Congressional Hearings
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: ADDRESSING CURRENT AND EMERGING THREATS
Congressional Hearings
SuDoc ClassNumber: Y 4.C 73/7
Congress: Senate
CHRG-115shrg37297
| AUTHORITYID | CHAMBER | TYPE | COMMITTEENAME |
|---|---|---|---|
| sscm00 | S | S | Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation |
[Senate Hearing 115-651]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-651
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: ADDRESSING CURRENT AND EMERGING
THREATS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY AND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 23, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-297 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY AND SECURITY
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman GARY PETERS, Michigan, Ranking
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ROY BLUNT, Missouri AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEAN HELLER, Nevada RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
CORY GARDNER, Colorado MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on January 23, 2018................................. 1
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 5
Statement of Senator Inhofe...................................... 19
Statement of Senator Cortez Masto................................ 20
Statement of Senator Hassan...................................... 22
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 24
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 26
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 27
Witnesses
Hon. David P. Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
John V. Kelly, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David P. Pekoske
by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 31
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 33
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 36
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 37
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 39
Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 42
Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto.................................. 44
Response to written questions submitted to John V. Kelly by:
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 46
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 46
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 46
Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto.................................. 49
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY:
ADDRESSING CURRENT AND
EMERGING THREATS
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Deb Fischer,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Fischer [presiding], Thune, Blunt,
Johnson, Inhofe, Gardner, Young, Peters, Nelson, Cantwell,
Klobuchar, Duckworth, Markey, Hassan, and Cortez Masto.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
I am pleased to convene the Senate Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and
Security for our first hearing of 2018, titled ``Surface
Transportation Security: Addressing Current and Emerging
Threats.''
I also want to welcome Senator Peters, who is the new
Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and I look forward to
working with him. A vote was just called. Senator Peters is
voting and then will be coming up to the hearing. After I give
my opening statement, I will be going to vote. Senator Inhofe
will chair while I am gone, and then hopefully we'll have a
pretty calm, good hearing following that.
We must ensure the security of all modes of transportation.
This includes our roads, rail, ports, pipeline, and mass
transit systems. Several recent and tragic incidents have
highlighted the need for greater attention to transportation
security.
In 2016, Europe saw terrible attacks that targeted
transportation systems. In Nice, France, a member of ISIL drove
a commercial truck into a crowded promenade, killing 84 people.
Similarly, in March of that year, 16 people were killed in
Brussels, Belgium, when a bomb detonated at a metro station.
The United States is not immune to these kinds of attacks.
On December 11, 2017, a man detonated an improvised explosive
device in an underground subway terminal in New York City.
Thankfully, there were no fatalities, although three people did
sustain injuries. A similar event occurred in New York City's
Chelsea neighborhood in September 2016, when a terrorist used a
bomb to injure 31 people near the town's train station.
These incidents are not exclusive to urban areas, either.
Last October, an armed man was able to stop a California Zephyr
Amtrak train near Oxford, Nebraska. He has since been charged
with terrorism. We must be constantly vigilant against threats
to our country, including on our Nation's transportation
system. Al Qaeda has reportedly issued instructions for
attacking our railroads, calling them our ``easiest targets.''
It's clear that our ports, highways, pipelines, and railroads
are at risk.
Today's hearing will focus on examining our response to
threats to our surface transportation system. How we respond is
vital to the security of passengers as well as our economic
security.
The witnesses today oversee our transportation security
system. On August 3, 2017, the Senate confirmed David Pekoske
to be Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration. The Administrator previously served as Vice
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. We will also hear
testimony from the Department of Homeland Security, Acting
Inspector General John Kelly, who was appointed Deputy
Inspector General in June 2016 and became Acting Inspector
General in December 2017.
I thank you both for being here.
In examining our transportation system's security, we
should examine the risks to our network as well as the
resources TSA has to address those risks and counter potential
attacks. The TSA does not directly manage surface
transportation security the way it manages our airport
security. Instead, TSA provides guidance, oversight,
intelligence, and assistance to system operators and law
enforcement as they work to secure our Nation's surface
transportation network. This role is critical to close the gaps
in our transportation security.
The men and women of TSA perform a tremendous service for
our country, working night and day to keep passengers and
freight secure. We must ensure TSA has the tools it needs to
carry out its mission.
This Congress, I was proud to cosponsor the Surface and
Maritime Transportation Security Act, a comprehensive bill to
address gaps in our surface transportation security. For
example, in September 2016, the Department of Homeland Security
Inspector General found that TSA lacked an intelligence-driven,
risk-based security strategy. Our bill would instruct TSA to
implement a risk-based strategy so that it can more quickly and
completely respond to those threats. It expands canine
explosive detection teams, authorizes computer vetting systems
for passenger railroads, and establishes a program to train
surface transportation security operators and inspectors to
identify and respond to threats. Additionally, it reforms the
credentialing process for Transportation Worker Identification
Credential, or TWIC, to ensure clarity with other credentialing
programs. We will also examine the types of threats that face
our transportation system, what strategies and technology are
available to address these threats, and how TSA works with
industry to shore up our security.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
And I would now like to invite our new Ranking Member of
the Committee, Senator Peters, to the Subcommittee hearing. And
if you would like to give your opening statement, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And it's
wonderful to be here with you. I'll look forward to working
closely with you in the months and years ahead, hopefully.
Senator Fischer. Good.
Senator Peters. So. Well, thank you, again, Madam Chairman,
for your--for holding this hearing on surface transportation
today. I'm honored to work in this position, and look forward
to delving into the issues that the Subcommittee has
jurisdiction over.
Mr. Pekoske and Mr. Kelly, thank you both for your service
to our country, and also thank you for being here today
testifying before the Subcommittee.
I look forward to working closely with the Transportation
Security Administration to ensure that the 60,000 public
servants who are committed to keeping the traveling public safe
have the tools and, equally as important, the resources to
address the ongoing and emerging threats in the transportation
sector.
As we have seen recently, surface transportation systems
continue to be a target of terrorist attacks. Just last year,
Inspire, an al Qaeda magazine, featured a cover story on how to
derail trains, with the goal of wrecking or blowing up a train
to create mass casualties. In December, a man carrying a pipe
bomb attempted to detonate it in a crowded Port Authority bus
terminal in New York City. And, tragically, we also saw, in New
York City last year, how vehicles can be used effectively as
weapons. In October, a man deliberately drove a rental truck
down a bike path in Lower Manhattan, killing eight people and
injuring 15 others. Abroad, we have, sadly, seen similar
tragedies in England, Spain, Germany, and France. Vehicles have
been used to cause injuries and casualties.
These attacks are an example of how quickly everyday life
can be brought to a shocking and horrific halt. It's a reminder
that we must find ways to address emerging threats and to
better protect our citizens. And we've heard this call before.
We have known for years that our surface transportation
system, particularly transit and rail, which attract large
numbers of passengers, are particularly vulnerable. The 9/11
Commission, in 2004, recognized that rail and transit could be
an attractive target for terrorists. And it's not just rail and
transit. All types of surface transportation could be at risk.
With thousands of containers moving in and out of ports,
hazardous materials moving through pipelines, and cargo moving
on trucks and rails across the country, the transportation
network is vast as well as it is open. These systems still
present a serious security challenge. A catastrophic failure to
our transportation system could have serious economic
consequences that impact every American.
We know this in Michigan, where an attack on line 5
pipeline in the Straits of Mackinac could cause significant
environmental damage, or the Detroit Ambassador Bridge, which
carries trade between the United States and Canada. So, we must
ensure that the Transportation Administration--the Security
Administration is focusing its time and resources on developing
and implementing new and innovative ways to adapt and meet the
ever-changing threats to our transportation system.
That's why I joined with Chairman Thune, Ranking Member
Nelson, Senator Fischer, and Senator Booker to support the
Surface Transportation and Marine Security Act, which, as you
know, passed this committee in April of last year. This bill
will take a step to close the gaps in that security and provide
additional resources to enhance security across our
transportation system.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on the
actions that they have taken to adapt to security threats and
what more we can do to secure our Nation's surface
transportation system.
So, with that, Ranking Member Nelson, do you have comments?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. On behalf of the Committee and a lot of the
things that Senator Peters has just mentioned, this Committee
has considered and passed legislation to address it. For
example, in 2016, we passed the Airport Security Enhancement
Act. We took important steps to prevent insider threats to the
aviation system. We increased random physical screenings and
covert red-team testing. In addition, we have the TSA
Modernization Act, which expands the use of explosives
detection K9s, continues efforts to expand the TSA pre-check
program, and extradites deployment of security screening
technology.
And, while these steps are critical, but the threat is
ever-changing. This is evidenced by TSA's announcement that the
flights originating from the UAE, from Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and Qatar to the U.S., will undergo enhanced cargo
screening. And we have discussed previously in this Committee,
I'm concerned that our current strategy does not address the
vulnerabilities that we face today, including getting your
technology, Mr. Administrator, using the very best technology
for screenings of passengers. And so, we had that also, that
attempted attack in the New York City transit station. We're
going to have to address these deficiencies to secure all of
these transportation systems.
So, I think it's time to reexamine our transportation
security strategy and refocus our efforts.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my opening
comments.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
I want to thank Chairman Fischer and Ranking Member Peters for
holding this hearing about current and emerging threats to our Nation's
surface transportation networks from terrorist attacks.
A series of attacks over the last year or so--from attacks in
London and Barcelona to those right here in the U.S.--have rung the
alarm bell. We cannot be content.
Transportation remains a very real target for terrorists and those
wishing to do harm.
This committee has heard that call. In 2016, we passed the Airport
Security Enhancement and Oversight Act. In doing so, we took important
steps to prevent insider threats to our aviation system. We increased
random physical screenings and covert, red-team testing.
In addition, we have the TSA Modernization Act, which expands the
use of explosive detection canines, continues efforts to expand the TSA
PreCheck program and expedites deployment of security screening
technology.
And while these steps are critical, the threat is ever changing.
This is evidenced by the TSA's announcement that flights originating
from the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar to
the United States will undergo enhanced cargo screening.
As we have discussed previously in this committee, I am concerned
that our current strategy does not address the vulnerabilities we face
today.
Recent incidents and the attempted attack at the New York City
transit station highlight the challenges we continue to face.
We must continue to address deficiencies to secure our rail,
transit, port and freight transportation systems.
I believe it's time to reexamine our transportation security
strategy and refocus our efforts.
We also need to provide sufficient funding to meet these
challenges.
We cannot cut programs that help our communities prepare for and
respond to threats.
And we need transit and port grants to help agencies improve their
security infrastructure.
I want to thank the witnesses for coming today and I look forward
to hearing from you on these issues.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt [presiding]. Well, thank you, Senator Nelson.
We're glad to have these witnesses with us today. David
Pekoske, the Administrator of Transportation Security
Administration, was sworn into that job last August. His
previous work includes serving as the Vice Commandant of the
U.S. Coast Guard and, in the private sector, supporting
government counterterrorism and security services. John Kelly,
the Acting Inspector General for the Department of Homeland
Security, was appointed to his job in June 2016. He was
appointed to his current role in December 2017. So, he's also
new to this current job. But, his previous work includes
service as the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for the
Emergency Management and Oversight, as well as the Assistant
Director for Forensic Audits and Special Investigations at GAO.
We're glad you're both here. And members will be returning
from voting, but, Administrator Pekoske, if you want to go
ahead and make your opening statement, followed by Mr. Kelly.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID P. PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Pekoske. Thank you, sir.
Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Peters, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you this afternoon alongside the
Acting Inspector General.
Surface transportation security is a key priority of mine,
and I'm looking forward to obtaining your perspective as we
work together to address current and emerging threats.
First, let me acknowledge the outstanding men and women of
TSA. It's my privilege to serve as Administrator to over 60,000
dedicated professionals. They provide security for millions of
Americans who use our transportation systems each and every
day.
Transportation security is an all-hands effort. Our
aviation security checkpoint personnel are the most visible
part of TSA, but there are thousands of other TSA employees
working behind the scenes, in the air, around the globe, and
with the owners and operators of our Nation's surface
transportation systems. They all contribute to TSA's success
and to our national security.
On behalf of this team, I thank you for your support in
enabling TSA to accomplish a mission so critical to the safety,
security, and economic well-being of the American people.
Madam Chairwoman, I have tremendous respect for the
oversight role that this subcommittee performs. I highly value
your perspective and opinions. You have made us stronger, and
America safer. I appreciate the Subcommittee's work on the
Surface and Maritime Transportation Security Act and the TSA
Modernization Act.
Since becoming Administrator, I have spent a majority of my
time at the front lines of TSA, engaging with TSA employees at
all levels of the organization and meeting with our partners.
Everywhere I have visited, I have found a deep commitment to
the mission. That's so important, because, as you know, we face
a determined adversary. The current threat environment is
complex, diverse, and persistent, as illustrated by two recent
terror attacks in the United States, the attempted suicide
bombing in the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey bus
terminal on December 11 that injured four people, including the
bomber, and the vehicle ramming attack a few weeks earlier, on
the west side of Manhattan, that killed eight people and
injured 11. They both illustrate the risk our surface
transportation systems are facing.
Unlike aviation, where TSA oversees and carries out day-to-
day security operations in our Nation's airport, our role in
surface transportation security is one of support,
collaboration, and partnership with surface transportation
owners and operators. The owners and operators, not TSA, are
primarily responsible for their security operations. And we are
proud of the partnerships we have developed, and the security
improvements that have resulted from those partnerships.
While TSA's budget for surface transportation is small
compared to the aviation sector, the Nation realizes a
significant return from this investment when it is aligned, as
it is, with the significant efforts being undertaken by our
surface transportation partners. TSA's resources and personnel
directly support ongoing security programs with committed
security partners, who, in turn, dedicate millions of dollars
to secure critical infrastructure, perform uniform law
enforcement, public safety, and special security teams, and
conduct regular operational activities and deterrence efforts.
The 9/11 Act placed 42 requirements on TSA. All have been
completed, with the exception of three rulemakings. As I
testified during my confirmation hearing, completing these
rules is a top priority of mine, and I know it is a concern of
yours. To update, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for security
training was released in December 2016. The final rule is
slated for publishing this coming summer as part of our DHS
unified rulemaking agenda. An Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for vulnerability assessments and security plans was
also published in December 2016, and I expect this rule will
proceed to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stage in Fiscal
Year 2019. Finally, the rule on employee vetting is in the
final drafting stages and will undergo DHS and OMB review this
year. I expect a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to be issued by
the end of calendar year 2018.
It's important to note that, through the issuance of
voluntary standards and guidelines developed collaboratively
with industry, TSA has been able to effectively raise surface
transportation security standards while the regulatory process
proceeds. To support surface transportation owners and
operators with their security needs, TSA focuses that--its
efforts on regulatory oversight, system assessments, voluntary
operator compliance with industry standards and TSA guidelines,
collaborative law enforcement and security operations, accurate
and timely exchange of intelligence information, intermodal
training. And I'd note that we conduct intermodal security
training and exercise programs, or called ISTEP programs,
throughout the year, and we have a public area security summit
scheduled for next month, here in Washington, D.C., dedicated
to surface transportation security. Additionally, TSA performs
technology development and testing. For example, we are testing
a standoff person-borne IED detection system. This is in the
final stages of operational testing and evaluation.
Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Peters, and members of
the Subcommittee, in closing, I am deeply committed to securing
the U.S. transportation system from terrorist attacks. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today. And I look forward to
your questions and comments.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Pekoske follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David P. Pekoske, Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Peters, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here
today to testify about the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) role in surface transportation security.
My colleagues at TSA and I appreciate the continued support of this
Committee and its Members, as we carry out our vital security mission.
We are grateful for the constructive relationship TSA enjoys with this
Committee, and I look forward to building on this relationship during
my tenure at the helm of TSA.
The U.S. surface transportation system is a complex, interconnected
network made up of mass transit systems, passenger and freight
railroads, over-the-road bus operators, motor carrier operators,
pipelines, and maritime facilities. These modes operate in close
coordination with--and in proximity to--one another every day. To that
point, the different modes of the surface transportation system often
use the same roads, bridges, and tunnels to function. In short, the
American economy and way of life depend on this network continuing to
operate securely and safely.
To put the size of the system into perspective, consider that over
11 million passengers daily travel on the New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (NY MTA) system alone. And more than 10
billion trips are taken each year on 6,800 U.S. mass transit systems,
ranging from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to very large
multi-modal systems, like the NY MTA, in urban areas. More than 500
individual freight railroads carrying essential goods operate on nearly
140,000 miles of track. Eight million large capacity commercial trucks
and almost 4,000 commercial bus companies travel on the four million
miles of roadway in the United States and on more than 600,000 highway
bridges greater than 20 feet in length and through 350 tunnels greater
than 300 feet in length. Over-the-road bus operators carry
approximately 750 million intercity bus passengers each year. The
pipeline system consists of approximately 3,000 private companies,
which own and operate more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines
transporting natural gas, refined petroleum products, and other
commercial products.
As you can see, securing surface transportation is a critically
important and complex undertaking. Recent terror attacks and plots--
like the attempted suicide bombing in the New York City Port Authority
Bus Terminal and an increase in vehicle ramming incidents around the
world, including the most recent attack also in New York City--provide
compelling reminders of the difficulty in securing a ``system of
systems'' that is designed to quickly move massive volumes of
passengers and commodities.
I look at three things when assessing risk in any particular
transportation mode; the threat, the vulnerability, and the
consequence, should an incident occur. When it comes to the surface
mode, I take the threat very seriously. Because of the open nature of
these systems, high ridership, and the types of commodities
transported, the system is inherently vulnerable and the consequences
of an attack would be high. Although we have invested significant
resources and implemented numerous programs and policies to reduce
identified vulnerabilities and minimize potential consequences, in the
current climate, vigilance and preparation can only take us so far. I
am actively assessing how best to leverage and enhance TSA's surface
expertise to strengthen our partnership with surface stakeholders.
TSA's Role
Unlike aviation, where TSA has been heavily involved in day-to-day
security operations since its inception, surface transportation
security has primarily been approached as a partnership with surface
transportation owners and operators because they, not TSA, are
primarily responsible for their own security operations. We believe
this collaborative approach and relationship with surface owners and
operators is appropriate. The interconnected, varied and expansive
scope of the surface transportation system creates unique security
challenges that are best addressed by system owners and operators and
federally supported through stakeholder communication, coordination,
and collaboration. TSA takes our security role for surface
transportation very seriously. To best support surface transportation
owners and operators with their security needs, we focus our efforts on
system assessments, voluntary operator compliance with industry
standards, collaborative law enforcement and security operations,
accurate and timely exchange of intelligence information, and
regulatory oversight. TSA's different role in security for surface
transportation versus aviation is understandably reflected in its
annual appropriation. Although TSA's budget for surface transportation
is small compared to the aviation sector, the Nation realizes a
significant return from this investment.
TSA's resources and personnel directly support ongoing security
programs with committed security partners who, in turn, dedicate
millions of dollars to secure critical infrastructure, provide
uniformed law enforcement and specialty security teams, and conduct
operational activities and deterrence efforts. TSA invests its
resources to help those partners identify vulnerabilities and risks in
their operations, and works with specific owners/operators to develop
and implement risk-mitigating solutions to address their specific
vulnerabilities and risks.
TSA is a co-Sector Specific Agency along with Department of
Transportation (DOT) and United States Coast Guard (USCG) for the
transportation sector. The USCG is the lead Federal agency for maritime
security in the U.S., and TSA supports the USCG in its maritime
security efforts and in coordinating interagency efforts for the
maritime mode. DOT and TSA work collectively to integrate safety and
security priorities for the other modes of surface transportation.
Although DOT's regulations relate to safety, many safety activities and
programs also benefit security and help to reduce overarching risk to
the transportation system. In the surface environment, TSA has built
upon those standards to improve the security posture with minimal
regulations.
TSA's Approach
Information and intelligence sharing is at the heart of TSA's
approach to surface transportation security. Whether we are providing
unclassified information about known tactics, or classified information
about specific threats, TSA works to deliver information to the
appropriate surface transportation security partners. We maintain a
communication network that facilitates the timely dissemination of
information to stakeholders so they can take appropriate actions to
prepare for, prevent and defeat acts of terrorism.
TSA also provides training and exercise support to surface
transportation operators and their employees. The focus of those
efforts is often on ensuring the effectiveness of communication
channels, response plans, and other operational protocols. From
frontline employees to security executives, TSA works to provide tools
that enhance preparedness and close gaps in security planning. We host
activities ranging from tabletop to full-scale exercises that focus on
events associated with a single transit system to multi-modal regional
events that bring federal, state, and local security and emergency
response partners together.
Without the partnership, collaboration, and initiative of surface
owners and operators, TSA could not fulfill our surface transportation
security mission in making systems as safe and secure as practical. I
have met with many representatives of the surface transportation
community to better understand their concerns and perspective on
securing the transportation network and continue to make this type of
open dialogue a priority. To that end, TSA is hosting a Surface Public
Area Security Summit next month to discuss security best practices and
promote additional collaboration. This event will bring together
domestic and international surface transportation stakeholders to
discuss security challenges, various approaches to addressing them, and
opportunities for future collaboration.
Innovation and technology
The inherently open and expansive scope of surface passenger
transportation and the evolving threat to it requires TSA to continue
researching and developing innovative processes and technologies to
increase security without creating undesired financial or operational
burdens. Partnership is the key to fostering innovation and ensuring
the surface transportation system is secure both today and in the
future.
TSA incorporates partner needs and capability gaps into our work to
influence and stimulate the development of new security technologies in
the marketplace. This effort is designed to make more readily available
innovative and advanced technologies useful for public area security.
We try to keep pace with the fast-moving advancement of security
technologies to address current and evolving threats by looking at
emerging technologies, including from outside the transportation
environment, to determine applicability to the surface transportation
environment. TSA works closely with surface transportation owners and
operators to introduce new technology and approaches to securing
surface transportation through collaborative operational test beds for
different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway motor carrier,
pipeline, and freight rail), and critical infrastructure protection
security technology projects to address the increasing threat
demonstrated from attacks world-wide. For example, TSA is presently
working with New Jersey Transit, Washington Metropolitan Transit
Authority, Amtrak, and Los Angeles Metro to assess the effectiveness of
technologies designed to address threats associated with person-and
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.
Implementing 9/11 Recommendations
We continue to work to address the remaining requirements of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Act, Public Law 110-53). To date, TSA has met over 90 percent of the
mandates imposed by the 9/11 Act, including 39 of the 42 surface
transportation security-related mandates. Completing the remaining 9/11
Act requirements is among my highest priorities.
These mandates include the issuance of regulations for surface
transportation employee training and vetting, the conducting of
vulnerability assessments and standards for security plans, and
mandates for the technology work just described. In December 2016, TSA
issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the Surface
Employee Training Rule and the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) for the Vulnerability Assessment and Security Plan Rule; TSA
anticipates publication of the final Training Rule this Fiscal Year.
While working on these rulemakings, TSA has taken steps through
collaborative initiatives and assessments to ensure that front line
employees receive security training and that owners and operators have
robust security programs which include security plans, employee vetting
and exercises.
Although the finalization of these rules is pending, TSA has worked
diligently with stakeholders that would be affected by these rules to
implement programs that meet, and in several instances exceed, what
would be required by the rules. For example, TSA evaluates several
areas required for a sound security program through our Baseline
Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program, including security
training, security planning, and employee and contractor vetting. The
majority of the higher-risk transit systems (those with daily passenger
trips of 60,000 or higher) achieved a score of 90 percent or higher in
the security planning, security training, and employee and contractor
vetting areas in their most recent BASE reviews.
Conclusion
In closing, I believe a reinvigorated strategy is an essential
foundation for success in our mission, and I have engaged my executive
staff, with their years of experience, to reexamine and re-envision
TSA's strategy and to place a much greater emphasis on surface
transportation security--both in organizational and mission focus. I
have also engaged many private sector surface transportation owners and
operators to improve strategic partnerships and promote effective
collaboration, and look forward to ongoing engagement with members of
this committee as we develop our strategic path forward for TSA.
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Peters, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
am honored to serve in this capacity and I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Fischer [presiding]. Thank you, Administrator.
Mr. Kelly.
STATEMENT OF JOHN V. KELLY, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Kelly. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Peters, members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify
alongside the TSA Administrator.
When the American public thinks of TSA, they think of a
transportation security officer in a blue suit--or, I'm sorry,
a blue shirt--instructing them to remove their belts and shoes
before going through a security screening at an airport. The
truth is that TSA has a much broader responsibility to also
oversee and regulate our Nation's surface transportation modes,
such as highways, freight, passenger rail, mass transit, and
pipelines. Nevertheless, TSA dedicated only 2 percent of its 7-
plus-billion-dollar budget on direct surface transportation
expenditures.
In 2016, we were published--we published three reports that
identified significant weaknesses in TSA's ability to secure
surface transportation modes in the Nation's maritime
facilities and vessels. Those reports identified a need for
crosscutting, risk-based security strategy, the need for better
controls in its background-check process, and delays in
implementing passenger rail security regulations. My oral
remarks highlight just a few of the key points from those
reports.
First, TSA's strategy needs--or TSA needs a crosscutting,
risk-based security strategy. In 2011, TSA began publicizing
that it uses an intelligence-driven, risk-based approach for
all transportation modes. However, we found that was not
correct. In 2016, we reported that TSA specifically designed
this approach only for air passenger screening. TSA has said it
is working on a cross-country--crosscutting, risk-based
strategy, but will not be available to provide it to us until
April 2018.
As for the second report, TSA uses the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential, or TWIC, to vet workers at
our national ports and maritime facilities. The TWIC vetting
process includes in immigration, criminal, and terrorism-
related checks to identify offenses that could preclude someone
from being granted unescorted access to secure facilities.
Unfortunately, the TWIC vetting lacks key internal controls
that compromise the program's reliability. These weaknesses
leave our Nation's seaports at risk for terrorists,
exploitation, smuggling, insider threats, and internal
conspiracies.
Finally, TSA failed to develop and implement rail security
regulations required by the 9/11 Act of 2007 that Congress
passed 10 years ago. Surface transportation vulnerabilities can
be best illustrated by the Ankara, Turkey, railway station
bombing in 2015; the Brussels, Belgium, metro bombing in 2016;
and the St. Petersburg, Russia, metro bombing in 2017.
Passenger and freight rail and computer rail have unique
security concerns. They operate in open infrastructures with
multiple access points. That makes it impractical to subject
all rail passengers to the type of screenings that air
passengers undergo. Consequently, unlike TSA's security
presence at airports, TSA's responsibility for rail passengers
consists of assessing intelligence, sharing threat information
with industry stakeholders, developing industry best practices,
and enforcing regulations.
Notwithstanding these differences, TSA could have taken
actions to strengthen rail security. Unfortunately, neither--
TSA neither identified high-risk carriers nor issued
regulations requiring those carriers to conduct vulnerability
assessments and implement TSA-approved security plans. TSA also
did not issue regulations that would require a railroad
security training program and security background checks for
front-line employees. Your Surface and Maritime Transportation
Security Act addresses many of these issues.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my oral testimony. I welcome
any questions that you or other members may--might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of John V. Kelly, Acting Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Peters, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify at today's hearing
regarding the security of our surface transportation security.
When the American public thinks of TSA, they think of the
Transportation Security Officer in a blue shirt instructing them to
remove their belts and shoes before going through security screening at
the airport. The truth is that TSA has a much broader responsibility to
also oversee and regulate our Nation's surface transportation modes--
highway, freight and passenger rail, mass transit, and pipelines--to
ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce. Recent
history--the October 2015 bombing of a railway station in Ankara,
Turkey; the March 2016 metro bombing in Brussels, Belgium; and the
April 2017 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia--depicts how
vulnerable surface transportation can be. However, TSA's budget
reflects the public perception of its mission, allocating most of its
resources to air passenger screening and dedicating only a small
portion to these vulnerable areas of non-aviation.
In 2016, the OIG published three reports \1\ that identify
significant weaknesses in TSA's ability to secure surface
transportation modes and the Nation's maritime facilities and vessels.
Specifically, we identified issues with TSA's ability to identify risk
across all modes of transportation, the reliability of background
checks for port workers, and passenger rail security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security (OIG-
16-91); TWIC Background Checks are Not as Reliable as They Could Be
(OIG-16-128); and Transportation Security Administration Needs a
Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy (OIG-16-134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy
TSA has many responsibilities beyond air travel, and is
responsible, generally through the use of regulation and oversight, for
surface transportation security. However, TSA focuses primarily on air
transportation security and largely ignores other modes. We found that
TSA does not have an intelligence-driven, risk-based security strategy
to inform security and budget needs across all types of transportation.
In 2011, TSA began publicizing that it uses an ``intelligence-
driven, risk-based approach'' across all transportation modes. However,
we found this not to be true. In an audit we released in September
2016, we reported that TSA specifically designed this approach to
replace its one-size-fits-all approach to air passenger screening but
did not apply it to other transportation modes.
Additionally, TSA's agency-wide risk management organizations
provide little oversight of TSA's surface transportation security
programs. TSA established an Executive Risk Steering Committee charged
with creating a crosscutting, risk-based strategy, which would drive
resource allocations across all modes. However, neither it, nor any of
these entities place much emphasis on non-air transportation modes.
In September 2017, TSA reported that it created a crosscutting
risk-based strategy based on our recommendations and expected to
finalize the strategy in October 2017. However, TSA did not submit this
strategy to the OIG. Instead, in January 2018, TSA reported that it
intends to submit its pending 2018 National Strategy for Transportation
Security (NSTS) as its response to our recommendation for a
crosscutting risk-based security strategy. The 2018 NSTS is due to
Congress on April 1, 2018 and TSA expects to provide us with a copy by
the same date.
We also reported that TSA lacked a formal process to incorporate
risk into its budget formulation decisions. Despite the disparate
requirements on the agency, TSA dedicated 80 percent of its nearly $7.4
billion FY 2015 budget to direct aviation security expenditures, and
only about 2 percent to direct surface transportation expenditures. Its
remaining resources were spent on support and intelligence functions.
We recommended that TSA establish a formal budget planning process that
uses risk to help inform resource allocations.
In September 2017, TSA provided documentation of the steps it has
taken to establish a formal budget process that incorporates risk. This
includes the development of a formal Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution framework, standing up the Planning and Programming
Analysis Branch, and creating five resource portfolios that, among
other things, prioritize mission needs across the agency. However, we
cannot close this recommendation until we receive TSA's risk-based
security strategy and ensure that the strategy's guidelines for
aligning resources with risk correspond with its new budget process.
TSA Missing Key Controls within the TWIC Background Check Process
TSA--responsible for safeguarding our Nation's ports and maritime
facilities through the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) program--lacks key internal controls and this compromises the
TWIC program's reliability. These weaknesses leave our Nation's
seaports at risk for terrorist exploitation, smuggling, insider
threats, and internal conspiracies.
TSA provides background checks, or security threat assessments, for
individuals who need unescorted access to secure port facilities; and
issues a biometric identification card, also known as a TWIC. The
background check process for TWICs is the same as that of aviation
workers \2\ and drivers who need a Hazmat Materials Endorsement.\3\ It
includes a check for immigration-, criminal-, and terrorism-related
offenses that would preclude someone from being granted unescorted
access to secure facilities at seaports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (OIG-15-98)
\3\ Commercial drivers required to transport hazardous materials
must undergo a background check by TSA prior to receiving a hazardous
material endorsement on their Commercial Driver's License.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified key
internal control weaknesses in TSA's management of the TWIC background
check process and recommended the Department take significant steps to
improve the effectiveness of the program as a whole.\4\ Although TSA
took some steps to address GAO's concerns, our review--five years
later--found that TSA did not adequately integrate the security
measures intended to identify fraudulent applications into the
background check process. For example, TSA required enrollment staff to
use a digital scanner that could evaluate security features present on
identification documents and generate a score to help TSA determine if
the document was authentic. However, TSA did not collect or use these
scores when completing its background checks--nullifying the
effectiveness of this security measure. For those documents that could
not be electronically scanned, TSA required the staff at the enrollment
centers to manually review identity documents. However, TSA did not
require that the staff be trained at detecting fraudulent documents.
When the enrollment staff documented their observations of suspicious
identity documents in TSA's system, TSA did not have a standardized
process for collecting, reviewing, or using the notes when completing
the background checks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Internal
Control Weaknesses Need to be Corrected to Help Achieve Security
Objectives (GAO-11-657).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We determined TSA management's lack of oversight was the primary
reason the TWIC background check process had many control weaknesses.
At the time of our review, the TWIC background check process was
divided among multiple program offices so that no single entity had
complete oversight and authority over the program. In addition, the
TWIC program lacked key metrics to measure TSA's success in achieving
program core objectives. For example, the measures in place focused on
customer service, such as enrollment time and help desk response time,
rather than the accuracy of the background check itself.
As of November 2016, TSA realigned its operations and assigned the
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as
the single point of accountability within TSA for the TWIC program's
management and operations with the functional oversight over all of the
security threat assessment process.
Additionally, since our review, TSA completed a comprehensive risk
analysis that reviewed existing controls, identified and analyzed
risks, and promoted control activities. TSA is in the process of
addressing the concerns identified by the study. TSA also updated its
program charter and objectives to focus on (1) efforts to positively
verify the identity of applicants; (2) conduct of the TSA Security
Threat Assessment; and (3) actions to recurrently vet and revoke TWIC
validity. TSA intends to update its performance metrics to better align
with the revised objectives. We will continue to monitor TSA's progress
in implementing corrective actions to strengthen the TWIC program.
TSA Delays Implementing Passenger Rail Security Regulations
TSA has failed to develop and implement regulations governing
passenger rail security required more than nine years ago by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Act).\5\ Unlike the security presence that TSA provides air passengers
in airports, its responsibility for rail passengers rests in assessing
intelligence, sharing threat information with industry stakeholders,
developing industry best practices, and enforcing regulations. This is
particularly important due to the volume of passengers using this mode
of transportation and the unique challenges in the rail environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Public Law 110-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Fiscal Year 2015 alone, Amtrak carried 31 million passengers
across the continental United States and Canada, and operated more than
300 trains daily. Additionally, Amtrak and other passenger rail
carriers operate in an open infrastructure with multiple access points
that make it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of
security screening that passengers undergo at airports. Notwithstanding
this, there were actions that TSA could have taken, but did not, that
would have strengthened rail security. Specifically, although required
to by the 9/11 Act, TSA neither identified high-risk carriers nor
issued regulations requiring those carriers to conduct vulnerability
assessments and implement DHS-approved security plans. TSA also did not
issue regulations that would require a railroad security training
program and security background checks for frontline employees.
Regulations to implement a training program are important to ensure
rail carriers have a mechanism in place to prepare rail employees for
potential security threats.
Furthermore, unlike aviation and maritime port workers, TSA did not
develop regulations requiring security background checks for rail
workers. TSA vets airport and maritime port workers who need unescorted
access to secure areas against the terrorist watchlist and immigration
status and criminal history information, and these processes are
consistent with the requirements in the 9/11 Act.
These very issues were identified in 2009 by GAO, which reported
that TSA had only completed one of the key passenger rail requirements
from the 9/11 Act. Seven years later, we identified that the same rail
requirements--a regulation for rail carriers to complete security
assessments, a regulation for rail security training, and a program for
conducting background checks on rail employees--remain incomplete.
Following the 2004 terrorist attack on a passenger train in Madrid,
Spain, TSA issued a security directive for Amtrak. That directive
required carriers to improve security procedures by designating a rail
security coordinator, reporting significant security concerns to TSA,
and allowing TSA to conduct inspections for any potential security
threats. TSA does conduct some limited inspections to verify carrier
compliance with these requirements. However, TSA does not enforce other
aspects of the security directive, such as the use of bomb-resistant
trash receptacles, canine teams, rail car inspections, and passenger
identification checks to enhance security and deter terrorist attacks.
Instead, TSA relies on Amtrak and other transit entities to implement
security measures if resources permit, and is even considering
rescinding these minimal requirements from the directive. Without
enforcing all security requirements, TSA diminishes the directives
importance and carriers ability to prevent or deter acts of terrorism.
Since the issuance of our report in May 2016, TSA has taken steps
to implement two of the three remaining requirements. TSA issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requiring security training for employees
of higher-risk and anticipates a final rule by the end of the fiscal
year. In the spring of 2018 TSA plans to issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking requiring security vetting for certain rail employees. TSA
asserts that Executive Order 13771 (which establishes a requirement
where an agency must eliminate two existing regulations for any new
regulation the agency wishes to issue), is complicating the issuance of
the agency's new rulemakings. If TSA does not fulfill these
requirements, it cannot ensure that passenger rail carriers will
implement security measures that may prevent or deter acts of
terrorism.
Pending Legislation
Many of the issues I've discussed today are addressed in the S.
763, Surface and Maritime Transportation Security Act. I want to thank
the Committee for introducing legislation to address a number of the
challenges facing the Department. We believe that if enacted, this
legislation will direct numerous improvements to our Nation's security.
However, I must emphasize that the Department and TSA have demonstrated
a pattern of being dismissive and lax on implementing requirements
related to non-aviation security. Under these circumstances, change
will require significant attention by Congress, the Inspector General,
and the Comptroller General to ensure that TSA and the Department take
timely actions to implement these improvements.
Future work
We will continue to audit and evaluate the Department's aviation
and non-aviation-related programs, report our results, and closely
track report recommendations. Currently, we are reviewing the
effectiveness of access controls to secured airport areas; Federal Air
Marshal Service international flight operations and ground-based
assignments; TSA's efforts to hire, train, and retrain its employees;
and TSA's use of the Sensitive Security Information designation. We are
also planning reviews on the security of rail facilities; TSA's canine
program; and a review of TWIC that is mandated by P.L. 114-244,
Essential Transportation Worker Identification Credential Assessment
Act.
Madame Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I welcome any
questions you or any other members of the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
We'll begin our first round of questions.
Mr. Kelly, as you noted in your testimony, TSA lacks an
intelligence-driven, risk-based security strategy across all
modes of transportation, and does not incorporate risk into its
budgetary decision-making. So, what should be included in this
strategy? And what effect do you expect incorporating risk into
the TSA's budget formulation decisions will have on the
agency's allocation of resources between all those different
modes of transportation?
Mr. Kelly. To answer your second question first, I think
there will be an increase in allocations toward surface
transportation. While air transportation is very risky, I think
the number of recent attacks on surface transportation areas
are going to demonstrate that there's a much greater risk
associated with surface transportation, and that there needs to
be additional emphasis put in those areas.
Senator Fischer. Administrator, can you give us, here on
the Committee, an update on the work that you're doing to
develop that risk-based security strategy so it does
incorporate all modes of transportation?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. We're working on a national
strategy for transportation security required by law. The two-
year update is due on August 1 to the Congress. That's well in
process. We're putting the final touches on that. That does
embed a risk-based look across all modes.
The Acting IG is correct, when we talk about risk-based,
it's only within the aviation sector, not across all the
surface sectors. This national transportation security strategy
will begin to do that.
Senator Fischer. In previous hearings, I've tried to
highlight my concern about the really very small percentage of
TSA's resources that are dedicated to surface transportation
responsibilities. What is your priority for surface
transportation security? And do you have plans so that you can
make adjustments to that allocation of resources?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Our priority, we--you know, we
have a very, very good partnership and working relationship
with the owners and operators of surface transportation
systems. And really our investment helps leverage the
investments that they make all around the country. We've
established several frameworks and a good set of guidelines
across the different modes of surface transportation that our
partners use really as their standards for performance. And so,
while we don't have regulations in place in all cases, the
guidelines we do have in place have allowed us to raise the
bar, if you will, on surface transportation security.
I will look, as we look at developing our fiscal 2020
budget, so the--you know, I came into office in August. The
fiscal 2019 budget was largely complete at that point. The
fiscal 2020 budget begins its development over the next couple
of months. We've already set up some initial standards, if you
will, or guidance, for developing that fiscal 2020 budget. And,
with that guidance, I--you know, I hope to use that risk-based
approach to look at our allocation of resources to surface
transportation across the modes of surface transportation,
particularly as it relates to aviation security.
Senator Fischer. If we look at other modes of
transportation, though, besides aviation security for example,
the Amtrak train that was attacked in the State of Nebraska in
a very rural part of our state; a passenger train was attacked,
and it has been determined it was a terrorist attack: how do
you address that now? I know it would be very difficult, very
costly to try to monitor all of rail across this country, let
alone all of our highways, roads, city streets where these
attacks can happen at any time. But, right now focus
specifically on rail and how, or if, you work with Amtrak, how
you coordinate on security to make sure that rail
transportation is secure, please.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. We work very closely with
Amtrak, and we have a program called Rail Safe, where Amtrak
sponsors a--an exercise, where we bring in all the partners.
Because, of course, Amtrak, as the--as the train moves down the
rails, it impacts many, many jurisdictions and many other
partners along the way. And so, these--that program has been
very successful. Amtrak has done a very good job of training
their employees. And Amtrak has a random process wherein they
check baggage of their passengers and also the identity of
their passengers.
But, it really goes to trying to work collaboratively with
Amtrak and passenger rail, in general, because we provide an
intelligence basis, due to our ability to query the U.S.
intelligence community, and provide information to them. And
so, a big part of our role is to ensure that we provide that
information on a timely basis, and also look at best practices
across other transportation modes. You know, there may be a
best practice in mass transit that might be very applicable to
Amtrak, for example. And so, we work very hard to make sure we
make those connections.
Senator Fischer. And do you receive information on a fairly
regular basis from our intelligence community?
Admiral Pekoske. We do. And we also have the ability to
query the community. So, if Amtrak has a concern about a
particular issue, we can query the community, and the community
has been very responsive to those queries. For example, that
issue that you raised with the magazine from ISIS that talked
about ways to affect train travel in the United States. We,
basically, went back to the intelligence community, asked them
for their--that assessment, and provided that back to Amtrak.
Senator Fischer. OK. Thank you, sir.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, to our witnesses again, for being here
today. Appreciate it.
I think it's fairly clear that the surface transportation
system is at risk, and there's significant risk. And I outlined
them--Chair, I, myself, outlined some of the attacks that the
American public is very aware of. Mr. Pekoske, you mentioned
them, as well, in your opening comments, as well. So--and these
attacks aren't going to go away. If anything, we're seeing an
escalation of them, as well. And more and more devastating, as
well. But, despite these continued threats to our
transportation system, President Trump's budget request would
have significant cuts to what is already a small percentage of
your budget. In fact, if I look at the President's budget,
public transportation, rail and bus, about 100 million is spent
now. That would be cut in half, roughly, to 48 million. Over
half. While the risks are clearly going up, a cut of half.
Ports, the same situation, 100 to 48. Surface programs,
generally, from 122 to 86.
Mr. Pekoske, just give me a sense. We are already
stretched, I believe. It's already a very small part of your
budget. And then to now have to take budget cuts of roughly
half to surface transportation, what is that going to mean to
the safety of the American public?
Admiral Pekoske. Well, the cuts in the budget that you
cite, sir, are cuts that are primarily directed at the Viper
Teams, which are teams that we provide that provide a visible
deterrent presence aboard surface transportation systems. It
does not affect our communications, our collaboration, our
establishment of guidelines, our training, our provision of
intelligence information, our sponsorship of exercises, and
things like that. But, the Viper reduction in the Fiscal Year
2018 budget was a big part of the reduction overall in surface
transportation.
I'd also say, sir, that, in the budget, there's never
enough there, for sure. And, as I look at the threats across
the entire transportation spectrum, the threats to aviation are
so significant and so prevalent. And I'm not minimizing in any
way, shape, or form, the threats to surface, but we need to
keep our focus there, as well. So, within a--if you look at the
top line of TSA, that top line is not growing, it's shrinking,
which requires some very hard decisions, in terms of how you
fit into that top-line number.
Senator Peters. Well, I think we all recognize that the
aviation threat is significant. But, given the fact that--is it
2 percent for surface? Is--what I understand is, 2 percent of
your budget goes for surface. And yet, a lot of the attacks
that we have seen of late are really involved with surface
transportation. I know you're in the process of doing a risk-
based analysis as to how we prioritize. And that's just good
management. And, obviously, we need to do be doing that. But,
still, does it just make sense, in your professional capacity,
that, really, is 98 percent of the risk in the aviation
community, or do we need to be focusing more on increasing that
2 percent to the surface transportation area?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir. I think, overall, the 2
percent--2 or 3 percent does need to go up, for sure. But,
there is a major difference between what we provide in surface
transportation, as far as security goes, and aviation. Because
we actually provide the security in the aviation sector. So, a
great proportion of the TSA workforce, all those salaries, all
that training, all that support, is in the aviation sector
because we actually directly provide the security there. So,
it's kind of hard to compare the two from an absolute-dollars-
to-absolute-dollars perspective.
Additionally, there's significant investment on the part of
the owners and operators of these surface transportation
systems, that, if you were to make that--try to make that
direct comparison, you really would have to wrap in that
investment, as well.
Senator Peters. Mr. Kelly, in--your testimony included
comments about TSA's lack of attention to surface security. And
I read that very closely. Specifically, you warned that the TSA
was dismissive and lacks on implementing requirements related
to non-aviation security. If you could elaborate on that, and
perhaps comment on Mr. Pekoske's testimony, as well, I'd
appreciate it.
Mr. Kelly. Certainly. Out of the ten recommendations that
were re-issued on the three reports that I referenced, only
three of those recommendations have been closed. Those
recommendations were made anywhere from 19 to 20 months ago.
And it has been taking an extended period of time for them to
implement those recommendations.
The three recommendations that they implemented were
relatively easy to achieve, because it only required them to
identify certain things or work within their own organization--
didn't require them to move outside of TSA.
The--I will tell you, though, in working with the
Administrator, my predecessor and I have noticed that he's very
committed to improving the TSA, and he has only been on the job
for less than 6 months, and attacking some of these issues are
going to take extended working with his staff to actually
implement them. So, I'm encouraged with his actions to move in
the right direction.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Peters.
We've been joined by the Ranking Member of the Committee.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
What I want to talk to you about is the red team that went
in to do a covert test. And, needless to say, the results were
disappointing. So, what has TSA done to address the fact that
huge numbers of people got through TSA screening with weapons?
And, further, how about the CT scanners? Talk about the next
generation that would solve the problem.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir. Let me start with the CT
scanners first, because you can solve the problem by--in three
ways: with technology, with a change in procedures, or a change
in training. In my opinion, the technology piece is the one
that will have, on the margin, the greatest impact on security
effectiveness. And so, that's my clear focus for aviation
security. We've stood up a project for--to begin to deploy CT
technology to the checkpoints. We should begin to see some CT
machines in checkpoints around the country for testing purposes
this year. And we hope to complete the initial testing by the
end of the summer, and then begin to deploy larger numbers of
CT machines in Fiscal Year 2019. President's budget is due to
be released on the fifth of February, and that will contain an
investment on CT equipment at the checkpoint.
And also, sir, with respect to procedures, once we saw the
intelligence information, examined the threats, and also had
the benefit of the IG's covert testing results and our own
covert testing results, we saw a need to change the procedures
at our checkpoint. And so, many passengers, from August all the
way through today, have noticed a change in procedures at the
checkpoint, where we ask passengers to take more things out of
their carry-on bags and put it in the bins. The reason for that
is, it declutters the X-ray image for us, and makes the
examination of the X-ray image much more effective. But, that's
not the only part of that changed procedure. We also changed
the procedure that our officers use to examine that X-ray image
that we found to be much more effective, and the way we search
the bags that we need to search. And so, overall, that
procedural change, alone, in our own covert testing that is
very akin to the IG's red-team testing, is an improvement of
about 20 percent in security effectiveness at the checkpoint.
So, that was a big improvement that we made right away.
Additionally, we increased the training for our TSA
workforce, where we conducted more training that's instructor-
led training, and led by instructors who are, typically,
explosives experts. And so, we can show, for example, what
we're seeing in the intelligence streams, and actually
demonstrate to our officers what it is we're concerned about
and what they should look at, not just for that particular
piece of equipment, but what its variance might be, so they're
alert for that as it might be going through the stream of
commerce that goes through the checkpoints.
So, overall, we've made substantial improvements in our
checkpoint operations. But, sir, to your point, the biggest
improvement will be that technology infusion, which I think is
right on the doorstep for us.
Senator Nelson. That red team test was done before you were
the TSA Administrator?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Upon taking office, what did you say to
your leadership team that you had to do to improve? Because the
results of the surprise tests were appalling.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir. The first thing we said is, we
need to make immediate changes to be able to address these test
results. And second--and it was my opinion, as a passenger
before I became the TSA Administrator--that we need to make a
significant technology change at that checkpoint. And so, that
was a--the two-pronged approach that--the training piece was
already underway, we just enhanced that over the course of the
fall. But, I think those three items will result in a
significant improvement in our performance at the checkpoint.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Admiral, numerous times last year, I and other members had
gotten involved in this issue--the canines and what they're
going to be doing, and the concern that we need to be using K9
teams. I think there is, kind of, unanimity on this Committee,
when we had a hearing on this for air passenger and air cargo
screening, and the current high demand for additional teams at
the airport across the country.
Now, I don't know whether you were here or familiar with
the hearing that we had when we had a witness, Steve Alterman.
He's of the Cargo Airline Associations. And he said, quote, ``I
think one of the reasons that we do not yet have a K9 program
is the lack of coordination between the various parts of TSA,
and nobody seems to be totally in charge that can bang heads
together and actually get it done.'' So, we're here to bang
heads, this morning. What is your thought? Are you familiar
with that statement that was made?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir, I'm familiar. And I'm very, very
familiar with the K9 program. I'm a huge fan of the K9 program.
I think we need to expand it significantly from its current
state. And literally, I look at the K9 program on a week-to-
week basis. I'm totally focused on that.
Senator Inhofe. What seems to be the obstacle?
Admiral Pekoske. The obstacle is getting canines through
our training program, down in San Antonio, which we have
changed. We've changed the throughput of that training center
from 300 canines per year to 350. And also, we're looking at
sourcing our canines more domestically than internationally
than we have in the past.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, there's a lot of interest in
that.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Because we've talked about that before.
Mr. Kelly, I mentioned to you that I was going to bring
this up, not expecting you'd necessarily have specific answers
today, or thoughts today, that you may want to do it for the
record. But, it's something that's of great concern to me. Now,
China's state-owned rail business, the CRRC, is larger than all
United States rails combined, and it benefits from the infinite
subsidies. China's very good at that, once they get any
competition. So, that's what we're faced with right now. In
2016, they sought to acquire Virtex. That's a United States
railway. I sent a letter. I think some others did, too, but, I
remember, I sent a letter to Jack Liu--at that time, he was the
Treasury Secretary--highlighting my concerns and asking the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States--that's
CFIUS--to review this transaction. Now, that happened in June
of what year was that? Yes, 2016. And 6 months later, without
any notice to us--now, keep in mind, the Department of
Transportation, I don't believe, is one of the organizations
that's on CFIUS. But, they didn't know anything that was going
on that I was even aware of. Then, all of a sudden, they
approved the sale--they approved the sale without any
notification, and so forth.
Now, this has happened before. And I'm concerned about the
way this process works. I would think that, certainly, the
Members of the House and the Senate would like to have a voice
in this and at least get a response before approving a sale.
Are you into this issue? Is this something you're familiar
with?
Mr. Kelly. Senator, I'm a little bit familiar with this
issue, because your staff rose it--brought that to our
attention of our staff. I did notice that there were a number
of Senators that co-signed that letter; I think many of them
here on this Committee. And I think the concerns that you've
raised are significant concerns. However, I'm not sure that's--
the role that the Department of Homeland Security has in this
area. I will bring this up to our staff and try to get back to
you on this.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. But, I question if this is the role of Homeland
Security or if it's a bigger of a role for the Department of
Treasury.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. And, you know, all due respect, I
don't care whose role it is, but----
Mr. Kelly. Yes.
Senator Inhofe.--it's going to be something that's going to
have to be addressed.
Now, you've refreshed my memory, and I do recall now, we
had several people that were on this Committee that signed this
letter with me. It was a letter from me. And it said that we
have problems with this transaction. And, to my knowledge, it
was done without any notification at all for any of the Members
here. So, anything that you can do--there are several of us who
are going to pursue a correction to this, or maybe a change in
the way CFIUS works. But, I think it's important, particularly
right now it's more significant, with what's happened in China
in the recent years, than it was at that time. So, I just want
to call that to the Committee's attention, and to yours, and
anyone else out there who has an idea.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Cortez Masto.
STATEMENT OF HON. CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Kelly, you noted, in your testimony, the lack of key
metrics to measure the success of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential Program's core objectives. And I'm a
firm believer in data and metrics. And I'm wondering, in your
opinion, are there other TSA programs or spending that also
struggle with these lack of proper performance metrics? And
would you elaborate on that, a little bit, if you would.
Mr. Kelly. I think some of the questions concerning the
covert testing is an area on the metrics on how well some of
the screeners do in achieving the goals. That would be another
area that I think there could be better metrics. If that
answers your question.
Senator Cortez Masto. Administrator, you agree?
Admiral Pekoske. I agree. We can do a lot better job with
our metrics and really having outcome-focused metrics in place.
With respect to the TSA workforce, we're making a significant
number of changes in that regard, particularly the way we
evaluate TSO performance. It had been a series of tests that
were done over the course of the year, that, if a
transportation security officer did not succeed in those tests,
he or she was given a limited number of chances to pass it
before they potentially lost their job. What we're doing now
is, we're, over the course of the year, measuring their
performance, so, at the end of the year, we can say, ``Hey,
this person has performed in an outstanding manner over the
course of the year; so, therefore, they're recertified for
their position.'' So, we've got a continuous stream of metrics
and a lot less anxiety on the part of the workforce.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. And then, the last time we
spoke, we also--and I appreciate you having a conversation with
me--the concern about the budget for surface transportation and
security. And I know you wanted time to get in there and take a
look and figure out your priorities. And I heard a little bit
today, but do you mind--I know you talked about Fiscal Year
2019 budget that you were involved with--can you talk a little
bit more about your priorities, particularly as it pertains to
what we're talking about for surface transportation?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Appreciate the question.
And, you know, as I look at risk, I look at risk as being a
combination of the threat, the vulnerability, and the
consequence, should an attack occur in any particular mode of
transportation. And I think we need to look at our risk
quotient overall within the transportation system, and then
allocate the resources where we see the greatest risk,
currently, but also where risk might be developing in the
future. And that's where the intelligence piece comes in mind,
because I--I really don't want to see us in a position where we
look at things in a static environment and say, ``OK, the risk
is here today,'' and we put resources--we allocate resources
based on that, when the trending might be----
Senator Cortez Masto. And so, can I just----
Admiral Pekoske. Right.
Senator Cortez Masto. I'm sorry----
Admiral Pekoske. Sure.
Senator Cortez Masto.--I only have 5 minutes.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes.
Senator Cortez Masto. So, does that mean you're looking at
that now to determine staffing needs----
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cortez Masto.--resource needs for technology,
resource needs that you will need, particularly in this budget
area, for surface transportation?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cortez Masto: Is that correct?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cortez Masto. Can you talk a little bit about new
technologies? For--and let me just put this in perspective. We
have seen, from smart buildings to smart technology in our
transportation sector--and, particularly in Nevada, this is
really exciting area for us and across the country. I'm
wondering if you can talk a little bit about these new
technologies that show promise for safety and security, that
you underscored in your testimony, when it comes to smart
transportation technology?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. The one that I highlighted in
my testimony and in my oral statement was the standoff
detection equipment that allows us to see if a person might
be--might have a--an IED on their body. And what this does is,
it doesn't transmit any energy toward the individual
whatsoever, it just reads the energy that somebody's body is
transmitting. And I took a demonstration of it a couple of
weeks ago. It's very, very good. And this is one of the things
that TSA does well, I think, is, we look at technology that's
out there, in combination with the Department of Homeland
Security science and technology directorate, and we do testing
for the industry, and we complete testing and then give them a
list of manufacturers whose results conform to what our
standards are. And then they can go buy it off of our list of
certified equipment, if you will. So, that's a very promising
area of work for us.
Senator Cortez Masto. And is this something you're also
looking at to incorporate into your budget, this new technology
that you think might be helpful with security?
Admiral Pekoske. What we incorporate into our budget,
Senator, there is really the testing of the technology, not the
purchase----
Senator Cortez Masto. OK.
Admiral Pekoske.--of the technology.
Senator Cortez Masto. OK.
Admiral Pekoske. Right.
Senator Cortez Masto. Appreciate that.
Admiral Pekoske. Right.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
Admiral Pekoske. But, I look--be looking for technology
overall, anything that might apply in aviation certainly into
surface would be a bonus, as well.
Senator Cortez Masto. I appreciate that.
Thank you both.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Cortez Masto.
Senator Hassan.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Hassan. Well, thank you, Senator Fischer and
Senator Peters.
And welcome, to our witnesses, this afternoon.
Administrator Pekoske, I wanted to start with you. One
challenge we faced in New Hampshire is the need to ensure that
our first responders in the Granite State have enough
information about what dangerous chemicals or other products
are traveling through by freight rail. Back in 2013, there was
an awful derailment and explosion in Lac-Megantic, Quebec,
which is just over the border from New Hampshire, in Canada,
killing over 40 people and--after a huge fire, petroleum and
petroleum byproducts polluting an entire town. So, first
responders need this information in order to adequately respond
if a derailment or terrorist attack were to happen. And we have
seen some improvement in sharing information over recent years,
but I'd like to hear your thoughts on how Federal, State, and
local entities can continue to collaborate with industry to
share information and best practices so that local first
responders aren't caught off-guard when a security incident
occurs.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. I think it's very important
that everybody, like you said, collaborates on this, because
the first responders, maybe at the State level, the local
level----
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Admiral Pekoske.--they may be at the Federal level--if
they're at the Federal level, they may be from multiple Federal
agencies.
Senator Hassan. Right.
Admiral Pekoske. And we do a process called the ISTEP,
Intermodal Security Exercise Training Program. And part of it
is training. But, where training really becomes embedded is in
exercises, as well. And so, as we run exercises, we can see
where there might be some shortcomings across the spectrum of
first responders, and be able to bridge that.
Senator Hassan. Well, I would appreciate--you know, I'd
look forward to talking with you more about it, because it
became--I think, for all states, it's a real issue. Sometimes,
the owners of the railroads or their customers don't want to
share specific information because it's proprietary. And we
need to figure out a way to make sure they do that and we all
understand the limits of the information-sharing.
To both of you, TSA has also coordinated with the
Department of Transportation to assess critical infrastructure,
such as tunnels and bridges. As of September 2015, TSA reported
it had provided remediation recommendations to 81 of 100 high-
risk bridges. Our crumbling infrastructure poses a really
significant and serious security threat. That's one of the
reasons my senior Senator, Senator Shaheen, and I introduced
the Safe Bridges Act, which would provide much needed funding
for repairing and replacing bridges categorized as structurally
deficient. So, how important is infrastructure investment to
our Nation's security? And we'll start with you, Administrator,
and then Mr. Kelly. Either one of you----
Admiral Pekoske. Sure. I think infrastructure investment's
critical to security, because--I mean, I think we should look
at infrastructure investment as a way to build in security into
that infrastructure as we're renewing it. It's a significant
effort on our part, with respect to airports, and certainly
with surface transportation systems. And, you know, the earlier
we can have a dialogue with owners and operators of systems
that are considering an infrastructure investment, the more we
can put our design desires into the build of that
infrastructure. And that gets to good pricing and good project
management.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. I agree with the Administrator. If you have a
crumbling infrastructure, it's much easier to break those----
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Kelly.--than it is to have the infrastructure that's
designed to actually withstand some things. Just look at the
way the building codes in San Francisco has enhanced the
buildings to deal with earthquakes.
Senator Hassan. Sure. Well, thank you for that.
I want to go back, for a minute, on the issue of our rail
system and our security. To Administrator Pekoske, I--as I
understand it, TSA is working to employ--and you guys have been
talking about it--a risk-based approach to securing the
passenger rail system. Part of that risk-based approach is to
assess whether the intelligence points to the likelihood or
probability that terrorist actors would select passenger rail
systems as a target. The other part of risk-based approach is
understanding passenger rail's vulnerability to an attack and
working to mitigate the effects of a successful attack. While
intelligence may not indicate the likelihood of an attack,
intelligence isn't foolproof, right? We all know that. So, what
measures are currently in place that would seek to prevent a
terrorist attack on passenger rail as a contingency plan in the
event that our intelligence underestimates the likelihood of
attack?
Admiral Pekoske. Senator, I think, you know, a good part of
that is look--is doing vulnerability assessments and figuring
out where you might make some enhancements to your security.
And we have a program that's called BASE. It stands for
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement. So, essentially,
we look at a system and say, ``Hey, here's where it is from a
security perspective. Here's where we can enhance it. And, on
the margin, what's our greatest return per enhancement so that
the investment goes the furthest?''
Senator Hassan. Well, thank you. And seeing my time is up,
Mr. Kelly, I will follow up with you more about some of the
progress or delays on the crosscutting, risk-based approach
that the Department is supposed to be undertaking.
Mr. Kelly. OK.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
thank you, to you, as well, Senator Peters, this important
hearing.
And, in Minnesota, we host a lot of big events, including
the Super Bowl, which is coming up. Just wanted to do a little
advertisement there, even though, sadly, our team won't be in
it. But, we will be hosting a million people in less than 2
weeks. So, league officials have said that it's going to be
one--the most transportation-centric event in NFL history.
You're nodding your head, Mr. Pekoske. What steps are you
taking to efficiently screen people at the airport and people
at the game? And I know you can't go into all the details, but
I would assume that this is--a general answer would apply to
all events that you do.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, Senator. It's--we're doing an awful
lot with respect to Super Bowl, as you might imagine. First
off, on the airport side, we work very closely with the
airports and the airlines to figure out when the bulk of
passengers will be arriving--actually which flights at which
times--so that we can put the right resources in place to be
able to handle them as they come into the airport and certainly
as they depart the airport once the game is over. This is, as
you said, a very transportation-centric Super Bowl. Some of our
Viper Teams will be present in Minneapolis for that, assisting
State and local, and coordinating very carefully with them.
And, of course, with respect to screening, we have
expertise in screening, and provide that expertise to the
stadium owners and operators.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. And I've always been a big
fan of the Viper units, and including the K9 units. As you
know, we had some issues at the airport, a while back, due to a
number of factors. And it was the K9 units that came in. I
maybe have told you that two dogs were flown in from Maui, so
they came to Minnesota from Maui; kind of wrecked their life,
but that's OK. They seem happy now. And so, around 50 percent
of the guests at the Super Bowl are going to arrive on the
metro transit's lite rail. Could you talk about how the Viper
Teams will help secure the metro transit train stations that'll
be used to get guests to and from the game?
Admiral Pekoske. Well, Viper Teams, Senator, are married up
with K9s, so that provides a very good force multiplier for the
Viper Teams. Additionally, the Viper Teams provide that visible
presence so that people see that, they get--you know, comforted
by the fact that there is a security presence there. But, key
to the Viper Team's success is the good coordination they have
with State and local officials. And part of this process is to
talk a lot, and coordinate a lot before the event occurs.
Senator Klobuchar. During your confirmation hearing last
year, I asked you about the greatest challenges TSA faces. In
response, you stated that ``workforce training and developing
and deploying new technology were at the top of your list.''
Where does TSA stand with its workforce training now? What
things have you done?
Admiral Pekoske. We place an awful lot of emphasis on the
workforce, period, and workforce training, in particular. And
we've got in place now, as we're--we're beginning to roll out a
new career progression for our transportation security officer
workforce, which essentially lays out for that work force,
which is the bulk of the Transportation Security
Administration, what a progression would be from an entry-level
transportation security officer to a transportation security
manager, the most senior person at the checkpoint. And along
the way, we provide required in-person and onsite training, in
addition to pay increases, once the training is achieved and
certifications are acquired. So, the whole idea was to really
map out for our workforce what a career in TSA, and what a
career progression would look like, and what kind of training
that we were committing, as an organization, to provide to
them.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good.
The freight rail system, one question on this, with over
4,400 route miles, 20 railroad companies are critical to
efficient movement of goods. We have a lot coming through, as
you can imagine, being next to North Dakota, where the oil is.
We've got biofuels coming through. We've got things coming
through Canada. And I think people would be surprised at how
much rail we have in Minnesota. According to your testimony,
TSA will be hosting this Surface Public Area Security Summit
next month to discuss best practices, to--collaboration with
the industry. Could you talk about the security of freight
rail?
Admiral Pekoske. We've invited freight rail to attend, and
I expect that we'll have a good representation from freight
rail. And we'll have a good representation from across the
board, including a good number of people from the aviation
sector. So, it's a really great opportunity to spend a day,
talk about overall public-area security, and move it forward,
getting best practices from the different modes of
transportation.
Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you very much.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank the
witnesses. And thank you to Ranking Member Peters for holding
this hearing.
All of these issues are so important. And I think you've
heard from many members: dogs, dogs, dogs. Because we know the
effectiveness of the K9 units. And we're using them even at our
ports as it relates to our ferry transportation system. And I'm
sure people are using them on security for other aspects of
rail and other things.
But, I have a letter from the Sea-Tac folks, because you
know that Sea-Tac is one of our fastest-growing airports in the
United States. And I quote from it. And they say they deeply
value the good relationship with TSA and believe that their
solutions continue to require some engagement from top TSA
leadership. I would assume they mean you. So, their issue,
which we have seen, is, when we have the K9 units that we need,
the airport functions well. When we don't have the K9 units, it
struggles to really reach capacity.
Admiral Pekoske. Right.
Senator Cantwell. So, we've had some TSA staffing
reductions because of those checkpoint issues, given, you know,
the new technology that's being implemented. But, we're down
from ten--nine K9 units, ten that were allocated, to five. And
this growth that we are seeing is just phenomenal. So, I
wondered if I could get your comments on how you could help us
with that?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. You should have all of your K9
teams back in full force by the end of March. So, that's good
news. And that's part of our effort to try to increase the
throughput through our training center, and really very
carefully monitoring the allocation of K9 resources across the
board. As you and I have discussed, you know, as you know, we
have 372 passenger screening K9 teams authorized in the TSA
budget. I think that number needs to go up, and up
substantially. And so, I--you know, I would like to see that go
up over the course of successive years so we get much more
capacity, because canines are so critical to security
effectiveness, for sure, and also to helping us manage
throughput issues at the airport.
Senator Cantwell. And does that include the training
partnership program language, as well?
Admiral Pekoske. The----
Senator Cantwell. Ability to do training verification by
third parties.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. In fact, we have a----
Senator Cantwell. I mean, to reach that number, do we need
to do both of those things?
Admiral Pekoske. I think to reach the number--I think we
can reach the number with the current training center that we
have, the initial step up, in a couple of years. But, the
third-party process is moving along pretty vigorously. And we
have an industry day scheduled for a week from today, actually.
And I'm very optimistic about that third-party K9 program. It's
got my attention, as do K9s overall. And I would expect that
we'll be able to launch that program in the next couple of
months, once we get----
Senator Cantwell. And what about the----
Admiral Pekoske.--once we get industry----
Senator Cantwell. And what about the staffing levels of
TSA? Could you look at that for me, please, and give me
comments at Sea-Tac?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Well, Mr. Chairman--I mean, Madam Chairman, I definitely
think that we need to take today's hearing as an opportunity to
work with TSA on increasing those K9 units. They do such
fabulous work. And it is just an amazing level of deterrence
that we need to have everywhere. And so, look forward to
working with the Chairman and everybody on how we get that over
the goal line.
Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
We've been joined by the Chair of the Committee, Senator
Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
The Chairman. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, for holding
today's hearing.
And thanks, to Admiral Pekoske and to Mr. Kelly, for being
here.
Admiral, I would also like to recognize the hard work of
your TSA officers. Like most people here, I travel between
South Dakota and Washington, D.C., weekly, and I always
appreciate the professionalism and the diligence of your TSA
teams. So, please thank them for all that they do in keeping us
safe.
And I also want to just say a quick word about both the
Surface and Maritime Transportation Security Act and the TSA
Modernization Act that this Committee has approved on a
bipartisan basis. Both bills seek to strengthen our
transportation security, guarding against terrorist threats to
our infrastructure and the traveling public by modernizing the
way TSA is organized and ensuring that resources are allocated
through a risk-based strategy. I remain committed to these
important pieces of legislation. I'm hopeful that the full
Senate will consider them, sooner rather than later.
Admiral, let me just ask you. You've been in the position
now for 5 months. Can you describe what you see as your biggest
challenge in the surface security area?
Admiral Pekoske. Sir, thank you. And thank you for the
comments about the TSA workforce. It's greatly appreciated. And
I know a number of the transportation security officers and
other staff in TSA watch this hearing, and they really
genuinely appreciate your comments and the comments of the rest
of the Committee members on their performance.
In terms of challenges overall, I think the--one of the
biggest challenges we face is getting more technology into the
organization. And it goes across the board, whether it's
aviation or surface. And the other challenge is--and you'll see
in the strategy, that I have in draft form right now--that I
would like to bring to all the members of the Committee in
draft form to get your feedback on--but, one of the key tenets
of that strategy is to lead transportation security, emphasis
on ``lead.'' And the second is to accelerate action on the part
of TSA. And that's been a theme I've seen since I've been in
the position for 5 months. And certainly I've heard from our
industry stakeholders, from Members of Congress, both on the
authorization and the appropriations side, is, we just need to
get, as a business that we're about, in a much quicker way, get
the decisions faster and get the solutions faster so that we
can get more K9 teams deployed quicker, that we can get more CT
technology at the checkpoint quicker, that we can test more
technology for surface transportation quicker than what we do
today.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Kelly, thank you for your testimony updating us on
TSA's actions to address your recommendations. I understand
that some progress has been made, but there are still some
actions that need to be completed.
Mr. Kelly. That is correct, Senator.
The Chairman. I also am pleased to hear that you think that
our bill, the Surface and Maritime Transportation Security Act,
addresses many of the remaining issues. Going forward, what do
you believe TSA's top priority should be for improving surface
security?
Mr. Kelly. For surface security, I believe that they need
to focus on a risk-based strategy for all of--all surfaces.
That will likely reallocate additional money toward surface-
based transportation, and that will provide greater resources
and oversights in those areas, which should improve security on
surface transportation.
The Chairman. Admiral, we've heard, in the past, complaints
from stakeholders of redundant checks, and from multiple
Federal agencies. What is TSA doing to coordinate with other
Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure the proper level
of security is in place, but, at the same time, prevent overly
burdensome and repeated inspections by multiple government
agencies?
Admiral Pekoske. Mr. Chairman, you know, one of our key
areas of focuses is the passenger experience and our
relationships with industry. And, you know, I'd be interested
in any examples that any partner has where they might see some
duplication between what TSA does and what another agency does.
Additionally, it's incumbent upon me to coordinate, without
even any of that information, with my other partners, certainly
in the Federal Government, to make sure that we eliminate or
reduce as much as possible any redundancies between our
efforts. Because it's just not efficient, and it's really not
good for our stakeholders to see things coming from multiple
different directions. We ought to be able to coordinate that
better.
The Chairman. OK.
Madam Chair, thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Thune.
I would like to thank the panelists for being here today.
Administrator, Mr. Kelly, we appreciate the information that
you've provided to us.
The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks. And,
during this time, Senators are asked to submit any questions
for the record. Upon receipt, the witnesses are requested to
submit their written answers to the Committee as soon as
possible.
Again, thank you, gentlemen.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. David P. Pekoske
Question 1. Amid public calls by Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups to target our rail systems, what more can be done to better
secure our passenger and freight rail infrastructure?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) addresses
the risks to freight and passenger railroads through information
sharing, including classified information (ensuring that railroad
security officials are aware of threats), planning (preparing plans for
countermeasures that can be employed when the level of threat is
elevated), training (providing training for employees to enhance their
awareness and understanding), and exercises (providing venues and
opportunities to test plans and operational practices in order to be
better prepared). TSA evaluates technology on behalf of industry to
provide products to help identify and or mitigate threat on passenger
and freight rail systems.
For over 12 years TSA has partnered with passenger and freight rail
industry stakeholders to establish ongoing testbeds that provide
critical data and information that stakeholders can use to improve
their infrastructure protection. These testbeds assess both marketplace
and emerging technology, integrated into sophisticated, layered
systems; thereby expanding and encouraging the technology marketplace
while providing industry with proven solutions and concepts of
operation that they can adapt to their particular needs. Examples of
these testbeds include a comprehensive intrusion detection and
protection testbed in the Northern New Jersey/Newark area and advanced
technology at the Tennessee River and Plattsmouth railroad bridges.
In response to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) Inspire
17 magazine published in August 2017, which gave detailed instructions
on how to build and deploy a train derail device and encouraged would-
be jihadists to use it:
TSA convened a meeting of subject matter experts from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) to ascertain the possible consequences
associated with the use of this device. TSA and the FBI
determined it would be beneficial to construct and test the
Inspire derail device.
TSA's Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis
conducted tests of the improvised derail device at the
Transportation Technology Test Center in Pueblo, CO in December
2017, with representatives from the FBI, FRA, and the National
Transportation Safety Board in attendance to observe the tests.
The full results of the tests are Sensitive Security
Information and can be provided upon request.
Question 2. Given recent incidents of terrorists targeting public
spaces, what is TSA doing and what more can be done to protect those
transportation open spaces?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) partners
closely with stakeholders in all modes of transportation to discuss and
develop best practices to enhance security in public areas. In
September 2016, TSA began hosting Public Area Security Summits with
industry, government, academic, and international stakeholders to
devise a strategy for information sharing, and protecting
infrastructure from emerging threats to public spaces of transportation
venues. Participation of both government and industry executives
provides a unique opportunity to leverage expertise and resources, and
collaborate on security plans moving forward. This program also enables
strategic alignment and unity of effort across numerous entities within
the public spaces. The work of the group resulted in the publication of
a Public Area Security National Framework in May 2017, with 11
corresponding recommendations. Additionally, the group continues to
meet--most recently in early February 2018--to discuss the
implementation of the recommendations and share best practices and
lessons learned. The Public Area Security Summits will continue bi-
annually, with the next meeting scheduled for fall 2018.
Various airports have adopted many of the recommendations and the
continued meetings provide a forum to share best practices. For
example, in 2017 MASSPORT hosted an Aviation Security Meta-Leadership
Symposium for their employees as well as local stakeholders for threat
awareness education as a direct result of the public area security
summits and framework.
The Framework recommendations included: Cultivate Relationships;
Develop Communication Strategies to Enhance Information Exchanges;
Enhance Situational Awareness; Expand Threat Awareness Education;
Develop Joint Risk Frameworks & Enhance Joint Vulnerability
Assessments; Establish Airport Operations Centers; Conduct Background
Checks & Threat Assessments of Public Area Workers; Conduct Workforce
Employee Training; Develop, Conduct, and Practice Exercises & Response
Drills; Invest in Innovative Construction Designs; and Coordinate
Response Planning.
Question 3. As a former Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, I know
you are familiar with the Coast Guard's roles and missions, can you
discuss what steps you are taking to ensure there are no seams that
terrorists can exploit between where the Coast Guard's maritime and
TSA's transportation responsibilities meet?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in the maritime mode, as the USCG is the
lead Federal agency for maritime security. TSA leverages its expertise
in passenger screening, explosives detection, transportation worker
credentialing, and multi-modal security to support the USCG in
coordinating and conducting interagency security efforts for the
maritime mode. As the USCG is the lead Federal agency for maritime
security, TSA supports the USCG in its maritime security efforts and in
coordinating interagency efforts for the maritime mode. TSA works
closely with the USCG, as well as other government agency maritime
partners, to provide subject matter expertise to Federal working
groups, disseminate security information to the public, and review
interagency documents. TSA supports the USCG by providing TSA-developed
maritime security training materials and coordinating maritime security
exercises with maritime stakeholders to strengthen security plans,
policies and procedures. TSA also works closely with USCG HQ offices in
support of their cybersecurity efforts, providing information on
cybersecurity measures and resources to the maritime industry.
Question 4. Administrator Pekoske, I am aware of several overdue
letters of response and reports that TSA owes to this Committee;
including five overdue reports required by the FAA Extension, Safety,
and Security Act of 2016, two from the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
as amended by section 3 of the Transportation Security Acquisition
Reform Act, and the 2017 Annual Report on Transportation Security.
a. Has TSA sent these reports to DHS for clearance?
b. When can we expect to see these reports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
does not have any outstanding overdue reports to the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation. In 2017, TSA submitted to the
Committee the reports required by the FAA Extension, Safety, and
Security Act of 2016, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by
section 3 of the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act, and
the 2017 Annual Report on Transportation Security. Included in those
submissions were the following eight reports:
1. Implementation of the Rap Back Service for Recurrent Vetting of
TSA-Regulated Populations on April 5, 2017
2. TSA Report on the Insider Threat to Aviation on May 4, 2017
3. TSA Office of Global Strategies Comprehensive Workforce
Assessment on May 25, 2017
4. TSA Security Coordination Enhancement Plan on June 28, 2017
5. TSA Pre3 Application Program Fee Revenue and Investments on
September 29, 2017
6. Small Business Contracting Goals Report on April 7, 2017
7. Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh
on December 19, 2017
8. 2017 Annual Report on Transportation Security on December 20,
2017
TSA remains committed to ensuring the timely submission of all
required letters and reports.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Hon. David P. Pekoske
Question 1. Administrator Pekoske, can you give the Committee an
update on TSA's efforts to review and reform the TWIC program as a
result of the agency's comprehensive risk analysis?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
program is a jointly managed program between the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) for the security threat assessment and
card issuance and the United States Coast Guard for the use and access
at regulated maritime ports and facilities. In 2017, the TSA
commissioned the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC),
a federally funded research and development center operated by the RAND
Corporation, to conduct an independent review of its Security Threat
Assessment (STA) controls and risks. The review found that while TWIC
controls are in line with Federal best practices and standards,
possible improvements were identified for each phase of the TSA STA
process. Where controls were less developed, HSOAC, provided
recommendations on new controls or areas where controls could be
strengthened for ensuring the security of the TWIC program. TSA is
using the recommendations from this review to develop a control and
quality management plan to augment its risk management processes. By
improving its framework for actively identifying and managing controls
and risk tolerances, the TSA TWIC program will minimize security
vulnerabilities to the STA process and provide reasonable assurance
that the program achieves its security objectives. TSA will brief the
Committee on the enhancements to its risk management process after it
has implemented the management plan, including an internal control
framework and enhanced adjudication and security controls for
conducting STAs. TSA plans to complete implementation in by the end of
calendar year 2018.
Question 2. Administrator Pekoske, during a Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security Subcommittee
hearing in 2016 we heard testimony that TSA has much to learn in the
cybersecurity realm. What actions have you taken, or plan to take, to
improve TSA's cybersecurity posture?
Answer. In accordance with all the cybersecurity Executive Orders,
Binding Operational Directives, and Policy Memos the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has continued to evolve its cybersecurity
posture, personnel, and capabilities. TSA is mitigating the
cybersecurity risks to TSA's data, systems, and networks through the
implementation of tools that: monitor privileged user activity; detect
malicious content in web traffic and e-mails; and accelerate the
detection of Indicators of Compromise (IOC). In 2017 TSA awarded three
strategic cybersecurity contracts. These contracts have enabled TSA to
augment its cybersecurity workforces in the areas of: Monitoring and
Cybersecurity Network Defense; Security Infrastructure and
Vulnerability Assessments; Digital Forensics; and Cybersecurity
Governance Risk Compliance.
For Surface Transportation Systems, TSA's Office of Security Policy
and Industry Engagement (OSPIE) works in coordination with TSA's
Offices of Intelligence and Analysis, Information Technology, Security
Operations, and with the other Sector Specific Agencies (SSA),
Department of Transportation and the U.S. Coast Guard with the
objective of awareness and outreach. Support for the Sector's cyber
risk management efforts is done through a non-operational approach
centered on education, facilitation, and information sharing. The
purpose of these efforts are to develop, deploy, and promote Sector-
focused cybersecurity initiatives, programs, tools, strategies, and
threat and intelligence information sharing products that support the
implementation of national mandates, strategies, policies, directives,
and priorities.
Current Initiatives:
Facilitate collaboration between industry and government
partners to promote cybersecurity risk management programs and
resources with the goals of:
Supporting the increased use of existing government
resources.
Increasing the industries' operational resilience and
ability to manage cyber risk.
Regional Surface Transportation Cybersecurity
Workshops--Partner with the DHS Office of Cybersecurity &
Communications and TSA Regional Surface Inspectors to deliver
facilitated workshops highlighting the many DHS and Federal
cyber-risk management resources that are available to critical
infrastructure partners.
We continue to practice an approach of
continuous improvement based on feedback received
during our workshops and hot-wash sessions.
As a result, industry stakeholders were
added as speakers at the last two workshops to share a
recent incident they have experienced and/or their
cybersecurity risk management strategy. We also added
in-depth discussion and Q&A about their take-aways from
their workshop participation.
On December 13, 2017, one workshop took
place in Cleveland, OH. There are five more workshops
planned for Fiscal Year (FY) 2018:
Atlanta, GA on March 14,
2018
Washington, DC on March
21, 2018
Dallas, TX in late April/
May 2018
Los Angeles, CA in late
June/July 2018
Pacific Northwest in late
July/August 2018
Past participants have included stakeholders from
Surface, Aviation and Maritime modes.
Distribute Cyber Security Awareness guides and the
Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Toolkit.
Sponsor and participate as a member on the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA), Enterprise
Cybersecurity Working Group (ECSWG), and Control and
Communications Systems Working Group (CCSWG) Recommended
Practice Working Groups. Current projects include:
Guidance document for a transit agency's CIO, CISO,
and HR to use to gain buy-in from their Management, C-Suite
and/or Board of Directors that:
Provides rationale for creating an active
cybersecurity awareness program.
A call to action that cybersecurity is everyone's
job.
Update to Recommended Practice Part 2 (2013)--
``Defining a Security Zone Architecture for Rail Transit
and Protecting Critical Zones'' to align to the Framework.
Rail Car Cybersecurity White Paper.
Transit Bus Cybersecurity White Paper.
Revising the TSA Pipeline Cybersecurity Guidelines
(2011) to align with the NIST Cyber Security Framework and
we expect to release in 2018.
Developing cybersecurity incident reporting guidelines
for Mass Transit and Freight Rail operators that both align
with existing regulations and support more robust Federal
incident response processes.
Expand partnerships and coordination efforts with our
DOT/NHTSA and industry stakeholders on vehicle
cybersecurity issues.
Recent Accomplishments:
Planned and facilitated a series of four regional
Cybersecurity Workshops in FY 2017. The workshops provided a
baseline awareness of existing U.S. Government cybersecurity
support programs and allowed stakeholders to share best
practices and lessons learned with one another. Additionally,
the facilitated discussion component served as an opportunity
for participants to both discuss industry's cybersecurity
challenges and for them to share their organization's best
practices.
FY 2017 Workshop locations:
Arlington, VA (DC Metro Area), co-hosted by
Arlington County--ART
Pittsburgh, PA, co-hosted by Port Authority of
Allegheny County
St. Louis, MO, co-hosted by Bi-State Development
Agency/Metro Transit
Oakland, CA (San Francisco Bay Area), co-hosted
by Bay Area Rapid Transit
Finalized and distributed over 56,000 thousand
cybersecurity-specific awareness guides.
Developed, promoted, and disseminated the Surface
Transportation Cybersecurity Resource Toolkit for Small &
Midsize Business (SMB) that provides guidance on how to
incorporate cyber risk into an organization's existing risk
management and governance process.
Developed and disseminated Cybersecurity Awareness Messages
(CAMs) and Surface Information Bulletins that covered:
Cyber Petya Ransomware Attacks.
Observance of 13th National Cybersecurity Awareness
Month.
Ransomware Attack Awareness: how to protect & how to
respond.
Collaborated with industry partners to provide cybersecurity
focused support at various industry sponsored modal meetings,
workshops, and conferences.
Participated as a member and collaborated on various
internal and joint public/private TSS cybersecurity working
groups that included:
Transportation Systems Sector Cyber Working Group
(TSSCWG).
Bi-weekly TSA Cyber Coordination working group.
Question 3. Administrator Pekoske, I understand TSA is testing a
system that could detect concealed explosives and suicide vests in
crowded areas like public transit systems.
Question 3a. Could you provide background and an update on this
program?
Answer. TSA has been actively exploring ways to detect threats on
persons within the public transportation environment for a number of
years. Recent advances in technology have dramatically improved
performance while reducing system cost. TSA continuously assesses the
technology marketplace and collaborates with technology providers to
improve their products. Technology involving standoff detection of
concealed threats is always of significant interest.
TSA has worked with several leading standoff detection technologies
since the first prototypes appeared around 2005. Two leading vendors'
units should be available for sale to the security industry by early to
mid-summer of 2018.
Question 3b. What is the program's detection rate?
Answer. Both systems have shown extremely high rates of detection
against a wide range of explosive threats, with very low rates of false
positives. While precise detection rates are classified, upon request
TSA can provide a briefing in an appropriate venue.
Question 3c. Would adoption of this technology slow the movement of
people going into or out of a public transit system?
Answer. No. The two standoff detection technologies being assessed
operate in real time, generally requiring only about one second of
visibility to detect. Under many circumstances, they can also screen
several persons at the same time. TSA surface security technologies are
focused on the ability to detect threats without impeding the free
movement of people through the venue.
Question 4. Administrator Pekoske, as part of its surface
transportation security portfolio, TSA does work to identify and issue
recommendations to the pipeline industry related to system security.
For example, in 2016, TSA completed a review, required by the 9/11
Commission Act, to review the security of the Nation's top 100 pipeline
systems. Do you have any updates on TSA's work to detect threats and
provide support for pipeline security? Additionally, TSA has a
memorandum of understanding with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) to cooperate on pipeline security
threats. Have you worked to develop a relationship with PHMSA and
Administrator Skip Elliott to support PHMSA's work on pipeline
security?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to work collaboratively with the pipeline industry to identify threats
and provide support for pipeline security.
Some of these TSA initiatives include:
Regular pipeline threat assessments and briefings
administered by TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(OIA). Threat updates are provided, at a minimum during monthly
stakeholder conference calls and annually to over 100 industry
security representatives at the International Pipeline Security
Forum.
Issuing Pipeline Security Guidelines (dated 2011) for
enhancing physical and cybersecurity. TSA worked with industry
stakeholders to update these Guidelines specifically with
regard to cybersecurity and we expect to release in 2018.
TSA Evaluates corporate security policies and procedures of
the Nation's top 100 pipeline systems and provides
recommendations for a more robust corporate security program.
The TSA Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) program
focuses on the collection of site-specific facility
information, and provides recommendations for improving the
security posture of critical pipeline facilities. In FY2017,
TSA conducted 70 CFSRs.
TSA maintains ongoing security technology testbeds at two
major pipeline sites, in partnership with a major U.S. pipeline
company.
The TSA Intermodal Security Training and Exercise program
provides exercise, training, and security planning tools in a
variety of formats (table top exercises, full scale exercise,
workshops).
TSA distributed over 10,800 Pipeline Counterterrorism Guides
in FY2017 to pipeline owners/operators as a means to enhance
security awareness and employee vigilance.
TSA uses multiple platforms to share timely and relevant
information including monthly stakeholder calls, security and
incident awareness messaging, collaboration with industry trade
associations, and active involvement with industry's Oil and
Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council and their initiatives.
Indicative of TSA's active and longstanding partnership with PHMSA
on pipeline safety and security matters, TSA's Surface Division
Director recently met with PHMSA Administrator Skip Elliott. TSA and
PHMSA have a memorandum of understanding detailing the various ways the
agencies cooperate on matters relating to pipeline security.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. David P. Pekoske
Reimbursements to Airports. Following the September 11th terrorist
attacks, several airports across the country, including many in
Florida, installed in-line baggage screening systems with the
understanding that they would be reimbursed by the TSA. My
understanding is that these airports are owed at least 217 million
dollars.
Question 1. When can we expect the TSA to begin the process for
reimbursing these airports?
Answer. In November 2017, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) completed the seven-step process, and finalized
the Airport Reimbursement List, as outlined in the TSA Reimbursement
Review and Validation Plan for In-Line Baggage Screening Systems,
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Report to Congress (June 16, 2016). The list
identifies 16 projects across 14 airports eligible for funding totaling
$217,879,014.36. With the passage of the Fiscal Year 2018 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, (Public Law 115-141), $50 million was made
available to begin satisfying these claims. TSA intends to implement a
pro rata distribution of the funds allocated toward reimbursement. This
allocation process was determined by TSA to be an objective,
transparent and equitable distribution of the discretionary
appropriations made available for the purpose of reimbursing airports
for eligible projects. Under the pro rata allocation method, each
airport is equally entitled to a share of their eligible costs on a pro
rata basis.
Using this methodology, an individual airport's reimbursement will
be based on the airport's eligible reimbursable amount as a percentage
of the total eligible amount for all airports. This percentage will
then be applied against the total amount of funding available to
determine the amount that will be reimbursed to a specific airport. The
distribution of the $50 million will be implemented in FY 2018.
Funding For Surface Security. We see the very real threats to our
surface security systems, yet less than two percent of the TSA's budget
is devoted to surface transportation. And more problematically, the
administration has proposed cuts to grant programs and VIPER teams that
support surface transportation security.
Question 2. Given the recent and continued incidents, shouldn't we
reexamine the amount of funding for surface security systems?
Answer. The primary responsibility for security in surface
transportation lies with the owners and operators of those systems and
companies, because the components of the transportation network are
largely privately owned and operated. Consistent with its authorities
and responsibility for transportation security, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) supports security of surface
transportation by developing policies and resources, as well as working
with system owners/operators in identifying, developing, and
implementing remediation strategies to include unpredictable
operational deterrence, preparedness and response exercises, improving
critical infrastructure resilience, front line employee security
training, and public awareness campaigns and materials.
Combined total funding for surface transportation security is much
greater than reflected in the TSA budget. Operators and local/regional
authorities commit funding to security and the Department of Homeland
Security is appropriated funding for surface transportation security
grant programs, which has totaled over $2.5 billion since Fiscal Year
2006.
Although TSA's budget for surface transportation is small compared
to the aviation sector, the Nation realizes a significant return from
this investment. TSA's resources and personnel directly support ongoing
security programs with committed security partners who, in turn,
dedicate millions of private sector dollars to secure critical
infrastructure, provide uniformed law enforcement and specialty
security teams, and conduct operational activities and deterrence
efforts. TSA invests its resources to help these partners identify
vulnerabilities and risks in their operations, and works with specific
owners/operators to develop and implement risk-mitigating solutions to
address their specific vulnerabilities and risks.
Question 3. How will the cuts impact surface transportation
security?
Answer. Canine Team. When discussing canine security teams, former
TSA Administrator Neffenger said that ``there is no better overall
detector of explosives than a dog's nose'' and that they ``work an
environment like no technology can.''
Question 4. What benefits have you seen from the use of canine
teams?
Answer. Canine teams are a highly mobile, reliable, and effective
tool when properly trained and utilized. The benefits derived from all
of our canine teams across all modes of transportation (Aviation,
Surface, Maritime and PSC) is immeasurable. From providing a clearly
visible deterrent, to their unmatched detection capabilities, to the
many and varied environments in which they operate, the presence of a
well-trained canine team has proven to significantly enhance the
overall security footprint.
Question 5. How would funding for additional teams help improve
security?
Answer. Increasing the number of canine teams would not only
provide for greater coverage and additional detection capability in the
transportation network, but also directly increases the deterrence
factor, possibly altering or preventing a terrorist attack.
Question 6. Are there other ways that the Federal Government can
help incentivize the use of canine teams?
Answer. TSA maintains a list of current law enforcement
participants who have requested to increase their current canine team
allocation, as well as non-participating agencies that have requested
to join TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program
(NEDCTP). Most agencies do not have sufficient discretionary funding to
support an increase in their current canine allocation or to establish
a canine program, and therefore appeal to the Federal Government for
assistance. The TSA program currently covers the costs associated with
the procurement of canines, handler training, yearly evaluations/
certifications of teams and provides participants a $50,000 per team,
per year reimbursement stipend. All other costs related to maintaining
and operating the canine are the responsibility of the participant. In
return, the participant agrees to spend 80 percent of their duty time
in their assigned area of responsibility conducting explosive detection
activities. One alternative solution is for TSA to stop providing the
$50,000 stipend and for participants to bear all costs associated with
maintaining and operating the canine teams. TSA would still provide the
canines, explosives training aids, handler training, and yearly
evaluation/certification of the teams.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. David P. Pekoske
Port Security Grant Program. America's seaports and airports must
be prepared to face a wide range of threats and vulnerabilities, both
natural and manmade. Yet the Port Security Grant Program, in which TSA
is a partner, and other Federal programs that support ports' efforts
are limited to preventing terrorist and criminal activity or providing
assistance after an emergency has already occurred.
More and more, security experts are advocating for an all-hazards
approach to protecting our citizens and critical infrastructure. Such
an approach seeks to prevent a wider range of potential threats and to
make our communities more resilient when incidents occur.
Question. To your knowledge, is DHS considering adjusting its
practices to reflect this evolving consensus port security and threat
management? Would you agree that there would be value in introducing
more flexibility into the Port Security Grant Program to accommodate an
all hazards approach?
Answer. The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) is administered by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in accordance with the
legislative requirements of 46 United States Code (USC) 70107.
Specifically:
(b) Eligible Costs.--The following costs of funding the correction
of Coast Guard identified vulnerabilities in port security and ensuring
compliance with Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and
facility security plans are eligible to be funded:
(1) Salary, benefits, overtime compensation, retirement
contributions, and other costs of additional Coast Guard
mandated security personnel.
(2) The cost of acquisition, operation, and maintenance of security
equipment or facilities to be used for security monitoring and
recording, security gates and fencing, marine barriers for
designated security zones, security-related lighting systems,
remote surveillance, concealed video systems, security vessels,
and other security-related infrastructure or equipment that
contributes to the overall security of passengers, cargo, or
crewmembers. Grants awarded under this section may not be used
to construct buildings or other physical facilities, except
those which are constructed under terms and conditions
consistent with the requirements under section 611(j)(8) of the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(42 U.S.C. 5196(j)(8)), including those facilities in support
of this paragraph, and specifically approved by the Secretary.
Costs eligible for funding under this paragraph may not exceed
the greater of--
(A) $1,000,000 per project; or
(B) such greater amount as may be approved by the Secretary,
which may not exceed 10 percent of the total amount of the
grant.
(3) The cost of screening equipment, including equipment that
detects weapons of mass destruction and conventional
explosives, and of testing and evaluating such equipment, to
certify secure systems of transportation.
(4) The cost of conducting vulnerability assessments to evaluate and
make recommendations with respect to security.
(5) The cost of conducting exercises or training for prevention and
detection of, preparedness for, response to, or recovery from
terrorist attacks.
(6) The cost of establishing or enhancing mechanisms for sharing
terrorism threat information and ensuring that the mechanisms
are interoperable with Federal, State, and local agencies.
(7) The cost of equipment (including software) required to receive,
transmit, handle, and store classified information.
(8) The cost of training law enforcement personnel--
(A) to enforce a security zone under section 70132 of this
title; or
(B) assist in the enforcement of a security zone.
The legislation primarily directs the program to provide security
related capabilities. Funding priorities under the PSGP are continually
informed by risk and threat assessments provided by the United States
Coast Guard (USCG), as the lead Federal agency for maritime security.
Having USCG as lead ensures that the program is flexible in evolving to
reflect the most current maritime security risks facing American ports
and waterways. TSA defers to the USCG, as the lead for Maritime
Security, regarding introducing more flexibility in the PSGP to
accommodate an all hazards approach, however many security mitigation/
response capabilities are by nature all-hazards in nature.
Note: On May 21, 2018, FEMA released the Notice of Funding
Opportunity and allocations for the Port Security Grant Program. In FY
2018, the PSGP provides $100,000,000 for transportation infrastructure
security activities to implement Area Maritime Transportation Security
Plans and facility security plans among port authorities, facility
operators, and State and local government agencies required to provide
port security services. The intent of the FY 2018 PSGP is to
competitively award grant funding to assist ports in obtaining the
resources required to support the development and sustainment of core
capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal of a secure
and resilient Nation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Hon. David P. Pekoske
Whether TSA has technology ready to deploy that can detect
explosives at rail and transit stations. In recent weeks, we have been
tragically reminded of the security threats facing our rail and transit
network.
On December 11, 2017, a terrorist detonated a homemade pipe bomb
affixed to his torso with the aim of inflicting as much death as
possible in a New York City subway station. Fortunately, the bomb only
partially detonated, no one was killed, and injuries were at a minimum.
TSA must take action to protect critical transportation hubs
immediately--like rolling out non-invasive technology that can find and
detect concealed explosives by identifying objects that block the
natural emissions from a person's body.
I understand that this technology is being tested in Los Angeles,
and some of my colleagues have publicly wondered whether it can be
deployed.
I urge you to expedite the testing process to ensure its efficacy
so this technology can be deployed nationally. It is critical that we
ensure safety without imposing any unnecessary screening burdens on
passengers.
Question 1. What is the status of this technology? When will it be
ready for use and deployment? Can you confirm that you're working to
roll out technology without imposing any unnecessary new screening
burdens?
Answer. TSA continues to collaborate with the technology
marketplace to gain new capabilities and enhance existing ones. Two
vendors have systems proven to be effective and suitable when used in
accordance with their known capabilities and limitations and with
appropriate concepts of operations. TSA has completed its assessment of
the two systems and they are ready to be purchased by appropriate users
directly from the vendors. The local and regional surface
transportation systems, privately owned and operated, are the
appropriator buyers and users of the technology. TSA will continue to
seek improvements and expand capabilities of this type of technology.
Several major transportation systems are expressing an interest in
either applying for grants funding to purchase or purchasing with their
own capital funds.
Checkpoint style screening is not feasible in high volume mass
transit/passenger rail environments. The technologies are designed to
accommodate high volumes of passengers moving in diverse directions
without unnecessarily impeding passenger flow.
TSA is continuing its programs energizing the marketplace to
provide security technologies that meet the needs of the surface
transportation industry.
Question 2. When and if the technology is ready and helpful--not
harmful--can you commit to putting it in commuter rail, not just
subways?
Answer. TSA provides assessments and testing/pilot data and
information in order to verify technology. This data and testing can
assist in drafting of grants proposals and industry procurement
decisions of technology for surface security. TSA is not funded to
procure or field security technologies for the surface transportation
industry. That includes both subways and commuter rail. Industry
purchases technology directly from the marketplace or through the
various Federal grant programs.
The need to address the growing menace of terrorists, trucks and
``vehicle ramming incidents''. In recent years we've seen a growing
menace: terrorists getting hold of large trucks and vans and using them
as weapons to kill and maim many.
Perhaps the most high-profile was the attack in France in 2016 in
which 86 were killed. But there have been many others, for instance:
In June 2017, terrorists used a van to kill pedestrians on London
Bridge, killing eight.
In August, a terrorist used a van to drive over pedestrians in
Barcelona, killing 14.
In October, close to home, a terrorist used a truck to drive over
pedestrians in New York City, killing eight.
Question 3. I asked about this issue at your confirmation hearing
in June. I recall your having said that you would look at this very
closely. What efforts have you made to address this issue? How are you
addressing these terrifying scenarios?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of
Operations Coordination collects information on more than 15,000
special events annually and performs a comparative risk analysis to
assess the likelihood of a terrorist attack at these events. The
results of this objective analysis are used across the Federal
Government for situational awareness and to make policy decisions about
how to support state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities.
Higher risk events may receive support from DHS and other Federal
agencies. For example, DHS's field-based Protective Security Advisors
(PSAs) serve as security subject matter experts who engage with state,
local, tribal, and territorial government mission partners and members
of the private sector stakeholder community to protect the Nation's
critical infrastructure. When directed, PSAs work with venue managers
to mitigate their security vulnerabilities, which includes the threat
of a vehicle ramming scenario.
DHS is in the process of establishing a comprehensive program
specifically focused on the security of soft targets-crowded places.
The focus of the program is to develop and implement innovative
solutions to reduce the probability of a successful attack by
adversaries who may be utilizing a variety of tactics, from simple
methods to more sophisticated weapons. The program will include the
development of enhanced security protocols, standards, guidance,
technology, and security-by-design approaches.
As part of this effort, continuing with existing authorities and
requirements, the Department's National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) is expanding upon its capabilities to assist the
critical infrastructure community in mitigating risks associated with
vehicle ramming attacks through a variety of means:
Protection Operations: In May 2018 the Federal Protective Service
(FPS) implemented its concept of operations for the protection of
Federal facilities identified as soft targets and crowded places that
are located adjacent to or near Federal facilities (sports venues, bus,
subway and train transit hubs, etc.) across the United States. Formally
known as Operation Resilient Protection (ORP), these operations provide
enhanced law enforcement, intelligence analysis, criminal
investigations, and physical security for pre-selected soft targets and
crowded places. Additionally, FPS implements ORP at Federal facilities
during NSSEs, and SEAR Levels I, II, and III. ORP was specifically
developed and implemented in response to international and domestic
incidents of vehicle ramming, mass shootings, sniper attacks, and other
terrorism-related tactics affecting soft targets and crowded places.
Furthermore, in partnership with the General Services Administration,
FPS also conducts Operation Reduce Risk, a program to identify,
interdict and recover counterfeit, stolen and lost government license
plates reducing the likelihood that an official looking vehicle can
gain access to be used in a vehicle based attack.
Partnership: As the executor of the Commercial Facilities Sector-
Specific Agency responsibilities, NPPD expanded its partnership base to
more effectively address vehicle ramming impacts to commercial
facilities. The American Car Rental Association (ACRA) and the Truck
Rental and Leasing Association (TRALA) are working closely with NPPD to
identify methods of enhanced security measures, which may reduce the
vulnerability of rental vehicles being used for attacks. These
partnerships include coordination with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As Task
Force Officers assigned to FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the
United States, FPS criminal investigators continually partner with the
FBI and state and local police and sheriffs' departments. FPS uniformed
police officers and commanders routinely partner with state and local
police and sheriffs' departments to protect Federal facilities from
vehicle ramming and other terrorism-related tactics.
Exercises: NPPD incorporates vehicle ramming attacks into exercise
scenarios conducted with the critical infrastructure community. These
exercises provide the opportunity to test response protocols along with
pre-incident information sharing processes, emergency response plans,
and recovery procedures involving soft targets-crowded places. So far
in Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, NPPD has conducted 14 tabletop exercises with
public and private sector stakeholders that included vehicle ramming as
part of the scenarios.
Resources: In February 2018, NPPD produced a ``Vehicle Ramming
Attack Mitigation'' video, which provides information to assist the
critical infrastructure community in mitigating this evolving threat
with technical analysis from public and private sector subject matter
experts. The video leverages real-world events, and provides
recommendations aimed at protecting organizations as well as
individuals against potential vehicle ramming incidents.
Intelligence Bulletin: In November 2017, FPS released a revised
Operational Readiness Bulletin (ORB) to all assigned law enforcement
officers, providing guidance regarding strategies, tactics, techniques,
and procedures for mitigating vehicle ramming attack vulnerabilities.
In December 2017, FPS released an Intelligence Bulletin that provided
an in-depth study of criminal and terrorist vehicle ramming incidents,
highlighting terrorist attack tactics, indicators to recognize
developing incidents, and countermeasures to mitigate the effects of
vehicle ramming attacks. NPPD also used analysis of Foreign Terrorist
Organization-inspired vehicle ramming operations in the west since 2016
to develop a product that informed the critical infrastructure
community on common characteristics of these operations, and
recommended mitigation strategies to improve resilience against future
attacks. FPS routinely publishes intelligence bulletins related to
vehicle ramming and other terrorism-related tactics. Depending on
information classification, the bulletins are provided to partner
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, Federal Executive Boards,
and Federal agency leaders.
Webinars: NPPD conducted two webinars in 2017. The soft targets-
crowded places webinar provided an overview of select attacks and
corresponding tactics, techniques, and procedures. In attendance were
1091 registrants from the Critical Infrastructure Sector as well as
representatives from Federal and local governments and the private
sector. The second webinar focused on vehicle ramming, leveraging the
information within the intelligence product mentioned above. This
webinar was attended by 441 registrants from the Critical
Infrastructure Sector as well as representatives from Federal and local
government and private sector.
Resource Development: To raise awareness in the commercial vehicle
industry, TSA worked with public and private sector partners to develop
an informational product on vehicle ramming attacks released in June
2017. This product included information on the threat landscape,
indicators, and countermeasures that could be implemented to prevent
and prepare for this evolving threat. This document is scheduled to be
updated in May 2018.
Preventive Measures: Although TSA's primary focus is on
transportation security, it also coordinates with public and private
sector partners to develop physical security measures to prevent
vehicle ramming attacks against soft targets. This includes scenario-
driven security exercises and the implementation of physical security
countermeasures to protect mass gatherings at public events. In April
2018, TSA facilitated a vehicle ramming seminar at the Kentucky
Department of Criminal Justice Training with the Kentucky State Police
(KSP) and Kentucky Trucking Association. This seminar focused on
intelligence briefings, a table-top-exercise with a vehicle ramming
scenario, and a live demonstration by the KSP, Metro SWAT, and the
State Bomb Squad to exercise response to a vehicle ramming attack. TSA
is in discussions with other state level associations and law
enforcement agencies to replicate this effort. TSA is currently working
with the American Trucking Association and state associations in New
York and Tennessee to conduct up to three full-scale exercises in
FY2019. FPS recently developed and is testing a risk analysis modeling
tool to determine the most effective risk-reduction physical security
measures and protection activities relative to vehicle ramming and
terrorism-related tactics. Validation of this methodology will continue
through Fiscal Year 2019.
Security Information Sharing: TSA collaborated with ACRA and TRALA
to share relevant security information to prevent the use of rental
vehicles in vehicle ramming attacks. Through this partnership, TSA and
the industry developed a report, titled ``Security Indicators for the
Vehicle Rental Industry,'' which was released in August 2017 to nearly
500 public and private stakeholders who have further distributed the
messages within their industries and communities. TSA also leverages
ongoing engagement opportunities, including webinars, meetings, and
industry conferences to promote vehicle security and countermeasures
against vehicle ramming attacks, to reduce the likelihood and
consequences of vehicle ramming events. Additionally, TSA continues to
promote security through Security Awareness Messages and industry calls
surrounding worldwide attacks, including vehicle ramming, to address
the ever evolving threat landscape, current tactics being deployed, and
potential countermeasures. In February 2018, TSA hosted a Public Area
Security Summit to discuss ways to mitigate the risk to public areas,
including the risks from vehicle ramming attacks. Attendees included
stakeholders from domestic and international surface transportation
industry, aviation industry stakeholders, and other Federal agencies.
The significance of protecting ports. As you likely know from your
Coast Guard experience--including many years in Connecticut, the U.S.
has more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 miles of inland, intra-
coastal, and coastal waterways that serve over 360 ports.
U.S. seaports handle more than two billion tons of domestic, import
and export cargo annually.
TSA has an important role in port security. Connecticut has three
ports--which are vital to our economy, just like our country's hundreds
of other ports.
Question 4. How secure is our maritime economy? What else can we do
to ensure our ports are as secure as they need to be?
Answer. In contrast to the other surface modes of transportation,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is not the lead
Federal agency for security in the maritime mode. The United States
Coast Guard (USCG) is the lead Federal agency for maritime security in
the United States, and TSA supports the USCG in its maritime security
efforts and in coordinating interagency efforts for the maritime mode.
TSA supports the USCG in maritime security via the jointly
administered Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
program. For the TWIC program, TSA conducts a security threat
assessment of individuals who are seeking unescorted access to secure
areas of maritime facilities and vessels. The assessment includes
recurrent vetting against intelligence databases for ties to terrorism,
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks, and an immigration
status check. TSA issues a biometric credential to the individuals who
successfully complete this process. While the USCG manages the physical
access requirements and the associated enforcement and usage of the
TWIC at the ports as part of USCG's overall maritime security mission,
TSA and USCG jointly manage an enforcement program to ensure that only
properly vetted personnel are entering secure areas of port facilities.
TSA prioritizes High Threat Urban Areas. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, TSA
Inspectors visited U.S. port facilities 1,695 times and inspected
59,790 TWICs. As a result, 180 Civil Enforcement Actions were taken,
resulting in 67 fines and 113 warning letters. In FY 2018 to date, TSA
Inspectors have visited U.S. port facilities 1,085 times and inspected
36,849 TWICs. TSA exceeded its target for inspections in FY 2017, so
far for FY 2018, and continues to increase its targets.
How a passenger with neither a ticket nor passport was able to
glide past security checkpoints and fly from Chicago to London. I
understand this hearing concerns surface transportation security--an
issue I want to be sure we address.
But I would be remiss if I didn't raise an issue that rightfully
garnered significant headlines over the past week.
The headlines concerned an individual named Marilyn Hartman--
apparently well-known to law enforcement officials in the aviation
community. According to reports and statements from police and security
officials, she was able to get past security officials at O'Hare in
Chicago and onto a flight bound for London, where she landed before
being apprehended and flown back to the U.S. last week.
No one was hurt. And her efforts raise concerns as well about
mental health.
But nonetheless the episode raises very serious concerns about
glaring, gaping holes in TSA's oversight. It gives me tremendous pause
and makes me nervous about what someone with more nefarious motives
could achieve.
Question 5. How do you respond to this incident? Does it worry you
as much as it worries me? What steps have you taken to make sure it
never happens again? How can we be sure it will not recur?
Answer. The incident at O'Hare International Airport (ORD) was
investigated and lapses in security procedures were discovered both at
the checkpoint and at the boarding gate. At ORD, physical barriers were
added and ticket document checking locations were repositioned for
optimal viewing of passengers. TSA worked with stakeholders to address
other lapses in security procedures. An after action meeting of all law
enforcement entities, airport authorities and air carriers was
conducted on
February 5, 2018 to finalize changes and ensure success in the
future. These efforts proved effective when Ms. Hartman was detected
and arrested at ORD shortly after being released from custody following
the first incident in question. Additionally, a different individual
was detected and arrested at ORD when that subject attempted to bypass
the Travel Document Check position.
TSA continues to provide training and national briefings on the
importance of area security to prevent future incidents like this. We
also routinely conduct inspections and testing during the airline
boarding process to ensure that the proper security procedures are in
place. While there is no guarantee that this type of incident will not
occur again, the specific efforts taken at ORD, incorporation of
lessons learned in national guidance and training, and inspection
regime should reduce the likelihood of recurrence.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Hon. David P. Pekoske
Transit Security Grant Program. When it comes to surface
transportation security, we need a layered approach--technology,
personnel, canines, public engagement. An all the above strategy.
That's why Congress established the Transit Security Grant Program,
which provides transit systems with Federal resources to protect
critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public
from acts of terrorism.
But since 2009, funding for this critical program has been slashed
by over 80 percent, putting a tremendous strain on our public transit
systems to address national security threats.
Question 1. Administrator Pekoske, would our transit systems be
better able to address surface transportation security threats if
Congress provided more funding for the Transit Security Grant Program?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transit
Security Grant Program (TSGP), administered by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), is an instrumental component of public
transit systems' security programs. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) works very closely with FEMA to ensure that the
TSGP funding priorities and framework are structured to buy-down the
most risk.
In FY 2018, the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) provides
$88,000,000 to the Nation's High-Threat Urban Areas for enhancement of
security measures at critical transit infrastructure including bus,
ferry, and rail systems. The intent of the FY 2018 TSGP is to
competitively award grant funding to assist transit systems in
obtaining the resources required to support the development and
sustainment of core capabilities identified in the National
Preparedness Goal of a secure and resilient Nation.
As your question notes, we need a layered approach to security to
protect our Nation's surface transportation systems from terrorist
threats. While TSGP funding is an important component in many transit
systems' approach to security, we must focus on the ways in which the
security layers fit and work together instead of on one layer in and of
itself. Effective security projects, including those funded through the
TSGP, are the result of several activities, many of which TSA helps
support at no cost to transit systems. Security projects should be
based on a threat and vulnerability assessment and tied into a security
planning process, as TSA's Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement
(BASE) program helps public transportation systems accomplish; the BASE
program is a voluntary security assessment of national mass transit and
passenger rail MTPR that informs development of risk mitigation
priorities and helps influence TSA allocations and resources. Projects
can also be the result of lessons learned and areas for improvement
identified in exercise After Action Reports, such as those from TSA's
Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP), which
provides exercises, training, and security planning tools to public
transportation agencies to strengthen company security plans, policies
and procedures, and the Exercise Information System online tool.
The threat environment is ever-changing, and TSA puts a priority on
disseminating intelligence information to appropriate entities through
monthly industry conference calls, and via ``as-needed'' calls when
real-life events occur.
Canine Teams. Man's best friend is also one of our greatest allies
in our efforts to defeat terrorism at home.
The MBTA--Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority--has eight
canines.
But we need more than eight canine teams to protect the Nation's
fourth largest transit system, with 145 rail stations and 177 bus
routes.
Question 2. Administrator Pekoske, will you work with me to ensure
we address the MBTA's canine needs? What steps can we take to ensure we
are providing our transit agencies and airports with the canines they
need to address security threats?
Answer. TSA continually performs risk analyses on the
transportation network and maintains a list of participating state/
local agencies who request additional canine team allocations. In
addition, TSA tracks all requests from agencies that are not a
participant in TSA's Canine Program but have expressed interest in
joining this voluntary program. In both cases, TSA strives to provide
canine team allocations as funding permits.
MBTA has played a critical role in the TSA Canine Program since
2005, when they were first allocated three canine teams. Over time, TSA
has been able to increase MBTA's canine team allocation.
TSA is funded for 1,047 canine teams, (372 proprietary teams and
675 state and local canine teams) all of which are currently assigned
to specific participants. One measure TSA is looking at to expand the
canine program is to offer participating state/local agencies the
ability to increase the number of canine teams they deploy through the
following proposal: TSA would provide the canines, explosives training
aids, handler training, and yearly evaluation/certification of the
teams; however, TSA would not provide the $50,000 per team stipend
currently allotted to program participants. The participant would bear
all costs associated with the care and maintenance of the canine team.
Due to the continued demand for canines, TSA has been working to
increase capacity in both training and fielded teams. TSA is piloting
new training models, adding a new procurement contract to purchase
canines with varying levels of training to assist in meeting future
needs, and working closely with the Department of Defense Military
Working Dog School to expand capacity at the Joint Base San Antonio-
Lackland facility. TSA is committed to supporting our transit agencies
and airports with the canines they need to address security threats.
Vehicle Ramming Attacks--Protecting Public Spaces. In recent years,
terrorists have added another weapon into their arsenal--large
vehicles.
Whether it be a promenade in France, a bridge in London, or a
bicycle path in New York, terrorists have launched vehicle ramming
attacks to kill hundreds and instill fear.
Administrator Pekoske, Massachusetts has many wonderful public
spaces where my constituents congregate.
Question 4. How can we maintain the accessibility these public
spaces while also protecting the public from vehicle ramming attacks?
Answer. The cornerstone of our thriving democracy is an open
society that provides the means to freely engage in many activities
without the fear of harm. Recent events such as vehicular attacks on
pedestrians and shootings in schools, nightclubs, and at concerts;
exemplify the importance of enhancing security at soft targets and
crowded places. Protecting these areas from terrorists and other
extremist actors, who are more prominently leveraging low
sophistication attack methods, such as vehicle-ramming attacks to cause
mass casualties, is a challenge that the department is meeting directly
and forcefully.
The DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is at
the forefront of soft targets-crowded places efforts. In January 2018,
the Department developed a plan to support and strengthen direct
security operations, intelligence and information sharing, capability
and capacity building, and research and development.
NPPD is also assisting the critical infrastructure community in
mitigating risks associated with vehicle ramming attacks through a
variety of means. Protective Security Advisors support security
planning in coordination with federal, state, local, and private sector
partners. They frequently conduct security assessments, coordinate
training, and provide situational awareness of critical infrastructure
in public gathering locations.
Vehicle Ramming Attacks--Technology. Technology can be part of the
solution.
In 2016, a vehicle ramming attack in Berlin was eventually stopped
when the truck's automatic braking technologies were triggered.
These safety innovations intervene when a collision is imminent,
taking control of the brakes to avoid crashes.
While the European Union requires automatic braking systems on
large trucks, the United States has not mandated that these life-saving
technologies be adopted by larger vehicles.
Question 5. Administrator Pekoske, could broader adoption of
automatic braking technologies help address the threat posed by vehicle
ramming attacks?
Answer. Technologies now making their way into the vehicle industry
could reduce the frequency and consequence of vehicle ramming attacks.
The Transportation Security Administration supports further research
into collision avoidance and other emerging technologies that may
mitigate this risk.
We stand ready to work with our Federal partners at the Department
of Transportation and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration as they set standards for future safety devices and
technologies for collision avoidance and remote vehicle disabling
technologies.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto
to Hon. David P. Pekoske
Aviation. While I know you were both before the Committee to
discuss surface transportation security specifically, I wanted to note
that in October 2017, Mr. Kelly's office completed audits of several of
TSA's most critical aviation security programs. The results of those
audits are classified so I will not go into them further here, but I
wanted to underscore just how seriously I and my colleagues take such
reviews and the urgent importance of TSA running state of the art
security programs across all modes of transportation.
As we all saw recently, a woman by the name of Marilyn Hartman
successfully boarded a flight in Chicago without a ticket. She managed
to make it all the way to London before she was stopped. Worse yet, she
has successful boarded planes without a ticket multiple times since 9/
11.
These security breaches have also impacted flights coming into
Nevada. In 2013, a 9-year old boy managed to board a flight in
Minneapolis and fly all the way to Las Vegas without being stopped.
Question 1. Administrator Pekoske, you spoke in your testimony
about innovation. Can you outline the specific programs and processes
your Administration have put in place to ensure TSA is regularly
reviewing its standard operating procedures in both ground and aviation
transportation systems to ensure state of the art practices? Are there
other processes your organization has identified that would ensure TSA
is using resources to maximize efficacy and adopt global best practices
in transportation security?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
implemented a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Review, Impact
Analysis, and Maintenance Plan, which provides guidance and direction
for the review and impact analysis process for SOPs. Reviews are
recurrent (annually, semi-annually, or quarterly) and also conducted
as-needed to ensure procedures align with or responds to current
security policies and the evolving threat environment. The SOP review
process includes reviewing intel-based requirements, new technologies,
test outcomes, and audit recommendations, to improve overall detection
and performance.
The review process was first implemented in August 2017. Since that
time, as it relates to identity verification, the Travel Document Check
SOP was updated and released on September 28, 2017 with an
implementation date of October 12, 2017. Additionally, another interim
change was released on January 22, 2018 with an implementation date of
February 5, 2018. Both SOP releases supported the need for policy
updates based on law making requirements (REAL ID) and identified areas
of required clarification for the frontline workforce.
Hiring/Recruitment.
Question 3. We have seen with Customs and Border employment that
recruitment can be a challenge. Have you seen similar barriers to
bringing in qualified personnel who stay long enough to keep a
consistent and high-level team together on both aviation, as well as
surface transportation security?
Answer. Yes, with regard to our Transportation Security Officer
(TSO) positions, TSA experiences many challenges in attracting and
retaining qualified personnel as the compensation level of the TSO
position is considerably lower than other positions in the field of
homeland security. As the U.S. economy has improved and local minimum
wages have substantially increased in recent years, the pay of the TSO
position is becoming less and less competitive. In an effort to recruit
quality applicants, we are doing our best to market the benefits of
Federal employment.
To align with airline flight schedules, TSA is required to hire
thousands of part-time TSOs each year. Hiring part-time employees with
schedules of 20-25 hours per week poses challenges as many employers
are currently offering full-time positions at comparable or higher
starting hourly wages. In many instances, we are losing quality TSOs to
other full-time jobs that offer the same, or sometimes, lower hourly
rates. Thus, we try to adjust our recruitment and advertising to reach
ideal part-time applicant pools, such as individuals who are going to
school and in need of part-time employment.
More recently, we have seen a significant increase in the number of
TSOs that have left TSA to transfer to other Federal agencies such as:
data entry clerks for United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, call center agents for Federal Emergency Management Agency,
and claims processors at the VA. For many, these entry-level positions
at other agencies are promotions and typically offer traditional
schedules without requiring early morning/evening/weekend/holiday
shifts or needing to be flexible with personal schedules due to the TSO
position being designated as emergency essential.\1\ For what is
considered an entry-level position, a great deal is expected and
required from our TSOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Emergency essential personnel are not excused from duty if an
emergency arises because the employee encumbers a position that is
identified as necessary to sustain a facility or function for
continuity of TSA operations during an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA always looks to build on the strengths of our employees and
advance their profession. TSA has created a road map for career
progression that details the skills and certifications an officer needs
to advance in their TSA careers. This roadmap provides a structured
progression for officers to see their career trajectory, incentivizes
on-the-job expertise in critical areas, and helps the agency retain our
highest skilled workers.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
John V. Kelly
Question. Mr. Kelly, as you noted in your testimony, the background
check process for the TWIC program is the same as that for aviation
workers and the Hazmat Materials Endorsement. The Surface and Maritime
Transportation Security Act would reduce duplicative background checks
by allowing a person who has been approved for a TWIC credential to
also be considered to have met the requirements for a hazardous
materials endorsement. Would removing duplication across these
credentials improve the effectiveness of the background check process
for transportation facility access?
Answer. The Hazard Materials Endorsement (HME) is a state driver's
license endorsement. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
performs the background check to ensure consistent background check
reviews across state lines. Based on our audit, we learned that TSA has
already taken into consideration and adjusted its fees for individuals
with the need for both a TWIC and an HME endorsement. According to TSA,
applicants with HMEs do not have to repeat the security threat
assessment if they are applying for a TWIC, and as a result the fee for
the TWIC is reduced. Eliminating the requirement for additional
background checks may not impact the effectiveness of the background
check process because in most cases individuals who have received a
TWIC will be automatically processed by TSA's system in less than one
day. Since HME is a state generated endorsement we do not have
jurisdiction to review the endorsement or its processes.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
John V. Kelly
Customs and Border Protecting Staffing at MCO. Mr. Kelly, I have
been told by the Orlando International Airport that U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) officers there are being reassigned to the
Southwest border as part of a continuing rotation.
Question. Has your office been made aware of these rotations and
can you comment on why it is necessary to shift resources from ports of
entry already experiencing C.B.P. staffing shortages?
Answer. We are not aware of any specific rotations from Orlando
International Airport to the Southwest border. As part of an ongoing
audit, we have received information which indicates CBP's Office of
Field Operations has fallen short of its staffing targets for Fiscal
Year (FY) 2016, FY 2017, and FY 2018. According to CBP, it is working
to address the shortages.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
John V. Kelly
The need for an aggressive, extensive review of the
administration's handling--or mishandling--of Puerto Rico recovery
efforts. I understand this hearing concerns surface transportation
security, an issue with critical importance in Connecticut. I want to
briefly mention another issue while the DHS IG is with us here today.
I'm proud to represent the state with the highest concentration of
Puerto Ricans in the U.S. In the days after the hurricane, my
constituents and I grew very concerned over FEMA's oversight of the
recovery. Our concerns remain.
I've now been to Puerto Rico twice since Hurricane Maria hit. I
have seen little real, robust progress. As I wrote in October to the
DHS IG, the American people need to know whether the Trump
administration is truly focused on helping the millions of Americans
now suffering in Puerto Rico.
Question 1. What steps is your office taking to investigate the
effectiveness of the response in Puerto Rico?
Answer. In my recent trips to Puerto Rico, I also witnessed first-
hand the devastation and hardship that Hurricane Maria caused to the
citizens of the United States that call Puerto Rico home. When
Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico, our office's first order of business
was to deploy auditors and investigators to FEMA's Joint Field Office
in Puerto Rico. Currently, we have four auditors and five investigators
in Puerto Rico. Having Office of Inspector General (OIG) staff on the
ground serves multiple purposes: to serve as an independent unit for
oversight of disaster response and recovery activities; to detect and
alert FEMA of systemic problems; and to help ensure accountability over
Federal funds. We focus our deployment activities on identifying
potential risks and vulnerabilities and providing our stakeholders with
timely, useful information to address emerging challenges and ongoing
operations.
Specifically, our auditors have begun, or are planning, a variety
of reviews both at the Federal and local level, intended to improve
FEMA's programs and operations. For instance, we plan to start capacity
audits in Puerto Rico during this Fiscal Year. Capacity audits and
early warning audits identify areas where FEMA public assistance grant
recipients and sub-recipients may need additional technical assistance
or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal requirements. By
undergoing an audit early in the grant cycle, grant recipients and sub-
recipients have the opportunity to correct noncompliance before they
spend the majority of their grant funding. It also allows them the
opportunity to supplement deficient documentation or locate missing
records before too much time elapses.
The other audit work we have underway or planned in Puerto Rico
focuses on a range of issues, including:
challenges with providing Puerto Rico disaster survivors
roof coverings to reduce further damage to their homes and
property;
review of disaster-related contracting including the
contracts with Whitefish Energy, Cobra Acquisitions, Bronze
Star LLC (blue tarps) and Tribute Contracting LLC (meals),
among others;
additional controls for Puerto Rico's high-risk grant
applicants;
FEMA's preparedness, management, and distribution of
supplies;
lessons learned from repair versus replacement funding
decisions;
FEMA's plan to use alternative procedures for the Public
Assistance Program;
police overtime pay;
Federal considerations relating to the privatization of the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority;
duplication of Federal benefits (in coordination with HUD
OIG); and
key infrastructure repair costs (such as for the Guajataca
Dam).
We will continue to work with FEMA, its partners, and our oversight
community to help ensure challenges are timely identified and
addressed.
With respect to our investigative work, our law enforcement
investigators' efforts in Puerto Rico have already yielded results,
uncovering serious schemes aimed at defrauding FEMA and turning
disaster survivors into victims. For example:
We are investigating a widespread identity theft ring in
which numerous individuals used the stolen identities of
hurricane victims to fraudulently apply for benefits, thereby
defrauding FEMA and victimizing hurricane survivors.
We have arrested an individual--in coordination with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement--for False Impersonation of
a Federal Officer or Employee. This individual attempted to
procure work at an Emergency Management Center as a voluntary
staff member for Hurricane Maria relief efforts. At the time of
the arrest, the individual was wearing a Homeland Security
Investigations Special Agent t-shirt, a DHS cap, and had a fake
DHS badge in his possession. Our agents obtained consent to
search the person's residence where they found additional t-
shirts with Homeland Security Investigations logos.
We will continue to review and triage the many complaints and
allegations that we receive each day, and judiciously expend our
limited investigative resources on those matters that pose the greatest
threats or risks to FEMA programs and operations. We will conduct our
investigative work in close and timely coordination with our
investigative partners, FEMA, and our oversight community with the aim
of protecting disaster survivors and the billions of taxpayer dollars
entrusted to the critical efforts of disaster response and recovery.
Question 2. When will we see a final investigative report?
Answer. With respect to our audit work, we anticipate finalizing
audit reports on the following issues this summer:
challenges with providing Puerto Rico disaster survivors
roof coverings to reduce further damage to their homes and
property;
review of disaster-related contracting including the
contracts with Bronze Star LLC (blue tarps) and Tribute
Contracting LLC (meals); and
additional controls for Puerto Rico's high-risk grant
applicants.
We anticipate completing additional audit work in Puerto Rico by
the end of the year.
With respect to our investigative work, while the results of our
law enforcement investigative reports in Puerto Rico will not be made
public, we would be happy to brief the Committee on our efforts once
the investigations have closed.
The need for greater review of DHS' sensitive locations policy.
Both CBP and ICE are bound by policies that enforcement operations
should not be undertaken in sensitive locations such as churches,
hospitals and schools, absent exigent circumstances. Nonetheless, there
are widespread reports of violations of these policies.
I have led two letters to DHS asking to clarify DHS policies on
sensitive locations and provide basic statistical data on compliance
with existing DHS policy regarding sensitive locations. One letter was
dated October 17, 2017, and the other was dated November 13, 2017.
The letters were driven by two particularly horrific reports of
apparent violations of DHS policies regarding sensitive locations. Last
May, CBP officers apprehended young parents Irma and Oscar Sanchez from
a hospital while their baby awaited emergency surgery. In October, Rosa
Hernandez, a 10-year-old girl with cerebral palsy, was detained by CBP
on her way to the hospital.
Question 3. Are you reviewing DHS' flouting of these policies?
Answer. Although we do not have any past or ongoing work on this
issue, our office is considering including an audit, inspection, or
special review of DHS policies, training, and actions at or near
sensitive locations to our Fiscal Year 2019 plan.
Question 4. Do you have any insight on whether that has been any
disciplinary or accountability measures taken against the officers
involved in those cases?
Answer. No, because we have not yet undertaken work in this area,
we are not aware of any disciplinary or accountability measures the
Department may have taken in connection with the cases you referenced.
Question 5. Do you have any insight into what measures are in place
to ensure that ICE and CBP track enforcement actions taken in sensitive
locations and document the exigent circumstances that justify them?
Answer. To the extent we initiate work on this issue, an evaluation
of ICE and CBP's system for tracking enforcement actions in sensitive
locations would likely feature in that review.
Question 6. Do you have any insight into training to ICE and CBP
officers receive on the sensitive locations policy of the Department?
Answer. To the extent we initiate work on this issue, an evaluation
of the training ICE and CBP officers receive on conducting enforcement
actions in sensitive locations would likely feature in that review.
Recent DHS IG report on Trump's immigration order. The DHS IG
released a long-awaited report on DHS' implementation of Executive
Order #13769--the President's first Muslim ban. The report stated that
DHS was totally unprepared for even the most basic and obvious
consequences of the Muslim ban. In addition, the report found that CBP
was aggressive in preventing affected travelers from boarding planes
headed to the U.S., in violation of two separate court orders.
In a department memo issued on January 12--in anticipation of the
release of the report--DHS management criticized the report, saying
that it ``contains a number of legal and factual inaccuracies and is
methodologically flawed.''
This report was completed months ago but was not publicly released
until last week. Your predecessor, John Roth, resigned after saying he
was troubled by attempts by the Department to redact information that
would cast the Department's response in a negative light.
Question 7. Do you stand by the assertions and conclusions in this
report?
Answer. Yes.
Question 8. Why did this report take months to be released in its
entirety?
Answer. DHS OIG's standard process typically includes providing the
Department an opportunity to review a draft report prior to publication
to identify information the Department believes should be withheld from
public release on the basis of, among other things, a statute or
Executive Order mandating nondisclosure (e.g., the Privacy Act).
Pursuant to this standard process, a draft of the report in question
was provided to the Department on October 6, 2017. Former Inspector
General Roth requested that the Department complete its sensitivity
review within two weeks of receipt. Just before the deadline passed,
the Department advised DHS OIG that it had sensitivity concerns
regarding the content of the report, but did not identify what portions
of the report were potentially sensitive. Over the next few weeks, DHS
OIG engaged the Department in discussions regarding the Department's
sensitivity concerns and proposed redactions.
As you are likely aware from Mr. Roth's November 20, 2017 letter to
the congressional requestors of the review and related press release
from our office, DHS OIG was troubled by the Department's delays in
articulating its sensitivity concerns with respect to this report.
Ultimately, the Department sought a privilege review by the Department
of Justice and eventually provided a draft of the report with its final
proposed redactions after close of business on Friday, January 12,
2018--more than three months after DHS OIG had provided the draft to
the Department. The following Monday, January 15, was a Federal
holiday. When business resumed on January 16, 2018, DHS OIG worked
expediently to analyze and incorporate the Department's management
response. We published the report on Thursday, January 18, 2018.
Question 9. Some information in the report has been redacted. Was
any information redacted as a result of interference by Trump political
appointees who sought to remove text that would have painted the
Department in a negative light?
Answer. As noted above, DHS OIG's standard process typically
includes soliciting input from the Department regarding information in
draft OIG reports the Department believes is not subject to public
release. Pursuant to this standard process, a draft of the report in
question was provided to the Department in October 2017. The Department
ultimately claimed privileges on various grounds, including
deliberative process and attorney-client privilege. Although DHS OIG
believes many of the Department's withholdings are overly broad and
would not withstand judicial scrutiny, the Department has made what it
claims to be good faith redactions pursuant to these privileges;
accordingly, we are bound to publish the report with the Department's
redactions.
Question 10. Do you stand by the report's finding that DHS was
``largely caught by surprise by the signing of the [Executive Order]
and its requirement for immediate implementation?''
Answer. Yes.
Question 11. Do you stand by the report's finding that the DOJ
Office of Legal Counsel failed to analyze the due process rights of
legal permanent residents or Special Immigrant Visa holders when it
approved the Executive Order?
Answer. We did not review the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel's (OLC)
process for approving the Executive Order, as DHS OIG does not have
jurisdiction to review the actions of DOJ employees. Accordingly, we
are not in a position to say whether DOJ OLC analyzed the due process
rights of legal permanent residents or Special Immigrant Visa holders
as part of its approval determination. Our report notes, however, that
the memorandum DOJ OLC ultimately issued approving the Executive Order
did not include any analysis of due process rights--in fact, it did not
include any analysis at all to support the conclusion that the
Executive Order was proper in terms of ``form and legality.'' We stand
by our report's description of DOJ OLC's memorandum.
Question 12. Do you stand by the report's finding that CBP did not
detect ``any traveler linked to terrorism based solely on the
additional procedures required by the [Executive Order]''?
Answer. Yes, based on the information available to us at the time
of our review, we stand by the report's finding that CBP did not detect
``any traveler linked to terrorism based solely on the additional
procedures required by the [Executive Order].''
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto
to John V. Kelly
Aviation. While I know you were both before the Committee to
discuss surface transportation security specifically, I wanted to note
that in October 2017, Mr. Kelly's office completed audits of several of
TSA's most critical aviation security programs. The results of those
audits are classified so I will not go into them further here, but I
wanted to underscore just how seriously I and my colleagues take such
reviews and the urgent importance of TSA running state of the art
security programs across all modes of transportation.
As we all saw recently, a woman by the name of Marilyn Hartman
successfully boarded a flight in Chicago without a ticket. She managed
to make it all the way to London before she was stopped. Worse yet, she
has successful boarded planes without a ticket multiple times since 9/
11. These security breaches have also impacted flights coming into
Nevada. In 2013, a 9-year old boy managed to board a flight in
Minneapolis and fly all the way to Las Vegas without being stopped.
Question 1. Mr. Kelly, where do you assess TSA stands in
implementing some of the related recommendations you mentioned:
creating a risk-based strategy and incorporating risk into its
budgeting process?
Answer. TSA issued a 2018 National Strategy for Transportation
Security (the Strategy) that purports to address the security of
``transportation assets in the United States . . . from attack or
disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces.'' The Strategy
presents a base plan that outlines a risk-based foundation for the
Strategy, and appends security plans that provide mode-specific and
intermodal activities to reduce terrorism risks and to protect
transportation systems. We continue to follow up with TSA on the
implementation of its Strategy.
While TSA has taken steps to formalize its budgeting process, it
still lacks a formal process to incorporate risk in its budget
formulations. TSA guidelines do not currently direct TSA transportation
modes to align resources with risk. Incorporating risk into the
budgeting process would help TSA decision-makers align resources more
effectively.
Question 2. Are there other processes your organization has
identified that would ensure TSA is using resources to maximize
efficacy and adopt global best practices in transportation security?
Answer. Through our hard-hitting audit work, which has resulted in
numerous recommendations, we have attempted to direct TSA to adopt
global best practices in transportation security. For example, during
one of our audits, we found that TSA did not receive all terrorism-
related information to vet aviation workers, and had multiple quality
issues in the biographic data it used to vet those workers. In response
to our report, TSA has implemented our recommendations with the effect
of increasing the quantity and quality of information used for vetting.
We have also identified areas where TSA could utilize its resources
more effectively. For instance, we recently identified limitations with
the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) contributions to aviation
security. While details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage
presented in our work are classified or designated as Sensitive
Security Information, we identified a part of FAMS operations where, if
discontinued, funds could be put to better use. In addition, we are
drafting a report on our recent access control testing which will
provide recommendations to the agency to strengthen access controls and
security breaches.
Travel Ban for the DHS IG. Mr. Kelly, recently your office released
a report on the implementation of Executive Order 13769, which is
better known as President Trump's first attempt at implementing a
Muslim Travel Ban. The report, prepared by your predecessor, concludes
that Customs and Border Patrol was unprepared for the roll out of the
travel ban, and that the resulting chaos harmed the agency's
reputation. Further, although the report found that CBP agents at U.S.
ports of entry made good faith efforts to comply with court orders
blocking the executive order, there were still violations.
Although this report was completed in early October, it was only
released in mid-January, reportedly because DHS and the Department of
Justice slow-walked the sensitivity and privilege reviews.
Question 3. Mr. Kelly, when did your office learn that DHS and DOJ
had completed their reviews?
Answer. On November 29, 2017, we learned that DOJ had completed its
review. The Department has not shared a copy of DOJ's analysis with DHS
OIG. On January 12, 2018, we received the Department's final redacted
version of the report along with its official Management Response.
Question 4. Mr. Kelly, you've been with the Office of the Inspector
General within DHS since 2008. In your experience, is it common for the
Department of Homeland Security to claim deliberative process privilege
in order to redact significant portions of a report by an Inspector
General?
Answer. It is extremely rare for the Department to claim the
deliberative process privilege to redact any portions of an Inspector
General report. As former Inspector General Roth noted in his November
20, 2017 letter to Congress, this was the first time in his tenure as
Inspector General that the Department had indicated it may assert this
privilege in connection with one of our reports or considered
preventing the release of a report on that basis. We regularly have
published dozens of reports that delve into the Department's rationale
for specific policies and decisions, and comment on the basis and
process on which those decisions were made.
Question 5. I have to say, I find it disturbing that this report,
which was made necessary by the secrecy and confusion surrounding the
implementation of the President's Muslim travel ban, is now itself
mired in secrecy and confusion. At minimum, the extreme delay in
releasing the report, and the unusual scope and breadth of the
redactions create the appearance that DHS and DOJ exerted improper
influence over the Office of the Inspector General and sought to limit
the impact of the report's critical conclusions. I think the American
people deserve transparency and accountability. Mr. Kelly, will you
release an un-redacted copy of this report?
Answer. While transparency and accountability are paramount to our
mission, those important objectives must be balanced against other
important interests, including personal privacy, national security, and
law enforcement interests. As a general matter, the Department has the
legal right to protect from public disclosure certain sensitive
information concerning the Department's operations subject to various
statutory exclusions and common law privileges. In this case, the
Department has made what it claims to be good faith withholdings
pursuant to these bases. Accordingly, despite continuing to believe
that the Department's claims of privilege may be overbroad, we are
bound to issue our report with the Department's redactions. Unless the
Department decides to peel back its redactions, we will not be
releasing an unredacted copy of this report.
Hiring/Recruitment.
Question 6. We have seen with Customs and Border employment that
recruitment can be a challenge. Have you seen similar barriers to
bringing in qualified personnel who stay long enough to keep a
consistent and high-level team together on both aviation, as well as
surface transportation security?
Answer. We are currently conducting an audit on TSA's efforts to
hire, train and retain employees. We anticipate completing our audit by
the end of the Fiscal Year and would be happy to brief your office on
the results of the final report.
[all]
| MEMBERNAME | BIOGUIDEID | GPOID | CHAMBER | PARTY | ROLE | STATE | CONGRESS | AUTHORITYID |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wicker, Roger F. | W000437 | 8263 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | MS | 115 | 1226 |
| Blunt, Roy | B000575 | 8313 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | MO | 115 | 1464 |
| Moran, Jerry | M000934 | 8307 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | KS | 115 | 1507 |
| Thune, John | T000250 | 8257 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | SD | 115 | 1534 |
| Baldwin, Tammy | B001230 | 8215 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | WI | 115 | 1558 |
| Udall, Tom | U000039 | 8260 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NM | 115 | 1567 |
| Capito, Shelley Moore | C001047 | 8223 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | WV | 115 | 1676 |
| Cantwell, Maria | C000127 | 8288 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | WA | 115 | 172 |
| Klobuchar, Amy | K000367 | 8249 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MN | 115 | 1826 |
| Tester, Jon | T000464 | 8258 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MT | 115 | 1829 |
| Heller, Dean | H001041 | 8060 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | NV | 115 | 1863 |
| Peters, Gary C. | P000595 | 7994 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MI | 115 | 1929 |
| Gardner, Cory | G000562 | 7862 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | CO | 115 | 1998 |
| Young, Todd | Y000064 | 7948 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | IN | 115 | 2019 |
| Blumenthal, Richard | B001277 | 8332 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | CT | 115 | 2076 |
| Lee, Mike | L000577 | 8303 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | UT | 115 | 2080 |
| Johnson, Ron | J000293 | 8355 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | WI | 115 | 2086 |
| Duckworth, Tammy | D000622 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | IL | 115 | 2123 | |
| Schatz, Brian | S001194 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | HI | 115 | 2173 | |
| Cruz, Ted | C001098 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | TX | 115 | 2175 | |
| Fischer, Deb | F000463 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | NE | 115 | 2179 | |
| Sullivan, Dan | S001198 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | AK | 115 | 2290 | |
| Cortez Masto, Catherine | C001113 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NV | 115 | 2299 | |
| Hassan, Margaret Wood | H001076 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NH | 115 | 2302 | |
| Inhofe, James M. | I000024 | 8322 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | OK | 115 | 583 |
| Markey, Edward J. | M000133 | 7972 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MA | 115 | 735 |
| Nelson, Bill | N000032 | 8236 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | FL | 115 | 859 |
Disclaimer:
Please refer to the About page for more information.