katie Moussouris by:
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 69
Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 69
Response to written questions submitted to Justin Brookman by:
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 69
Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 71
DATA SECURITY AND BUG BOUNTY
PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE
UBER BREACH AND SECURITY RESEARCHERS
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product
Safety, Insurance, and Data Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Moran [presiding], Blumenthal, Blunt,
Nelson, and Cortez-Masto.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Good afternoon. Welcome to the Consumer
Protection Product Safety, Insurance, and Data Security
Subcommittee's Hearing on ``Data Security and Bug Bounty
Programs.''
The Subcommittee will come to order. Thank you all for
being here today to discuss the October 2016 Uber data breach
and the allegations against the company regarding impermissible
payments to concealed security incident through its Bug Bounty
Program.
A bug bounty is a reward offered to someone outside of the
company who identifies an error or vulnerability in a computer
program or system in connection with the Coordinated
Vulnerability Disclosure Program.
The Committee plans to examine the value of these
innovative programs and other coordinated approaches to
identify cyber vulnerabilities and prevent the types of
instances that have occurred and, unfortunately, will probably
occur in the future.
In late 2016, Uber was notified by anonymous sources that
certain archived copies of its database had been compromised.
According to a letter in response to an inquiry made by this
Committee, in partnership with the Senate Finance Committee,
Uber's Security Team ``took immediate steps to respond to and
limit the impact of the incident,'' including identifying the
parties responsible and paying a $100,000 to them in exchange
for assurances that the compromised data would be deleted.
I have a letter and Uber's response that I would ask
unanimous consent to be submitted for the record. Without
objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Uber
December 11, 2017
Hon. John Thune,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Jerry Moran,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, Insurance, and
Data Protection,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Orrin Hatch,
Chairman,
Committee on Finance,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Bill Cassidy, M.D.,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Social Security, Pensions, and Family Policy,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairmen Thune, Hatch, Moran, and Cassidy:
Thank you for your letter dated November 27, 2017, requesting more
information regarding the data security incident we announced on
November 21, 2017. Thank you also for the interest shown and the time
taken by your committee staff during our briefing on December 4, 2017.
As Uber's new CEO, I am committed to setting our course for the future,
which begins with building a company that everyone can trust and be
proud of. For that to happen, we have to be honest and transparent as
we work to repair our past mistakes.
I appreciate the depth and range of interest reflected in the
questions posed in your letter and at our briefings. As we described
when we met with your staff, we think it is important for you to get
the facts from us directly. Our work on this matter remains ongoing,
but we are now able to share the information below, and we appreciate
the opportunity to share more as it develops.
On November 14, 2016, Uber's security team received e-mails from an
anonymous individual who claimed to have accessed Uber data and
demanded payment. Uber investigated and determined that the individual
and another person working with him had obtained access to certain
archived copies of Uber databases and files located on Uber's private
cloud data storage environment on Amazon Web Services. Uber determined
the means of access, shut down a compromised credential, and engaged in
communications with the outside actors. To the best of Uber's
knowledge, the outside actors' access began on October 13, 2016, and
there was no further access by the actors to Uber's cloud storage after
November 15, 2016.
Uber's security team took immediate steps to respond to and limit
the impact of the incident, including engaging in immediate and then
ongoing communications with the original outside actor and a second
individual subsequently identified to have been working with him. Uber
agreed to pay the money demanded in exchange for an agreement to delete
the data. Uber eventually paid $100,000 to the two individuals
combined. The payment was made in December 2016 through HackerOne
(www.hackerone.com), which Uber uses for its Bug Bounty program. Uber
also worked to identify the real names and identities of the outside
actors. It was successful in this effort, and it thereafter engaged in
further communications with the two individuals using their real
identities, including having them sign assurances that the data was
destroyed. Although Uber mitigated damage precipitated by the breach,
two of the Uber employees who led the response failed to disclose the
incident to the appropriate parties. Uber does not know why these
individuals failed to discharge properly their responsibility, but they
were terminated as a result.
Mandiant, an independent cybersecurity firm, conducted a forensic
analysis of the data at issue. Mandiant found no indication that trip
location history, credit card numbers, bank account numbers, Social
Security numbers or dates of birth were downloaded. They found that the
data includes:
Information pertaining to approximately 57 million users
(both riders and drivers) worldwide, including approximately
7.7 million drivers. Approximately 32 million of these
individuals are outside the United States. Approximately 25
million users are inside the United States.
For nearly all users, the downloaded files included names,
e-mail addresses, and mobile phone numbers.
In some cases, the files also included other information
collected from or created about users by Uber, such as Uber
internal user IDs (UUIDs); the UUIDs of a user who invited
another user to sign-up with Uber or whom users shared rides
with if they had opted into certain programs; a small number of
short driver-related notes; certain one-time locational
information, such as the latitude and longitude corresponding
to the location where the user first signed up for the Uber
service; and other account information, including user tokens
and hashed and salted versions of user passwords.
For approximately 600,000 of the 7.7 million drivers, the
files also included a driver's license number. Virtually all of
these individuals are in the United States.
Uber provided individual notice to drivers with driver's license
numbers in the data set starting on November 22, 2017, in most cases by
mail but via e-mail if Uber has no mailing address for the individual
on file. That notification offered one-year complimentary credit and
identity theft protection services from Experian and provided
information on how to sign up. Uber also provided information pages for
riders and drivers on its website. Uber notified the United States
Attorney's Offices for the Southern District of New York and for the
Northern District of California, the Federal Trade Commission, the
attorneys general of states with a regulator notice requirement in
their data breach law, and the Dutch Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (data
protection authority, our lead regulator for user data outside the
United States) on November 21, 2017. Uber is continuing to provide
information as requested on an ongoing basis to regulators, law
enforcement, and government entities worldwide. We note that some of
your questions relate to other ongoing legal proceedings and
investigations to which the company is a party, including the Federal
Trade Commission's ongoing investigation, which remains open. We do not
here comment on other ongoing legal proceedings and investigations.
In addition to the steps taken to confirm the data taken had been
destroyed, Uber has not seen evidence of fraud or misuse tied to the
incident; it is monitoring the affected accounts and has flagged them
for additional fraud protection. As to Uber's privacy and data security
practices generally, Uber's privacy policies detail what information it
collects relating to riders and drivers and how it uses and discloses
that information. Uber's current privacy policy is available at https:/
/privacy.uber.com/policy, and that page also contains a link to Uber's
previous policy, dated from 2015. (Uber's 2013 privacy policy is
available on archive.org as well.) Uber provided notice of both the
2015 and 2017 revisions by e-mail to users. Uber's data security
practices include access controls, multi-factor authentication,
credential management systems, and use of encryption in transit and,
where technically feasible, at rest. This particular incident (as we
discussed in our recent briefings with your staff) nonetheless occurred
because, unfortunately, the outside actors determined valid Uber login
credentials for a particular workspace. After this incident (and well
before providing notice of it in November 2017), Uber put in place
several additional protections designed to mitigate the chance that the
same form of intrusion could succeed today, such as adding two-factor
authentication to one of the services that was involved in this
incident.
Thank you for the opportunity to share this information with you.
Please know that we take this matter very seriously, and Uber is
available to help answer any additional questions you may have.
Sincerely,
Dara Khosrowshahi,
CEO,
Uber Technologies, Inc.
Senator Moran. An independent forensics analysis found that
the exposed data included information pertaining to
approximately 57 million users in total, both drivers and
riders, 25 million of those affected users were from the United
States, and driver's license numbers of about 600,000 drivers
were compromised in the breach.
The fact that the company took approximately a year to
notify impacted users raises red flags within this committee as
to what systematic issues prevented such time-sensitive
information from being made available to those left vulnerable.
Additionally, my colleagues and I seek specific
clarification as to what policy safeguards are currently in
place to prevent bug bounty programs from being used as
extortion pay-out mechanisms in the future.
These substantive concerns, however, should not completely
outweigh the overall utility of this innovative crowd-sourced
approach that many industry actors have taken to proactively
identify chinks in their technological armor through
effectively administered bug bounty programs and other cyber
vulnerability disclosure efforts.
As the American public becomes more and more dependent and
dependent on innovative technologies to complete everyday
tasks, cyber security vulnerabilities pose a direct threat.
Whether it's through a critical telehealth monitoring system,
autonomous vehicle transporting your family, or access to
personally identifiable information, cyber threats are
continuously evolving with the technology we rely on.
My goal for this hearing is to find out exactly what
prevented Uber from immediately notifying its users who are
impacted by the 2016 breach, the specifics of the related
payments and what steps Uber is taking internally to improve
its notification protocols.
I also want to have a larger discussion of how
vulnerability disclosure programs, like bug bounties, can be
used effectively to deter cyber threats from harming consumers.
It's my pleasure to introduce our panel today and I again
appreciate, as I expressed to you personally, my gratitude for
your presence here today.
Mr. John ``Four'' Flynn is the Chief Information Security
Officer for Uber Technologies. He's an expert in information
security with over 10 years' experience in the field, including
leading Infrastructure Security at Facebook and managing
Security Operations at Google.
Mr. Marten Mickos is the Chief Executive Officer of
HackerOne, which is a leading bug bounty firm in the country,
serving a variety of government and private sector clients,
including Uber, and administering their Crowd Source
Vulnerability Disclosure Programs.
Ms. Kate Moussouris is the Founder and CEO of Luta
Security, Inc., which advises its clients on vulnerability
coordination programs and applicable internal company policies.
And, finally, Mr. Justin Brookman is the Director of
Consumer and Technology Policy for the Consumers Union, which
is an independent nonprofit consumer organization. In his role,
he focuses on policies related to consumer data privacy
security.
I look forward to the testimony of these experts on our
witness panel.
I either now turn to the Ranking Member of the Full
Committee or the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee for their
opening remarks.
Gentlemen. The Senator from Connecticut.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and I'd like to thank you and the Chairman as well as
our Ranking Member for holding this hearing, which is truly of
paramount importance to consumers in our country.
There ought to be no question here that Uber's payment of
this blackmail without notifying consumers who were gravely at
risk was morally wrong and legally reprehensible and violated
not only the law but also the norm of what should be expected.
At the same time that Uber was negotiating with its
blackmailers, it also was speaking with the Federal Trade
Commission for a smaller 2014 breach affecting the personal
information of more than a 100,000 Uber drivers.
Drivers and riders were not informed of the breach that
brings us here today. Neither were law enforcement authorities.
It was not only kept secret but the company paid those hackers
a $100,000 ransom to destroy evidence and keep quiet. In
effect, it was almost a form of obstruction of justice.
The Online Trust Alliance says that 93 percent of all
breaches in 2017 did not stem from software vulnerabilities.
They were the result of poor security protocols, like failing
to update software, use e-mail authentication, and training
people to recognize phishing attacks. These kinds of weaknesses
are readily correctable and the industry has a responsibility
for doing it.
We've had repeated hearings and we ought to be demanding
more action of law enforcement authorities as well as the
industry over the years. In fact, we've had one hearing after
another focused on data breaches. Very recently, we heard from
the current and former heads of Equifax and Yahoo following
their historic breach disasters.
A piecemeal after-the-fact approach would be better served
if the Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, were able to
prescribe rules that prevent these kinds of data breaches by
requiring reasonable security practices in the first place and
that's why the Ranking Member and I, Ranking Member Nelson,
who's here today, reintroduced the Data Security and Breach
Notification Act.
This bill directs the FTC to develop robust, flexible rules
that require businesses to adopt reasonable security protocols
to protect consumers' personal information from unauthorized
access and establish strong breach notification requirements.
Whether driving a ride-share or calling a ride-share,
individuals expect companies collecting their sensitive
personal information to do everything in their power to protect
their data and their security and privacy, notify them promptly
when there is a breach that endangers those consumers and
riders.
These kinds of expectations are not unreasonable or
inflated. These expectations are realistic. They are
commonsense measures that all Americans have a right to expect,
and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator.
The Senator from Florida, we're honored to have the Ranking
Member of the Full Committee with us today, Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and what
Senator Blumenthal has just said, the legislation is out there.
We will continue to work with the Chairman of the Full
Committee, Senator Thune, in order to try to get meaningful
data security legislation, but any such bill cannot simply
cater to corporate interests.
A bipartisan bill must provide consumer protections that
are better than is in the current law and why is this? Well,
this hearing today is just the latest edition in a long history
of hearings that this Full Committee has held on high-profile
data breaches.
Uber now joins Equifax, Yahoo, Target, Sony, and the
University of Maryland, among others, as a breached entity
telling a story to this committee and to Congress, and this
story at this hearing only once again underscores the need for
the comprehensive and strong Federal legislation to provide the
protections.
Currently, the FTC is the key Federal agency that's
bringing enforcement actions against the breached companies
that have collected and stored vast amounts of consumer data,
unfortunately, with lax security standards.
A myriad of state laws currently provide American consumers
with a limited degree of protection. So we should not adopt
Federal legislation that undercuts the FTC's existing
longstanding well-established authority nor should we consider
a bill that eviscerates all state legal protections and
replaces them with weak Federal standards.
From this Senator's standpoint and I think Senator
Blumenthal's, we can support only a data security bill that
provides consumers with protection that are stronger than the
current ones. It would be better for Congress to pass no bill
than to pass a bill that provides less protections to the
consumers compared to the status quo.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
Today's hearing is the latest edition in a long history of hearings
that the Commerce Committee has held on high profile data breaches.
Uber now joins Equifax, Yahoo, Target, Sony, and the University of
Maryland, among others, as a breached entity telling its story to this
committee and to Congress. And this story at this hearing only once
again underscores the need for comprehensive and strong Federal
legislation that will provide adequate protections to consumers.
In this regard, Senator Blumenthal and I have once again introduced
such legislation, the Data Security and Breach Notification Act, which
would require companies to secure their data and to promptly notify
consumers when there is a breach.
The bill would also impose criminal penalties on corporate
officials that willfully disguise breaches from the public, and it
would provide for robust enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission
and state attorneys general working together to hold companies
accountable.
As in previous Congresses, I will continue to work with Chairman
Thune and other interested members of the committee to craft bipartisan
and meaningful data security legislation.
However, any such bill cannot simply cater to corporate interests.
A bipartisan bill must provide consumer protections that are better
than what is in current law.
Currently, the FTC is the key Federal agency that is bringing
enforcement actions against breached companies that collected and
stored vast amounts of consumer data with lax security standards in
place. And a myriad of state laws currently provide American consumers
with a limited degree of protection from data breaches.
We should not adopt Federal legislation that undercuts the FTC's
existing, long-standing and well-established authority; nor should we
consider a bill that eviscerates all state legal protections and
replaces them with weak Federal standards.
From my standpoint, I can only support a data security bill that
provides consumers with protections that are stronger than current
ones. It would be better for Congress to pass no bill at all than pass
a bill that provides consumers with less protections under the status
quo.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Senator Moran. You're welcome, Senator Nelson. Thank you
for joining us.
We're now ready for the testimony of our witnesses, and I
would call on Mr. Flynn for his opening statement.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JOHN FLYNN, CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER,
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Blumenthal, and members of the
Subcommittee, my name is John Flynn, and I serve as the Chief
Information Security Officer of Uber.
I'm grateful for the opportunity to testify today regarding
bug bounty programs, the 2016 data security incident at Uber,
and lessons that we have all learned from this incident.
I'm honored to be here with an esteemed panel of people who
have brought such an important security practice to companies
worldwide.
Today, I'd like to focus on three topics. First, bug bounty
programs and the important role they play in the never-ending
battle against cyber threats. Second, the 2016 data security
incident at Uber where I worked to determined how the intrusion
occurred and close the gaps that the intruders exploited.
Third, the lessons learned and additional layers of protections
that we've implemented.
Bug bounty programs are a critically important tool. In
addition to internal security efforts that are widely used as
part--they are widely used as part of a comprehensive data
security program. Bug bounty programs are an invitation to
outside experts to search for vulnerabilities and report them.
In exchange, companies offer rewards in recognition of that
work.
Monetary bounties can range from hundreds of dollars to
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some companies offer non-
monetary rewards, including branded apparel or public
recognition.
Because of the security benefits of bug bounty programs,
many major technology companies use them, including Uber,
Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and others. The U.S. Government
also has bug bounty programs, including at the Department of
Defense.
Since we publicly launched our program in 2016, Uber's Bug
Bounty Program has assisted in resolving more than 800
vulnerabilities and paid about $1.3 million in bounties. It has
achieved very significant improvements for a relatively modest
expenditure, including addressing a bug in the SSH
Authentication System and a remote code execution bug in one of
our websites.
The 2016 data security incident unfolded in a way that's
entirely different than a typical bug bounty. On November 14,
2016, our Security Team received e-mails from an anonymous
individual who claimed to have access to Uber data and demanded
a six-figure payment.
We investigated the incident and assembled an Incident
Response Team. The team of technical experts, which I directed,
quickly determined the means of access and shut down the
compromised credentials. Specifically, our first step was to
validate the intruder's claims. We determined that the data
came from backup files stored in an AWS S3 bucket.
We next determined the intruder gained access to AWS S3
through credentials contained within code on a private
repository on GitHub. Despite the limited information, we
locked down the point of entry within 24 hours.
Separately, our Chief Security Officer Joe Sullivan led an
effort to identify the intruders, a process we call
attribution. Although I was not directly involved, I understand
that the Attribution Team used various methods, including
forensics, to gather further information on the intruders.
It ultimately ascertained the identities of both intruders,
made contact, and received assurances that the data had been
destroyed.
As you know, Uber paid the intruders a $100,000 through
HackerOne and our Bug Bounty Program. Our primary goal in
paying the intruders was to protect our customers' data.
However, this was not done consistent with the way our Bug
Bounty Program normally operates.
In my view, the key distinction regarding this incident is
that the intruders not only found a weakness, they also
exploited that vulnerability in a malicious fashion to access
and download data and made extortion demands.
We recognize that the Bug Bounty Program is not an
appropriate vehicle for dealing with intruders who seek to
extort funds from the company. My written testimony contains
additional details regarding the contents of the data.
While the incident remains under the investigation by the
company and others, I echo statements by Uber's new leadership
that it was wrong to not disclose the breach earlier. We are
working to make transparency and honesty core values of our
company, which I am gratified to see.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear and testify
today. I would be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flynn follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Flynn, Chief Information Security Officer,
Uber Technologies, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Blumenthal, and members of the
Subcommittee, my name is John Flynn. Since July 2015, I have served as
the Chief Information Security Officer for Uber Technologies, Inc. I am
grateful for the opportunity to testify today regarding bug bounty
programs, the 2016 data security incident at Uber, and lessons that
we--and the broader technology community--have learned from that
incident. I am honored to be on such an esteemed panel with people who
have brought such an important security practice to companies
worldwide.
Before addressing today's topics, I would like to tell you a little
about myself. My parents were USAID diplomats and Peace Corps
volunteers. After studying computer engineering at the University of
Minnesota, I too joined the Peace Corps. As a Peace Corps volunteer, I
served for more than two years in Belize, where I helped lead a program
that ensured teachers had access to computers and I taught classes on
information security. After the Peace Corps, I attended night classes
to obtain a master's degree in computer science while working full time
as a Security Engineer at the George Washington University here in
Washington.
Before joining Uber, I held positions as an Information Security
Manager at Google, and as an Information Security Director at Facebook.
I have spent over a decade working on highly technical data security
issues, during a period in which data security has expanded
dramatically as a field and as a paramount priority for the technology
industry and the country.
I would like to focus on three topics in my testimony today. First,
I have significant experience with bug bounty programs from working for
multiple companies, and will explain the important role that such
programs play in the never-ending battle against cyber threats. Second,
I will provide my perspective on the 2016 data security incident at
Uber. My primary involvement in that matter was on the technical side,
working under our chief security officer, and leading the effort to
determine how the intrusion occurred and then to close the gaps that
intruders exploited. While I am in a strong position to address the
technical aspects of that incident, I was not actively involved in the
process of identifying the intruders or interacting with the intruders
once they were identified by others. Third, we learned valuable lessons
from the 2016 incident, and I will describe the additional layers of
protection and other enhancements that we have implemented to secure
our users' data and minimize the risk of future intrusions.
Importance of Bug Bounty Programs
Bug bounty programs are a critically important tool and widely used
as part of comprehensive data security programs. Of course, bug bounty
programs do not take the place of dedicated internal security teams who
work throughout the entire software development lifecycle to detect and
repair vulnerabilities. At Uber, there are multiple teams of
specialized experts constantly working to ensure that our systems are
secure. My team consists of more than 100 people with experience in
technical areas of security. Our security efforts generally involve the
following: (1) controlling access to our systems and services; (2)
using security by design principles during the planning process; (3)
auditing and testing code during development and throughout its
lifecycle; (4) monitoring for threats; and (5) managing ongoing
reinforcement and patching processes to protect our systems and
software from reported vulnerabilities.
Bug bounty programs are a useful addition to these steps. Let me
briefly explain bug bounty programs. All complex systems have
``bugs''--imperfections unintentionally written within the software's
code. Sometimes these bugs create vulnerabilities, which could be
exploited by an intruder to gain access to confidential data. Security
teams across the industry, including those at Uber, invest heavily in
preventing and identifying as many of these bugs as we can before code
is updated in our products. However, due to the evolving nature of
software, programmers continuously update code by augmenting,
rewriting, and overwriting their prior work. That process inevitably
results in unexpected errors and vulnerabilities. To help mitigate this
reality, bug bounty programs allow companies to access additional
skilled individuals to augment our in-house engineers. This outside
perspective is also valuable in providing a fresh set of eyes and new
ways of thinking to help our security teams address various challenges
with innovative solutions.
Typically, a bug bounty program is an invitation for outside
experts (commonly referred to as ``researchers'') to search voluntarily
for vulnerabilities and report them to the company or government agency
that is the sponsor of the particular bug bounty program. This is
supposed to be done pursuant to specific guidelines, as well as defined
parameters regarding the types of systems that should be searched. For
example, Uber posts a ``treasure map'' online to tell our researchers
where to look for bugs in our systems. It points our researchers to the
systems we care the most about.
Companies typically offer rewards, or ``bounties,'' in recognition
of the work performed by the researchers. Monetary bounties vary in
size, from hundreds of dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars,
depending on the severity of the bug. Companies may also offer physical
items, such as branded apparel, commemorating bugs that are found, as a
non-monetary reward for the researcher. ``Street cred'' and public
recognition also go a long way to motivate researchers, so many
companies publish information about the most impressive bugs found.
Not surprisingly, the security benefits of bug bounty programs have
motivated many major technology companies, including Uber, Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, and others, to implement bug bounty programs.
Moreover, the U.S. Government also has recognized the value of bug
bounty programs to protect its sensitive information technology
systems. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has bug bounty
programs such as ``Hack the Pentagon'' and ``Hack the Air Force,''
which the Department has operated with great success. In addition, last
July, the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the U.S.
Department of Justice issued A Framework for a Vulnerability Disclosure
Program for Online Systems, which provides helpful guidance on how to
design and operate a bug bounty program.
In 2015, when I joined the company, one of the first things we did
to improve security was launch a bug bounty program. This was a private
``beta'' program and included about two hundred researchers who helped
us identify and remediate nearly 100 bugs. Following the success of our
beta program, we launched a public bug bounty program in March 2016.
Our current program, hosted by HackerOne, offers a combination of
public recognition and monetary bounties as incentives for researchers
to search our products and websites for potential bugs.
Since its initial launch, this bug bounty program has assisted Uber
in resolving more than 800 system vulnerabilities. The program's
monetary payout stands at approximately $1.3 million in total. For us,
this bug bounty program has been incredibly valuable, achieving very
significant improvements in our data security posture for a relatively
modest expenditure. I believe many other companies and agencies have
had a similar experience with bug bounty programs.
Our bounties typically range from a few hundred dollars to several
thousand dollars--depending on the impact and severity of the bug.
Given the large number of companies with bug bounty programs, monetary
payments can help incentivize bug hunters to focus on Uber's bugs. That
is, companies compete for the time and attention of these outside
researchers, and relatively modest monetary incentives help ensure that
researchers focus their attention on our software. Again, I think many
companies and agencies have reached this same view.
The vulnerabilities found by our researchers demonstrate the
concrete value of bug bounty programs. As we have publicly shared, one
researcher discovered a bug in the SSH authentication system used
between different internal services. If exploited, the bug could have
allowed escalation of internal privileges. This would have allowed
people to access systems they did not have privileges to access.
Another researcher who participated in our public bug bounty program
found a ``remote code execution'' bug on one of our websites. This was
an important issue because remote code execution gives attackers the
ability to run commands on a target computer. In this case, the
researcher demonstrated the ability to execute commands on a system
within our data center. Potentially, a malicious attacker could have
used this vulnerability to access sensitive user data.
Uber's bug bounty program unquestionably has increased the scale
and speed at which we are able to identify and eliminate cybersecurity
threats. We are constantly refining our tools to prevent the bugs that
are found from being written into our code in the first place.
Over the nearly three years we have been running this program, more
than 500 researchers have participated. Through our bug bounty program,
we can benefit from a vast, diverse, worldwide pool of talent, often
beyond our ability to hire.
Of course, operating a bug bounty program is not without its
challenges. Security researchers can be an eccentric group, and within
this community there are individuals with varying degrees of technical
experience and professionalism who engage through bug bounty programs.
Researchers sometimes express concern with the amount of the bounty
that is paid, believing that their discovery may be worth more than we
determine was appropriate, based on our program guidelines. Other
times, a researcher may identify a bug that we already know and are
working to fix. The researcher sometimes takes issue with not receiving
a monetary reward for those already identified bugs. Occasionally, a
person may contact the company to report a vulnerability (without
exploiting it), completely unaware of our bug bounty program, and make
a demand for compensation. We try to work with such persons to submit
their report through the bug bounty program in exchange for a fair
reward under the program guidelines.
2016 Uber Data Security Incident
The 2016 data security incident unfolded in a way that is entirely
different from the typical bug bounty program scenario. On November 14,
2016, Uber's security team received e-mails from an anonymous
individual who claimed to have accessed Uber data and demanded a six-
figure payment. Uber investigated and determined that the individual
and another person working with him had obtained access to certain
archived copies of Uber databases and files located on Uber's private
cloud data storage environment on Amazon Web Services (``AWS''). In
line with standard protocol, Uber assembled an incident response team.
This team included technical experts whom I directed, and we worked
quickly to determine the means of access, shut down the compromised
credential, and take various steps to secure our systems against a
further attack. To the best of Uber's knowledge, the intruders' access
began on October 13, 2016, and there was no further access by the
intruders after November 15, 2016.
For the Subcommittee's information, I would like to explain in
greater detail how Uber responded to this security incident. As with
any security incident, the first step was to validate the claims that
the intruder had made. Very often these situations are hoaxes. The Uber
security team requested data from the intruder, which he provided, and
then confirmed that the data were Uber's. With that validation, we
initiated an incident response procedure. Incident response to any data
incident is an orchestrated affair. The first steps involve fast,
intense work with limited information and a very short time to
eliminate the threat. We set up a command center where members of the
team could work in parallel and discuss issues in real time.
The overall effort was led by our former Chief Security Officer,
Joe Sullivan, to whom I reported. I led the technical work to identify
how the intrusion occurred and remove the vulnerability. Joe Sullivan
and others led what we call ``attribution''--the process of identifying
the intruders.
During the technical effort, we immediately began the process of
determining where the data at issue resided and how the intruder gained
access. Within 24 hours, we determined that the data came from back-up
files stored in an AWS S3 bucket. S3 stands for ``simple storage
service.''
The next step of the investigation for my team was to determine how
the intruder gained access to the AWS S3 bucket, which requires access
credentials. We learned that the intruder found the credential
contained within code on a private repository for Uber engineers on
GitHub, which is a third party site that allows people to collaborate
on code. We immediately took steps to implement multifactor
authentication for GitHub and rotated the AWS credential used by the
intruder. Despite the complexity of the issue and the limited
information with which we started, we were able to lock down the point
of entry within 24 hours.
Subsequently, we did a thorough review of our GitHub repositories.
My technical team initiated the process of removing additional code
from GitHub that could be considered sensitive, and confirming rotation
of keys. We ceased using GitHub except for items like open source code.
The incident response team also worked to identify the type of data
downloaded to assess the risk.
In addition to the technical response, another team worked on
attribution. Although I was not directly involved, I understand that
the attribution team used various methods, including forensics, to
gather further information on the intruders. This was a challenging
endeavor because the intruders were extremely adept at covering their
tracks.
Ultimately, the attribution team ascertained the real identity of
both the original individual who contacted the company, and the second
person working with him. I understand that the original individual was
located in Canada, and that his partner, who actually obtained the
data, was in Florida. I further understand that the attribution team
made contact with both individuals and received assurances that the
data had been destroyed.
As you know, Uber paid the intruders $100,000 through HackerOne and
our bug bounty program. Our primary goal in paying the intruders was to
protect our consumers' data. This was not done in a way that is
consistent with the way our bounty program normally operates, however.
In my view, the key distinction regarding this incident is that the
intruders not only found a weakness, they also exploited the
vulnerability in a malicious fashion to access and download data.
In 2017, after learning about the incident, new company leadership
at Uber asked an independent cybersecurity firm, Mandiant, to conduct a
thorough analysis of the data at issue. Mandiant's analysis showed that
the data included information pertaining to approximately 57 million
users worldwide, including approximately 25 million users in the United
States. Of these, approximately 4.1 million users in the United States
were drivers. For nearly all users, the downloaded files included
names, e-mail addresses and phone numbers. In some cases, the
information also included information collected from or created about
users by Uber, such as Uber user IDs, certain one-time locational
information (e.g., the latitude and longitude corresponding to the
location where the user first signed up for the Uber service), user
tokens, and passwords encrypted using hashing and salting techniques.
Of the driver accounts, approximately 600,000 thousand included
driver's license numbers.
In their independent analysis, Mandiant found no indication that
trip location history, credit card numbers, bank account numbers,
Social Security numbers, or dates of birth were compromised.
Lessons Learned and Data Security Enhancements at Uber
While the circumstances surrounding the 2016 security incident
remain under investigation by the company and multiple regulators, and
I am not privy to the details of those ongoing investigations, there
are a number of lessons learned that I would like to highlight today.
First, I would like to echo statements made by new leadership, and
state publicly that it was wrong not to disclose the breach earlier.
The breach should have been disclosed in a timely manner. The company
is taking steps to ensure that an incident like this does not happen
again, with personnel changes and additional remedial actions. We are
working to make transparency and honesty core values of our company. I
would add that this is a change that I personally am gratified to see
and wholeheartedly support.
Although we regret that we did not publicly report the incident in
2016, we did at that time take numerous steps internally to improve our
security posture in response to the incident. As I noted previously, we
immediately instituted multifactor authentication on Github. We then
subsequently ceased using GitHub except for items like open source
code. As to AWS, we were already using multifactor authentication for
individual access accounts--which these intruders did not compromise.
After the incident we expanded the use of multifactor authentication
protocols for AWS service accounts using techniques such as IP
restrictions, commonly referred to as ``white listing.'' We have also
taken other steps to enhance security for AWS data storage, such as
refining Identity & Assessment Management permissions, improving our
ability to authenticate someone before granting access to these systems
and to confirm whether they are authorized to access them. We also
added auto-expiring credentials to protect further against attacks
using exposed, lost, or shared credentials. We continue to look to
Amazon's evolving best practices and guidance to protect our AWS
system.
We recognize that the bug bounty program is not an appropriate
vehicle for dealing with intruders who seek to extort funds from the
company. The approach that these intruders took was separate and
distinct from those of the researchers in the security community for
whom bug bounty programs are designed. While the use of the bug bounty
program assisted in the effort to gain attribution and, ultimately,
assurances that our users' data were secure, at the end of the day,
these intruders were fundamentally different from legitimate bug bounty
recipients.
Going forward, Uber is revisiting its incident response approach in
circumstances such as these. We have hired Matt Olsen, a former general
counsel of the National Security Agency and director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, to help structure the security team and guide
new processes going forward. I have already seen some of these changes
take place, such as more stakeholders involved in the decision-making
process for how to handle security incidents, and informing law
enforcement of potential security incidents right away.
I would like to conclude by stating that we strongly support a
unified, national approach to data security and breach standards. We
are proactively engaged in the many conversations in both the technical
and policy communities to help identify what the critical components of
federal data breach legislation should be, and are pleased to see this
robust conversation taking place with various Members of Congress and
your staff. We welcome the opportunity to be at the table to help all
stakeholders understand the best practices.
* * *
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear and testify today. I
would be happy to answer your questions.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Mr. Mickos.
STATEMENT OF MARTEN G. MICKOS, CEO, HACKERONE
Mr. Mickos. Chairman Moran, Senator Blumenthal, Ranking
Member Nelson, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify today.
I look forward to providing you with my perspective on data
security and bug bounty programs.
Mr. Chairman, a brief note. As I have informed your staff,
there are legal proceedings with respect to the Uber incident.
We are cooperating fully and eagerly in those proceedings. As a
result of these proceedings, however, I will unfortunately not
be able to discuss many aspects of that incident.
I am the Chief Executive Officer of HackerOne, the world's
leading provider of hacker-powered security. HackerOne operates
bug bounty programs that connect companies and governments with
the world's best white hat hackers to find and fix
vulnerabilities before malicious actors exploit them.
It all starts with the vulnerability disclosure program,
which is essentially a neighborhood watch for software. When an
entity decides to offer financial rewards to finders of
vulnerabilities, the vulnerability disclosure program becomes a
bug bounty program.
Such programs are useful for organizations large and small,
in the private and in the public sector. Examples include:
Adobe Systems, GSA, General Motors, Qualcomm, Starbucks, United
Airlines, and many more. Some of them run their own homegrown
programs, others will run their program on a platform, such as
HackerOne.
The nature of HackerOne's business is preventative. We are
not in the incident response business. We are in the data
breach prevention business. Through HackerOne's service alone,
over 63,000 vulnerabilities have been found and fixed. The
average bounty is approximately $500 and the current maximum
bounty listed on HackerOne is $250,000. No other method has
been shown to produce similar results with such favorable
economics.
Organizations signing up with HackerOne typically start
with an invitation-only program. Later, the program can be made
public, in which case any hacker is allowed to submit reports.
It is the customer who decides on the bounties. To receive
any form of payment by a HackerOne, the hacker must submit
identifying information and the appropriate tax forms.
HackerOne is committed to compliance with all relevant
rules and regulations. Additionally, we have internal
guidelines and specific terms and conditions that apply to
hackers and to customers, respectively.
The Federal Government is an innovator in this area. The
U.S. Department of Defense and HackerOne pioneered the first
Federal Government Bug Bounty Program called ``Hack the
Pentagon.'' Since the program's inception, more than 3,600
security vulnerabilities have been safely resolved in critical
DoD assets.
FTC, NTIA, FDA, NHTSA, and the Department of Justice have
declared vulnerability disclosure programs as cyber security
best practice. These agencies recognized the critical role that
hackers play in securing technology and protecting consumers.
For instance, in July 2017, the Department of Justice
published a framework for vulnerability disclosure program for
online systems to provide guidance to entities on setting up a
program.
Our goal must be an internet that enables privacy and
protects consumers. This is not achievable without ethical
hackers taking an active role in safeguarding our collective
security, and that in turn requires a safe legal environment
encouraging all individuals to come forward with vulnerability
information, no matter the circumstances.
I would like to offer three recommendations. First, I
encourage you to support CFAA reform that removes criminal
penalties on actions that do no harm, protecting individuals
that act in good faith to identify and report potential
vulnerabilities.
Second, I encourage you to support a harmonized and
unambiguous breach notification law governing all consumer-
facing entities. Those who in good faith operate or participate
in a vulnerability disclosure policy should not be legally
exposed.
Third, Congress should encourage data security best
practices that require all companies responsible for
safeguarding consumer data to implement a vulnerability
disclosure policy.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, we need hackers. Ethical hacking
may be the only force that can stop criminal hacking. Hundreds
of thousands of security vulnerabilities have already been
found and remediated. Hacker-powered security does not only
protect consumers, it also creates opportunity for aspiring
hackers across the country.
With this, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this
important issue, and I look forward to any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mickos follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marten G. Mickos, Chief Executive Officer,
HackerOne
Introduction
Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Blumenthal, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I look
forward to providing you with my perspective on Data Security and Bug
Bounty Programs.
I am Chief Executive Officer of San Francisco-based HackerOne, the
world's leading provider of hacker-powered security. I have spent my
entire 30-year career in software, including as Senior Vice President
at both Hewlett-Packard and Sun Microsystems, and prior to that as CEO
of MySQL. In addition, I served on the Board of Directors of Nokia
Corporation.
HackerOne operates bug bounty programs that connect companies and
governments with the best white hat hackers in the world to find and
fix vulnerabilities before malicious actors exploit them. As of January
2018, over 160,000 white hat hackers have registered with HackerOne to
defend customers, among them the United States Department of Defense,
removing over 60,000 vulnerabilities and preventing an untold number of
breaches in the process.
The Threat of Weak Cybersecurity
Today's cybersecurity practices are severely outdated in contrast
to the cyber threats that society faces. When exploited for criminal
purposes, even just one single and relatively unremarkable security
vulnerability can create havoc, as the Equifax data breach \1\ grossly
reminded us of in 2017.
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\1\ https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-
what-do
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Unfortunately it is only a question of time before cybercrime
causes physical damage to structures or, worse, physical harm to
humans. Citizens in general and consumers in particular are exposed to
risks that they cannot possibly deal with themselves. Privacy is
threatened. Consumer protection against faulty and vulnerable software-
based products is presently inadequate.
The economic repercussions are enormous, and we are only now
starting to see the true costs of lax cyber hygiene. When data breaches
occur, corporations lose millions of dollars. These costs are often
passed along to consumers who additionally face unquantifiable burdens
associated with the breaches, including compromise of privacy.
It is an unfortunate fact that in the digital realm, society is
currently failing to provide its citizens with what societies were
established for: safety and security.
Hacker-Powered Security Offers a Solution
Whatever protections and defenses we build into our digital
assets--and we should build a lot of them--there is one practice that
covers every possible cause of cyber breach. There is an ``immune
system'' \2\ that will approach the digital assets from the same
direction as adversaries and criminals do--from the outside. There is a
mechanism that at scale has the opportunity to ultimately detect every
hole, every weakness and every security vulnerability in a system or
product built by humans.
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\2\ https://www.ted.com/talks/
keren_elazari_hackers_the_internet_s_immune_system
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This practice is often called ``Hacker-Powered Security.'' It is a
mechanism that turns the asymmetry that favors the attacker into an
asymmetry that favors the collaborating defenders. It is a collective
effort that relentlessly looks for more vulnerabilities. Its
outstanding success metrics are a result of stochastic probability: the
more attempts there are at finding vulnerabilities, the higher the
likelihood that these will be found. Over time the result improves
asymptotically towards 100 percent.
Hacker-powered security is a model that invites external and
independent security researchers and ethical hackers--we will here
simply call them ``hackers''--to hunt for vulnerabilities in
computerized systems. Today there are over one hundred thousand white
hat hackers in the world. These are individual experts who have signed
up to help corporations and organizations to detect and fix their
security weaknesses. These hackers are motivated by the challenge, by
the opportunity to do good and by peer recognition. They are rewarded
for their finds with bounties. They are bug bounty hunters.
How Hacker-Powered Security Works
Hacker-Powered Security covers any cybersecurity-enhancing services
and automations that are partially or wholly produced by independently
operating security experts outside the company or organization in
question.
The most fundamental function of hacker-powered security is a
Vulnerability Disclosure Program, also called Responsible Disclosure or
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure.
A vulnerability disclosure program is essentially a neighborhood
watch for software. The motto is ``If you see something, say
something.'' Concretely, if and when an ethical hacker finds a security
vulnerability in and company or government organization's website or
mobile app or other computer system, this person will be invited to
disclose the vulnerability found to the system's owner.
Most human beings are ready to help their neighbor, so the impetus
for vulnerability disclosure is enormous. Issues of legality and trust,
however, make vulnerability disclosure more complicated than a regular
neighborhood watch. To solve this issue, leading companies have created
their own policy frameworks for the disclosure of vulnerabilities to
them, and others turn to companies such as HackerOne to organize and
coordinate such programs.
When an entity decides to offer financial rewards to finders of
vulnerabilities, the vulnerability disclosure program is called a Bug
Bounty Program. Bug bounty programs have existed at least since
1983.\3\ The practice was perfected by Google, Facebook and Microsoft
over the past half-dozen years. Around the same time, companies such as
HackerOne emerged for the purpose of bringing this powerful method
within reach of any organization that owns and operates a digital asset
(meaning a computer system, a website, a mobile application, an
Internet-of-Things device, or some other digital product).
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\3\ Hunter & Ready ran a campaign in 1983 called ``Get a bug if you
find a bug'', offering a VW beetle as reward for bugs found in their
real-time operating system. Netscape launched a bug bounty program in
1995.
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Proven Effectiveness
Hacker-powered security programs have demonstrated their
effectiveness compared to other methods for vulnerability detection.
Hiring full-time employees or external service or product vendors to
test for vulnerabilities is more expensive. Through HackerOne's service
alone, over 63,000 security vulnerabilities have been found and fixed.
The current maximum bounty listed on HackerOne is $250,000. No other
method for validating software or manufactured products that are in use
by consumers has been shown to produce similar results at such a
favorable economic unit price.
Hacker-powered security is a model that scales. Today there are
over 160,000 registered ethical hackers, and over the coming years this
number is likely to grow to over a million. This army of hackers will
be able to take on the work of the entire digital realm of our society.
Thanks to the diversity and scale of the hacker community, hacker-
powered security finds vulnerabilities that automated scanners or
permanent penetration testing teams do not find. Existing models are
good at finding predictable security vulnerabilities, but even more
important is to find the unpredictable ones--the unknown unknowns.
Given a large enough hacker community and enough time, such
vulnerabilities will be identified.
Vast and Diverse Clientele
Hacker-powered security emanated over the past decade as a best
practice among Silicon Valley tech companies. Today, the model has
matured and became applicable to all types of businesses. Any company,
corporation, association or public sector agency that develops and
deploys software (in whatever form, such as embedded in hardware) can
benefit from hacker-powered security.
The vendors providing hacker-powered services have established
communities of ethical hackers for whom they keep track of skill
profiles and performance metrics. Bug bounty programs may be self-
managed by the customer, or fully managed by the vendor. In the latter
scenario, customers save both time and money while being presented with
valid security vulnerabilities on a continuous basis. In either
scenario, it is up to the customer to remediate the vulnerability once
found.
Entities that operate such vulnerability disclosure and/or bug
bounty programs include: Adobe, AT&T, CERT Coordination Center, U.S.
Department of Defense, Dropbox, Facebook, Fiat Chrysler, U.S. General
Service Administration, General Motors, GitHub, Google, LendingClub,
Microsoft, Nintendo, Panasonic Avionics, Qualcomm, Snapchat, Starbucks,
Spotify, Twitter, and United Airlines. Hacker-powered security is
useful and accessible for organizations both large and small,
technology-focused or not, in the private or public sector. The model
is suitable for all entities that develop and deploy software.
Who are the Hackers?
The original experts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) defined themselves as ``one who enjoys the intellectual challenge
of creatively overcoming limitations.''
Security experts may be described using a variety of titles
including ``ethical hacker'', ``white hat'', ``security researcher'',
``bug hunter'', and ``finder.'' One title is conspicuously absent:
Criminal. Hackers are not criminals. Specifically, bug bounty platforms
offer no benefit to someone with criminal intent. On the contrary,
HackerOne will record data about every hacker on the platform and only
reward actions that follow the rules. For these reasons, criminals go
elsewhere.
Hackers are driven by a variety of motivations, many of which
altruistic. The security advocacy organization I Am The Calvary
summarizes these motivations \4\ as: Protect (make the world a safer
place), Puzzle (tinker out of curiosity), Prestige (seek pride and
notability), Profit (to earn money), and Protest/Patriotism
(ideological and principled).
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\4\ https://www.iamthecavalry.org/motivations
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The HackerOne 2018 Hacker Report \5\--a survey of over 1,000
hackers--revealed that profit was only the fourth most common
motivation for why hackers do their work. Before that came the desire
to learn, be challenged, and have fun. To protect and defend is also a
central motivation for hackers. A 2016 study by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) within the
Department of Commerce found that only 15 percent of security
researchers expect financial compensation in response to a
vulnerability disclosure.\6\
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\5\ https://www.hackerone.com/sites/default/files/2018-01/
2018_Hacker_Report.pdf
\6\ https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
2016_ntia_a_a_vulnerability_disclosure
_insights_report.p
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Hacker-powered security does not only improve security. The model
democratizes opportunity and offers meaningful work to anyone with the
inclination and drive to be a useful ethical hacker. Many hackers are
young adults. They can do their work from anywhere. The money hackers
make is used to support their families, pay for education, and catapult
them into successful professional careers. Hacking brings meaning and
mandate to enterprising people irrespective of their location. Hacking
brings positive societal impact across the Nation.
Case Studies
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and HackerOne pioneered the
first Federal government bug bounty program. Since the program's
inception, more than 3,600 security vulnerabilities have been safely
resolved in DoD critical assets with hacker-powered security. While the
majority of the vulnerabilities reported through the DoD vulnerability
disclosure policy were without financial compensation, hackers have
been awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars in bug bounty payments by
DoD.
``Hack the Pentagon'' was initially launched as a pilot program
under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. This pilot ran
from April 18 to May 12, 2016. During that short time more than 250
vetted ethical hacker participants submitted vulnerability reports. A
total of 138 valid vulnerabilities were found and remediated.
``We know that state-sponsored actors and black-hat hackers want to
challenge and exploit our networks,'' said Secretary Carter of Hack the
Pentagon.\7\ ``What we didn't fully appreciate before this pilot was
how many white-hat hackers there are who want to make a difference--
hackers who want to help keep our people and nation safer.''
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\7\ https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/
Article/802929/defense-secretary-ash-carter-releases-hack-the-pentagon-
results/
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``It's not a small sum, but if we had gone through the normal
process of hiring an outside firm to do a security audit and
vulnerability assessment, which is what we usually do, it would have
cost us more than $1 million,'' \8\ Carter said of the $150,000 pilot
program.
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\8\ https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/802828/carter-
announces-hack-the-pentagon-program-results/
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The Pentagon announced it would continue Hack the Pentagon program
and bring this successful model to other agencies.
Hack the Army
The ``Hack the Army'' Bug Bounty program \9\ ran from November to
December 2016 with 371 registered, vetted and eligible participants. Of
those who participated 25 were government employees including 17
military personnel. Of the 416 vulnerability reports submitted by
hackers, 118 were unique, valid and actionable. The first one was filed
within 5 minutes of the launch of the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://www.hackerone.com/blog/Hack-The-Army-Results-Are-In
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While bug bounties are a way for the DoD to tap into private sector
talent, sometimes the cybersecurity talent is already within their
ranks. One of the researchers that successfully hacked the U.S. Army
was an Army Captain presently in school at the Army's Cyber Center of
Excellence at Fort Gordon, Georgia. In addition to having a full-time
job and family, this officer registered for Hack the Army to get real,
operational hands-on training in addition to his extensive schooling.
Hack the Air Force
It took just under one minute for hackers to report the first
security vulnerability to the U.S. Air Force. Within the first 24
hours, 70 reports were submitted, 23 of which were valid. During the
``Hack the Air Force'' bug bounty challenge, 207 valid vulnerabilities
were discovered. Nearly 300 vetted individuals had registered to
participate in the Hack the Air Force bug bounty challenge and more
than 50 earned bounties.
``Adversaries are constantly attempting to attack our websites, so
we welcome a second opinion--and in this case, hundreds of second
opinions--on the health and security of our online infrastructure,''
\10\ said Peter Kim, the Air Force Chief Information Security Officer.
``By engaging a global army of security researchers, we're better able
to assess our vulnerabilities and protect the Air Force's efforts in
the skies, on the ground and online.''
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\10\ http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1274518/hack-
the-air-force-results-released/
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Two of the Hack the Air Force participants were military personnel
opting to help as an act of patriotism despite being ineligible for
bounties, and 33 participants came from outside the U.S. Some of the
top participating hackers were under 20 years old, including a 17 year-
old from Chicago who earned the largest bounty sum for 30 separate
discoveries.
The Hack the Air Force bug bounty challenge was so successful that
the Air Force ran a second bug bounty challenge--Hack the Air Force
2.0--in December 2017.
Consistency with Existing Laws & Best Practices
Federal regulatory agencies responsible for consumer safety have
acknowledged and adopted vulnerability disclosure programs as a
cybersecurity best practice. These agencies recognize the critical role
that hackers play in securing technology and protecting consumers.
In June 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published security
guidance for businesses summarizing security best practices from the
agency's 50+ data security settlements.\11\ One common cause for
complaint against an organization's security practices was the lack of
a vulnerability disclosure process. For example: ``FTC charged that the
company didn't have a process for receiving and addressing reports
about security vulnerabilities. HTC's alleged delay in responding to
warnings meant that the vulnerabilities found their way onto even more
devices across multiple operating system versions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/
start-security-guide-business#
current
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In later comments made by the FTC to the NTIA Safety Working
Group,\12\ the commission reaffirmed the importance of this practice:
``[FTC] staff highlighted the important role that vulnerability reports
play in ensuring product security, and recommended that businesses
implement reasonable vulnerability disclosure processes to facilitate
communication with the research community.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/
ftc-staff-comment-national-telecommunications-information-
administration-regarding-safety-working/170215ntia
comment.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) published Cybersecurity Best Practices for Modern Vehicles.\13\
It states: ``Automotive industry members should consider creating their
own vulnerability reporting/disclosure policies, or adopting policies
used in other sectors or in technical standards. Such policies would
provide any external cybersecurity researcher with guidance on how to
disclose vulnerabilities to organizations that manufacture and design
vehicle systems.'' Major automakers, including General Motors \14\ and
Tesla,\15\ have adopted policies for encouraging hackers to identify
and disclose vulnerabilities in their connected automobiles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/
812333_CybersecurityForModernVehicles.pdf
\14\ https://hackerone.com/gm
\15\ https://www.tesla.com/about/security
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In December 2016, the Food and Drug Administration published
Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices,\16\ noting
that ``. . .cybersecurity information may originate from an array of
sources including independent security researchers..'' and described
``Adopting a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and practice''
as a critical component of any medical device manufacturer
cybersecurity program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/guidance
documents/ucm482022.pdf
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In July 2017, the Department of Justice (DoJ) Criminal Division's
Cybersecurity Unit published ``A Framework for a Vulnerability
Disclosure Program''.\17\ The DoJ observes ``[organizations are]
adopting vulnerability disclosure programs to improve their ability to
detect security issues on their networks that could lead to the
compromise of sensitive data'' and goes on to provide guidance for
operating these programs in a manner consistent with existing
cybercrime laws.
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\17\ https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/983996/
download
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In October 2017, deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein made this
public statement:\18\ ``All companies should consider promulgating a
vulnerability disclosure policy, that is, a public invitation for white
hat security researchers to report vulnerabilities. The U.S. Department
of Defense runs such a program. It has been very successful in finding
and solving problems before they turn into crises.''
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\18\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-
rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-global-cyber-security-summit
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These Federal agencies have recognized the critical role that
ethical hackers play in enabling public and private sector
organizations to provide secure services that are resilient to
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Conclusion and recommendation
We need hackers. Our goal must be an Internet that enables privacy
and protects consumers. This is not achievable without ethical hackers
taking an active role in safeguarding our collective security.
Hackers are truly the immune system of the internet. They are a
positive power in society. We must enable and encourage them to make
their best security contributions. This requires a safe legal
environment encouraging all individuals to come forward with
vulnerability information, no matter the circumstances.
I provide you with the following recommendations:
First, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), enacted in 1984,
contains vague wording that has not kept pace with the proliferation of
the internet. The act is in need of modernization. I encourage the
members of the committee to support CFAA reform \19\ to remove imposed
criminal penalties on actions that do no harm to consumers. Individuals
that act in good faith to identify and report potential vulnerabilities
should not be legally exposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ https://www.eff.org/document/letter-def-con-cfaa-reform
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Second, the patchwork of breach notification laws enacted primarily
at the state level may create uncertainty and perverse incentives for
those who safeguard consumer data. I encourage this subcommittee to
support a harmonized and unambiguous breach notification law governing
all U.S. companies and consumers. It is important that such a law
provide clarity on the definition of a data breach to ensure that those
who operate or participate in a good faith vulnerability disclosure
policy are not legally exposed.
Third, I repeat the words of numerous experts that a ubiquitous
``See something, Say something'' practice for vulnerabilities is a
vital and critical step towards improving cybersecurity for consumers.
The absence of a formal channel to receive vulnerability reports
reduces a vendor's security posture and introduces unnecessary risk.
Corporations should welcome input from external parties regarding
potential security vulnerabilities and Congress should encourage that
behavior.
As Jeff Massimilla, Vice President for Vehicle Safety and Product
Cybersecurity at General Motors, stated: ``To improve the security of
their connected systems, every corporation should have a vulnerability
disclosure policy that allows them to receive security submissions from
the outside world.'' \20\
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\20\ https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/general-motors-
cybersecurity/
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Hacker-powered security has matured as a model to be ready to help
society solve one of its most pressing problems: cyber threats.
Pioneering entities have perfected the practice of hacker-powered
security. Hundreds of thousands of security vulnerabilities have
already been found and remediated. The vast community of hackers stands
ready. The hackers are not asking what society can do for them. They
are asking what they can do for society. Ethical hacking may be the
only force that can stop criminal hacking. The asymmetry of digital
threats can be turned around with pooled defense. Together we hit
harder against cybercrime.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important issue.
Senator Moran. Thank you for joining us.
Ms. Moussouris.
STATEMENT OF KATIE MOUSSOURIS, FOUNDER AND CEO, LUTA SECURITY
Ms. Moussouris. Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Blumenthal,
and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify at this hearing on behalf of Luta
Security and the security research community.
We commend the Committee for holding this open hearing to
help understand, clarify, and differentiate between defensive
security research and vulnerability disclosure activities which
may or may not include bug bounties versus internet-enabled
crimes which may include extortion for unauthorized access to
consumer data.
I'm the Founder and CEO of Luta Security, working with
governments and complex organizations on multi-party supply
chain vulnerability coordination to create mature, robust, and
sustainable vulnerability coordination and disclosure programs.
We base these programs on the Industry International
Standards, ISO 29147, Vulnerability Disclosure, and ISO 30111,
Vulnerability Handling Processes, and our own Vulnerability
Coordination Maturity Model.
I am the co-author and co-editor of these international
standards, was Co-chair of the NTIA's Multi-stakeholder
Vulnerability Disclosure Working Group Subcommittee of
Multiparty Vulnerability Coordination, and I have over 20 years
of professional, technical, and strategic work in technology
and information security as a former penetration tester or
ethical hacker for hire at the company called @stake to
creating Microsoft vulnerability research, the first Microsoft
bug bounties, and advising the U.S. Department of Defense for
several years resulting in the launch of the ``Hack the
Pentagon'' Program.
But today, I'm here as a witness to talk about the defense
market for bugs, the role of bug bounties and other security
research, and the role of the defensive ecosystem to shape
these new markets.
When I was a teenager learning to hack in the late 1980s,
there was no broadly recognized and accessible defense market
for hacking skills. There were no online banks or e-commerce
sites to hire us to test their internet-facing systems for
holes, and there certainly weren't any bug bounty programs.
Even the U.S. Government had only a few years earlier
become aware of threats to national security across the
burgeoning early internet through Hollywood films, such as War
Games.
Only in the past five to eight years have we seen any major
acceptance by governments and companies working cooperatively
and openly with hackers. However, there is still a great fear
among many organizations that opening a front door for hackers
to report security holes will cause damage from disruption of
operations, intellectual property theft, fraud, reputational
damage, and, of course, data breaches.
In 2015, 94 percent of the Forbes Global 2000 had no
published way to report a security hold to them. If you saw
something, it was very difficult and risky to say something.
So while the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act hasn't materially
changed over the past 34 years to grant security researchers
safe harbor, in July 2017, the Department of Justice issued
``Framework for Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Online
Systems'' and this guide is meant as a way to help
organizations think through important scoping issues around
protected classes of data and systems when creating
vulnerability disclosure programs with or without cash
incentives.
The main premises are: decide whether sensitive systems and
data are in scope for discovery; encourage the use of test
accounts whenever possible to avoid the unnecessary compromise
of other users' privacy and data without their permission; make
it clear that only the minimum necessary proof is required to
prove that a vulnerability exists and no further access or
exploitation past that point is authorized.
Further, define how any deliberately or accidentally,
because ``hackidents'' happen, accidentally accessed private
data should be stored and transmitted and specify the manner in
which the proof of the hack is conveyed, perhaps using a screen
capture so as to not further transmit unauthorized accessed
data.
So this is to protect both the well-intentioned researchers
from ambiguity and accidental overstepping as well as to
protect consumers whose data may be subject to access.
And, finally, as a creator and advisor to some of the major
new bug bounty programs in the past several years, I want to
point out that the ecosystem for reward bug hunting is skewing
the markets toward more bug hunters but not necessarily more
bug fixers.
This imbalance that's being created in these markets may
very well shift the ecosystem toward rewarding more data theft
than bug hunting. Already we are facing a global shortage of
talent in cyber security and an overall workforce creation is
necessary in defense.
We have got over 350,000 unfilled cyber security positions
in the United States that are open and, according to a 2016
study, none of the top 10 U.S. computer science programs
required a cyber security course for graduation and three of
the top 10 universities don't even offer an elective course in
cyber security.
The defense market for bugs that we are creating needs to
be focused. Markets are not inevitable. They are actively
created. If I were to recommend three practices, it would be
funding for increased education in security to be set for all
grades, setting forth requirements that all college majors in
computer science understand secure coding and organizational
cyber risk management, and a reflection on fewer ``hack the X''
bills being introduced without proper assessment of sustainable
defensive capabilities in each government agency considering a
bug bounty.
Thank you for the opportunity of testifying. I welcome your
questions and comments.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Moussouris follows:]
Statement of Katie Moussouris for the hearing entitled, ``Data Security
and Bug Bounty Programs: Lessons Learned from the Uber Breach and
Security Researchers'' for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation's Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product
Safety, Insurance, and Data Security \1\ on Tuesday, February 6, 2018
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/data-
security-and-bug-bounty-programs-lessons-learned-from-the-uber-breach-
and-security-researchers
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Blumenthal, and distinguished
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify at
this hearing on behalf of Luta Security and the security research
community.
We commend the Committee for holding this open hearing to help
understand, clarify, and differentiate between defensive security
research and vulnerability disclosure activities, which may or may not
include bug bounties, versus Internet-enabled crimes, which may include
extortion for unauthorized access to consumer data.
I am the founder and CEO of Luta Security, working with governments
and complex organizations on multi-party supply chain vulnerability
coordination to create mature, robust, sustainable vulnerability
coordination and disclosure programs. We base these programs on the
industry international standards ISO/IEC 29147 Vulnerability
disclosure,\2\ ISO/IEC 30111 Vulnerability handling processes,\3\ and
our Vulnerability Coordination Maturity Model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
c045170_ISO_IEC_29147
\3\ https://www.iso.org/standard/53231.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am the co-author & co-editor of these international standards,
was co-chair of the NTIA's multi-stakeholder vulnerability disclosure
working group subcommittee of multi-party vulnerability
coordination,\4\ with over 20 years of professional technical and
strategic work in technology and information security, as a former
penetration tester at @stake,\5\ to creating Microsoft Vulnerability
Research, the first Microsoft bug bounties, and advising the U.S.
Department of Defense for years, resulting in the launch of the Hack-
the-Pentagon program. I am also one of two private industry official
delegates of the U.S. technical experts working group to renegotiate
the Wassenaar Arrangement,\6\ successfully helping clarify exemptions
for vulnerability disclosure and incident response in export
controls.\7\ I served as an expert witness for European Parliament's
consideration of dual-use export control reform in the context of
vulnerability disclosure and bug bounty programs.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.first.org/global/sigs/vulnerability-coordination/
multiparty/FIRST-Multiparty-Vulnerability-Coordination-draft.pdf
\5\ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/@stake
\6\ https://langevin.house.gov/press-release/langevin-statement-
wassenaar-arrangement-plenary-session
\7\ http://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/365352-serious-
progress-made-on-the-wassenaar-arrangement-for-global
\8\ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDJxAm-AVNA&feature=youtu.be
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, I'm here as a witness to talk about the defense market for
bugs, the role of bug bounties and other security research, and the
role of the defensive ecosystem to shape these new markets.
When I was a teen learning to hack in the late `80s, there was no
broadly-recognized and accessible defensive market for hacking skills,
no online banks or e-commerce sites to hire us to test their Internet-
facing systems for holes, no bug bounty programs, and even the United
States government had only a few years earlier become aware of threats
to national security across the burgeoning early Internet--through
Hollywood films such as War Games.
This awareness of the power of hackers had prompted not job offers
or viable legal career paths, but legislation that made hacking a
criminal offense.\9\ This law not only gave prosecutors the necessary
legal tools to go after nation state actors and criminals, but to this
day has caused a chilling effect on security research for defensive
purposes. This chilling effect on researchers has also been reflected
in the reluctance of governments and organizations to engage with
hackers, further complicated by recent data breaches under the mis-
applied term ``bug bounty''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/movies/wargames-and-
cybersecuritys-debt-to-a-hollywood-hack.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only in the past 5 to 8 years have we seen any major acceptance by
governments and companies working cooperatively and openly with
hackers. However, there is still a great fear among many organizations
that opening a front door for hackers to report security holes will
cause damage from disruption of operations, intellectual property
theft, fraud, reputational damage, and data breaches.
In 2015, 94 percent of the Forbes Global 2000 had no published way
to report a security hole to them. If you saw something, it was
difficult to say something. It was even a risk to your freedom, if the
organization chose to pursue legal action against you under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).
While the CFAA hasn't materially changed over the past 34 years to
grant security researchers safe harbor for helping to point out
security bugs, in July of 2017, the Department of Justice issued ``A
Framework for a Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Online Systems.''
\10\ This guide is meant as a way to help organizations think through
important scoping issues around protected classes of data and systems
when creating vulnerability disclosure programs, with or without cash
incentives or bug bounties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/983996/
download
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The main premises to help create robust vulnerability disclosure or
bug bounty programs are straightforward in the DoJ framework, with a
summary of the key aspects as follows:
1. Decide whether sensitive systems and data are in scope for
discovery and reporting by external helpful hackers.
2. Encourage the use of test accounts whenever possible to avoid the
unnecessary compromise of other users' privacy and data without
their permission.
3. Make it clear that only the minimum necessary proof is required
to prove that a vulnerability exists, and that no further
access or exploitation past that point is authorized.
4. Further define how any deliberately or accidentally accessed
private data should be stored and transmitted.
5. Specify the manner in which proof of the hack is conveyed,
perhaps using a screen capture to avoid further transmitting
the protected data.
6. Decide whether to include the requirement to destroy any copies
of data once the report is delivered.
To protect both well-intentioned researchers from ambiguity and
accidental overstepping the intended scope, as well as to protect
consumers whose data may be subject to access, transmission, and
storage without their consent, it is important to define these
parameters as clearly as possible. This applies in vulnerability
disclosure programs as well as bug bounties.
Finally, as a creator and advisor of some of the major new bug
bounty programs in the past several years, I want to point out that the
ecosystem for rewarding bug hunting is skewing the markets toward more
bug hunters, but not necessarily more bug fixers. This imbalance that
is being created in these markets may very well shift the ecosystem
towards rewarding more data theft than bug hunting.
There is a difference between paying $10,000 for a bug and paying
$100,000 for a breach. If the legal market for bugs becomes muddied
with extortion payments that are exponentially higher, we will be
building the wrong kind of market, and consumers will be the victims
instead of the beneficiaries of enhanced work with hackers.
Already, we are facing a global shortage of talent in cyber
security, and while more legal ways to report bugs is good, the
creation of an overall defense workforce is necessary, in the United
States and worldwide.
``In 2017, the U.S. employs nearly 780,000 people in cybersecurity
positions, with approximately 350,000 current cybersecurity openings. .
.''
``With more than 200,000 open cybersecurity jobs in 2015 in the
U.S. alone and the number of threat surfaces exponentially increasing,
there's a growing skills gap between the bad actors and the good guys.
One way to close the gap is through automation, but we also need to
train developers, at the very earliest stage of their education, to
bake security into all new code. It's not good enough to tack
cybersecurity on as an afterthought anymore. This is especially true as
more smart devices become Internet accessible and therefore potential
avenues for threats.''
According to a 2016 study, ``none of the top 10 U.S. computer
science programs required a cybersecurity course for graduation, and 3
of the top 10 university programs don't even offer an elective course
in cybersecurity.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ https://www.cloudpassage.com/company/press-releases/
cloudpassage-study-finds-u-s-universities-failing-cybersecurity-
education/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much like in Star Wars, The Force for finding vulnerabilities has a
dark side as well as a light side, but they are two sides of the same
coin, representing indistinguishable skill sets. We are creating more
of an imbalance in The Force, weighted against defenders.
As a visiting scholar with MIT Sloan School helping to study the
vulnerability economy and exploit markets, I helped clarify the
differences in the offense and defense markets for bugs. The offense
market is characterized by nation states and criminals buying bugs and
exploits at high prices to keep them from being fixed as long as
possible to prolong their use in attacks.
The defense market is typically paying lower amounts than the
offense market, but doesn't traditionally require the bug hunter to
stay silent about their find, once it is fixed, providing the finder
with recognition and further opportunities for their career in other
ways.
The defense market for bugs cannot compete directly with the
offense market on price.
Very quickly, we would run out of willing software developers and
testers, and the markets are already taking that direction in the way
that bug bounties are being used today. Bug bounty hunters worldwide
are on average able to make more than being a software developer in
many countries. Perverse incentives include overpaying for bugs on the
defense market, as well as the rewarding of data theft with much higher
prices than an honest bug hunter would get for adhering to the rules.
The entire defensive bug hunting ecosystem has a responsibility to
help uphold the law & guide the creation of programs that will not
breach ethical or legal standards. We have a responsibility to the
current and next generation of hackers to demonstrate best practices in
bug bounties as well as the broader vulnerability disclosure picture.
``Focusing on the labor market opens new productive avenues for
conversation and future research: It suggests linkages between research
on vulnerability markets and a larger body of work rooted in the
tradition of economic sociology. These efforts consider markets not
only or, at times, not even primarily--as engines of efficient resource
allocation, but move to address pressing descriptive questions related
to the contingent and historical specificity of the construction of
markets. Markets are not inevitable. They are always actively
created.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Ryan Ellis, Keman Huang, Michael Siegel, Katie Moussouris, and
James Houghton. ``Fixing a Hole: The Labor Market for Bugs.'' New
Solutions for Cybersecurity. Howard Shrobe, David L. Shrier, and Alex
Pentland, eds. Cambridge: MIT Press. In Press. ISBN: 9780262535373
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/new-solutions-cybersecurity
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If Congress were to act to help clarify the role of defensive
security research, and encourage the growth of the defense market for
bugs, as well as the United States labor workforce in cybersecurity
defender roles, I would ask that:
1. Funding for increased education in security be set for all grades
(K-12), to begin finding early security talent and recruiting
for defense
2. Setting forth requirements that all college majors in computer
science understand secure coding and organizational cyber risk
management
3. Fewer ``Hack the x'' bills be introduced without proper
assessment of sustainable defensive capabilities in each
government agency considering launching a bug bounty.
Again, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity of testifying
today. I welcome your questions and comments.
Senator Moran. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Brookman.
STATEMENT OF JUSTIN BROOKMAN, DIRECTOR. PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY, CONSUMERS UNION
Mr. Brookman. Chairman Moran, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you very much for the opportunity to testify here today.
I am here today on behalf of Consumers Union, the advocacy
division of Consumer Reports. We are the world's largest
independent testing organization and we use our ratings content
and advocacy to create a fair, safer, and healthier world.
Let me start out by saying the Consumers Union is a strong
proponent of bug bounty programs. We believe they play a
crucial role in a data security ecosystem that has failed
consumers far too often.
The 2016 Uber incident, however, highlights the practices
are still developing in this area and we don't always have
clear expectations about how these programs should work.
While bug bounty programs are one useful tool in
maintaining reasonable security, they are not a magic bullet.
Ultimately, in order to fix the poor state of modern security,
incentives need to change and that is why we urge Congress to
update consumer protection laws to establish reasonable data
security requirements and to hold companies accountable for bad
practices, and this premise that poor data security practices
are widespread is, I hope, not controversial.
We've seen a never-ending torrent of major data breaches
punctuated by the exposure of a 145 million social security
numbers in last year's Equifax breach. We are connecting more
and more smart devices to the internet but they're not always
developed with security in mind. Many never get security
updates or even have the ability to get updated.
Bug bounty programs represent an innovative approach to
data security by leveraging a diverse third-party ecosystem to
identify vulnerabilities before they can be taken advantage of
by malicious actors.
Last year, Consumer Reports released a document that we
called The Digital Standard. It's an open-sourced collaboration
designed to articulate best practices in privacy and security
and related values, such as repairability and interoperability,
and in this document, we specifically identify having a bug
bounty program as an indicator of good security practices at
the company.
Moreover, we identified a commitment not to pursue legal
action against security researchers as another indicator of
good security practices, the rationale being that this provides
a strong disincentive certainly for outsiders to try to improve
any particular company's practices but also to security
research more generally.
The 2016 Uber incident raises challenging questions about
how best to manage bug bounty programs. While I think Uber had
a duty to notify its driver's license numbers had been
compromised, the case highlights the potential tension between
breach notification laws and bug bounty programs and raises
other questions.
When should discovery of vulnerability by a third party
trigger breach notification to consumers? How can researchers
test for bugs without ever touching consumer data? When, if
ever, should bounties be negotiable?
And we certainly have concerns about the use of non-
disclosure agreements to prohibit discussion of vulnerability,
even after it had been remediated.
These are just some of the important questions raised by
the case and I applaud the Committee for holding this hearing
to explore these and other issues.
Bug bounty programs should and will continue to play an
important role in improving data security but they're just one
piece. Fundamentally, companies need to have a legal
responsibility to use reasonable security to protect personal
information and that is why Congress needs to act to update
legal protections for consumers to reflect the extremely real
threat posed by poor data security.
There are a few things I think Congress can do. One,
empower the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC has a long
bipartisan history of responding to constantly changing array
of threats on behalf of the American people, but they're
understaffed and they typically can't get penalties from
wrongdoers when they break the law. That should change.
Second, Congress should pass legislation requiring
companies to use reasonable data security. The FTC has
interpreted its Section 5 authority to require reasonable
security but they have been challenged in court and it's
difficult, if not impossible, to attribute instances of harm to
individual data breaches. We should have rules requiring
reasonable security.
And, last, don't block the states from protecting their own
citizens. Some level of preemption may be appropriate in a bill
but states have to be allowed to pass protections for what a
Federal bill doesn't cover. The states have been leaders on
data security, passing the first breach notification laws,
starting in 2002, and they have kept updating those laws over
time so they don't just cover financial information, they cover
other sensitive categories, like health data and e-mail and
photo storage accounts. States need to be empowered to step in
and protect their citizens when Federal protections are
missing.
Thank you very much for inviting me to discuss these
important issues. I look forward to answering any questions I
can.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brookman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Justin Brookman, Director, Privacy and Technology
Policy, Consumers Union
On behalf of Consumers Union, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. We appreciate the leadership of Chairman
Moran and Ranking Member Blumenthal in holding today's hearing to
explore the still-developing field of bug bounty programs, and how they
can best be implemented to promote data security for American
consumers.
I appear here today on behalf of Consumers Union, the advocacy
division of Consumer Reports, an independent, nonprofit organization
that works side by side with consumers to create a fairer, safer, and
healthier world.\1\
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\1\ As the world's largest independent product-testing
organization, Consumer Reports uses its more than 50 labs, auto test
center, and survey research center to rate thousands of products and
services annually. Founded in 1936, Consumer Reports has over 7 million
subscribers to its magazine, website, and other publications.
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Consumers Union is a strong proponent of bug bounty programs, and
believes that they play a crucial role in a data security ecosystem
that has failed consumers far too often. Used properly, bug bounty
programs enable companies to learn of breaches and vulnerabilities, in
service to the larger goals of protecting consumer data and alerting
consumers to threats as warranted and/or required by law. In the case
of the 2016 Uber security incident, we believe the company should have
disclosed the event earlier, not only because a hacker had accessed
sensitive data, but because it appears credentials to that data had
been publicly accessible for some time. This incident illustrates the
continuing need for Congress to pass legislation providing stronger
incentives for companies to deploy reasonable safeguards for personal
data.
I. The Poor State of Modern Data Security and the Importance of Bug
Bounty Programs
As this Committee well knows, the story of data security in recent
years is not a pretty one. Massive data breaches have become
commonplace, as companies accumulate vast troves of valuable consumer
data but frequently fail to put adequate systems in place to protect
it. The Target data breach of 2013 compromised the information of an
estimated 110 million people,
including the payment card information of about 40 million
consumers.\2\ Hackers obtained the data of about 80 million people in
the Anthem data breach of 2015.\3\ And last year, criminals took
advantage of well-known vulnerabilities in software used by Equifax to
access the Social Security numbers of over 145 million people.\4\
Targeted companies often have the opportunity to head off a breach but
neglect to take action. For example, the software vulnerabilities that
made Equifax a ripe target for attackers had been public for months,
but Equifax failed to address them before the breach.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in
Security Breach Settlement, N.Y. Times, (May 23, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/target-security-breach-
settlement.html.
\3\ Brendan Pierson, Anthem to Pay Record $115 Million to Settle
U.S. Lawsuits over Data Breach, Reuters (Jun. 23, 2017), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-anthem-cyber-settlement/anthem-to-pay-
record-115-million-to-settle-u-s-lawsuits-over-data-breach-
idUSKBN19E2ML.
\4\ Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Firm Has Concluded Forensic
Investigation of Cybersecurity Incident, Equifax.com (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/2017/10/02/equifax-announces-
cybersecurity-firm-concluded-forensic-investigation-cybersecurity-
incident/.
\5\ Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, Wired (Sep.
14, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse/.
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Bug bounty programs represent a novel and innovative approach to
identifying vulnerabilities before they can be taken advantage of by
malicious actors. These programs incentivize a diverse third-party
ecosystem to probe systems for potential failures. They also provide an
alternative to sale of exploits on the black market where they can
fetch several hundred thousand dollars--or more.\6\ By offering to pay
for information directly, companies can offer white- and grey-hat
hackers a legal way to monetize their skills, with a far better outcome
for companies and consumers. The rapid rise of these programs is
evidence of their success. In 2016, Google paid out over $3 million
under its bug bounty program for vulnerabilities in products such as
Android and Chrome.\7\ Last year it partnered with HackerOne to expand
the program to cover popular third-party apps in its Google Play
Store.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Kif Leswig, Here's what Apple thinks about the black market for
$1 million iPhone hacks, Business Insider, (Jul. 4, 2016), http://
www.businessinsider.com/apple-addresses-black-market-for-software-
vulnerabilities-2016-6
\7\ Taylor Hatmaker, Google's bug bounty program pays out $3
million, mostly for Android and Chrome exploits, Techcrunch, (Jan. 31,
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/31/googles-bug-bounty-2016/.
\8\ Liam Tung, Android Security: Google will pay $1000 for holes in
these top apps, ZDnet, (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/article/
android-security-google-will-pay-1000-for-holes-in-these-top-apps/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consumers Union strongly supports the development of bug bounty
programs, not just by large tech companies, but for any company that
stores sensitive consumer data that could lead to identity theft, harm,
or embarrassment if exposed. In fact, bug bounty programs are
identified as an indicator of good data security in the Digital
Standard--an open source effort led by Consumer Reports to articulate
best practices for privacy, security, ownership, and governance in an
increasingly connected world.\9\ We launched the Digital Standard with
our partners Ranking Digital Rights, Disconnect, and the Cyber
Independent Testing Lab in March of last year as part of a strategic
shift to start evaluating products for these values as part of our core
reviews and ratings service.\10\ In addition to highlighting the value
of bug bounty programs, the Digital Standard defines as best practices
``disclos[ing] the time-frame in which it will review reports of
vulnerabilities'' and--notable for this hearing--``commit[ting] not to
pursue legal action against security researchers.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The Digital Standard, https://www.thedigitalstandard.org/.
\10\ Consumer Reports to Begin Evaluating Products, Services for
Privacy and Data Security, Consumer Reports, (Mar. 6, 2017), https://
www.consumerreports.org/privacy/consumer-reports-to-begin-evaluating-
products-services-for-privacy-and-data-security/
\11\ The Digital Standard, Data Security, Vulnerability disclosure
program, https://www
.thedigitalstandard.org/the-standard.
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II. ``John Doughs'' and the Uber Bug Bounty Program
Although open source software development has always depended on
external support to identify errors and weaknesses in code, formal bug
bounty programs within major technology companies are still a
relatively new phenomenon. As such, it is understandable that
expectations, norms, and best practices are still developing in this
area.
In 2016, a hacker calling himself ``John Doughs'' e-mailed Uber's
chief security officer Joe Sullivan that he had discovered a ``major
vulnerability'' in Uber's systems.\12\ In subsequent conversations with
the hacker, Uber discovered that company engineers had posted
credentials to Uber's servers on the code management portal GitHub, and
that Doughs had used the credentials to access information about Uber's
57 million user and driver accounts, including sensitive data such as
driver's license numbers. Although Uber told Doughs that its maximum
bug bounty payout was $10,000, the hacker insisted that he expected
``six digits'' for his information. Eventually, Uber decided to pay
Doughs $100,000, and required him to agree to delete the compromised
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Nicole Perlroth and Mike Isaac, Inside Uber's $100,000 Payment
to a Hacker, and the Fallout, N.Y. Times, (Jan. 12, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/technology/uber-hacker-payment-100000.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In general, we believe it is counterproductive to report
participants in bug bounty programs to law enforcement absent a strong
indication of malicious intent. We are not convinced there is anything
wrong per se with a hacker asking for more money than is originally
offered for information on a vulnerability. A hacker may reasonably
believe that the value of the information and the time invested in
uncovering it merit a higher payment. In the past, others have
criticized Uber's bug bounty program for failing to provide reasonable
payments for identifying exploitable holes in their code.\13\ At some
point, a request for more money may convey an implicit--or explicit--
threat to sell the exploit or compromised data elsewhere if the demands
are not met. However, from the publicly reported facts, it is not clear
that that happened in this case. In any event, Uber had invited persons
such as Doughs to look for precisely the type of vulnerabilities that
he eventually found. If security researchers have to worry that looking
for bugs in code will lead to criminal referral, the efficacy of bug
bounty programs will dramatically decrease.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Gregory Perry, How I Got Paid $0 From the Uber Security Bug
Bounty, Medium, (Dec. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/bread-and-circuses/
how-i-got-paid-0-from-the-uber-security-bug-bounty-aa9646aa103f
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, Uber had an ethical--and legal--obligation to be more
forthcoming with its users after it was made aware of its security
lapse. Forty-eight states--as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have laws mandating disclosure
to consumers when their personal information is jeopardized in a
security breach.\14\ Drivers' license information--which was
compromised in this incident--is typically included within such laws.
While breach notification triggers vary significantly among the states,
it seems quite likely that at least some state laws mandated disclosure
to Uber drivers about the incident. For example, California law
requires breach notification when ``unencrypted personal information
was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person.'' While many other states only require
notification upon a determination that no harm was likely to have
occurred, it is not clear how Uber could have reasonably come to this
conclusion. Even if Uber felt it could trust that John Doughs had not
sold or copied the data, Uber knew that credentials to its servers had
been publicly accessible in Github and could have been used by others
to access sensitive personal information.\15\ Uber is in constant
communication with its drivers and could easily have told them about
the potential exposure of their information; instead they decided to
say nothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Security Breach Notification Laws, National Conference of
State Legislatures, (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx.
\15\ Jeremy Kahn, Uber Hack Shows Vulnerability of Software Code-
Sharing Services, Bloomberg, (Nov. 22, 2017), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/uber-hack-shows-
vulnerability-of-software-code-sharing-services. This was not the first
time Uber credentials posted to GitHub led to a data security incident;
in 2014, credentials posted in a publicly available GitHub repository
compromised the data of 50,000 users. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State data breach notification laws were first passed starting in
2002, and were clearly not written with bug bounty programs in mind.
Notification laws and bug bounty programs both play an important role
in protecting consumers, but there is a potential conflict between the
two that needs to be reconciled. Indeed, notifying consumers of
breaches created by ethical hacking pursuant to bug bounty programs
could unnecessarily alarm consumers without providing any clear
benefit.\16\ Lawmakers seeking to update these protections must be
extremely careful to balance the security benefits provided by external
hacking with the right of consumers to know when their information is
truly at risk, perhaps by developing general standards to govern the
legitimate use of these programs. In any event, Uber was not entitled
to simply decide not to follow consumer protection (and other) laws it
believed to be onerous or unnecessary. Uber previously took over six
months to announce a different data breach in 2015, making the delay in
announcing the 2016 breach all the more difficult to justify.\17\
Further, if in fact a condition of the payment to Doughs was that he
could not disclose the incident--even after the vulnerability had been
remedied so no one could exploit it--then the lack of transparency from
Uber is still more concerning.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Similarly, security researchers have called for modifications
to the Wassenaar anti-proliferation agreement to allow for cross-border
communications about security vulnerabilities and the effective
management of bug bounty programs. See James Sanders, How the Wassenaar
Arrangement threatens responsible vulnerability disclosures,
TechRepublic, (Jul. 7, 2015), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-
the-wassenaar-arrangement-threatens-responsible-security-vulnerability-
disclosures/.
\17\ Dave Lewis, Uber Suffers Data Breach Affecting 50,000, Forbes,
(Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davelewis/2015/02/28/
uber-suffers-data-breach-affecting-50000/#5e59102c2db1.
\18\ Mike Isaac, Katie Brenner, and Sheera Frankel, Uber Hid 2016
Data Breach, Paying Hackers to Delete Stolen Data, N.Y. Times, (Nov.
21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/technology/uber-
hack.html. Even today, Uber and HackerOne, despite publishing
statistics about the bug bounty program, appear to be omitting
inclusion of this incident. The bounty program's webpage states that
its top bounties range between $4,400 and $20,000, despite reports that
John Doughs was paid over $100,000 for information about this security
vulnerability. See Uber: Bug Bounty Program, Uber, https://
hackerone.com/uber. This is despite the site denoting ``AWS credential
exposure resulting in access to driver documents'' as an example of in-
scope vulnerability class examples--precisely the vulnerability exposed
by Doughs.
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III. New Laws are Needed to Provide for Better Security Incentives
Bug bounty programs should continue to play an important role in
safeguarding consumers personal information. And Consumer Reports is
committed to providing more information to the marketplace about which
companies perform best under the Digital Standard, including which
companies have the best security practices.
However, due to a misalignment of incentives, most companies today
do not adequately invest in cybersecurity. Many breaches are not
detected or publicly disclosed. The likelihood of law enforcement under
the current regulatory scheme is low. The potential profits from using
consumer data far outweigh any penalties that can be assessed for
violations, incentivizing carelessness and misuse. And companies that
experience a data breach bear only a portion of the cost--much of that
instead is laid on consumers. As such, we need a much stronger data
security law in the United States.
Americans lost an estimated $16 billion to identity theft in 2016,
up almost $1 billion from the year prior.\19\ Department of Justice
data reveals that about 7 percent of Americans over the age of 16
experienced identity theft in 2014.\20\ About 9 percent spent a month
or more repairing their accounts or credit histories.\21\ Tax identity
theft--when identity thieves use compromised social security numbers to
file taxes and collect the refund--is a significant concern as well. In
Fiscal Year 2016, the Internal Revenue Service discovered fraudulent
returns filed for nearly 1 million people, totaling $6.5 billion.\22\
And because consumers often cannot reliably attribute these losses to
particular companies, those companies typically can't be held
responsible in court for consumers' losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Identity Fraud Hits Record High with 15.4 Million U.S. Victims
in 2016, Up 16 Percent According to New Javelin Strategy & Research
Study, Javelin (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/press-
release/identity-fraudhits-record-high-154-million-us-victims-2016-16-
percent-according-new.
\20\ U.S. Dep't of Justice, Victims of Identity Theft, 2014 1 (Sep.
2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf.
\21\ Id. at 10.
\22\ Written Testimony of John A. Koskinen Before the Senate
Finance Committee on the 2017 Filing Season and IRS Operations,
Internal Revenue Serv. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www
.irs.gov/newsroom/writtentestimony-of-john-a-koskinen-before-the-
senate-finance-committee-on-the-2017-filing-season-and-irs-
operationsapril-6-2017.
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Congress needs to act to update consumer protections to reflect the
extremely real threats poses to consumers by poor security practices.
First, lawmakers should give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
\23\ stronger resources and tools to protect consumers. The FTC has a
long, bipartisan history of responding to an ever-changing array of
threats on behalf of the American people. However, the agency does not
have sufficient resources to police the marketplace as it should, and
there are gaps in its authority to address privacy and data security
lapses in various sectors. For example, it currently lacks the
authority to take action against nonprofit entities and ``common
carriers.'' \24\ Moreover, when it does bring a case against a bad
actor, it typically lacks the authority to obtain civil penalties to
deter potential wrongdoers from similar behavior. As such, deceptive or
unfair business practices can be rationalized by companies as a (fairly
low) cost of doing business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ From August 2015 to August 2017, I served as Policy Director
of the FTC's Office of Technology, Research, and Investigation.
\24\ Oral Statement of Commissioner Terrell McSweeny before the
House Judiciary Committee, (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_statements/1268963/
mcsweeny_oral_testimony_to_us_house_of_representatives_committee_on_the_
judiciary_11-1-17_.pdf.
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Second, Congress should pass legislation requiring companies that
have access to sensitive personal information to use reasonable
security to safeguard it. Despite the FTC's long-standing use of the
FTC Act to address data security lapses, some companies continue to
challenge it.\25\ The FTC to date has brought over 60 cases challenging
shoddy data security practices, but given the uncertainties in
application, challenges in attributing harm to specific incidents, and
the lack of penalties, the market has yet to internalize the risks
posed to consumers by potential data breaches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ E.g., Mallory Locklear, FTC lawsuit over D-Link's lax router
security just took a big hit, Engadget, (Sep. 21, 2017), https://
www.engadget.com/2017/09/21/ftc-lawsuit-d-link-lax-router-security-
took-hit/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, while the vast majority of American citizens are protected
by state data breach notification laws today, a Federal standard has
the potential to strengthen these requirements and impose stronger
penalties. However, the goal of any Federal breach notification law
must be to strengthen consumer protections, not weaken the already
inadequate incentives in place today. As a result, any such bill should
include the resources and stronger authority for the FTC discussed
above. Further, it must not broadly preempt state breach and security
laws that cover information outside the scope of a Federal law.
Indeed, states must be allowed and encouraged to continue to
innovate to protect their citizens. States have been the leaders in
passing and revising data breach notification legislation over the
years. At first, these laws primarily covered financial information
such as Social Security numbers and credit card account numbers.
However, over time, several states have extended these laws to cover
new categories of information that, if compromised, pose risks to
consumers. For instance, some states have extended breach notification
protections to e-mail and photo storage accounts, recognizing that
those databases contain incredibly personal information, and could be
leveraged for new types of damaging identity theft.\26\ States must be
allowed to iterate over time to protect their citizens from new and
emerging security threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ E.g., Delaware Amends Its Data Breach Notification Law, Mayer
Brown, (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.mayerbrown.com/delaware-amends-its-
data-breach-notification-law-08-29-2017/.
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Conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today about the
challenges of implementing bug bounty programs to best safeguard
personal information. We believe that these programs play a vital role
in uncovering vulnerabilities in code before they can be exploited by
malicious actors. However, in order to incentivize companies to deploy
these and other data protection safeguards, Congress must update
consumer protection laws for the modern age to account for the
unprecedented threats to our personal data. I look forward to answering
the Committee's questions.
Senator Moran. Thank you very much. Thank you all.
Let me start with some questions and I don't know whether
we'll have time for a second round or not. So if we can have
relatively brief answers, I'll try to have relatively brief
questions.
First of all, for you, Mr. Flynn, what's the justification
that there apparently was no, in the view of Uber, legal or
other obligation to notify the victims of the hack?
Mr. Flynn. Senator, there's no justification for that. We
should have notified our customers at the time when this did
occur and it was a mistake not to do so.
Senator Moran. So Uber does not take the position that the
law is unclear?
Mr. Flynn. I do believe that the patchwork laws that are
per state are a challenge for all companies and defenders to
contend with. I do believe that is the case, but in this case,
I think the real issue was that we didn't have all the right
people in the room making that evaluation and making the right
decision and making right by our customers.
Senator Moran. Thank you for that honest answer.
Perhaps this is Mr. Mickos or Ms. Moussouris. Excuse me.
Ms. Moussouris. Like a dinosaur, Moussouris.
Senator Moran. Moussouris. Thank you. That's very helpful.
I'll be sitting here thinking if I get it right what dinosaur
was that.
So what determines the price for which a hacker is paid for
the return of the information? Is that a negotiated item and
what are the factors that are determined, in this case a
$100,000 being apparently appropriate?
Mr. Mickos. Mr. Chairman, by now the world has paid tens of
thousands of bounties. So there starts to be a typical pricing
for any sort of vulnerability. So you can compare to other
companies and you can set your bounties in accordance with
common practices.
But the bounty decision is always a decision for the
company who's receiving the vulnerability and the main
influencing factor is the severity of the vulnerability, i.e.,
how bad would it be if indeed a criminal abused the
vulnerability, and that is why in my opening statement I said
the average over all these bounties is only about $500 per
vulnerability, but the highest bounties offered are $250,000.
So it's mathematically a question of a power law distributed
set where there are very few extremely valuable vulnerabilities
that will catch a very high price all the way up today to
$250,000 whereas the majority of the regular day-to-day bug
bounty program operates in the range of hundreds or thousands
of dollars.
Senator Moran. What's the obligation to report the payment
or the breach to law enforcement and once a bounty is paid, is
that obligation changed? Is that part of the agreement?
Mr. Mickos. Mr. Chairman, the business, the bug bounty
program is a preventative service and it is not the function of
incident response.
Senator Moran. So in the case of your client, Uber, did you
work for them? You were performing services for them prior to
the incident of 2016?
Mr. Mickos. Uber became a customer of HackerOne in 2015 and
they operate their Bug Bounty Program on our platform, yes.
Senator Moran. And so you did not determine a vulnerability
prior to the realization that there was a problem in 2016?
Mr. Mickos. The way we deal with it, the vulnerability gets
reported through our platform. We do not see the contents of
the report. It goes to the customer and the customer takes
action and may come back to HackerOne and say this was a valid
vulnerability report, please pay the following bounty to this
hacker, and that is how we deal with any of these bounties when
they come from any of our customers.
Senator Moran. What are the other techniques, besides bug
bounties? I said it in my opening statement, but I think you
indicated, Ms.----
Ms. Moussouris. Moussouris.
Senator Moran.--Moussouris--thank you so much for the
reminder. Defensive hack ecosystem. So we've been focused on
bug bounties, but there apparently are other techniques that we
ought to be aware of?
Ms. Moussouris. Yes, of course. If I could answer your
previous question about bounty price?
Senator Moran. Please.
Ms. Moussouris. That is actually something that is very
important in terms of the defense market.
There is a defense market for bugs and exploits and there
is an offense market for bugs and exploits and they're
characterized not just in price. There's a huge price
differential, but they're characterized differently when it
comes to what their objective is.
So the offense market for bugs is buying bugs and exploits
that are fairly reliable and much higher priced in order to
keep them secret and usable for attack purposes. They could be
bought for regular law enforcement or used by nation states.
They could be bought by criminal organizations.
Defensive bounty prices, which regular bug bounties are a
part of the defensive market, there is a logical ceiling above
which those defensive market prices cannot exceed. You cannot
compete directly with the offense market.
The reason for that is you will create a perverse set of
incentives where you might, you know, essentially incent some
developers inside of an organization to collude with a member
of the outside to write bugs into the code. You may create an
environment where it's much more lucrative to spend your time
hunting for bugs than it is to develop fixes or even develop
new code.
So we're already seeing a skew in the market right now
where the way that the bug bounties are being used and applied,
where it is actually much more lucrative. I think HackerOne
just released a report talking about how much more lucrative it
is to be a bug bounty hunter than it is to be a developer and
that's including in the United States.
So we do have to be mindful of this market that we're
creating here and make sure that we're not over-skewing and
over-rewarding the pointing out of flaws without creation of an
ability to catch these bugs and deal with them appropriately
and building that workforce.
So back to your----
Senator Moran. Excuse me one moment.
Ms. Moussouris. Yes.
Senator Moran. So I want to make sure I understand
something because this is at least useful to me. It's not a
question of whether you pay the consequences of the breach
versus the amount of money that the bounty would be.
It seems to me that when Mr. Mickos says the maximum is
$250,000, that's the compensation for finding the problem. It's
not a competition between how much money I'm going to pay to
find the problem after there has already been a problem because
the consequences of the hack will be much more expensive than
the $250,000 maximum that Mr. Mickos--do I understand something
here?
Ms. Moussouris. Well, it is hard to estimate the overall
cost of a breach. It's hard to estimate it to the company
involved, to the users whose data may be compromised, and to
other, you know, affected and related systems.
So there should not actually be a direct correlation
between the resulting potential harm and a defensive market
price. It is much more of a token of appreciation, even if it
is a six-figure payout, and I created Microsoft's
Vulnerability, you know, Bug Bounty Program at $100,000 but it
was for a technique. That is something that's sufficiently rare
that it wasn't creating these perverse incentives where, you
know, people could quit working at Microsoft, stop working on
platform mitigations, and instead go off and, you know, supply
these.
Whereas the damage that, you know, potential new
exploitation technique could cause in the ecosystem is
certainly much more multiple millions of dollars. It is the
idea of setting these incentives at an appropriate level where
you are drawing out interest and creativity of the hacker
community to work with you, but not setting them so high for
something that is not sufficiently rare enough that you're not
creating this much more lucrative business.
And in the case of these breaches, what I'm concerned about
as, you know, a concerned member of the defensive economy here
is that why would a hacker turn in a bug and follow the rules
for $10,000 when the term ``bug bounty'' has been muddied to
include downloading 57 million records and getting paid a
$100,000 for that data theft?
I think that is a line that we should be very, very clear
that bounties should not be negotiable in that way. You had
asked that question. Should they be negotiable? I think not.
They are about setting what you think is a reasonable price,
such that you're below that, you know, perverse incentive mark
of inciting some bad actors and some bad activities and really
setting an example for the hackers of today and the hackers of
tomorrow to participate in the defensive economy for bugs in
the right way.
Senator Moran. Thank you very much.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Moran.
I think this distinction is pretty simple and I think you
make it in your testimony, Ms. Moussouris, when you say that we
need to make clear that only ``the minimum necessary proof is
required to prove that a vulnerability exists and that no
further access or exploitation passed that point is
authorized.''
And actually, Mr. Flynn, you make it pretty clear, too,
when you say in your testimony, ``in my view, the key
distinction regarding this incident is that the intruders not
only found a weakness, they also exploited the vulnerability in
a malicious fashion to access and download the data.''
It's the difference between a security consultant who says
about your home, you have this vulnerability to forced entry
and the criminal who says you have this vulnerability to forced
entry and I have your child, pay me a $100,000. That's ransom.
It's a crime.
And so concealing it, in my view, is in effect aiding and
abetting that crime. I don't know what you want to call it, but
wouldn't you agree with me that the net effect was to cover up
or seek to cover up a crime?
Mr. Flynn. Mr. Blumenthal, thank you for those points.
I agree that this was not consistent with the way in which
our Bug Bounty Program normally operates and it's important to
understand that this is not the way that we're going to do
these things moving forward.
You know, I think that, as you point out, sir, the fact
that this was a multistep malicious intrusion, a downloading of
data, and an extortion and ransom demands, means that this
wasn't consistent with that or the way that that program
normally operates.
Senator Blumenthal. And any such criminal conduct needs to
be reported immediately to authorities.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, sir, exactly.
Senator Blumenthal. And to consumers, ordinary people,
whose lives may be put at risk as a result.
Mr. Flynn. I agree with you on both counts, sir. I think we
made a misstep in not reporting to consumers and I think we
made a misstep in not reporting to law enforcement and those
are both things that we have corrected and will correct going
forward.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree with me, actually with
the Electronic Privacy Information Center that ``bug bounties
need to be non-negotiable and clearly defined in company
policy. Otherwise, companies are letting user data be held as
ransom.''
Mr. Flynn. I do believe it's important to understand the
boundaries between our Bug Bounty Program and a case like this
which had those features that you had pointed out, the
extortion and ransom demands and so forth.
Senator Blumenthal. Extortion and ransom demands but also
when you say you're going to run a bug bounty program, if you
say we're going to negotiate with you when you have access to
our information or when you have the information, it exposes
you in effect to extortion and ransom demands, correct?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, sir, and what I would recommend, after
learning a lot of lessons from this experience personally, is
that I would recommend all companies that are running and
operating bug bounty programs to ensure that they have a
process and procedure in place for when and if this type of
occasion does occur because I think it's something that we
hadn't contemplated at the time and we made some missteps along
the way as a consequence.
Senator Blumenthal. Does Uber have that procedure in place
now?
Mr. Flynn. So we have changed a number of aspects of our
approach. One of the things that we didn't do well here is that
we didn't include enough of the right legal representatives to
determine if this was a data breach notification requirement.
So we've done one thing, which is brought everybody into the
room. I think we've done another thing where we've made sure
that we----
Senator Blumenthal. Let me just because my time is running
out----
Mr. Flynn. Oh, sorry.
Senator Blumenthal.--ask you, do you have clear limits,
parameters, for non-negotiable and clearly defined policy on
how much you will pay?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, as part of new leadership coming in, we are
in the process of reviewing and updating our policy regarding
that right now.
Senator Blumenthal. So you don't have them now but you're--
--
Mr. Flynn. It's something we are working on and we've also
brought in Matt Olsen, the former General Counsel of the
National Security Agency, to help guide us, as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Mickos, does HackerOne have those
kinds of policies in place?
Mr. Mickos. We do.
Senator Blumenthal. Clear brackets or parameters?
Mr. Mickos. Senator, we do have policies. We do not engage
in extortion payouts. That's against our policies. It's not the
business we are in.
Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired. In deference to
the other members of the Committee, I'm going to stay within
the limit. I'm hoping that maybe we'll have another round.
I would--while I'm remembering to do it, I have three
documents I'd like to submit for the record. A written
statement by Kathleen McGee, Chief of the Bureau of Internet
and Technology for the New York State Office of Attorney
General. Her statement highlights the important role of State
Attorneys General in protecting consumers and enforcing data
security protections.
The second is the letter, dated February 5, 2018, from
Representatives Schakowsky and Lujan, and the third is the
letter, also dated February 5, from the Electronic Privacy
Information Center.
Senator Moran. Without objection, they'll be entered.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathleen McGee, Chief of the Bureau of Internet &
Technology, New York State Office of the Attorney General
Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Blumenthal, and other distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Kathleen McGee, and I am the Chief of the Bureau of
Internet & Technology at the New York State Office of the Attorney
General, Eric T. Schneiderman. The Bureau of Internet & Technology is
responsible for protecting New Yorkers from existing as well as new and
developing online threats.
I am pleased to present this prepared testimony concerning data
breaches, which continue to victimize consumers with greater and
greater frequency, from small local businesses to giants like Target,
Anthem, Yahoo, Equifax, and Uber.
In late November 2014, the New York Attorney General's Office
opened an investigation into Uber's collection, maintenance and
disclosure of riders' personal information amidst reports that Uber
executives had access to riders' locations and that Uber displayed this
information in an aerial view, known internally as ``God View.''
Separately, Uber notified our office that, as early as September 2014,
it had experienced a data breach where Uber driver names and driver's
license numbers were accessed by an unauthorized third party.
In a settlement resolving those allegations, Uber agreed, among
other things, to:
Maintain and store GPS-based location information in a
password-protected environment, and encrypt the information
when in transit.
Limit access to geo-location information to designated
employees with a legitimate business purpose, and enforce this
limitation through technical access controls, and a formal
authorization and approval process;
Designate one or more employees to coordinate and supervise
its privacy and security program;
Conduct annual employee training to inform employees who are
responsible for handling private information about Uber's data
security practices;
Adopt protective technologies for the storage, access, and
transfer of private information, and credentials related to its
access, including the adoption of multi-factor authentication,
or similarly protective access control methodologies;
Conduct regular assessments of the effectiveness of Uber's
internal controls and procedures related to the securing of
private information and geo-location information and the
implementation of updates to such controls based on those
assessments; and
Maintain a separate section in its consumer-facing privacy
policy describing its policies regarding location information
collected from riders.
Despite those commitments, reports surfaced late last year that
Uber experienced yet another data breach affecting 57 million riders
and drivers. Worse yet, Uber reportedly kept the data breach secret for
more than a year after paying a $100,000 ransom.
These deeply concerning reports led the New York Attorney General's
Office to open an investigation into this breach and Uber's associated
conduct. While I cannot share details from ongoing investigations, I
can say we are getting to the bottom of this Uber breach, and that we
take very seriously drivers' and riders' right to the protection of
sensitive information they entrust to Uber.
States have a central role in protecting consumers and their data.
The New York Attorney General's Office and other State Attorneys
General offices have been policing data breaches for nearly two
decades. In fact, State Attorneys General frequently work
cooperatively, in collaboration with each other and relevant Federal
agencies, to protect consumers in this area.
Indeed, the states have led the way on data protection for
consumers. When the Internet was still relatively new to consumers,
states responded with data protection and data breach laws to protect
their residents. And as the technology has evolved over the years,
state law has evolved with it.
Back in 2002, when the Internet was younger and e-commerce was
beginning to take off, California enacted the first data breach
notification law. It proved to be a tremendous success for consumer
protection, and New York and other states soon followed. Today, 48
states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories all have data
breach notification laws. That is the sort of innovation at the state
level that our Federal system, at its best, promotes.
The states have already adapted those laws as technology and
consumers' use of it changed, and as new threats emerged. For example,
as e-mail and other online accounts became an increasing part of
consumers' daily lives--to make appointments, send confidential
documents, and discuss work and personal affairs--account credentials
became the ``keys to the castle'' for consumers' data.
As a result, states amended their laws to add username-and-password
combinations as a trigger for breach notification--a key state law
innovation. This is just one of many examples. As companies
increasingly used fingerprints to unlock devices, state laws began
covering biometric data.
But it is better to prevent breaches before they happen. And states
have been equally innovative on this point: enacting legislation
requiring companies to implement adequate data security, and updating
such laws as technology evolves. And states have a second tool:
consumer protection laws, which State Attorneys General use to police
misrepresentations about data security--as with other consumer
products, it can be unlawful for a company to make misrepresentations
about data security to consumers.
The New York Attorney General's office, recognizing the importance
of this issue for consumers and the need to update New York's law, has
proposed legislation to update New York's data security and breach
notification laws. And, the New York Department of Financial Services--
a separate state agency with jurisdiction over New York's banking and
insurance sectors--also has innovated in this area, implementing
important data security regulations to protect consumers' financial
data.
In light of this background, I would like to make a few key points.
First, it would be a big mistake for Congress to preempt states'
ability to legislate and innovate in this area. The law must be able to
keep pace with the ever-increasing rate of change in technology. States
have proven the ability to act quickly in that regard--from both
legislative and enforcement perspectives. In contrast, bills have been
proposed in Congress for many years but, for one reason or another,
enactment has proven elusive. Even if a Federal law were enacted, it
could prove difficult to amend and would fall far behind new
technologies that will inevitably continue to emerge. Thus, even a
Federal law providing the most stringent protections based on current
state requirements will leave consumers more and more vulnerable over
time.
Second, when it comes to enforcement, states occupy a leading role
today and must continue to do so.
Our office has issued data breach reports in recent years that show
an alarming increase in data breaches. Indeed, in 2016 we received
1,300 data breach notices--up 60 percent from the year before. This
Committee is likely aware of the megabreaches, such as the Target
breach involving 40 million credit card numbers and the Anthem breach
involving over 78 million records including Social Security Numbers. In
those instances, New York and other states used a well-established
process to coordinate enforcement efforts against companies that
violated consumer trust with inadequate data security. As a result, the
states obtained not just data security reforms through injunctive
relief but also large civil penalty recoveries that are essential to
deterring other companies from violating consumer trust through lax
security practices.
Less well-known, yet equally important, are the enforcement actions
our office takes in response to smaller breaches that occur by the
hundreds each year in New York and other states. One recent case
illustrates the point. A small company outside Buffalo, New York
misconfigured a web server, which led to the disclosure of 500
employment applications with Social Security Numbers in Google search
results. Our office found out through a tip, contacted the company
immediately, and got the applications removed from search results
within days.
Even if a Federal agency were provided with the most comprehensive
data security law and the considerable resources needed for serious
enforcement, it is unlikely that a Federal agency would be as
responsive as our office and our sister State Attorneys General to
breaches involving local businesses and relatively small numbers of
local consumers. These breaches may be smaller than a Target or an
Equifax or an Uber--but the victims are no less in need of law
enforcement protection. Smaller breaches like these are the rule, not
the exception.
Further, with years of first-hand experience policing data security
in our state, we know how to distinguish between breaches that a
company should have prevented with better security versus breaches that
could not have been avoided despite the company's reasonable security
practices. By virtue of this experience, and our knowledge of
conditions within our local communities and industries, we can avoid
both underenforcement that would leave consumers unduly vulnerable and
overenforcement that would create undue burdens on local businesses.
For all of these reasons, I respectfully urge this body to ensure
that any legislation it considers meets the following requirements,
which are vital to protecting states' innovative role in consumer data
protection:
Any new Federal requirements should not preempt state law,
but instead should expressly set a floor--not a ceiling--on
data security standards and protocols in the event of breaches.
States must be able to innovate in the areas of data security
and breach notification and pass stronger and more up-to-date
laws than the Federal standard.
As with several other Federal consumer protection laws, any
Federal requirements must be enforceable by State Attorneys
General in addition to a Federal agency, and any Federal
penalties or other monetary relief must be recoverable by the
states as well.
To the extent any preemption language is included, beyond
the floor/ceiling issue discussed above, the language must be
drawn carefully to avoid unintended severe consequences. Some
preemption language can be so broad that it might be
interpreted to set aside state laws concerning personal privacy
or computer crimes, and that would be a serious problem for
constituents.
These or similar provisions for joint Federal and state enforcement
authority are already included in other Federal laws and have proven
successful. For example, the New York Attorney General's office has
coordinated with the FTC on several investigations into violations of
the Federal Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, or COPPA, to stop
invasive tracking on major child-focused websites.
The vast majority of State Attorneys General have similarly called
on Congress to avoid preempting state action on data security, as
recently as 2015, when a broad bipartisan group of 45 State Attorneys
General joined in asking Congress to oppose then-pending data security
bills with harmful preemption provisions.
Our office continues to enforce data security protections on behalf
of New Yorkers and to work with New York's state lawmakers to
continually update those protections. We appreciate your Committee's
efforts to complement those efforts at the Federal level while ensuring
that work at the state will continue successfully.
______
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Washington, DC, February 5, 2018
Senator John Thune, Chairman,
Senator Bill Nelson, Ranking Member,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,Russell
Senate Office Building, Room 253
Washington, DC 20002
Dear Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson:
We write to you regarding the upcoming hearing on ``Data Security
and Bug Bounty Programs: Lessons Learned from the Uber Breach and
Security Researchers.'' \1\ The Electronic Privacy Information Center
(``EPIC'') supports initiatives, including payments to outside computer
security experts, that prompt companies to fix vulnerabilities as this
makes user data
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data Security and Bug Bounty Programs: Lessons Learned from the
Uber Breach and Security Researchers, 115th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2018), S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, https://
www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=73871FA8-29AD-
4ED5-ABB8-C86B4BE4E0A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
more secure. But Uber disguised a blackmail payment as a bug bounty
payment and waited over a year to disclose the breach of personal data
to authorities and to consumers. Bug bounty programs do not excuse non-
compliance with data breach notification laws.
EPIC is a public interest research center established in 1994 to
focus public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues
in the information age. EPIC is a leading consumer privacy advocate and
has played a key role in developing the authority of the Federal Trade
Commission (``FTC'') to safeguard the privacy rights of consumers.\2\
EPIC's complaint \3\ concerning Google Buzz provided the basis for the
FTC investigation and subsequent settlement, and the Commission's
settlement with Facebook also followed from a complaint filed by EPIC
and a coalition of consumer privacy organizations.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, e.g., Letter from EPIC Exec. Dir. Marc Rotenberg to FTC
Comm'r Christine Varney (Dec. 14, 1995) (urging the FTC to investigate
the misuse of personal information by the direct marketing industry),
http://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/ftc_letter.html.
\3\ In re Google Buzz (2011), https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/
googlebuzz/.
\4\ In re Facebook, Inc. (2011), https://epic.org/privacy/
inrefacebook/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uber's privacy and security practices have been of particular
concern to EPIC. EPIC filed a complaint \5\ with the FTC in 2015
regarding Uber's egregious misuse of personal data. That complaint led
to an FTC settlement \6\ with Uber in August 2017. In 2015, EPIC also
proposed a privacy law for Uber and other ride-sharing companies.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ EPIC Complaint to the FTC, In the Matter of Uber Technologies,
Inc. (June 22, 2015), https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/uber/
Complaint.pdf.
\6\ Agreement Containing Consent Order FILE NO. 1523054, In the
Matter of Uber Technologies, Inc., https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/1523054_uber_technologies
_agreement.pdf.
\7\ Marc Rotenberg and Julia Horwitz, Privacy Rules for Uber,
HuffPost (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/julia-horwitz/
privacy-rules-for-uber_b_6304824.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important for this Committee not to lump in Uber's actions
with legitimate payments to computer security experts. Bug bounty
programs are used in both the public and private sectors to identify
vulnerabilities. Blurring the line between bug bounties and breaches
hurts white hat hackers who want to disclose vulnerabilities in an
ethical way. Joe Sullivan, Uber's chief security officer (who has since
been fired), denied that the 2016 incident was a breach and said the
company had treated it as an authorized vulnerability disclosure.\8\
But e-mails between Uber and the hacker reveal more complicated
circumstances. After Uber told the hacker that the max payout of their
bug bounty program was $10,000, he responded that he expected at least
$100,000 and then threatened the company.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Nicole Perlroth and Mike Isaac, Inside Uber's $100,000 Payment
to a Hacker, and the Fallout, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/technology/uber-hacker-payment-
100000.html?_r=0.
\9\ Id. (One e-mail read: ``Yes we expect at least 100,000$ I am
sure you understand what this could've turned out to be if it was to
get in the wrong hands, I mean you guys had private keys, private data
stored, backups of everything, config files etc. . . . This would've
heart [sic] the company a lot more than you think.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bug bounties need to be non-negotiable and clearly defined in
company policy, otherwise companies are letting user data be held as
ransom. $100,000 could have been an appropriate bounty for Uber to pay.
Last month Google paid a security researcher $112,500 for an Android
bug \10\ and Apple offers up to $200,000 for iOS and iCloud bugs.\11\
But the communications between Uber and the hacker make the $100,000
payment look more like extortion than a payment for services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Charlie Osborne, Google awards researcher over $110,000 for
Android exploit chain, ZDNet (Jan. 18, 2018), http://www.zdnet.com/
article/google-awards-researcher-over-110000-for-android-exploit-chain/
\11\ Andrew Cunningham, Starting this fall, Apple will pay up to
$200,000 for iOS and iCloud bugs, ArsTechnica (Aug. 4, 2016), https://
arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/08/starting-this-fall-apple-will-pay-up-
to-200000-for-ios-and-icloud-bugs/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More critically, bug bounty programs do not exempt companies from
data breach notification laws. Even though Uber obtained assurances
that the downloaded data had been destroyed,\12\ it was still required
under state laws to notify users and authorities of the data breach.
Once Uber was aware that user data had been compromised, it had a legal
obligation to notify those affected by the breach. Waiting over a year
to disclose is a clear violation of state data breach notification
laws, most of which require a company to notify affected users within
30 or 45 days.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Dara Khosrowshahi, 2016 Data Security Incident (Nov. 21,
2017), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/2016-data-incident/.
\13\ National Conference of State Legislatures, Security Breach
Notification Laws (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The legal avenues for security researchers and white hat hackers to
disclose vulnerabilities need to be more clearly defined. Most
companies--94 percent of the Forbes Global 2000 to be exact--do not
have a published vulnerability disclosure policy and because of this
nearly one in four hackers have not reported a vulnerability that they
found.\14\ This hurts users, whose information may be stolen through a
vulnerability that went unpatched because it was never reported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ HackerOne, The 2018 Hacker Report (Jan. 17, 2018), https://
www.hackerone.com/blog/2018-Hacker-Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2016 Uber breach also highlights the need for reform of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (``CFAA'').\15\ Due to the CFAA, companies
are able to give white hat hackers little assurance that they will not
seek civil or criminal penalties if they assist the company. The law
blurs the line between ethical and unethical hacking, leaving companies
and hackers in legal limbo. Former Secretary of the Army, Eric Fanning,
said ``what Hack the Pentagon validated is that there are large numbers
of technologists and innovators who want to make a contribution to our
nation's security, but lack a legal avenue to do so.'' \16\ Last year,
the Department of Justice created A Framework for a Vulnerability
Disclosure Program for Online Systems, but following this framework
only ``substantially reducing the likelihood that such described
activities will result in a civil or criminal violation of law under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.'' \17\ If we want white hat hackers
to help companies and government identify vulnerabilities, we need to
be able to give them more legal protection than they have now.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Testimony of Marc Rotenberg, Computer Virus Legislation
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (November 8, 1989) reprinted in
Marc Rotenberg, ``Computer Virus Legislation,'' Computers & Society,
vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1990).
\16\ HackerOne, Hack the Pentagon, https://www.hackerone.com/
resources/hack-the-pentagon.
\17\ DOJ Cybersecurity Unit, A Framework for a Vulnerability
Disclosure Program for Online Systems (July 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/983996/download.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We ask that this letter be entered into the hearing record. We look
forward to working with the Committee to help strengthen security
practices that protect users.
Sincerely,
Marc Rotenberg,
President,
EPIC.
Christine Bannan,
Administrative Law and Policy Fellow,
EPIC.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Cortez-Masto.
STATEMENT OF HON. CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Cortez-Masto. Thank you, and thank you for this
hearing. It is so appreciated. It's obviously fascinating but
so needed.
Let me start, Mr. Flynn, with you because I'm trying to
understand this.
So in November 2016, when you identified that data breach,
at that time, were you engaging also in separate defensive bug
bounty programs to help you identify security breaches?
Mr. Flynn. Yes.
Senator Cortez-Masto. And had HackerOne been on payroll
already then?
Mr. Flynn. That's correct, Senator. We had started that
program in 2015, I believe.
Senator Cortez-Masto. And the breach that actually
occurred, was it somebody that was invited in as a defensive
type of bug bounty or is this a criminal element that found a
breach and exploited it to get money from you?
Mr. Flynn. My understanding is these people came in not
knowing about bug bounty programs from the get-go and it was
our attempt to try to get them to use the program as it was
intended.
Senator Cortez-Masto. So it was a criminal element coming
in to exploit and get money from you and you were trying to put
them into a defensive bug bounty program to put them on the
right track?
Mr. Flynn. It's not atypical, Senator.
Senator Cortez-Masto. To the panel, is that a normal
process that occurs that there are some criminal elements out
there, they identify a breach, they're there to exploit a
company, but now we have this whole new world of bug bounty and
we're going to try to put them on the right path here to help
us or is it you're trying to manage somehow how much you
literally have to pay out? Can I open that up? I'm just
curious. This is all new to me.
Mr. Flynn. I'm happy to answer, if you like.
Senator Cortez-Masto. OK. Go ahead.
Mr. Flynn. In my experience at least, it's not atypical to
have people that come in with a report of a problem--a security
issue--not knowing how bug bounty programs operate and not
being familiar with the nature of the programs.
I've seen this a number of times in my career and in many
cases, we can steer those people into the program and behaving
in accordance with the program's requirements.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Don't you have concerns that they're
a criminal element? You're going to go out after them and hold
them accountable because if they do it to you, they're going to
do it to somebody else?
Mr. Flynn. Well, it's not clear that they were a criminal
element in the beginning of the exercise until we were able to
know more about who they were and what they were after.
Senator Cortez-Masto. OK. And I think I'm with Senator
Blumenthal. I'm a former Attorney General. To me, that's a
criminal element and you want to uncover who they are and hold
them accountable and not try to somehow put some parameters
around them that legitimizes them, I guess, is my concern.
Second, I'm curious about this conversation about how we
have this perverse incentive and the whole idea of pricing.
Who defines that? Is it the company that actually defines
that pricing cap? How does that work?
Ms. Moussouris. Well, you know, typically the organization
paying will determine what price it's willing to pay. However,
you know, we've seen a lot of failures to understand behavioral
economics in this environment. This is not the highest bidder
wins type of scenario.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Right.
Ms. Moussouris. It is also not a replacement for your in-
house labor costs to actually find and prevent these
vulnerabilities in the first place and so when people are
trying to pay for, you know, the work that it took to find
vulnerability, they're missing the point. They might be able to
actually better invest that money in more in-house resources to
find and prevent those issues from being vulnerabilities in the
first place.
The prices for vulnerabilities themselves, I think, right
now, there is definitely an uptick in the pricing for various
bug bounty programs. As I said earlier, that logical ceiling
has to hold below a perverse incentive level.
Senator Cortez-Masto. So let me ask this, and I guess we're
all trying to understand whether there needs to be Federal
regulation or how we address this issue so that we are putting
the security protocols in place and working with vendors or
people out there to help us identify it but not legitimizing a
criminal element, I guess, is my concern here.
And so besides the pricing piece of this, I also understand
there--I think two of you, Mr. Brookman and Mr. Mickos, you
talked about that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which was
enacted in 1984, needs to be reformed.
Is that a venue where we can take a look at addressing all
of these concerns we're hearing today, as well?
Ms. Moussouris. Absolutely. I think that, you know,
providing safe harbor for researchers in the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act would go very far toward encouraging legitimate
helpful hackers for coming forward because right now, it is a
gray area, and especially if the scope of a program is not
clear, they will not necessarily know whether they've
overstepped and they might be afraid to come forward.
So we want to encourage that. We want to provide safe
harbor for them in the form of reforms to the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act because the actual act of discovering
vulnerabilities for defense and discovering them for
exploitation purposes, those are technically indistinguishable
acts.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Right.
Ms. Moussouris. So providing that safe harbor is going to
be important.
Senator Cortez-Masto. OK. And I know my time is up, but
this is a fascinating topic. So I appreciate it.
Mr. Brookman, I didn't know if you had a comment quickly on
any of this.
Mr. Brookman. Yes. I would not encourage Congress to try to
micromanage the bug bounty process. I did not testify about to
see if they would reform, though I certainly am sympathetic to
a lot of the issues you talked about.
But as I stated in my oral testimony, I think the most
important thing you can do is shift the incentives to the
companies that do bear the costs of data security incidents,
you know, whereas we're seeing, you know, companies, like
Equifax, will have a stock hit and then like, you know, a year
later, they're back to where they were. They're not bearing the
cost of that identity theft.
You know, some companies who are hit a lot do have good
robust programs but you see that a lot of the top companies, I
think, you know, systematically in the industry, you don't see
enough of this. So the incentives need to change.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Moran. We're going to have a second round. Let me
start by asking this question.
When, if ever, is it appropriate to disclose a cyber
security vulnerability to the public before it's fixed?
Ms. Moussouris. So having run Microsoft Vulnerability
Research, which was an organization within the Microsoft
Security Response Center, designed to notify other parties of
either vulnerabilities we found ourselves internally that
affected third party software, and it was also a coordination
arm that would coordinate among multiple parties, so think of
the, you know, multiparty coordination involved with Heart
Bleed or with the Meltdown Inspector incidents.
There are times when a vulnerability in question affects so
many different organizations that you may do the best you can
to coordinate the activities of creating patches all up and
down the supply chain but you will inevitably have to leave
some out of the embargoed disclosure, the staged disclosure of
these vulnerabilities, which means in the end, you will be
doing the best you can to prepare as many organizations as
possible, but you will end up disclosing a vulnerability before
everyone has had a chance to either create patches or apply
some of the patches that you've created.
So that is one example of a legitimate circumstance where
you would disclose ahead of a patch. Another is simply that
there is exploitation going in the wild, a patch isn't ready,
and you need to disclose to warn users and administrators to be
able to mitigate and protect themselves.
Senator Moran. Before anyone else responds, let me turn to
Senator Blumenthal, who has to return to Armed Services.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. I have a classified Armed Services
briefing or hearing that I have to return to, but I just want
to highlight one of the comments I made at the beginning.
Without casting aspersions personally on anybody here, I
hope that you would agree that stronger legislative tools have
to be given to the Federal Trade Commission. I hope that you
will work with me on the Data Breach Accountability and
Enforcement Act of 2017 which the Ranking Member and I have co-
sponsored.
The FTC needs tools to adequately protect consumers and to
prevent future damaging breaches. So that's a final request. I
hope that you are sympathetic to it and that you will support
efforts to move forward with those kinds of tools.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize that I'm going to
have to take off.
Senator Moran. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Let me ask this question to Mr. Flynn. The Justice
Department published a set of guidelines aimed at helping
companies run bug bounty programs within the law. These
guidelines included a suggestion that any firm inviting hackers
into their systems consider imposing restrictions on a hacker
``accessing, copying, transferring, storing, using, and
retaining'' sensitive data.
As of last Friday, February 1, Uber had not added such a
clause to their Bug Bounty Program listed on the HackerOne
website.
Does it have plans to add a similar clause to its policy?
If this type of clause had been included in Uber's program, how
would a bounty request in the 2016 breach have been treated?
Mr. Flynn. So let me first say I think it's a great point.
We are going through that process right now of looking at our
clauses exactly as you describe. I'm not a lawyer, so I can't
really speak to the details of the clause itself, but I think
it's a great suggestion, and I think I'm going to take it back
and have a discussion about it with my team.
And then you had another question at the end there, if I
recall.
Senator Moran. I just wondered how different it would have
been in 2016 if that clause had been a matter of practice?
Mr. Flynn. I think the answer I would imagine is, you know,
essentially this was not a typical bug bounty situation, as I
described, and I would say that, you know, I think there was a
real attempt to try to get this individual to participate in
the program, but ultimately this person was, you know, offering
extortionist demands and so I think, you know, looking back on
it and learning what I've learned now, I think the better
approach would be to have a separate process once you determine
that it's outside of the scope of the program itself and engage
that process at that time.
Senator Moran. Thank you very much.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, you're welcome.
Senator Moran. Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. So, Mr. Flynn, when Uber has somebody get
inside their system, did I understand that that would be their
records on where every driver drove and every rider rode and
maybe their entire rider history? Is that the kind of thing you
would see if you got into your system?
Mr. Flynn. So in this case, Senator, this was a backup of a
very specific database stored outside of our systems and the
data that was stored there did not include the elements you
described. It included--it had a number of records for--I think
it was, you know, 25 million different users, but of----
Senator Blunt. Would it have had the payment records for
those users?
Mr. Flynn. It had credit--sorry. Excuse me. It had--sorry.
Let me just look here. It had the drivers' license numbers for
600,000 of our drivers included in that data store.
Senator Blunt. What else did it have, besides that?
Mr. Flynn. It had--for new e-mail users, it had the names,
e-mail addresses, and phone numbers of those users. For some of
the users, it had Salton and Hash passwords. It didn't include
some of the things you described, trip location history, credit
card information, bank account numbers, plain text passwords,
social security numbers, or birth dates. Those were not
included in the data.
Senator Blunt. And what have you done since then to secure
that data in a better way?
Mr. Flynn. Well, within 24 hours of learning about this
incident back in 2016, we took a number of important steps: the
first of which was, you know,--so just describing the attack
briefly, the attacker got into an external GitHub repository,
which had some of our source code, by using a password of one
of the users that was in the system.
We rotated all the passwords. We implemented multi-
factorial authentication on the system. The attacker also took
advantage of finding keys in the code base that was stored in
that infrastructure. We rotated all the keys and actually put
them in a secure storage system, as well, and, finally, the
keys that the attacker was able to glean from that code
repository was then able, in turn, to be used against our
Amazon S3 external infrastructure.
We also rotated the keys, put them in a secure storage
location, and we put IP-based restrictions on those keys so
that they couldn't be used to access that data going forward.
Senator Blunt. For those of you who worked to find flaws in
the system or protect a system, what kind of lessons would be
learned there from the ability to get to that information?
Mr. Mickos, is that what you do?
Mr. Mickos. Yes, Senator Blunt, we are a platform that
connects the hackers to the companies. We do not look for
vulnerabilities ourselves or fix them, if that was your
question.
Senator Blunt. Yes. So you do not do that. Do you provide
the platform?
Mr. Mickos. We provide the platform and, if you will, the
marketplace between the two and we provide a trusted place
where hackers can trust that they will be well treated by the
customers, the companies, or government organizations, and they
in turn can trust that they know who they're dealing with on
the hacker side. That is our business.
Senator Blunt. And I'm assuming your name is not Missouri?
Mr. Mickos. No. My name is Mickos.
Senator Blunt. No. Yours is Mickos. What is your last name?
Ms. Moussouris. My last name is pronounced Moussouris or at
least that's how I've----
Senator Blunt. I was close.
Ms. Moussouris.--chose to mispronounce it.
Senator Blunt. I was pretty close. Half of the people where
I live call our state Missoura and half call it Missouri and--
--
Ms. Moussouris. You miss----
Senator Blunt.--you could easily mistake your name.
Now what--from your company perspective, what lessons
should we learn there?
Ms. Moussouris. Well, my company actually does help
organizations look at their overall defensive picture and helps
them figure out the best way to work with the hacker community
but actually looks at their business goals when it comes to
security.
So in terms of the trusted advisorship, when we look at
their capabilities, we look at whether or not they're actually
actively investing internally on some operational security
basics, such as what would have prevented, you know, this type
of breach where keys and credentials were available.
There's a lot you can do in terms of low-risk internal
investments in terms of security, which have been documented
by, you know, lots of organizations over the past 25 years of
developing information security best practices.
So we don't just advise on how to start a bug bounty. It's
really about looking at the overall picture, looking at where
your investments are, and determining is it actually a place
where you can invest further on your internal staff, further in
terms of operational security, and then prepare the mechanisms
such that you can receive vulnerability reports from the
outside, whether it's from a hacker or from one of your
suppliers.
I mean, this really could be from anywhere. It could even
be from the Federal Government letting you know that you have a
vulnerability. So it's building capacity.
Senator Blunt. And, Mr. Brookman, is there a growing
concern about how much information is out there and how many
people seem to be able to get their hands on it?
Mr. Brookman. Yes, certainly. I mean, as I testified, data
breaches are commonplace for people. Companies don't have
sufficient incentives. I mean, we've seen in so many of these
hacks and there are things that maybe, you know, it's easy to
play Monday morning quarterback, but things that were easily
remediable.
In this case, hard coding AWS of credentials in GitHub is
an incredibly common practice, one that Uber had been caught
doing before. It was a private account but still generally
considered not to be best practice.
Equifax case, updating the website to address the publicly
known vulnerability. Even the companies that are trying to do
it right get it wrong and there's just not enough incentive for
companies to try to get it right.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Cortez-Masto.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Thank you. I have one final question.
Small businesses, you know, in Nevada, there are probably
almost 240,000 of them. The conversation I have with them all
the time is their cyber security and they just don't have the
resources to really address this issue and are oftentimes
victims.
Any thoughts on what can be done to help our small
businesses and give them the tools they need to protect their
cyber security? And I would just open it up to whoever. Mr.
Mickos, Ms. Moussouris.
Mr. Mickos. Yes, Senator Cortez-Masto.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Yes, please.
Mr. Mickos. As I said in my opening statement, we believe,
as DOJ and others, that a vulnerability disclosure program is
useful for anybody. This is what then Secretary of Defense Ash
Carter said. ``If you see something, say something,'' meaning
every company with software that contains valuable consumer
data, they need to have an ability to receive input from the
outside world because there's so much good intent among
security researchers and hackers on the outside.
And I would recommend you to read this report, the 2018
Hacker Report where we go through the hackers and what
motivates and how they work.
So back to your small businesses, if they will have a way
of receiving vulnerability reports and taking action, they will
all successively get more and more secure.
Now to be a little bit more specific, many of them, of
course, don't have IT staff. They are working with a third-
party provider where they run their website or mobile
application. That provider has a very important responsibility
in doing the same.
Senator Cortez-Masto. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Moussouris. So I would say that, first and foremost,
the small businesses need to run some of these freely available
tools on their own infrastructure before they invite external
parties in to do so.
Doing so first is just part of their own preventative
mechanisms. That will give them a decent picture before they
operationalize what I very strongly support, which is having
vulnerability disclosure programs, but you need to be able to
take care of the bugs you already know about yourself first.
The fact of the matter is, it's not just small businesses
that have a problem dealing with vulnerabilities they already
know about. There's been a doubling in the common
vulnerabilities and enumeration where the CDE count, the
overall bug count, that have been reported.
There was a doubling last year of reported vulnerabilities.
There is a bug fatigue that is plaguing organizations and
governments all over the world and it is not just small
businesses.
So we have an operational problem and I think that
preventative measures and looking internally first, growing
those capabilities, and then looking to outside help is the way
to go.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Thank you.
Mr. Brookman. I just had a couple thoughts. This is
fantastic question. I mean, when you look at, you know,
companies, like Uber, who have invest in the best and the
brightest, even they have problems.
I think a few words of advice. One, practice data
minimization. I mean don't connect stuff you don't need to be
connected. Don't collect data you don't need, get rid of all
data. A general recognition to try to update everything. I
mean, you rely on vendors, non-updated software is one of the
biggest problems in this space.
The FTC has some really good resources on this with their
Start with Security series, which I know you contributed to.
It's really fantastic guidance for small businesses in this
area, so I would point people to that.
Senator Cortez-Masto. Thank you. Thank you very much. I
appreciate the panel and the discussion today.
Senator Moran. Senator, thank you very much.
Let me ask a final question and then we'll conclude this
hearing.
You're all aware likely that 48 states have different data
security breach notification laws. This patchwork creates a
different standard, depending on where you are, and many
companies, as we know, operate outside of a state and they
contract with people who are in different places to do their
security work.
Anyone have any thoughts about Federal preemption
legislative solution in regard to notification so that there's
greater clarity and certainty for a company in their
obligations?
Mr. Flynn. Senator, if you might, if you don't mind, as a
defender and having dedicated my life to protecting customer
data and implementing security engineering defense, I would say
that it is something I would very much support personally
because I do believe it's very hard for companies to contend
with this patchwork of notification regulations throughout the
United States.
So, Senator, a short statement, but I believe very much
that this is the right approach and I'd love to work with you
on it, if I can.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Mr. Mickos. Mr. Chairman, as I said in my opening
statement, we're in support of this. I would love to work with
you on the details of such legislation.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Mr. Brookman. I would say I have significant reservations
about that. I mean, if the approach of a Federal bill is just
to make it simpler to have a data breach incident, then that,
you know, decreases an incentive and decreases their costs and
I think could lead to actually a worse security environment.
I would encourage any statute to allow states to actually
pass new bills, especially for information that's not covered.
In my opening statement, I mentioned e-mail accounts, photo
storage accounts, not originally in data breach notification
bills, but over time people have recognized, well, there's some
really sensitive stuff in there. If my iCloud gets hacked, I
should be told about it. I would not want to see a Federal bill
say, OK, here are the 18 elements that you need to be notified
for and then prevent the states from over time changing that.
I mean, we can discuss other ways to update it over time,
give the FTC the ability to nullify the definitions, but I'd be
very nervous about freezing that in time with Federal
legislation.
Ms. Moussouris. And I would say that, you know, I look
forward to helping to contribute to make sure that any kind of
legislation that normalizes data breach laws takes into account
that we don't want to create an environment where organizations
are incentivized not to know and not to detect, to avoid data
breach laws.
We don't want to swing the pendulum backwards and so I look
forward to working with you as this goes forward to not create
some of those unintended consequences of over-legislation.
Senator Moran. We welcome all of you on working with us,
but especially intending to avoid unintended consequences.
Is there any witness who would like to add anything to the
record before I close it out? Anyone have something they'd like
to make certain is said before we conclude the hearing?
[No response.]
Senator Moran. Thank you very much.
Then the hearing record will remain open for two weeks.
During this time, Senators are asked to submit any questions
for the record. Upon receipt, the witnesses are requested to
submit their written answers to the Committee as soon as
possible.
This concludes our hearing today, and I'm very grateful to
our witnesses.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
John Flynn
Question 1. What separates a good faith researcher from a malicious
actor? What's to stop a criminal from posing as a researcher? How can
companies or vendors tell the difference?
Answer. A good faith researcher investigates and discloses
vulnerabilities in an ethical manner consistent with the prescribed
terms of the bug bounty program. Good faith researchers are generally
cooperative throughout the bounty process and willing to abide by the
program's rules. Although it may not always be apparent what someone's
intentions are or whether a criminal actor is posing as a white hat
researcher, certain conduct should raise a red flag. Anyone who in bad
faith strays beyond the bounds of the bug bounty program by engaging in
behavior such as maliciously compromising user data, making threats, or
making extortionate demands should not be considered a good faith
researcher.
Question 2. What is the role of bug bounty programs when faced with
extortion attempts?
Answer. Bug bounty programs are designed for good faith
researchers, not extortionists.
Question 3. As you have acknowledged, the hackers involved in the
2016 breach of your company did obtain data of your users. As it
relates to Uber's specific bug bounty program, how often is data
actually obtained by the hacker that is disclosing a vulnerability to
your company? Was the sheer number of exposed and obtained records in
the 2016 case unusual compared to other vulnerability disclosure cases
your company had witnessed through the bug bounty program?
Answer. Most often researchers will use test accounts or access
their own data when researching vulnerabilities. If the researcher
comes in contact with user data while acting in good faith, the access
should be limited to the minimum amount needed to identify and report
the vulnerability. We agree that the 2016 incident was unusual compared
to other vulnerability disclosure cases witnessed by Uber in terms of
sheer number of records.
Question 4. HackerOne's 2018 Hacker Report and a 2016 study
conducted by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) both indicated that profit is a relatively
limited motivation among hackers participating in coordinated
vulnerability disclosure programs. Given the panel's experience with
professionals in this field, could you please further describe the
predominant motivators.
Answer. Historically, before there were bounty programs,
researchers would report vulnerabilities as a way to build their
reputation in the security community and among their peers. Even today
this is the biggest motivator and can open doors for researchers, such
as being offered jobs to work for the companies whose vulnerabilities
they uncovered.
Question 5. Would you agree that it is absolutely critical for
companies to administer any vulnerability disclosure program
responsibly based on sound principles (such as those included in DOJ's
2017 guidelines) as it has obvious impacts on industrywide use of these
types of programs that are proven to protect consumers?
Answer. Yes. Bug bounty programs are critical for many large
companies to detect security issues, and the programs should be
designed and managed responsibly so that they can continue to be an
important security tool. The DOJ's 2017 framework is a good starting
point. It is not prescriptive, but rather outlines a process that
companies considering bug bounty programs can follow to clearly define
for researchers what the company considers to be authorized
vulnerability disclosure and discovery conduct.
Question 6. Did Uber have a predetermined maximum bounty amount for
its bug bounty program? If so, what was the maximum amount?
Answer. Uber's Bug Bounty program at HackerOne has a published
maximum payment of $10,000, see https://hackerone.com/uber, but the
actual amount of any payment under the program is up to Uber in its
sole discretion, see https://www.uber.com/legal/other/
bugbountyprogramterms/ (``Bounty payouts, if any, will be determined by
Uber in its sole discretion.'').
Question 7. Mr. Mickos's testimony stated that the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act is in need of modernization to prevent liability of
hackers acting in good faith in identifying vulnerabilities to protect
consumers. Do you have any specific recommendations related to
modernizing the law?
Answer. Other panel participants are closer to these issues, but we
at Uber understand that those speaking on behalf of good faith security
researchers would like to see more clarity that when conduct complies
with the terms of a bug bounty program, it is not ``unauthorized''
access under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
Question 8. Following an inquiry that I sent along with Chairman
Thune and our colleagues from Senate Finance Committee, Uber responded
with a letter on December 11, 2017, describing the 2016 breach and the
ensuing actions taken by the company. The letter described the payment
of $100,000 to the two individual hackers responsible for the breach
and stated, ``It thereafter engaged in further communications with the
two individuals using their real identities, including having them sign
assurances that the data was destroyed.'' For the sake of clarity, was
the $100,000 paid to the two individuals prior to their real identities
being known?
Answer. As I explained in my written testimony, I was not part of
the ``attribution'' team--the team that determined the two individuals'
real identities. I was aware that the process of paying them was part
of the process of determining their identities, but I am not sure if
their identities were confirmed prior to or after the moment the
payment was made.
Question 9. Please describe to the greatest extent possible the
``assurances'' that were made to Uber's ``attribution team'' that the
stolen data had been eliminated. Were signed documents the sole source
of assurance?
Answer. It is my understanding that the attribution team obtained
various sources of information about the destruction of the data, in
addition to the signed documents and in person meetings.
Question 10. Please describe the measures Uber has taken to confirm
these assurances and monitor the affected accounts for additional fraud
protection.
Answer. We have seen no evidence of fraud or misuse tied to this
incident. That being said, we have identified the 57 million affected
accounts in our systems, and have tagged them for a heightened level of
fraud protection. Specifically, we have created new fraud ``rules''
that will surface any unusual activity on the accounts going forward.
Uber already looks at many signals like location or device ID, in
addition to e-mail address and password, to authorize logins to Uber
user accounts. Additionally, we automatically send users a second
factor authentication request such an SMS or e-mail if we detect a
high-risk login attempt.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to
John Flynn
Question 1. Uber has argued repeatedly that it is a tech platform,
rather than a transportation company. By using this characterization,
the company is able to avoid certain local and Federal regulations that
protect consumer safety and worker rights. But last year, Uber made a
deal to purchase and deploy 24,000 autonomous vehicles from Volvo. Is
Uber a transportation company or a tech platform company? For
cybersecurity, whose rules and standards does Uber follow at the
Federal level?
Answer. Uber is a technology company and not a transportation
company. It is a technology company that strives to make a difference
in the lives of people in the real world, starting--for now--with
improving how transportation resources are utilized by matching drivers
with riders (the Uber app), shippers with haulers (Uber Freight), and
consumers with restaurants and restaurants with delivery partners (Uber
Eats). Uber's technology creates and standardizes markets that
efficiently connect otherwise unmatched supply and demand, but Uber
itself is not a participant in the market.
At the Federal level, the Federal Trade Commission regulates data
security for consumer-facing technology services through Section 5 of
the FTC Act. In addition, some specific aspects of Uber's services are
subject to applicable sector-specific laws, such as HIPAA.
Question 2. In your written testimony, you state that Uber is
``working to make transparency and honesty core values of [the]
company.'' What specifically has Uber done to increase transparency and
make honesty part of its core values?
Answer. Uber has taken several steps to ensure that transparency
and honesty are core values of the company. First, Uber created a
robust Integrity Helpline for its employees to report concerns. Second,
Uber has also embraced all of the recommendations presented to it by
former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder regarding improving Uber's
workplace culture. Third, it is devoting resources to improve and
expand its Compliance team. Fourth, it has installed additional safety
features for riders and drivers in its app. Finally, Uber now gives
victims pursuing individual sex assault or sex harassment claims the
choice to litigate their claims in court or arbitration.
Uber is not perfect, but it is deeply committed to being better and
to doing the right thing, and it will continue to engage in the self-
reflection and change that are essential to getting where it wants to
go as a company.
Question 3. What percentage of Uber's annual revenue and workforce
are dedicated to minimizing the risk of future data breaches outside of
a bug bounty program? What were those percentages before the 2016 data
breach?
Answer. Uber has long devoted substantial resources to minimizing
the risk of data breaches, separate and apart from its bug bounty
program. Some of these other efforts were noted in Uber CISO John
Flynn's written testimony to the Subcommittee, which explained at page
2 that bug bounty programs are just one part of a comprehensive data
security program. Uber's internal work efforts to minimize the risk of
data breaches is, in many respects, part and parcel of other aspects of
quality code development since minimizing vulnerabilities is a
component of writing high-quality code, and it is also a part of
broader security efforts relating to all aspects of security including
physical security as well as data security. As a result, it is
difficult to quantify the percentage of Uber's annual revenue and
workforce ``dedicated to minimizing the risk of future data breaches
outside of a bug bounty program,'' and that is not a metric that Uber
keeps in the ordinary course.
Question 4. Other than the 2016 data breach, how many other
incidents has Uber experienced where cyber intruders extorted the
company?
Answer. The team at the company that handles cybersecurity threats
is not aware of any other incidents in which a cyber intruder extorted
the company.
Question 5. What exactly did Uber get in exchange for paying the
extortionists $100,000 through HackerOne? Did Uber confirm that the
data was deleted? How did Uber make this confirmation?
Answer. Uber paid the outside actors $100,000 in exchange for their
agreement to delete the data they had downloaded and their written and
oral assurances that they had destroyed and would not use or
disseminate that data. The process of making the payment also helped to
determine the real identities of the outside actors, which enabled Uber
to engage in further communications with them regarding technical
details of how they had deleted the data. Uber has seen no evidence
that the data downloaded by the outside actors has been disseminated or
used, or any evidence of fraud or misuse tied to this incident, since
the incident occurred over a year ago.
Question 6. What policy changes has Uber enacted in response to the
2016 data breach?
Answer. Uber has taken several steps in response to the 2016 data
breach. At the time of the incident, Uber determined the means of
access, shut down the credential used by the outside actors, and took
other steps intended to confirm that the outside actors had destroyed
and would not use or further disseminate Uber's data. Uber also imposed
technical security measures designed to prevent a similar incident from
occurring in the future, as described on page 6 of Uber CISO John
Flynn's written testimony to the Subcommittee; these technical
improvements are now a part of Uber's baseline security posture.
Additionally, Uber has made a number of policy changes since the
incident including the following:
Uber adopted specific written policies to establish baseline
security measures that are required for use of Amazon Web
Services and S3.
Uber revised its Bug Bounty program terms, specifically to
provide more detailed information about what type of conduct is
not good faith conduct and what the limits are on accessing
user data.
Uber is revising its incident response plans.
Question 7. Does Uber have an internal whistleblower program? How
is it managed?
Answer. Uber's Integrity Helpline is available to all employees for
reporting concerns. Employees may report their concerns to the Helpline
via website or telephone in their language of choice. The Integrity
Helpline is hosted by an independent third-party to ensure the
anonymity of the reporter, if desired by the reporter, and is
maintained by Uber's Global Compliance team. Upon filing a report, the
reporting employee will be provided with an access code to use so that
she or he can contact the Integrity Helpline to track her or his
report. Once a report is filed, it is sent to the relevant Uber team
for review and investigation, and appropriate action will be taken for
substantiated reports.
Question 8. In March 2015, Vice News reported that stolen Uber
accounts were being sold on the dark web for $1, although Uber claimed
that there was no data breach at the time. To Uber's knowledge, how was
this account data stolen? How many data breaches have been occurred at
the company? Does Uber keep an estimate of how many stolen accounts are
sold on the dark web? What is the current estimate? How many complaints
does Uber get from customers per month about stolen accounts?
Answer. As indicated in the original Vice article that we believe
is referenced by the question (https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/
article/z4mk7j/stolen-uber-customer-accounts-are-for-sale-on-the-dark-
web-for-1), Uber found no indications that it suffered a data breach.
Indeed, the article itself merely claimed that it found Uber account
login information available for sale, but acknowledged that while
``[t]hese logins may indicated that Uber's security was hacked or
compromised somehow . . . [i]t also might mean that these customers
were breached individually by other means, and their Uber credentials
harvested and put up for sale.'' (Emphasis added).
Given that Uber found no evidence of a data breach that could have
led to the login information for these accounts being stolen, it has no
non-speculative information about how the information was obtained. As
one possibility, when people choose to use the same or very similar
login credentials for multiple online or app accounts, or simply use
easy-to-guess passwords, third parties can sometimes determine those
credentials. These types of ``account takeovers'' are a common problem
across all online services, Uber as well as others. Uber addresses the
issue as described in the response to the next question, below.
Question 9. How does Uber address stolen accounts? Please walk
through the experience that a typical customer would go through when he
or she notices suspicious account activity. How does a customer resolve
issues with a stolen account if the thief has changed the e-mail
address or phone number associated with the account? How effective is
Uber at resolving customers' complaints about stolen accounts.
Answer. Uber takes reports of fraud very seriously, regardless of
their root cause. In the United States, when Uber detects a suspicious
login to an account, even if the user has not notified Uber of
concerns, Uber sends a second-factor authentication request to the user
to help stop and prevent the incorrect person from accessing the
account. When a rider notifies Uber about suspicions that his or her
account has been stolen or taken over, Uber's customer support
representatives: (1) will look for signs that the account has been
compromised, (2) secure the account by rotating the user password and
forcing two-factor authentication, (3) restore the account (i.e.,
reverse any changes made to the user's e-mail, phone number, etc.), (4)
refund the affected rides, and (5) advise the user about the risks of
password re-use. The process for drivers is similar, except drivers
must verify that their payment information is correct before Uber
unlocks their account.
Question 10. Uber recently signed onto the Shared Mobility
Principles for Livable Cities--one of these principles is in support of
open data. But, citing user privacy issues, Uber has not always been
successful in sharing data with local planning officials. User privacy
is important, but so is sharing data with cities. How exactly will Uber
now prioritize meaningful data sharing with state and local
governments? Where is the sweet spot between user privacy and providing
data to city planners and other government officials?
Answer. Uber is committed to building replicable models for sharing
insights with city planners and other government officials. Last year,
we launched Uber Movement, a free and public website using Uber's data
to help cities address some of the challenges they face day to day. We
engaged with city leaders, urban planners and civic community
stakeholders around the world to validate our assumptions to develop
and design Movement. Right now, Movement is optimized to look at macro
trends in a city to accommodate specific urban use cases--traffic
analysis and demand modeling and also understanding the impacts of
different infrastructure investments and changes to the built
environment--road closures, bridge closures, etc.
Additionally, we're working with the non-profit SharedStreets to
create new methods for public-private collaboration and data sharing
that respect the need for rider and driver privacy as well as the
competitive landscape of the industry. We're starting with a pilot in
Washington, D.C., and are working with the District Department of
Transportation, Department of For Hire Vehicles, and SharedStreets to
share data on curb usage across multiple modes of transportation.
Better understanding curb utilization can help cities around the world
prepare for a future where more and more of us are accessing
transportation through a combination of shared modes, rather than
relying on our own vehicles. We're looking forward to building on what
we learn from working with DC to support data partnerships in other
cities using SharedStreets data standards.
Earlier this year, we also announced the Cincinnati Mobility Lab, a
first-of-its kind multi-year partnership with the City of Cincinnati to
explore different mobility issues. Through this partnership, we're
sharing insights that look at how to improve the problem of curb
congestion, to commuting challenges, to working to develop a strategy
for the future of the City's public transit service--one that is
seamlessly integrated with other ways of getting around the City.
Question 11. Uber often touts the potential for transportation
network companies to complement public transit by providing the last-
mile service. Does Uber currently provide those services to riders with
small children who require car seats or does it require customers to
provide appropriate safety equipment? Does Uber currently provide those
services to riders with a disability or limited mobility? Does Uber
currently provide those services to older adults or persons with
limited technology proficiency? What accommodations does the company
make for those groups? Does Uber levy additional charges on those
riders?
Answer. Riders and drivers using the Uber app are expected to
follow local laws when it comes to transporting infants and small
children. In certain locations, for an additional fee, people who ride
on the Uber app can request a vehicle equipped with a car seat. The
seat is forward-facing and for children who are at least 12 months old,
22 lbs, and 31 inches tall. Additional details about the car seat
offering can be found here. People who ride also have the option to
bring their own seats for installation in Uber. However, it is up to
the person driving to accept the trip and they may cancel the trip if
they so choose.
Uber works hard to understand the needs of elderly riders and
riders with disabilities. For example, the uberASSIST option in the
Uber app is designed to network riders who would like a helping hand
with drivers who have chosen to obtain training from a third-party
organization on how to provide additional assistance. In addition, we
developed the Uber Central dashboard to allow senior centers and other
organizations to call rides for senior riders who may not have access
to a smartphone. Finally, the ``Request for a Guest'' feature allows
Uber users to seamlessly request a ride for their loved ones right from
the Uber app. The senior receives a text message with the vehicle
information and the driver's phone number so they can communicate
directly with them.
Additionally, the Uber app is compatible with various accessibility
technologies, including VoiceOver, TalkBack, and wireless braille
(depending on hardware and operating system) that can help provide a
safe and reliable transportation option for the blind and low-vision
community. In addition, by providing visible and vibrating alerts as
well as GPS navigation, Uber has provided economic opportunities for
drivers who are deaf and hard of hearing. Both the Uber Rider and
Driver apps are monitored and tested regularly by internal resources
and by a third-party provider of Accessibility testing and monitoring.
You can read more about our Accessibility efforts on our website here:
https://accessibility.uber.com/.
All driver-partners are expected to accommodate riders using
walkers, canes, folding wheelchairs, service animals, or other
assistive devices to the maximum extent possible. Where available,
UberWAV lets riders who use non-folding, motorized wheelchairs to
connect with drivers in wheelchair accessible vehicles that are
equipped with ramps or lifts.
Question 12. When providing the last-mile service, how does Uber
ensure that cars are available in all areas of a city at all times? How
does Uber provide access to riders with limited or no access to the
Uber app?
Answer. By design, our app aims to make efficient and reliable
transportation a possibility for everyone, everywhere. Our technology
automatically and efficiently matches riders' requests with nearby
drivers, and real time dynamic pricing ensures that the supply of cars
can meet the demand from passengers. As Uber has grown, more people in
more parts of cities have been able to push a button and get a ride.
Over time, wait times have decreased significantly across more parts of
cities, including parts that other means of transportation cannot
reach. In Los Angeles, a metro area that covers 100 square miles, the
average ride is less than 10 minutes away, and in New York's outer-
boroughs, riders are just as likely to get picked up as if they were in
downtown Manhattan. In fact, a majority of our trips in New York now
start outside Manhattan and 52 percent don't start or end in the
central business district.
As mentioned in our response to Question 11, the Uber Central
dashboard allows organizations, like senior centers or transit
agencies, to call rides for riders who may not have access to a
smartphone. Additionally, the ``Request for a Guest'' feature allows
Uber users to seamlessly request a ride for their loved ones right from
the Uber app. The senior receives a text message with the vehicle
information and the driver's phone number so they can communicate
directly with them.
Question 13. Uber recently signed onto a letter with the Service
Employees International Union supporting portable benefits. What
benefits is Uber planning provide to its drivers? Will they be offered
nationwide?
Answer. Uber's joint letter with the SEIU and Civic Venture
Partners is about working together on the creation of a portable
benefits system in Washington state. We are working with our partners,
the business community and labor to make progress on this important
policy goal with a view to determining policy and regulatory frameworks
over the course of 2018 and developing legislation for introduction in
2019. We would be eager to provide your staff updates as this effort
progresses.
While we continue our work in Washington state, we are working to
provide additional benefits to our drivers nationwide. For example, we
believe that at a basic level everyone should have the option to
protect themselves and their loved ones against rare and unforeseen
work accidents that prevent them from earning a living. That is why
Uber, with Aon, now enables drivers to access a driver injury
protection program for a few cents per mile directly through the Uber
app. This product provides Uber driver-partners the option to obtain
coverage for medical expenses, disability payments and a survivors
benefit resulting from a covered accident. Drivers who elect to enroll
are protected for injuries while online, en route and on-trip in
connection with the Uber app; however the premium of a few cents per
mile is calculated and charged only for miles travelled while on-trip.
While the Driver Injury Protection insurance offered to Uber's
driver-partners is first-of-its-kind, it is the latest example of
benefits designed primarily for independent workers. In the US, Uber's
partnership with Betterment enables drivers to contribute to their
retirement savings, while 150,000 drivers have been able to navigate
the healthcare market through Stride Health.
Drivers can also file their taxes and claim returns through our
partnerships with Stride, TurboTax and H&R Block, cash out their
earnings instantly with Instant Pay, and receive discounts on fuel and
other operational expenses.
Question 14. Uber has repeatedly admitted to underpaying its
drivers. What oversight has Uber put in place to ensure that this does
not happen again?
Answer. We have made an effort to regain drivers' trust by owning
up to our mistakes and improving the driver experience from end-to-end.
In particular, we have made many improvements for drivers designed to
make their earnings easier to understand and access, including:
Easier to understand rates--Drivers see the exact rates they
earn for every minute and every mile they drive. Previously,
drivers needed to deduct Uber's service fee from their rates to
determine their earnings. Now, no math is required. Drivers
will always know exactly what they'll earn.
Clearer in-app earnings pages--In response to driver
requests for more clarity in our earnings calculations, we have
updated our trip receipts. Drivers now see a clear breakdown of
how their trip earnings were calculated, as well as additional
fare details, including what the rider paid and Uber's service
fee.
Faster fare receipts--Drivers tell us seeing what they earn
in real-time is important. We have committed to a goal of
having earnings details available in the app within 15 seconds
after a trip ends.
Cash out more earnings, anytime--With InstantPay, drivers
are able to cash out their earnings (including promotions)
instantly up to five times a day. We've made promotions
available for immediate cash out through Instant Pay.
Additionally, we have defined new policies and controls designed to
help ensure drivers earn what they are owed for every trip. We also
have a dedicated, cross-functional oversight group tasked with
reviewing and approving all pricing and service fee changes.
Question 15. Uber has committed to changing its workplace culture
to address discrimination and sexual harassment concerns. What policy
changes have been enacted for full-time, permanent employees of Uber?
What policy changes have been enacted for drivers of Uber?
Answer. Uber is not immune from the global epidemic of sexual
violence, which affects nearly one in three women worldwide, and we
want to be a big part of the solution. That's why we've committed to
making important changes. Over the last year, we've met with 80+
women's groups and have been working closely with advocates and experts
from sexual assault organizations to listen and incorporate feedback
about how we can make a difference.
Experts tell us that one of the best ways to prevent sexual
harassment incidents is through education and awareness. That's why
we've committed $5 million to support prevention initiatives, and have
been partnering with leading organizations in this space to educate our
employees, riders and drivers with important information on this topic.
We recently made important changes to give victims of sexual
assault and sexual harassment more choices, ensure they have the option
to share their story, and raise the bar on transparency:
First, Uber no longer requires mandatory arbitration for
individual claims of sexual assault or sexual harassment by
Uber riders, drivers or employees. We believe the survivor
should choose their venue of redress for their individual
claims, whether that's in court or arbitration.
Second, survivors now have the option to settle their claims
with Uber without a confidentiality provision that prevents
them from speaking about the facts of the sexual assault or
sexual harassment they suffered. The decision to talk about
what happened should rest with the survivor, not Uber, and
supporting that choice will help end the culture of silence
that surrounds sexual violence.
Third, we committed to publishing a safety transparency
report that will include data on sexual assaults and other
incidents that occur on the Uber platform. We are the first
ridesharing company in the world to make this commitment.
In addition, we believe that sexual assault awareness should
permeate every level in our company. That's why we have begun educating
employees--starting with our executive leadership team, who receive
training on sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention hosted by
experts from the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence and the
National Network to End Domestic Violence, and we'll continue to do
more. We have a robust HR team and systems equipped to handle and
manage a myriad of employee matters, and we have an anonymous hotline
where anyone can bring their workplace issues. Our Employee Relations
team, solely dedicated to investigating and addressing employee issues,
has been strengthened. We've also taken the following steps to improve
our culture: performance review system, compensation review, manager
trainings, Executive Education, $3M diversity fund, improved hiring
practices to promote diversity & inclusion. Additionally, we
implemented a comprehensive equal pay analysis and have ensured
aggregate pay equity between women and men, and between all racial
groups.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Marten G. Mickos
Question 1. What separates a good faith researcher from a malicious
actor? What's to stop a criminal from posing as a researcher? How can
companies or vendors tell the difference?
Answer. Intent is what separates a good faith security researcher
from a malicious actor. Researchers that are reporting vulnerabilities
through lawful channels are doing so with the intent that the
vulnerability report be delivered to the owner of the system for the
bug to be resolved.
Vulnerability disclosure and bug bounty programs are so designed
that they provide no particular benefit or special access to the
participants. On the contrary, the programs generate additional work
for the participant while collecting various pieces of information
about them. For these reasons, a malicious actor has something to lose
and nothing to gain in such a program. It is more rational for the
malicious actor to engage in their unauthorized activity outside of the
program.
Like in most professional endeavors, it is at least in theory
possible for a criminal to pose as a legitimate participant. But given
that there are no benefits but only obligations in a program, this
would not be rational behavior. The only way to receive a benefit from
a vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty program is by reporting a
valid vulnerability to the owner of the system. When that happens, a
vulnerability can be removed and rendered unusable by criminals.
Criminals, for the above mentioned reasons, do not wait for
vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty programs to start, and they
obtain no benefit from joining such programs if they exist. Criminals
engage in their unauthorized activity at any time and outside any
formal program.
When researchers bring security vulnerabilities to the attention of
companies and organizations, they should assume good faith until proven
otherwise.
The question of whether an entity operating a program can tell the
difference between a well-intended researcher and a criminal becomes
philosophical or even irrelevant. Outside of the program, any criminal
activity is possible and often likely. Inside the program, only good
and non-criminal deeds are rewarded.
The above text describes the general case. Additionally, there can
be a special case of a bug bounty program in which the program-
operating entity indeed does offer special access or benefits to the
participants. For instance, a company may provide test accounts or
other credentials to participating researchers so that they may venture
deeper into the computer system in their hunt for vulnerabilities to
report and be rewarded for. In such programs, the participating
researchers go through additional vetting and screening. The exact
nature of the screening depends on the company's or organization's
preferences and may include verification of identity and tax ID,
verification of home address, criminal background check, and so on.
With these additional screening requirements, the operator of the bug
bounty program guards itself against malicious actors gaining access to
the program in question.
For an overview of the motivations of ethical hackers and for
personal profiles of a number of them, we recommend reading the 2018
Hacker Report that is available from HackerOne, Inc., on our website
www.hackerone.com and by contacting us by e-mail at info@hackerone.com.
Question 2. What is the role of bug bounty programs when faced with
extortion attempts?
Answer. Extortion has absolutely no role in bug bounty programs.
Whenever a situation develops that may indicate an extortion
attempt, HackerOne advises the sponsor of the program (its customer) to
notify and work with law enforcement for guidance and instructions. It
is always the entity with the bug bounty (or vulnerability
coordination) program that determines whether conduct by a hacker or
hackers is authorized or unauthorized. Bug bounty platform providers
such as HackerOne act as a preventative service.
There are situations where immature researchers may ask for a
bounty in an impolite or even threatening way. Often, such situations
can be de-escalated with the help of mediation and diplomacy. Hackers
do commonly suggest or ask for specific bounty amounts from the vendor.
The size of the bounty is largely determined by the severity of the
vulnerability, and severity can be properly assessed only by the
customer. So the finder is in a position of no control at all over the
payment outcome. To balance this, they often make suggestions, requests
and claims for specific bounties in the hope that the customer will be
open to suggestions. As many hackers are young and all of them are
impatient, the language of such requests may not seem proper to someone
not familiar with the trade, even though the hacker has the best of
intentions.
Question 3. According to your testimony, the diversity and scale of
the hacker community allows the ``hacker-powered security'' model to
identify vulnerabilities that automated scanners and permanent
penetration testing teams will not. Can you please further explain this
sentiment? Are there any metrics or numbers that are able to cite to
quantify the effectiveness of the model over other approaches?
Answer. Customers on HackerOne have resolved more than 65,000
unique security vulnerabilities to date by working with the hacker
community. A good portion of these customers have reported back to
HackerOne that they are finding vulnerabilities that they could not
otherwise detect with scanners or penetration testing (also called
pentesting). The strongest metric in support of hacker-powered security
is the fact that even after deploying scanners and pentests there are
innumerable security vulnerabilities that bug bounty and vulnerability
disclosure programs identify.
There are a number of reasons for this. A key reason is that
scanners and penetration testing are limited in scope whereas hacker-
powered security is broad and diverse.
A scanner has been programmed by engineers to detect specific
previously known vulnerability types, but it is limited in its ability
to modify its search or ``think outside the box.'' Though useful,
scanners cannot find what humans can. Penetration tests are conducted
by humans and therefore represent more intellectual variety and
creativity than scanners. But they cannot measure up against a broad
and creative collection of external researchers. Penetration tests
follow pre-defined guidelines and are designed to test for a specific
set of vulnerabilities. Often, customers are more eager to get a clean
report than to find all possible vulnerabilities.
In both the case of scanners and of penetration testing, the
customer is paying a fixed price for effort. But in the case of hacker-
powered security, the customer pays for result. Hackers do not get paid
unless they find something of value to the customer. This leads the
hackers to try harder and think more creatively, and that in turn leads
to superior results.
Question 4. Your testimony described vulnerability disclosure
programs with the motto of ``If you see something, say something,'' and
further elaborates how the outside hacker will be invited to disclose
the vulnerability to the system's owner. During the disclosure process,
is it a common practice for the hacker to actually take exposed data in
order to demonstrate proof of vulnerability to the company? If so, is
there a standard type or amount of data that these [sic] is needed for
the hacker to demonstrate authenticity?
Answer. The amount of evidence that it is prudent to collect when
discovering a security vulnerability is a topic of great interest to
the security community. On the one hand, the hacker is bound and
committed by the program rules not to cause harm or obtain any data
that is not needed for the work. On the other hand, there are
situations where perhaps the only way of demonstrating that a breach
could be possible is to actually exfiltrate some data.
Entities that operate bug bounty programs declare on their program
page the rules for the hackers. Typically, they will prohibit data
exfiltration, as this example from a prominent bug bounty program
shows: ``Findings not eligible for bounty: . . . Internal pivoting,
scanning, exploiting, or exfiltrating data from internal [company name]
systems.''
It should be noted that a hacker may not initially know what is
inside a data file found. In order to determine the nature of the file,
the hacker may have to open it, which for practical purposes may mean
downloading it, which amounts to exfiltration. If the contents are
irrelevant, then no harm was done. If the file contains pointers to
other data sources, or perhaps credentials to another system, then this
is valuable information for resolving the security problem. But if the
contents turn out to be customer or personal information, then the
hacker must immediately erase any such copies of the file and refrain
from opening it or using it again. The determination of whether it is
permissible to open the file or not can be made only after the file has
been opened.
Question 5. HackerOne's 2018 Hacker Report and a 2016 study
conducted by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) both indicated that profit is a relatively
limited motivation among hackers participating in coordinated
vulnerability disclosure programs. Given the panel's experience with
professionals in this field, could you please further describe the
predominant motivators?
Answer. In the course of its business, HackerOne has enabled tens
of thousands of hackers to find and help fix over 65,000 security
vulnerabilities. The motivations behind the hackers' work are as
diverse as the group. In the hacker surveys we have conducted, we
consistently see hackers operating under multiple motivations.
Financial rewards are essential and important, but they are far
from the only motivation. The presence and success of numerous
vulnerability disclosure programs (i.e., programs that pay no financial
rewards) serve as a clear indicator that there are plenty of hackers
ready to hunt for security vulnerabilities for other than pecuniary
reasons. For instance, in the various programs by the Department of
Defense, about 3,000 vulnerabilities have been reported into the
vulnerability disclosure program and 600 within the bug bounty
programs.
Many hackers hack for the intellectual challenge. They want to
learn more and they are eager to know that they have the skill to find
a hole in the armor of a famous company or government entity. Being
thanked or acknowledged by a prestigious vulnerability disclosure
program is a great motivation.
Often, hackers hack in order to find like-minded people and be able
to collaborate with them. It is a reward in itself to be able to
interact with someone with unusual skill or intellect.
Others hack for the pragmatic reason of advancing their careers.
The list of vulnerabilities found that each hacker has on their
individual HackerOne page serves as evidence of their skills. It helps
them gain entry to colleges and universities or to land a security job
at a company or other organization.
For many, there is an altruistic motive in hacking. They want to
make the world a more secure place. They want to contribute to society.
They have a sense of duty and feel that if they know how to detect
vulnerabilities, it is their mandate to report them to the owners of
the various systems.
Question 6. Would you agree that it is absolutely critical for
companies to administer any vulnerability disclosure program
responsibly based on sound principles (such as those included in DOJ's
2017 guidelines) as it has obvious impacts on industry-wide use of
these types of programs that are proven to protect consumers?
Answer. Yes, HackerOne applauded the U.S. Department of Justice for
its 2017 guidelines for vulnerability disclosure programs (VDP). The
DoJ's guidance reflects best-practices across the industry and is a
critical document for any organization. Indeed, in many ways, HackerOne
is dedicated to facilitating the responsible implementation of VDPs
across the broad spectrum of vulnerable entities in line with the DoJ's
guidance.
Question 7. Given the unique national security aspects of working
with DOD, I am interested to hear more about HackerOne's involvement in
the vulnerability disclosure programs aiding our Armed Services,
starting with the ``Hack the Pentagon'' program and followed by the
``Hack the Army'' and ``Hack the Air Force 1.0 and 2.0.''
Answer. The Department of Defense's Defense Digital Services
pioneered the first ever Federal bug bounty challenge, ``Hack the
Pentagon,'' in 2016. The DoD is continuing to do so by engaging with
the global hacker community through its ongoing vulnerability
disclosure policy.
Since the Hack the Pentagon program launched in 2016, over 3,600
vulnerabilities have been resolved in government systems through the
bug bounty and vulnerability disclosure challenges on HackerOne.
Working with the ethical hacker community supplements the useful work
the DoD's internal security teams are already doing.
Hack the Army
The Hack the Army Bug Bounty program ran from Wednesday, November
30, 2016 to Wednesday, December 21, 2016. Hackers reported more than
118 valid unique security issues.
Through this program, the Army was able to tap into the reservoir
of diverse hackers on HackerOne, many of whom would otherwise not work
with the Army, augment the work the Army red teams are already doing to
help secure their systems and networks, and increase the security of
mission critical systems and networks that house information critical
to military recruiting.
The Army chose as its target digital assets that might have been
used as a stepping stone for reaching personally identifying
information about Army recruits--colloquially referred to as ``the
crown jewels.'' Ensuring this data was secure was a high priority for
DoD because of the sensitivity of the information for America's
potential war fighters.
The most significant vulnerability found was due to a series of
chained vulnerabilities. A researcher could move from a public-facing
website, goarmy.com, and get to an internal DoD website that requires
special credentials to access. The researchers got there through an
open proxy, meaning the routing was not shut down the way it should
have been. The researcher, without even knowing it, was able to get to
this internal network because there was a vulnerability with the proxy
and with the actual system. On its own, neither vulnerability is
particularly interesting. Paired together, they become critical.
Automated testing tools are not capable of such leaps of logic. It
requires a highly skilled and creative researcher (or team of
researchers) to chain together a number of independent flaws in order
to create a path to the critical inside of the system.
The Army remediation team that owns and operates the websites, as
well as the Army Cyber Protection Brigade, acted quickly. Once the
report was submitted, they were able to block any further attacks, and
ensure there was no way to exploit this chain of vulnerabilities.
Hack the Air Force
The Hack the Air Force Bug Bounty program ran from May 30, 2017 to
June 23, 2017, with nearly 300 individual hackers participating in the
bug bounty challenge. More than 50 hackers earned bounties for
reporting more than 207 valid unique security vulnerabilities, the
first of which was reported in less than a minute from the start of the
program.
Some of the vulnerability reports received an initial response time
of less than a minute by the Air Force security teams. The average time
to resolution during the challenge was 4 days. What this means is that
the Air Force's security team was extremely fast at processing reports,
verifying them and resolving bugs, making the systems more secure
faster.
Hack the Air Force 2.0
On December 9, 2017, the first day of the challenge, 24 hackers met
in New York City and participated in a live hacking event--the first
ever to include Federal government participation on-site. DoD and U.S.
Air Force personnel worked alongside the vetted and pre-selected
hackers to simultaneously report security flaws and remediate them in
real-time. Together, they collaborated to find 55 of the 106 total
vulnerabilities during this nine-hour hacking event.
Twenty-seven trusted hackers successfully participated in the Hack
the Air Force bug bounty challenge--reporting 106 valid vulnerabilities
and earning a total of $103,883. Hackers from the U.S., Canada, United
Kingdom, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium and Latvia participated in the
challenge. In this event, the highest single bounty of any Federal
program--$12,500--was awarded.
Question 8. More specifically, were there lessons learned from the
earlier programs that your company addressed and implemented in the
more recent programs?
Answer. Working with its DoD counterparts, HackerOne and the
security research community continue to improve its programs. We
regularly revise and improve our internal process descriptions and our
external program guidelines in order to reduce the risk of failure in a
program and to increase the overall productivity and effectiveness of
hacker-powered security. We also continually learn more about the
digital assets of our customers so that we can provide better advice on
which assets to include in a program, and at what phase of the program.
As our customers develop a thorough expertise in operating a bug
bounty program, we may recommend events where hackers and the security
team of the customer are brought together for a live hacking event. We
did so during ``Hack the Air Force 2.0'' and the results exceeded
expectations.
Hack the Air Force targeted operationally significant websites and
online services. The goal of the program was to explore new approaches
to its security, and to adopt the best practices used by the most
successful and secure software companies in the world. The preliminary
results indicate nearly doubling the results of the first Hack the
Pentagon program a year earlier.
With every DoD bug bounty the pool of invited participants has
grown, with the intent of opening it wider to continue to include all
qualified participants. By now, every person on HackerOne is legally
permitted to participate in the DoD's vulnerability disclosure program
(VDP). To date, the DoD's VDP has resolved more than 3,000 security
vulnerabilities.
Question 9. How did your company account for the specific
capabilities and functions of the different services your company
worked with?
Answer. The key to success in a bug bounty or vulnerability
disclosure program lies in diversity of approach and specificity of
skill among the hackers. That is why HackerOne has established the
world's largest community of security researchers, also known as white
hat hackers. By having an enormous pool to draw from, we ensure that
for each particular program there is a large enough group of hackers
with the particular skills needed. We record and keep track of skill
profiles in our hacker database. When a new program launches, we can
find the hackers most likely to have the required skills.
As new customers launch programs on HackerOne, a useful cross-
pollination of skills often happens. The new customer typically brings
along hackers with deep skills in their particular digital asset. These
hackers can then find other programs with similar profiles. And from
those other programs, existing hackers may engage in the new program.
In this way, over time, individual hacker skills are strengthened, and
the overall skill profiles in the HackerOne community become more
complete.
Additionally, both HackerOne and its clients may arrange for
additional education, training and briefing of hackers in specific
areas of technology. The more information there is available, the
sharper the skills and the better the results of bug bounty programs.
Arguably the best source of learning for ethical hackers is the
Hacktivity feed () where vulnerability reports are being published by
various companies and government agencies for others to learn from once
the vulnerability has been fixed and removed.
Question 10. Please explain the utility of a combined pool of
Federal employee and outside participants.
Answer. The success of cyber security is measured not by how many
good events there are but by how many bad events can be avoided. The
best results are achieved by multiple layers of security. Even if one
layer occasionally fails, there is another layer that will catch the
deviation from the norm.
Cyber security starts with the design of the digital system. This
is the first layer of security. Later in the software lifecycle comes
quality assurance, which also removes weaknesses. When a digital asset
is ready for production use, it still needs testing and validation.
This is where internal and external bug hunting teams come into the
picture. Internal teams of employees have the benefit of inside
knowledge of the system. External teams of hackers have the benefit of
lack of bias. These and other, more technical, layers of security are
needed for the best outcome.
A theme we heard over and over again while working with the DoD is
that military and civilian personnel need hands-on training whenever
possible. This keeps their skills sharp and allows them opportunities
to see unique tactics from a highly skilled researcher community.
Allowing employees to participate in bug bounty programs provides
realistic training experiences in a controlled environment, at a low
cost.
Question 11. Your testimony states that $250,000 is the current
maximum bounty listed across all programs that the company administers
for its clients. Are the maximum bounty amounts pre-determined in
agreements with your client companies?
Answer. On HackerOne's platform, it is the customer that sets the
bounty criteria, often based on a recommendation from HackerOne.
HackerOne maintains a set of recommended bounty amounts that we derive
from historical bounty payment data, adjusting for size and ambition
level of the program in question. The bounty amount is typically a
function of the severity of the vulnerability and the value of the
digital asset in which the vulnerability was found.
The client company has the full right to deviate from their own
criteria and pay out higher bounties than advertised. As a matter of
fact, many programs do not publish or advertise any maximum bounty.
In addition to bounties, customers can choose to pay individual
bonuses to hackers. For instance, if a hacker has prepared an unusually
well-researched and well-written vulnerability report to the customer,
the entity may choose to reward the hacker with a bonus on top of the
bounty. The bonus amounts are typically small. In 2017, less than 5
percent of all hacker rewards were bonuses.
Question 12. Your testimony stated that the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act is in need of modernization to prevent liability of hackers
acting in good faith in identifying vulnerabilities to protect
consumers. Do you have any specific recommendations related to
modernizing the law?
Answer. Current law, particularly the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA), does a disservice to the Internet and its citizens. Congress
should amend it to reflect the modern-day needs of the country's
cybersecurity community, including the value and necessity of voluntary
disclosure programs.
The CFAA fails to define the terms ``without authorization'' or
``exceeding authorized access,'' which are key elements of the law.
This broad undefined language has resulted in the CFAA being called one
of the most controversial, confusing, and inconsistently interpreted
laws in the country. We suggest that the law should clarify ``without
authorization'' and distinguish between bad intent on the one hand, and
good intent or innocent lack of intent on the other.
While intended as a criminal law preventing malicious hacking, a
1994 amendment to the bill allows for civil actions. We suggest that
the CFAA focus on criminal liability rather than civil liability. Much
of the chilling effect created by the law originates from its broad
interpretation in civil cases, where the burden of proof is reduced.
HackerOne also suggests that violations of contractual obligations,
such as a website's terms of service, must not form a basis for
criminal charges. Further, it should be clarified in the law that if
access to data is already authorized, gaining that access in a novel or
automated way is not a crime (i.e., changing IP addresses, MAC
addresses, or browser User Agent headers). Finally, minor violations of
the CFAA should be punishable with minor penalties, ensuring the
punishment fits the violation.
HackerOne urges Congress to modernize the CFAA and related laws to
reflect the necessity to fight cybercrime with modern-day tools and
processes, including particularly voluntary disclosure programs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to
Marten G. Mickos
Question 1. I have been working to make the process of software
vulnerability disclosures more transparent and accountable. As part of
this effort, Senators Gardner, Johnson, Klobuchar, and I introduced the
PATCH Act. Do you support the PATCH Act?
Answer. We believe in the general and overarching principles of
finding, fixing and disclosing security vulnerabilities. We as a e
society should make every effort to detect security vulnerabilities and
have them corrected by the owner of the system before the vulnerability
can be exploited by criminals or other adversaries. Once the
responsible owner of a system has remediated the vulnerability, or
after a reasonable time of being advised of the existence of a
vulnerability, it is in society's best interest to make this
information publicly known. In our increasingly connected world, it is
rare that critical lessons learned from a vulnerability are limited to
a single organization. We also acknowledge that the government from
time to time will have valid and specific reasons of a national
security character not to report or disclose a known security
vulnerability. Such withholding of vulnerability information from the
owner of the system in question should be allowed temporarily only when
required to address a specific and significant nation security threat.
To the degree the PATCH Act validates and enforces these principles, we
support the act.
Question 2. HackerOne's code of conduct clearly forbids extortion
or blackmail. Yet, after the 2016 incident, Uber still remains a client
of HackerOne and is listed on its platform. Was Uber's payoff to its
extortionists not a violation of HackerOne's code of conduct? Was their
account suspended or penalized in any manner?
Answer. Based on our observations and investigations, Uber is not
and has not been in violation of HackerOne's terms and conditions or
code of conduct for customers. HackerOne did not suspend or penalize
Uber's customer account in any manner.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Katie Moussouris
Question. If we are going to increase the size and expertise of our
cybersecurity workforce it is essential that we commit to expanding
educational opportunities for American students. That's why I
introduced the bipartisan Innovate America Act with Senator John
Hoeven. Provisions from this bill became law as part of the Every
Student Succeeds Act. They will improve students' access to STEM
education by allowing states to award funding to create or enhance a
STEM-focused specialty school or a STEM program within a school.
Minnesota has received $4 million of these grants and will be making
awards soon.
Ms. Moussouris, how significant is the current skills gap in the
cybersecurity workforce?
Answer. No Response Provided.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to
Katie Moussouris
Question 1. There are serious questions about the disclosure
timeline and process of the ``Spectre'' and ``Meltdown'' flaws. Do you
believe that the right entities were involved in the research and
disclosure process leading up to public notification? How could this be
improved?
Answer. No Response Provided.
Question 2. What should be the threshold for disclosing
vulnerabilities to the U.S. government? As the cyber threat model
evolves, how and when should this threshold change?
Answer. No Response Provided.
Question 3. I have been working to make the process of software
vulnerability disclosures more transparent and accountable. As part of
this effort, Senators Gardner, Johnson, Klobuchar, and I introduced the
PATCH Act. Do you support the PATCH Act?
Answer. No Response Provided.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Justin Brookman
Question 1. I introduced the Seniors Fraud Prevention Act with
Senator Susan Collins, the Chair of the Senate Committee on Aging, to
help the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) more effectively combat senior
fraud. When personal information has been compromised online, identity
theft and other fraud can follow consumers for years. My bill would
help fight scams designed to strip seniors of their assets by helping
educate seniors about fraud schemes and improving monitoring and
response to fraud complaints. This bill was passed by the Commerce
Committee last year and I am happy to say it passed the Senate in
August.
Mr. Brookman, what additional resources or authority at the FTC
would be helpful in protecting consumers' personal information?
Answer. There are a number of important steps that I believe
Congress should undertake to improve the FTC's ability to protect
consumer privacy. These include:
Enact statutory privacy protections. The United States is
outlier in that it is one of the few nations that does not
provide legal protections for most personal data. Instead, only
a few isolated pockets of information (such as medical history,
data about children, and video rental records) are protected--
and even some of those protections are being rolled back.\1\ In
lieu of dedicated privacy authority, the Federal Trade
Commission has leveraged existing consumer protection law to
challenge some privacy violations, but its legal authority is
extremely constrained. Most of the FTC's privacy cases have
been brought under its deception authority, meaning that the
FTC can only act if a company proactively deceives a consumer
about its data practices. Absent affirmative transparency and
choice obligations, many companies evade this liability by
offering only vague and inscrutable information about its
practices in privacy policies that consumers rarely read. The
FTC has more recently brought privacy cases under its
unfairness authority, but such cases require a showing of
``substantial injury''--and what constitutes a substantial
privacy injury is a legal uncertainty.\2\ Congress could
dramatically improve privacy protections and consumers' rights
by enacting privacy legislation modeled on the Fair Information
Practice Principles;\3\ Consumers Union would be more than
happy to collaborate with your office and other interested
members of Congress in crafting what such legislation would
look like.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, e.g., Kimberly Kindy, How Congress dismantled Federal
Internet privacy rules, Washington Post, May 30, 2017, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-congress-dismantled-federal-
internet-privacy-rules/2017/05/29/7ad06e14-2f5b-11e7-8674-
437ddb6e813e_story
.html?utm_term=.11a7cf766dad.
\2\ The Federal Trade Commission recently hosted a public workshop
on this topic. See Informational Injury Workshop, Federal Trade
Commission, Dec. 12, 2017, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-
calendar/2017/12/informational-injury-workshop.
\3\ Bob Gellman, Fair Information Practice Principles: A Basic
History, Apr. 10, 2017, https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-
FIPshistory.pdf.
Statutory penalties for lawbreaking. The Federal Trade
Commission lacks the legal authority to obtain civil penalties
in the considerable majority of its cases--instead, it can only
obtain injunctive relief and offer restitution to injured
consumers (though again, restitution is challenging in the
privacy realm where injuries are difficult to quantify). As
such, companies are able to treat legal challenges merely as a
cost of doing business. The FTC should be able to obtain
reasonable civil penalties in order to sufficiently deter
wrongdoing, both for violations of a new privacy statute as
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
well as its existing Section 5 legal authority.
Ability to issue clarifying regulations. Unlike many
regulatory agencies, the Federal Trade Commission generally
lacks the ability to issue regulations under the Administrative
Procedure Act. This limitation prohibits the agency from
issuing more precise guidance to companies and consumers as to
what behavior is prohibited, relying instead on establishing
legal norms through litigation and negotiated consent decrees.
We urge Congress to provide the FTC with this authority, both
for a new privacy statute as well as for Section 5.
Staffing. The Federal Trade Commission needs more resources
to perform its consumer protection mission. Despite the U.S.
economy more than doubling in size since 1980, the size of the
FTC staff has--to say the least--failed to keep up. Moreover,
other agencies are increasingly pushing their own
responsibilities to the FTC, especially on privacy--from the
Federal Communications Commission\4\ to the National Highway
Traffic and Safety Administration.\5\ Further, some FTC critics
have called upon the FTC to litigate more its cases--instead of
relying upon settlement agreements--in order to create binding
and reliable rules (though, as noted above, this could also be
accomplished through rulemaking).\6\ However litigating against
more well-resourced companies is labor intensive, and the
Commission will need considerably more attorneys in place to
pursue such as a strategy. In addition to additional legal
support, I strongly support funding more technical staff at the
FTC in order to competently police online privacy and related
issues, both within substantive divisions such as the Division
of Privacy and Identity Protection, but also in the Office of
Technology Research and Investigation (or OTECH) which supports
the entire Consumer Protection Bureau mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Amir Nasr, Trump's Repeal of Internet Privacy Rules Shifts
Regulatory Powers to FTC, Morning Consult, Apr. 7, 2017, https://
morningconsult.com/2017/04/04/trumps-repeal-internet-privacy-rules-
shifts-regulatory-powers-ftc/.
\5\ Joe Jerome, NHTSA Automated Vehicles Guidance Punts Privacy to
the FTC and Congress, Center for Deomcracy & Technology, Sep. 22, 2017,
https://cdt.org/blog/nhtsa-automated-vehicles-guidance-punts-privacy-
to-the-ftc-and-congress/.
\6\ Tom Struble, Reforming the Federal Trade Commission Through
Better Process, R Street, Dec. 2017, http://
2o9ub0417chl2lg6m43em6psi2i.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads
/2017/12/122.pdf.
Question 2. During your time at the FTC, did you notice any trends
in how new technology was being used to exploit seniors?
Answer. In my experience, the Federal Trade Commission takes very
seriously its obligation to protect all citizens, but especially
segments of the population that may be vulnerable to particular
practices. Through its Every Community Initiative, the FTC has tried to
identify various ways that predators are more likely to target certain
populations.\7\ A recent FTC Fraud Report found that while senior
citizens were not more likely to be targeted with fraud generally, they
were more likely to be targeted by certain scams, such as fraudulent
prize promotions, timeshare fraud, and fraudulent medical claims.\8\
Tech support scams was another such category, where attackers try to
exploit unfamiliarity with technology to sign consumers up for
unneeded, high-cost technical assistance--or worse, hold a consumer's
computer hostage until a ransom has been paid.\9\ The FTC has brought a
number of tech support scam enforcement actions,\10\ and in 2016 held a
public workshop on the growing menace of ransomware.\11\ Robocalls are
another common--and growing--frustration of older Americans, and the
FTC along with the FCC have taken a variety of actions to try to combat
their rise.\12\ Consumers Union has also advocated a number of
additional steps that policymakers should take, including requiring
phone companies to offer to all consumers comprehensive tools to block
spoofed and unwanted calls, at no charge, and without delay.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Every Community, Federal Trade Commission, https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/every-community.
\8\ Testimony of Lois Greisman before the Senate Special Committee
on Aging, Stopping Senior Scams: Developments in Financial Fraud
Affecting Seniors, Feb. 15, 2017, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1069573/
p134405_commission_testimony_re_stopping_senior_scams_senate_02152017.pd
f.
\9\ Id.
\10\ E.g., Press Release, FTC Obtains Settlements from Operators of
Tech Support Scams, Federal Trade Commission, Oct. 26, 2017, https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-obtains-settlements-
operators-tech-support-s cams.
\11\ Fall Technology Series: Ransomware, Federal Trade Commission,
Sep. 7, 2016, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/09/
fall-technology-series-ransomware.
\12\ Robocalls, Federal Trade Commission, https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0025-robocalls.
\13\ E.g., Maureen Mahoney, Letter from Consumers Union to Senators
Bill Nelson et. al, Apr. 5, 2018, g/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CU-CFA-
Robocalls-S.-134.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to
Justin Brookman
Question 1. There are serious questions about the disclosure
timeline and process of the ``Spectre'' and ``Meltdown'' flaws. Do you
believe that the right entities were involved in the research and
disclosure process leading up to public notification? How could this be
improved?
Answer. Given the unprecedented scope of the Spectre and Meltdown
vulnerabilities and my lack of practical experience in incident
response, I am hesitant to severely criticize the disclosure timing and
processes that were used. Multi-party coordination can be
extraordinarily challenging under less complicated circumstances, and
there are inevitable and difficult trade-offs between the values of
concealing information to prevent leaks that could harm consumers with
sharing information to the diverse parties who will have to address the
vulnerabilities. I question the assessment that the vulnerabilities
were not being actively exploited, and how it was used as a rationale
for not sharing information with US-CERT. Further, I believe that
several companies' initial public statements understating the scope of
the problem was counterproductive. It is my hope that the companies
involved will undertake a rigorous assessment of what worked well and
what did not in order to learn from this experience, as this will
certainly not be the last major vulnerability that threatens devices
and services across the ecosystem.
While the Spectre/Meltdown incident may provide valuable lessons
about incident response and coordination, I believe there are
potentially more important lessons about how security often receives
insufficient attention during product design. The current legal
framework does not provide strong enough incentives for companies to
safeguard against these types of vulnerabilities in the first place.
Functions such as speculative execution prioritize performance at all
costs without sufficient weighting of the risks of exploitation.
Unfortunately, companies do not bear the full costs of security
vulnerabilities, as it is consumers who end up bearing the burdens of
identity theft, impaired functionality, and the need to replace
products. While companies who experience a security breach may face the
loss of consumer goodwill, in a vulnerability as fundamental as Spectre
and Meltdown, consumers may not even know which company to blame, given
that so many products and system layers were affected. In concentrated
industries with only a handful of providers (or fewer), the
insufficiency of after-the-fact market pressure is an even greater
problem.
Consumers often feel helpless in the wake of incidents such as
these, unsure of which products are vulnerable, and if so, to what
types of attacks. While there are some useful guidelines for consumers
to keep in mind (keep software updated, use tracker blockers to stop
unnecessary interactions with third-party servers), consumers are
usually not in the best position to ensure security on their systems.
Companies should have legal obligations to deploy and maintain
reasonable security measures, proportionate to the risks borne by both
by the companies and others. In some cases, this may compromise
performance, if the security risks outweigh the performance loss.
However, in many cases, this can be remediated through addressing other
prevalent anti-consumer inefficiencies, such as device bloatware and
excessive reliance on third party tracking code.
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| MEMBERNAME | BIOGUIDEID | GPOID | CHAMBER | PARTY | ROLE | STATE | CONGRESS | AUTHORITYID |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wicker, Roger F. | W000437 | 8263 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | MS | 115 | 1226 |
| Blunt, Roy | B000575 | 8313 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | MO | 115 | 1464 |
| Moran, Jerry | M000934 | 8307 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | KS | 115 | 1507 |
| Thune, John | T000250 | 8257 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | SD | 115 | 1534 |
| Baldwin, Tammy | B001230 | 8215 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | WI | 115 | 1558 |
| Udall, Tom | U000039 | 8260 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NM | 115 | 1567 |
| Capito, Shelley Moore | C001047 | 8223 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | WV | 115 | 1676 |
| Cantwell, Maria | C000127 | 8288 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | WA | 115 | 172 |
| Klobuchar, Amy | K000367 | 8249 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MN | 115 | 1826 |
| Tester, Jon | T000464 | 8258 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MT | 115 | 1829 |
| Heller, Dean | H001041 | 8060 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | NV | 115 | 1863 |
| Peters, Gary C. | P000595 | 7994 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MI | 115 | 1929 |
| Gardner, Cory | G000562 | 7862 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | CO | 115 | 1998 |
| Young, Todd | Y000064 | 7948 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | IN | 115 | 2019 |
| Blumenthal, Richard | B001277 | 8332 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | CT | 115 | 2076 |
| Lee, Mike | L000577 | 8303 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | UT | 115 | 2080 |
| Johnson, Ron | J000293 | 8355 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | WI | 115 | 2086 |
| Duckworth, Tammy | D000622 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | IL | 115 | 2123 | |
| Schatz, Brian | S001194 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | HI | 115 | 2173 | |
| Cruz, Ted | C001098 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | TX | 115 | 2175 | |
| Fischer, Deb | F000463 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | NE | 115 | 2179 | |
| Sullivan, Dan | S001198 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | AK | 115 | 2290 | |
| Cortez Masto, Catherine | C001113 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NV | 115 | 2299 | |
| Hassan, Margaret Wood | H001076 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NH | 115 | 2302 | |
| Inhofe, James M. | I000024 | 8322 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | OK | 115 | 583 |
| Markey, Edward J. | M000133 | 7972 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MA | 115 | 735 |
| Nelson, Bill | N000032 | 8236 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | FL | 115 | 859 |
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