Congressional Hearings
BEYOND ISIS: COUNTERING TERRORISM, RADICALIZATION, AND PROMOTING STABILITY IN NORTH AFRICA
Congressional Hearings
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Congress: Senate
CHRG-115shrg36687
| AUTHORITYID | CHAMBER | TYPE | COMMITTEENAME |
|---|---|---|---|
| ssfr00 | S | S | Committee on Foreign Relations |
[Senate Hearing 115-629]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-629
BEYOND ISIS: COUNTERING TERRORISM,
RADICALIZATION, AND PROMOTING
STABILITY IN NORTH AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA
AND COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 6, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gpo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-687 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,
CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida TIM KAINE, Virginia
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho.................... 1
Hon. Nathan Sales, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez.................................... 26
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey................................... 35
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Cory A. Booker..................................... 37
Hon. Joan Polaschik, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC............................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Senator James E. Risch..................................... 23
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Tim Kaine.......................................... 28
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Cory A. Booker..................................... 41
(iii)
BEYOND ISIS: COUNTERING TERRORISM,
RADICALIZATION, AND PROMOTING
STABILITY IN NORTH AFRICA
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
Central Asia and Counterterrorism,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Johnson, Young, Kaine,
Murphy, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. I am going to call the meeting of the
subcommittee to order. Thank you all for coming today.
A couple of things to start with, number one, we are going
to have votes starting at 3 o'clock. We will deal with that
when we have to deal with that.
The second thing is, this committee does not meet as
frequently as many other committees, the primary reason being
that the issues that we deal with are of sufficient magnitude
that they are generally dealt with by the whole committee. So
either this committee wraps itself around the other or vice
versa, depending upon how you look at it.
But in any event, we really deemed that this was an
appropriate subject, however, for this subcommittee. Obviously,
the complexity of dealing with the issues on North Africa are
certainly worthy of our consideration, thus, the meeting today.
And we have a very good panel to help us deal with this, people
who deal with this all the time.
So thank you all for being here.
Ambassador Sales, I know your travel schedule has been
quite robust. And as a result of that, I appreciate you
accommodating us, to actually be able to be here yourself
today.
North Africa is an important region for the United States,
as well as transatlantic security. Several years ago, we
watched the Arab Spring begin in Tunisia and then spread across
the Middle East. People in the region wanted a better life and
were clearly tired with the slow pace of change. Despite their
aspirations, the pace of change has not met their expectations.
Today, we still see weak institutions, and strong leaders
make change difficult. And in the process, safe havens continue
to exist for terrorists.
The region, especially Morocco and Tunisia, has seen a
significant number of their people, of their citizens, join
ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Now these fighters pose a threat as
they return to the region, to their own homeland.
Morocco and Algeria have strong institutions to collaborate
with the United States. In Tunisia, the Government is stable,
but still fragile, and requires a commitment to help build
their institutional capacity.
ISIS's increased presence in the Sinai is troubling, to say
the least. The attacks against Coptic Christians and Muslims,
like the recent mosque attack, highlight how large a threat
ISIS still is in the region.
In Libya, we see rival factions and weak institutions
undermine the capacity to govern the country, leaving few
partners to work with in the fight against terrorism. The
byproduct is freedom of movement for terrorists to plan, train,
and finance their activities.
At the same time, countries around the region are competing
for influence and power rather than helping the domestic
leaders build capacity and effective institutions to govern
their own country. This only undermines counterterrorism
efforts.
However, this challenge is not something that can be
confronted solely through military force. Targeted U.S.
airstrikes have been helpful, but political resolution in Libya
is vital to building long-term partner capacity and actually
rooting out terrorism.
If factionalism persists, we will never get beyond military
action.
Also, I worry that the broader region is becoming not just
a training ground for terrorist camps, but a base of operation
as deeper affiliations with international terrorist
organizations are growing. This has profound implications for
European security, as smuggling and extremists themselves cross
the Mediterranean into Europe.
There is an opportunity for the United States to partner
with our allies in Europe and the gulf to help bring more
stability to the region, and I look forward to hearing our
witnesses help explain how we can accomplish this challenging
task.
I know that Senator Kaine wants badly to join us today, but
like all of us, he has challenges, and he is going to be here.
So we will look forward to his opening statement when he gets
here.
In any event, I want to thank both Ambassador Sales and
Ambassador Polaschik, and ask you to honor us with what you
have to say. And we will start with Ambassador Sales.
STATEMENT OF HON. NATHAN SALES, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE,
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Sales. Thank you very much, Chairman Risch,
Ranking Member Kaine, and other members of the subcommittee. I
would like to thank you for inviting me to discuss U.S.
counterterrorism efforts in North Africa.
And, Mr. Chairman, should I pause now to hear from Senator
Kaine? Very good.
I would like to thank you for holding this hearing, and I
am especially grateful to you for scheduling this hearing at a
time that allows me to personally participate.
Our top priority in the region is to prevent terrorist
groups from threatening the United States by denying them the
ability to operate in the continent's vast, under-governed
spaces.
Terrorists who enjoy safe haven are capable of exporting
violence around the world, striking us here at home and
striking the homelands of our closest allies. We saw al Qaeda
do this from Afghanistan in the 1990s through 9/11. More
recently, we also saw ISIS do the same thing from its false
caliphate in Syria and Iraq.
This is the reason why we are helping the sometimes-fragile
states of North Africa build their counterterrorism capacity.
We want to develop their capabilities to the point where they
are able to defend themselves without relying on assistance
from the United States.
Today, ISIS is on the ropes in Syria and Iraq, but
significant challenges remain--ISIS networks in North Africa,
as you have already mentioned, Senator; foreign terrorist
fighters from the region who have traveled to the war zone and
now seek to return home; al Qaeda affiliates, like AQIM.
Today, I am going to highlight several areas where the CT
Bureau and the rest of the State Department have been working
with our North African partners to address these and other
problems.
First, law enforcement and criminal justice. Strong,
stable, and responsive governments are an important bulwark
against terrorism. That is why we help partner nations develop
appropriate legal frameworks to effectively prosecute terrorist
offenders. In particular, we strengthen our partners' ability
to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism-related
crimes. We also help them build crisis response teams that are
capable of responding to terrorist attacks in real-time.
Second, border security. Terrorists exploit long, porous
borders in remote and loosely governed parts of the continent.
An important part of the solution to that problem is
information-sharing. For that reason, we have worked with our
interagency partners to conclude HSPD-6 agreements with dozens
of countries, including a number in North Africa. As you know,
HSPD-6 calls for information-sharing about known and suspected
terrorists.
We have also worked to stem the flow of FTFs across
international borders. This means getting our partners to use
Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database and other
resources.
We are also expanding the PISCES program. That rather
elaborate acronym is Personal Identification Secure Comparison
and Evaluation System. It is a mouthful, but what it does do is
provide state-of-the-art border-screening systems to 24
countries.
A third important CT tool is designations. The State
Department has listed a number of foreign terrorist
organizations that are active in North Africa. Examples include
ISIS Sinai, ISIS Libya, AQIM, and Ansar al-Sharia. Using these
designations enables us to help cut off the financial flows
that are the lifeblood of these organizations.
Fourth, we work to counter radicalization in a way that is
tailored to each North African country's unique circumstances.
It is not enough to stop FTFs from traveling to the war zone or
remove them from the battlefield. This is a battle of ideas,
and we also need to delegitimize the radical ideology that
attracts them in the first place and prevent them from getting
into terrorist pipelines.
Finally, looking beyond Foggy Bottom, the Department of
Defense continues to advance U.S. counterterrorism priorities
in North Africa by taking the fight directly to the enemy.
On October 29th, our soldiers captured Mustafa al-Imam, who
was allegedly involved in the 2012 Benghazi terrorist attacks.
We have transferred him to the United States for prosecution,
where he will face justice for his alleged crimes. We continue
to investigate the perpetrators of this attack, and we look
forward to bringing them to justice.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you again for
holding this hearing. I will now turn the floor over to
Ambassador Polaschik, who will discuss some of the political
and diplomatic aspects of our efforts in the region.
Thank you.
[Ambassador Sales's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Nathan A. Sales
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee: Thank you for the invitation to discuss U.S.
counterterrorism efforts in North Africa, which form a critical part of
our global campaign against ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates. Our
primary goal in the region is to prevent terrorist organizations from
threatening the United States and our interests by denying them the
ability to operate in the continent's vast, under-governed spaces.
Terrorist groups with safe haven are able to export their violence
around the world, striking our homeland and those of our closest
allies. We saw al-Qa'ida do this from Afghanistan in the 1990s through
9/11; more recently, we saw ISIS do the same from Iraq and Syria.
To mitigate the threat posed by terrorist groups in North Africa,
we are helping fragile states build capacity as well as leveraging
highly capable states' counterterrorism expertise. We want to develop
our African partners' counterterrorism capabilities to a point where
they need not rely on assistance from the United States to defend
themselves.
ISIS is on the ropes in Iraq and Syria. But as the group loses
control over territory in its core, it is essential that we prevent it
from reconstituting itself elsewhere. In particular, ISIS maintains
networks in North Africa that seek to conduct or inspire attacks on the
continent, in Europe, and against U.S. interests. Furthermore, North
African foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) have figured prominently in
the ranks of ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria, and we must remain
vigilant against the threat posed by FTFs returning home. Algeria's
long conflict with the Armed Islamic Group in the 1990s underscored how
important it is for countries to effectively manage the risks posed by
returning terrorist fighters. I note that Algeria today is a highly
capable counterterrorism partner that is attuned to these risks and
sharing its hard-won insights with like-minded partners, including the
United States. We also remain concerned about al-Qa'ida's affiliates in
the region, especially al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and
their growing reach into other parts of Africa.
Today, I will highlight several specific areas where the Bureau of
Counterterrorism has been working with North African partners to
address these and other challenges: training law enforcement officers
and judges how to handle terrorism cases; strengthening information
sharing and terrorist screening; cutting off the flow of money to
terrorist groups; and countering the radical ideologies used by ISIS
and its affiliates to recruit new members.
Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice, and Crisis Response
Strong, stable, and responsive governments that provide security
and economic prosperity for their citizens are an important source of
strength against terrorist threats. This is why the CT Bureau works
closely with partner countries to develop appropriate legal frameworks
to bring criminal cases against terrorist offenders. In particular, we
assist partners with strengthening their ability to investigate,
prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism crimes. We also help them develop
crisis-response capabilities to address terrorist incidents in real
time.
To investigate, we work closely with our interagency partners to
provide assistance to law enforcement units so they have the
appropriate knowledge, skills, and tools to detect, thwart, and respond
to terrorism. This includes training, equipping, and mentoring crisis
response units, canine teams, bomb squads, fusion centers, and cyber
investigation teams.
To prosecute, we work with lawyers to enable them to prepare
persuasive, well-developed cases that draw on different kinds of
evidence and that lead to convictions. Examples include case-based
mentoring designed to help prosecutors secure convictions or working
with countries to develop counterterrorism prosecution cells that are
versed in terrorism case law.
o adjudicate, we work with judges on procedural and substantive
issues so they have a better understanding of the complexity of
terrorism cases and the types of evidence that will be brought to bear.
We round out our efforts in the criminal justice system by working with
prison officials to provide training and technical assistance so they
can effectively punish convicted terrorists and identify those who may
be receptive to rehabilitation.
For instance, we have partnered with Tunisia's security services to
improve their ability to detect, respond to, and mitigate terrorist
threats. In May, the Tunisian National Guard launched a raid that
resulted in the death of a senior ISIS leader who was believed to be
planning attacks during Ramadan. Just last month, Tunisian tactical and
investigative units collaborated to arrest members of an alleged
terrorist cell; an investigation is ongoing under the auspices of the
Public Prosecutor's offices.
Promoting this kind of interagency coordination is a staple of the
training and assistance we provide to our partners. We are also working
with Algeria's national criminal forensics laboratory to provide
forensics training to judiciary and law-enforcement personnel, which
the Algerians are now able to share with neighbors.
And last month in Egypt, we concluded our first train-the-trainer
course on Explosive Incident Countermeasures. This will help Egypt
address bomb threats and train other first responders on the
identification, neutralization, and safe disposition of explosive
devices.
Information Sharing, Borders, and Aviation
Terrorists do not respect borders, so it is no surprise that ISIS
and al-Qa'ida adherents range across parts of the Maghreb and also
further south in Mali, Niger, and other Sahel countries. They seek to
exploit long, porous borders in remote and loosely governed areas of
the continent.
This is why the CT Bureau focuses on improving border security-
especially through information sharing at international borders, where
there is a critical need to detect and prevent terrorist travel. With
the FBI-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and in
coordination with interagency partners, the State Department has
concluded bilateral arrangements with a number of countries to exchange
information about known and suspected terrorists pursuant to Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), including in North Africa.
We also have encouraged our partners to stem the flow of suspected
FTFs across their borders. This means getting countries to make greater
use of INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Document and other databases
and resources related to FTFs--resources that allow countries to screen
travelers and to assist their law enforcement agencies in identifying
and investigating terrorist travelers. We also continue to expand the
Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(PISCES) program, which provides state-of-the-art border screening
systems to 24 countries.
On aviation security, we are expanding our counterterrorism
cooperation with Egypt, and we expect to provide enhanced explosives
detection and screening technologies, training, and canines in 2018.
Likewise, in 2017, the CT Bureau revitalized a dormant bilateral
relationship with Libya and provided aviation security training to 24
participants of the Libyan Aviation Authority from six airports across
Libya.
Designations and Countering Terrorist Finance
A third important tool in our comprehensive approach is terrorist
designations and countering the financing of terrorism. Designating
individuals and terrorist groups exposes and isolates terrorists and
their supporters, denies them access to the U.S. financial system, and
enables authorities to prosecute them for their crimes and prevent them
from entering this country. Moreover, designations can assist or
complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and other
governments, whether through their own or UN designations.
The State Department has designated a number of entities operating
in North Africa as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including ISIS-
Sinai Province, ISIS-Libya, AQIM, Ansar al-Shari'a, and the al-
Mulathamun Battalion. We continue to identify individuals and entities
for designation to combat terrorism and disrupt terrorist financing in
the region.
Preventing Radicalization and Recruitment
There are a wide variety of reasons why so many FTFs come from
North African countries. Some were motivated by a desire to overthrow
the Assad regime and others by ISIS's call to join its false caliphate.
Still others were exposed to radical ideology in environments that had
struggled to build strong public and private institutions capable of
countering messages of hate. This appears to have been the case in
Tunisia, from which as many as 3,000 to 6,000 FTFs traveled to the
conflict zone in Iraq and Syria. By contrast, in Algeria, where the
memories of the ``dark decade'' fighting Islamist terrorists remain
fresh, the societal and institutional arrangements put in place seem to
have prevented any major outflow.
Countering radicalization in a way that is tailored to each North
African country is another critical component of a comprehensive
approach to counterterrorism. We must do more than simply identify and
stop FTFs from traveling or remove them from the battlefield. We need
to delegitimize the violent ideology that attracts them and also
prevent them from getting into terrorist pipelines in the first place.
In Morocco, for example, we are using lessons from the fields of
public health and disease control to confront radicalism in local
communities by detecting, interrupting, and changing behaviors and
community norms.
In addition, the CT Bureau works closely with the Strong Cities
Network (SCN). The SCN is the first global network of mayors,
municipal-level policy makers, and practitioners united to build
community resilience to extremism in all its forms. The network has
more than 100 city members from Los Angeles, New York, and Chattanooga,
to Peshawar, Nairobi, and Vilvoorde. Tunis is the first North African
member, and SCN also has cities from northern Cameroon and Mauritania
in its Sahel ranks.
Military Action
While I am not here to discuss in detail the use of force against
terrorists, the Department of Defense continues to advance our
counterterrorism objectives in North Africa by taking the fight
directly to the enemy. We have come a long way from the middle of 2016,
when Libya's branch of ISIS was the strongest ISIS affiliate outside of
Iraq and Syria. U.S. direct action and our partnership with Prime
Minister al-Sarraj's government and its aligned forces forced ISIS out
of Sirte and placed significant pressure on the ISIS-Libya network,
hampering its ability to conduct complex attacks and project
significant threats outside the country.
Separately, on October 29, U.S. forces captured Mustafa al-Imam,
who was allegedly involved in the 2012 Benghazi terrorist attacks, and
transferred him to the United States for prosecution. We continue to
investigate and identify all those who were involved in the attack, and
we will spare no effort to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Working with Partners
Finally, it is important to understand that our efforts in North
Africa are not in isolation. To the contrary, we are working with
European allies, other key partners, and multilateral institutions to
amplify our efforts and make a larger impact. Morocco and Algeria in
particular are regional leaders in multilateral counterterrorism
initiatives, including those of the African Union, the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum
(GCTF).
We welcome Morocco's support and leadership as our co-lead of the
GCTF's Initiative to Address Homegrown Terrorism. Over the course of
the next year, a series of regional workshops will identify innovative
prevention programs for addressing the challenges of homegrown
terrorism. Algeria also plays an important role in the GCTF, co-
chairing the West Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group, which
helps mobilize assistance to help West African countries build capacity
to counter terrorism. GCTF members remain committed to addressing
returning FTFs, countering terrorist financing, enhancing border
security, building capacity, and preparing national action plans in
African countries.
Conclusion
The United States uses a range of tools and resources and works
closely with the governments of North Africa and other partners to
comprehensively address terrorism. We are encouraged by reporting from
our diplomatic posts about how our training and resources are directly
assisting partners to disrupt terrorist operations, prosecute terrorist
suspects, and protect borders. I will now turn the floor over to
Ambassador Polaschik, who will discuss the political and diplomatic
aspect of our approach to this region. We greatly appreciate Congress's
support. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Risch. Ambassador Polaschik?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN POLASCHIK, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Polaschik. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Kaine,
subcommittee members, thank you for the invitation to appear
before you.
As Ambassador Sales just described, ISIS and other
terrorist groups have been significantly degraded in this
region. Nevertheless, these groups continue to capitalize on
political friction, economic frustrations, and regional
fragmentation in their quest to destabilize our partners and
threaten attacks against U.S. interests.
As an integral component of our counterterrorism efforts,
the United States is working closely with our partners in North
Africa as they seek to advance political reconciliation,
promote economic reforms, and strengthen civil society to
ensure a robust and comprehensive approach to our collective
threats.
I would like to speak briefly about our specific efforts
and also would like to submit a statement for the record.
Turning first to Libya, where the ongoing political crisis
continues to impact security throughout the region, Libya must
first overcome the current political impasse to achieve lasting
stability. That is why the administration recently hosted Prime
Minister al-Sarraj in Washington to reaffirm support for his
Government of National Accord and U.N.-facilitated efforts to
mediate a political settlement.
We urge all Libyans to engage constructively in the U.N.
process and pursue their ambitions through the ballot box. Any
attempt to impose a military solution will only fuel civil
conflict, providing ISIS and al Qaeda with opportunities to use
Libya as a base to threaten the U.S. and our allies.
The potential for greater instability in Libya is of
particular concern to Tunisia. As Tunisia consolidates its
democratic transition, economic stagnation and social
marginalization have prompted approximately 4,000 Tunisians to
join ISIS. U.S. engagement is focused on supporting Tunisia's
efforts to enhance its ability to respond to this threat,
bolstering Tunisia's judicial capacity to investigate and
prosecute those involved in terrorism, and tackling the root
causes of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon.
In Tunis last month, the Deputy Secretary of State spoke
directly with Tunisian leaders about the country's economic
challenges, pledging U.S. support, but urging quicker
implementation of reforms that are vital to ensuring all
Tunisians are able to participate fully in political and
economic life.
Algeria, where I recently served as U.S. Ambassador, has
witnessed a dramatic improvement in its political, economic,
and security situation since the 1990s. Today, Algeria stands
as a highly effective counterterrorism partner, able to deny
terrorists safe haven within its borders and working to build
the capacity of its more fragile neighbors. A measured but
effective political and economic liberalization in recent years
has undergirded this transformation.
Morocco continues to distinguish itself as a capable
security partner and regional leader, particularly with respect
to countering violent extremism and radicalization on the
African continent. Morocco is a net exporter of security.
For example, in close cooperation with us, Moroccan
personnel have trained counterterrorism forces in Senegal and
Chad, while Morocco has lent powerful support to the G5 Sahel
to strengthen the regional response to terrorism.
Egypt remains an important strategic partner. Its most
pressing internal security challenge is the ISIS affiliate in
northern Sinai.
Let me pause to reiterate the U.S. Government's condolences
for the horrifying November 24th mosque attack, which killed
over 300 Egyptians.
ISIS has also targeted Egypt's Christians via appalling
church bombings and attacks on pilgrims. Other terrorist groups
have claimed attacks on Egyptian officials and police outside
the Sinai.
For Cairo, instability in Libya and the potential for ISIS
to regroup there represent critical threats to Egyptian
security.
We remain committed to supporting Egypt's efforts to defeat
terrorist threats. Building on decades of strong security ties,
we are seeing growing counterterrorism cooperation and
continuing strong military-to-military efforts across a range
of programs.
Turning briefly to economic stability, President el-Sisi
has taken bold and necessary steps on reform, and the economy
is improving, albeit slowly.
Finally, we will continue to emphasize the importance of a
comprehensive approach to counterterrorism that protects and
minimizes damage to civilians. We have been engaged in a frank
but, as yet, inconclusive dialogue about Egypt's restrictive
NGO law and Egypt's convictions of employees of U.S. NGOs.
We have raised and will continue to raise at senior levels
our concerns about policies that challenge democratic
governance. And we continue to stress the fundamental
importance of respect for human rights, civil liberties, and
the need for a robust civil society.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kaine, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[Ambassador Polaschik's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joan Polaschik
promoting political stability and countering terrorism in north africa
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Kaine, subcommittee members, thank
you for your invitation to discuss U.S. efforts to promote political
stability and counter terrorism in North Africa. As Ambassador Sales
just described, ISIS and other terrorist groups have been significantly
degraded in this region. Nevertheless, these groups continue to
capitalize on political friction, economic frustrations, and regional
fragmentation in their quest to attract new recruits, destabilize our
partner governments, and threaten attacks against U.S. interests and
our partners in Africa and Europe.
As an integral component of our counterterrorism efforts, the
United States is working closely with our partners in North Africa as
they seek to advance political reconciliation, promote economic
reforms, and strengthen civil society to ensure a robust and
comprehensive approach to the threats we collectively face in this
region.
In Libya, our objective is a stable, unified Libya capable of
working collaboratively with the United States and our international
partners against terrorism and fostering security and prosperity for
the Libyan people. Prime Minister al-Sarraj and his Government of
National Accord (GNA) have been stalwart partners in these efforts. We
also commend the tireless diplomacy of U.N. Special Representative
Ghassan Salame to resolve this conflict and achieve a political
solution.
Turning first to Libya--where the ongoing political crisis
continues to impact security throughout the region--that country must
overcome the current political impasse to achieve lasting stability.
That is why the President, Secretary Tillerson, and other senior U.S.
officials hosted Prime Minister al-Sarraj in Washington over the past
week to reaffirm support for U.N.-facilitated efforts to mediate a
political settlement and help Libya prepare for national elections in
2018. As the U.N. Security Council recently affirmed, the Libyan
Political Agreement must remain the framework for a political solution
to the conflict and peaceful transition. We urge all Libyans, including
``Libyan National Army'' Commander Haftar, to engage constructively in
this U.N. process and pursue their ambitions through the ballot box.
Any attempts to impose a military solution will only fuel a renewed
civil conflict, providing ISIS and Al Qaida with opportunities to again
use Libya as a base to threaten the United States and our allies.
In 2016, forces aligned with Prime Minister Sarraj and the GNA
expelled ISIS from Sirte, dealing a significant blow to what was the
most significant ISIS presence outside of its core in Syria and Iraq.
Today, in parallel with ongoing military efforts to ensure ISIS cannot
regroup in central Libya, we are helping Libyan authorities consolidate
these gains through targeted stabilization programs, such as training
for Libyan personnel on the safe removal of explosive remnants of war
that ISIS fighters left behind. As communities liberated from ISIS
control rebuild, we will encourage the Libyan government to expand
economic opportunities, restore health and other basic services, and
promote inclusive governance, steps that are critical to fill the gaps
in weakly governed areas of the country that ISIS exploited in 2015 to
gain a foothold in Libya.
The potential for greater instability in Libya is of particular
concern to neighboring Tunisia. As Tunisia consolidates its remarkable
democratic transition, a complex web of interrelated factors have
spurred radicalization and prompted approximately 3,000 to 6,000
Tunisians to join ISIS: chronic youth unemployment and economic
stagnation, feelings of social marginalization, and terrorist
recruitment techniques honed to highly localized grievances. U.S.
diplomatic efforts and assistance programs are accordingly focused on
supporting Tunisia's efforts to reorient its security efforts to
respond to this threat; bolstering Tunisian judicial capacity to
investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate those involved in terrorism
cases; and tackling the root political and economic causes of the
foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon. Recent polling by the
International Republican Institute suggests further reason for concern:
nearly 90 percent of Tunisians claimed that corruption is now worse
than under the Ben Ali dictatorship, and roughly half of Tunisia's
young people aspire to emigrate, legally or not, to Europe.
Six years after the Jasmine Revolution set the Middle East ablaze,
economic opportunities have often lagged behind the unprecedented
openings for free political expression. Prime Minister Chahed and his
government have outlined encouraging plans to shift this trajectory
through greater economic inclusion, a revitalized private sector, and a
stronger and more effective judiciary. Certain reforms, including cuts
to public sector wages, will be painful in the short term, and further
test Tunisia's political and societal cohesion. We support Tunisia's
continued progress with the IMF to promote macroeconomic stability,
curtail public expenditure growth, and promote budget transparency. The
United States will provide targeted assistance to build capacity,
increase economic literacy, and strengthen Tunisia's still fragile
institutions, but the fundamental responsibility for ensuring Tunisia
weathers its current economic challenges will rest with the Tunisian
people and their elected leaders.
In Tunis last month, Deputy Secretary Sullivan spoke directly with
Tunisian leaders about these challenges, pledging U.S. support but
urging quicker implementation of reforms vital to ensuring all
Tunisians are able to participate fully in both political and economic
life. Policies that enable private sector-led job creation, spur
innovation, and empower civil society groups to hold their government
accountable will address the very grievances that terrorists seek to
exploit to attract young Tunisians to their vile cause.
Algeria, where I recently served as U.S. Ambassador, has witnessed
a dramatic improvement in its political, economic, and security
situation since the ``dark decade'' of the 1990s. Today, Algeria stands
as a highly effective counterterrorism partner in the region, both able
to deny terrorists safe haven within its borders and, increasingly,
export its best practices to more fragile states across Central Africa
and the Sahel.
A measured but effective political and economic liberalization in
recent years has undergirded this transformation. Since 2011, the
Algerian Government has adopted a path of gradual political reform:
lifting a state of emergency in place for nearly two decades, enhancing
the role of the parliament, re-instating presidential term limits, and
creating an independent electoral commission. Last month, Algerians
peacefully went to the polls to elect municipal governments.
Encouragingly, the Algerian government also recognizes that economic
reforms and a greater openness to foreign investment are critical
ingredients for its lasting stability. As the country seeks to adapt to
persistently low oil prices, the parliament has begun to rein in public
subsidies and boost taxes, unpopular but necessary steps to stabilize
the Algerian economy. Onerous import restrictions, however, continue to
limit Algeria's competitiveness and dampen prospects to knit Algeria
more closely to the international community.
Morocco continues to distinguish itself as a capable security
partner and regional leader, particularly with respect to countering
violent extremism and radicalization on the African continent. Morocco
is a net exporter of security. For example, in close cooperation with
us, Moroccan personnel have trained counterterrorism forces in Senegal
and Chad, while Morocco has lent powerful support to the G-5 Sahel
Joint Force Initiative to strengthen the regional response to
terrorism.
At home, a persistent, small-scale protest movement has highlighted
the intersection of political instability and counterterrorism. In
response to the tragic death of a fish vendor last year in a
confrontation with local authorities, Moroccans in an underdeveloped
northern region have demanded greater investment in their region, more
help creating jobs, and fairer treatment by security forces. We are
encouraged that Moroccan leaders have begun to respond to these
economic concerns, easing political tensions and denying terrorists the
chance to exploit grievances to recruit new members.
Finally, six years after Tahrir Square and three years after
President al-Sisi's election, Egypt remains an important strategic
partner facing a number of challenges. Its most pressing internal
security challenge is the ISIS affiliate in Northern Sinai; let me
pause for a moment to reiterate the U.S. government's deepest
condolences for the horrifying November 24 mosque attack, which killed
over 300 Egyptian citizens. ISIS has not yet claimed responsibility for
the attack, the worst in modern Egyptian history, but we are confident
ISIS was responsible. We have seen reports of ISIS flags at the scene.
ISIS has also targeted Egypt's Christians, killing more than one
hundred over the last year, including by appalling church bombings and
attacks on Christian pilgrims, and by efforts to drive Christians out
of the Sinai Peninsula. In addition to ISIS' campaign in Sinai, other
terrorist groups have also claimed attacks on Egyptian officials and
police outside of the Sinai, and many of the above-mentioned attacks on
Christians have taken place in mainland Egypt. In October, militants
killed numerous Egyptian police officers in an attack in the Western
Desert region.
Egypt's 750-mile border with Libya represents an additional
security challenge. For Cairo, instability in Libya and the potential
for ISIS to regroup in Libya represent critical threats to Egyptian
security.
We remain committed to supporting Egypt's efforts to defeat
terrorist threats. Building on decades of strong security ties, we are
seeing growing counterterrorism cooperation, and continuing strong
military-to-military efforts across a range of programs. We conducted
the first Bright Star joint military exercise in eight years, with a
new focus on contemporary, asymmetric threats. U.S.-origin equipment,
for example mine-resistant vehicles, contributes daily to the Egyptian
Armed Forces' ability to effectively confront the challenges.
I want to turn briefly to economic stability. President al-Sisi and
his government have taken bold and necessary steps on economic reforms
supported by the United States and the international community, and the
economy is improving, albeit slowly. These reforms have included
floating the currency, introducing a Value Added Tax and reducing fuel
subsidies, and expanding social spending to support the less fortunate.
Egypt is committed to continue reducing its deficit and making
structural reforms to improve the business environment and spur
investment. These steps to strengthen the Egyptian economy are
extremely important to promoting Egypt's long-term stability.
We will continue to emphasize with our Egyptian government
interlocutors the importance of a comprehensive approach to
counterterrorism that protects and minimizes damage to civilian
populations. We have been engaged in a frank, but as-yet inconclusive,
dialogue about Egypt's restrictive NGO law, and Egypt's conviction of
employees of U.S. NGOs. We have raised--and will continue to raise at
senior levels--our concerns about policies that challenge democratic
governance, and continue to stress the fundamental importance of the
respect for human rights, civil liberties, and the need for a robust
civil society.
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Kaine, thank you for the opportunity
to speak with you about ongoing efforts in North Africa to promote
political and economic stability in order to achieve a lasting victory
against terrorism in this complex region. I look forward to answering
your questions.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much. That was a really good,
comprehensive overview. And obviously, we have the right panel
here to delve into this.
So with that, Mr. Ranking Member, did you want to make a
statement?
I am going to reserve my questions, so I will yield to you.
Senator Kaine. I apologize for being a few minutes late.
But it spared you hearing an opening statement from me, so
there is some good news.
All right, let me just jump right into questions.
One of the things that I am always puzzled by, and I think
you can each offer some insight into this, is that there are
relatively stable countries in North Africa that we work
closely with--Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria. And yet, a large
number of the foreign fighters that go to fight with ISIS come
from these nations.
Why is that the case? Why have they been such producers of
foreign fighters who go fight with ISIS?
Ambassador Sales. Thanks for the question, Senator. And let
me say, it is good to see you again.
I think the answer to that question is very context-
specific. I think different countries have experienced
radicalization and the migration of foreign terrorist fighters
for different reasons.
So Tunisia, for instance, has sent anywhere from 3,000 to
6,000 foreign terrorist fighters from North Africa into Syria
and Iraq. Morocco, by contrast, has sent about 1,700. The
numbers for some of the other countries are substantially
lower.
In the case of Algeria, which exhibits a very low incidence
of foreign terrorist fighter movements, I think part of the
reason for their relative success in the region is because of
their long history throughout the 1990s of combating Islamist
violence in Algeria. I think that experience has helped Algeria
create governmental institutions and civil society institutions
that help their population, that sort of inoculate their
population against the siren song of radicalism.
Of course, not perfectly. All countries could stand to do a
better job. But I think that experience from the 1990s has been
one factor that has contributed to the relatively advantageous
situation when it comes to foreign terrorist fighters.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask a second question. The
President's announcement today about Jerusalem, this body has
long recognized the reality of Jerusalem as the center of
government for Israel. But the reason that Presidents have not
taken the step before now has not been because of that reality.
It has been because of advice by allies in the region,
including allies of Israel like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
who have basically said, if the U.S. weighs in on that, it may
well lead to extremism in the region that could be dangerous
either to Israel or potentially dangerous to the U.S., U.S.
Embassy personnel, et cetera.
Is that a concern that we should be taking seriously
following this announcement? And what is the State Department
doing to try to protect our Embassy personnel in the region?
Ambassador Polaschik. Well, Senator, I hope that you have
had a chance to listen to the President's statement. I know you
all have very busy schedules. I was just reading very quickly
the transcript myself, to make sure that I had the latest
information.
I think we need to look at a few issues here. First, as you
said, the President recognized Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel and its seat of government. But in his remarks, the
President also said a number of important things about the
final status and stressed that the specific boundaries of
Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem are subject to final status
negotiations between the parties. The United States has not
taken a position on boundaries or borders. We realize----
Senator Kaine. If I could just interrupt, because I do not
want to run over time. I have the statement here, and it does
include that.
The piece I am particularly interested in is one aspect of
the President's statement. This is a summary: Departments and
agencies have implemented a robust security plan to ensure the
safety of our citizens and assets in the region.
That suggests that the administration was aware that this
could have some negative security consequences for Embassy
personnel and others in the region prior to making the
announcement.
What is the State Department doing? What are these robust
security plans? What is the State Department doing to try to
protect our people, in the event that this announcement leads
to the kinds of events that the King of Jordan and others have
suggested it might?
Ambassador Polaschik. The safety and security of American
citizens, both our American citizens working for the U.S.
Government, but, of course, our private American citizens
throughout the world, the security of our installations, the
safety of the thousands of troops that we have throughout the
world, including in the region, are of paramount concern for
this administration, and especially for Secretary Tillerson,
who starts all of his staff meetings with a focus on security.
So this is something that we have been weighing very
carefully. We have been meeting internally. We have been
sending messages out to our Embassies and consulates throughout
the world, asking them to think about these issues.
And of course, we are also talking to our partner
governments, to make sure that we are doing everything possible
to ensure the safety of our American citizens throughout the
world.
Senator Kaine. Do you know whether we have deployed, for
example, additional Marine security guards or other military or
other protective assets into areas that are likely to be
affected, should some of these concerns occur?
Ambassador Polaschik. Senator, I would be happy to provide
more information in a closed session.
Senator Kaine. Okay, all right. That is fine. That is
enough for my first round of questions. I may have more.
Senator Risch. Sure. We will get back to you. Thanks so
much.
Senator Young actually got through the door before you did,
Senator.
Senator Young. Well, thank you, Chairman.
This hearing, like so many others, underscores for me the
importance of us, once again, focusing on the need for this
committee to pass an Authorization for Use of Military Force.
As my colleagues know, I introduced legislation to that end
back in March. I have enjoyed working with many of my other
colleagues to understand the importance of this issue, and have
led on this issue, and applaud the chairman's recent efforts to
take up this cause. And hopefully, we can keep moving forward
on that front.
Ambassadors, the counterterrorism discussion often focuses
on the kinetic element to the exclusion of other elements of
that fight. Now, it is certainly true there are some terrorists
who are irreconcilable and simply have to be taken off the
battlefield through military means.
But a comprehensive CT strategy has to be more than that.
It has to focus on capturing or killing today's irreconcilable
terrorists while also addressing sources, root causes of
radicalization.
Ambassadors, based on your current positions and your
lifetime of experience, what do you see as the connection
between, on one hand, our international development efforts
working with our partners and, on the other, the fight against
terrorists?
Ambassador Sales. Well, Senator Young, thank you for the
question.
I think there is a very tight and close relationship
between development that leads to well-established, democratic
institutions, prosperous economies on the one hand, and
counterterrorism successes on the other.
Democracy is a great bulwark against terrorism, and efforts
to build democracies that are open and transparent and
responsive to their citizens, and protective of basic civil
rights, are key counterterrorism tools.
And the reason for that, I think, Senator, is because
democratic governments that provide their citizens a voice, an
opportunity to be heard, falsify the false claim of terrorists
that a resort to violence is necessary to address one's
concerns. That is never the case, but it is especially not the
case in a democratic government.
And so I think that the broader suite of USG policies that
seek to develop the economies of countries around the world and
to strengthen their commitment to democracy pay a number of
dividends, not the least of which are counterterrorism
dividends.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Ambassador Polaschik, could you also speak to this issue,
and perhaps focus not just on our efforts to nurture and
promote democracy, but also maybe to more basic human needs--
hunger, medical attention, and economic development?
Ambassador Polaschik. Of course, yes.
And this is something that we are trying to do, to take a
holistic approach to the drivers of radicalization. And as
Ambassador Sales said in his previous response, I think the
context is different from country to country, from individual
to individual. So we are trying to tailor our overall
engagement in various countries to address what we see as
specific needs.
So for example, in Tunisia, there is a lot of focus not
just on strengthening the capacity of the law enforcement and
the security services, but also looking at what it is going to
take to create employment, so that the large numbers of very
highly educated young people actually have good, satisfying
jobs.
We have the Tunisian American Entreprise Fund that is
creating small enterprises. There is a robust USAID program. We
have, of course, all our MEPI programs that are focused on
youth leadership and training.
In terms of the kind of basic humanitarian needs, as you
know, a lot of countries in our region have higher levels of
income, so we don't have a lot of USAID missions in the classic
sense.
Of course, we have programs in Morocco. We have programs in
Egypt, Jordan, throughout the region. Libya and Yemen, things
are focused more on the sort of transition.
Humanitarian assistance is obviously a very, very key part
of this for countries that are in conflict. The U.S. has
delivered hundreds of millions, in fact, billions of dollars of
aid in recent years.
Senator Young. My sense, informed by some recent
authoritative reports, is there is going to be an increasing
need for our country to focus on this, working with other
international partners. There are two reports that recently
came out.
The first report was published just yesterday by the World
Food Program USA that demonstrates the link between food
insecurity and instability.
And the second report was produced by the United Nations
Development Program. It is entitled, ``A Journey to Extremism
in Africa,'' and this report highlights the link between lack
of developments, on one hand, and violent extremism, on the
other.
With unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
introduce both of these reports in the record.
[The reports mentioned above may be accessed through the
hyperlinks below:]
https://www.wfpusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
wfp_food_security_final-web-1.pdf
http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-
JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf
Senator Young. And lastly, I would just like to ask the
Ambassadors whether you have had a chance to review these
reports.
Ambassador Sales. Not yet, Senator, but will look forward
to doing so.
Senator Young. You as well?
Ambassador Polaschik. Likewise.
Senator Young. All right. Thank you, Ambassadors.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. I have some questions, but just a quick
follow-up.
I mean, that is what worries me, is that the budgets
reflect priorities, and we seem to be focusing, when it comes
to North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, far more on our military
expenditures, which are essential and necessary. And the
various counterterrorism coalitions that we are in are
extraordinarily important.
But I do worry about seeing budgets being proposed from the
administration that are slashing a lot of critical programs
that ultimately create an environment for stability, where we
deter folks from a pathway toward radicalization. In addition,
our diplomatic resources in Africa, have also been cut as well
as investments we are making in institution-building and the
like.
I wonder if you could comment on that, because Senator
Young has made this point numerous times, and I tend to agree
with him. I am actually growing more worried that we are
relying on our military interventions with the thought that
might somehow not only solve the immediate problems but also
the longer term causes of radicalization.
Ambassador Sales. It is a great question, Senator. Thank
you for raising it.
I think Ambassador Polaschik and I, and the entire State
Department and the administration, would give you the same
answer. And that is that the kinetic aspects of our
counterterrorism strategy are important and vital, and so are
various other non-kinetic aspects of our counterterrorism
strategy. And that is why we are here today to tell you about
them.
Let me, if I could, just give you a couple of examples of
some of the things that we are doing in North Africa in the
civilian space, in the border security, law enforcement, and
CVE space to round out the full suite of whole-of-government
tools that we are using to address these threats, both short-
term and long-term.
So in places like Algeria, for instance, we are partnering
with local law enforcement to develop their ability to
investigate terrorism-related crimes. We are working with
judges to help them understand how to handle complex terrorism
cases, how to deal with evidence, how to deal with witness
protection and facility protection. And we are also working
with prison officials to help them manage the very difficult
issues that arise when you are trying to incarcerate.
Senator Booker. And I appreciate that. And maybe for a QFR,
I would love to get the full details of this, being that I only
have 3 minutes left.
Specifically to the point about food aid, the proposal of
the administration is to cut the funding to the very programs
that reports like this one show are necessary for us to create
stability.
Ambassador Polaschik. Senator, if I might jump in on that,
I think there are some very interesting and positive
developments in North Africa with respect to international
cooperation, because this is a part of the world where the
impact of the terrorism, of the migration flows, of the
smuggling is felt very keenly by Europe.
So actually, Tunisia is a really good example, and Libya as
well, where we have ramped up our assistance very quickly. We
have given huge sums of money to help strengthen Tunisian
institutions, to help them get through that initial period. And
then the rest of the international community has come in to
help pick up the slack and take on other projects.
So for example, there is a G7 initiative underway in which
we are sharing the burden with our partners to help address all
of these needs that you outlined. Libya is also another very
positive example where the United States is doing part of it,
but the Europeans are also doing a very major part.
So I think as we look at the realities of this
administration's budget request, something that we have done
very, very effectively is to work with our international
partners to make sure that we are looking holistically at the
needs and to make sure that other partners are engaging in
areas where we might not be able to engage as robustly as we
have in the past.
Senator Booker. Okay. I wish we had more time.
When you mention Tunisia, I get worried about the
corruption going on in their government, and problematic
efforts like their Administrative Reconciliation law, which
gives sort of blanket immunity for civil servants. And these
are obviously the things that create grievances.
I just want to, in my remaining moments, ask about the
human trafficking problem. I am sure you all saw the CNN videos
with what is to me heartbreaking evidence of modern-day
slavery, the trafficking going through areas that my
subcommittee covers. There is a lot of evidence that these
human trafficking and, in fact, according to EU reports, the
decrease in registered migrants does not necessarily translate
into one-to-one reduction, because of the overall flow as new
routes are going.
This is happening, the flow of human trafficking, the
modern-day slavery. This is something I know weighs on your
hearts and anybody who is aware of the degree of it. there are
today desperate people who are fleeing, seeking opportunities,
and ending up being sold into slavery.
It is unconscionable. It is unacceptable. It should enrage
this Nation. And we should be doing something about it.
So in the remaining moments, could you let me know what the
U.S. is doing to try to help address this situation, what kind
of humanitarian aid, migration-related assistance we are
providing, and how we are cooperating with our allies in the
region, specifically with the EU? And has the State Department
considered doing things to hold the perpetrators of these
abuses accountable, including sanctions under the Magnitsky Act
or other authorities?
Ambassador Polaschik. We share 100 percent your concerns
about this horrifying situation. And Libyan Prime Minister
Sarraj was just in Washington last week. That certainly was a
topic of discussion. The Security Council met recently to talk
about this, and the United States expressed its deep concern
over this.
On the humanitarian front, we have been engaged in
supporting migrants, providing humanitarian assistance, since
the very early days of the revolution back in 2011. This is,
unfortunately, not a new development in Libya.
So we continue to be very, very engaged, working with IOM
and others to make sure that the people caught up in these
horrific crimes get the care and assistance that they need.
With respect to trying to get a handle on it, I think this
comes back to many of the issues that Ambassador Sales was
talking about, making sure that there are appropriate border
controls.
But it also comes back to the root causes, as the Senator
has also identified. The people who are coming from these
countries elsewhere in the continent whose lives are so
desperate that they are willing to make that journey across the
Sahara, clearly, something needs to be done so that they have
prospects in their own countries.
So it is a multifaceted approach. It is something that we
are looking very carefully at, and we coordinate very closely
with our colleagues in the African Affairs Bureau to make sure
that we are looking at this in a very holistic way.
Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Booker.
Senator Johnson?
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the witnesses for your testimony and your service to your
country.
In the committee that I chair, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, we have an annual threat hearing. And 2
years ago, FBI Director Comey testified or predicted that as we
tighten the noose around ISIS in Syria--Iraq and Syria, at that
point in time--we were going to see a diaspora, a spreading of
foreign fighters into other regions.
This year, FBI Director Wray and some of the other
witnesses, NCTC Director Rasmussen, had more encouraging
testimony, saying that we are really seeing those fighters stay
there and die in Raqqa, although, we have heard reports of
fighters leaving Raqqa.
Today, we had a hearing on this evolving fight. Let's face
it, there is a new phase now as we have denied them the
territory, but we have not denied them the cyber caliphate. But
it was actually pretty encouraging, saying that because Turkey
has shut down the migrant flow, it is actually quite difficult
for ISIS foreign fighters to leave that warzone, leave Syria.
Because we did not have a representative from the
Department of State, I just want to ask the Ambassador and the
secretary, do you agree with that assessment? Are they pretty
well trapped in that warzone?
Ambassador Sales?
Ambassador Sales. Thanks for the question, Senator Johnson.
I think the situation today is a lot better than it was in
2014. There are much stricter border controls in place today to
monitor and prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters
across international borders. That is not to say, however, that
the threat has gone away. I think the threat has simply
changed.
So as you know, the Paris attacks 2 years ago, November
2015, were carried out by foreign terrorist fighters who had
gone to the warzone and then come home. We are still seeing
terrorist attacks today in Europe, in the United States, most
recently in New York City on Halloween, by people who have not
traveled to the warzone, but rather are inspired by the radical
ideology and message of hate that ISIS perpetuates.
ISIS is very savvy when it comes to using social media as a
megaphone to broadcast their message, and they are able to
reach people who have no capacity to travel to the warzone.
That is one of the concerns, Senator, that I think we need to
focus on.
Senator Johnson. I understand that, but I am asking
specifically about those foreign fighters being able to escape
that warzone. And 2 years ago, we had the migrant flow through
Turkey. We have clamped down on that. Are there other escape
avenues?
Secretary Polaschik, by the way, that sounds like a very
Wisconsin-type name. [Laughter.]
Senator Johnson. Correct, Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Yes.
Ambassador Polaschik. Well, Senator, I actually grew up
here in Alexandria, Virginia, but my family is from North
Eastern Pennsylvania.
So, yes, in terms of the other routes, as Ambassador Sales
said, the Turks and others have really clamped down, but no
system is infallible.
I think what is positive, since the hearing that you
referenced, is the actions that we have taken in Libya, and we
have had a very good counterterrorism partner in Prime Minister
Sarraj and the GNA. So we have very effectively, with the
Libyans, degraded ISIS's capacity in Libya, and then the
follow-on strikes in other desert camps.
So I think the scenario that I was very worried about when
I was sitting as U.S. Ambassador in Algeria, that it would
squeeze ISIS corporate headquarters and they would pop up in
North Africa, actually has not happened.
I know from speaking with the Algerians who follow these
issues very, very closely, they are concerned about the follow-
on effect into the Sahel region, which is outside of my
particular area of expertise within the State Department, but
as Ambassador Sales and others have pointed out, a region with
weak institutions, a limited capacity.
So I think one of the very positive things that the
administration is doing is working with the stronger partners
in North Africa to help build the capacity of the weaker Sahel
states.
Morocco, as I mentioned in my opening statement, has been
doing great work. Algeria does as well. And I think this is
something that we can really continue to do, because these
states share the same vision that we have, in terms of the need
for security, stability, and those kinds of economic reforms as
well.
Senator Johnson. You might have answered my final question
here.
In a full committee hearing, Chairman Corker pointed out
that there are 19 different nations that the Defense Department
is operating in to try to prevent the spread of terrorism.
Obviously, history shows us that we have failed states like
Afghanistan. If we allow those to continue to fester, terrorism
builds, like we allowed ISIS to rise in the ashes of al Qaeda
in Iraq.
One of the top priorities, I would imagine, of this
administration would be to prevent that from happening. In your
regions that you are responsible for, which is or which are the
nations most at-risk for being that failed state that that type
of terrorist activity could blossom in?
Ambassador Sales. Well, Senator, it is difficult to say who
is at the top of the list or who is at the bottom of the list.
I would say that all countries have their challenges. And let
me explain in a bit more detail, mindful of the time, what we
are doing to help them meet those challenges.
It is essential that the sometimes-fragile states develop
reliable and strong and capable institutions to deliver basic
government services, such as law enforcement, such as criminal
justice, such as border security. These kinds of capabilities
that we enjoy in the United States and in much of the developed
world are useful tools in the counterterrorism toolkit.
But I would go one step further and say that, in building
CT capabilities in these areas, we also help these countries
address some of the concerns that Senator Booker poignantly
raised a moment ago. A state that is capable of preventing a
terrorist from coming across its border is also capable of
preventing a human trafficker from coming across its border. A
state that has courts that are capable of adjudicating
terrorism-related crimes also has courts that are capable of
adjudicating human-trafficking-related crimes.
So the CT investments that we are making pay a number of
dividends not just in the CT space, but across-the-board, I
think.
Senator Johnson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch. Both of you would like to ask some more
questions. Why don't we take a short recess? We can go down and
vote at the end of this one, at the beginning of the next one,
and come back in a few more minutes, if that is all right with
you.
With that, we will be in recess until we get back.
[Recess.]
Senator Risch. We will come back to order again. I see we
have lost the onlookers, but we have the important people here,
which is a good thing.
I apologize for that, but the wheels of justice turn slowly
on the floor of the Senate, slower than most places.
Thank you, again, for coming. And thank you so much for
your input.
Senator Young, you had some follow-up.
Senator Young. I want to thank the Ambassadors again for
their presence here today.
I would like to turn to discussing the importance of cyber
warfare in fighting against terrorism.
Would you agree, first of all, that our Nation's cyber
activities are increasingly important as we carry out the fight
against ISIS, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and other
terrorist actors?
Ambassador Sales. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Young. Okay. Do you have any thoughts related to
policy, funding, or other legislative initiatives that we need
to be embarking on to improve our cyber capabilities?
Ambassador Sales. Senator, that is a very big question, and
I do not think I am prepared to answer it in it is entirety, so
let me answer a couple smaller pieces, specific facets of that
question, as best I can today. And we are happy to come back
and discuss it.
Senator Young. It is a broad question, of course. I want
you to focus narrowly on the counterterrorism context, please.
Ambassador Sales. Right. I think one of the vulnerabilities
that we face is that the shady figures who are willing to sell
on the dark web, exploits that are capable of taking advantage
of vulnerabilities in commonly used software products, they
have insufficient scruples to prevent them from selling to
rogue states. They sell to organized crime, and my concern is
that they would also be willing to sell these sorts of cyber
weapons to terrorist organizations.
I am not aware of any intelligence indicating that that is,
in fact, happening. But it is a risk that I think is a risk
that we should take seriously and think about addressing.
Senator Young. Just days ago, I visited Fort Meade, Army
Cyber Command, specifically the 780th Military Intelligence
Brigade, Task Force Echo, in order to gain more information
about DOD cyber activities as they relate to counterterrorism.
And I had the pleasure of visiting with members of the Indiana
National Guard, who are part of this unit, and learning more
about their work. And so I just wanted to let people publicly
know that I am proud of their activities.
As things come up, I hope you will let this committee know
and our office about things we ought to be doing here on the
Hill to further their efforts and others who are involved in
this fight.
I would like to turn to another technology issue, and it is
ISR. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
March 9 of this year, General Waldhauser, who is Commander of
AFRICOM, stated that only approximately 20 percent to 30
percent of AFRICOM's ISR requirements are met.
On October 30, I asked Secretary Mattis about this ISR
shortfall, and he said General Waldhauser was 100 percent
correct. Secretary Mattis said all geographic combatant
commands suffer from an ISR shortfall.
The Secretary said, ``There is a finite amount of ISR
assets, and we deal them out like gold coins to the various
commands.''
Ambassador Sales, as the coordinator for counterterrorism,
do you agree with the assessments of General Waldhauser and
Secretary of Defense Mattis regarding this shortfall?
Ambassador Sales. Senator, I certainly am not in a position
to second-guess military experts on what their operational
needs entail, in light of their hardware capabilities.
Senator Young. So the implications, as I understand it, are
pretty severe, right? So this will deal an adverse sort of blow
to our situational awareness, our support of operations. And it
will prevent us from getting early notice about various
threats.
I have no doubt that members of the military and others
involved in these efforts are doing the best they can with
limited resources.
But despite these efforts, can you provide any additional
detail on, operationally, how the lack of ISR has impacted our
efforts in North Africa?
Ambassador Sales. Senator, it is a great question, and I
defer to the Pentagon, because it is DOD that determines what
their operational requirements are, and they operate the assets
that are designed to advance those operational needs. So I
defer to them, sir.
Senator Young. Okay, as a diplomat, you work with other
countries, our NATO allies, quite a bit. Have there been
conversations with them about how they might help augment our
resources in this area?
Ambassador Sales. Senator, one of the most important
commitments that President Trump has asked our allies to make
in NATO, but elsewhere as well, is to share a greater portion
of the burden of our mutual self-defense.
We are constantly talking with NATO allies and other allies
about what they can do to contribute more to our shared
efforts. And I suspect that ISR would be no exception to that.
Senator Young. You are not aware of any specific
conversations about North Africa and the needs there, dialog
with----
Ambassador Sales. I have not participated in any such
conversations, but perhaps Ambassador Polaschik could
elaborate.
Ambassador Polaschik. Senator, I think that we could
probably have a good discussion in a closed session about some
of these issues, because there is good counterterrorism
cooperation with a number of our partners in the region. But we
would have to do that in a closed session.
Senator Young. Along with the Embassy security stuff. Okay.
Ambassador Polaschik. Yes.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
As I think about counterterrorism challenges in North
Africa more generally, one of the issues that I am very
troubled about is what I think is now sort of a permanent
problem of migrants and refugees.
I have a very different thought than the President does
about what to do about it, but I actually think that he is
right that this refugee crisis, at any point in time with tens
of millions of people as refugees or migrants, it does raise
concerns about terrorists sneaking over borders. And it raises
all kinds of other concerns.
Even well-meaning people seeking a refugee status moving
into a country like Jordan that doesn't have many resources, of
water, for example, can create all kinds of instability in
Jordan, or refugees from Syria that go into Lebanon when there
is not enough of a school system for the Lebanese kids can
create all kinds of challenges.
So terrorism, instability, there are major, major issues
that refugee and migrant populations create. And frankly, I
think we are used to thinking of refugee and migrant issues as
sort of episodic, but I think we, frankly, have to view them as
sort of normal and likely to be somewhat permanent, based on
weather emergencies, violence, civil war, corruption. All kinds
of issues drive this.
You are the first State Department witnesses I have had
before me since this happened, so you get the benefit of being
asked the question. But I was stunned when the Trump
administration announced on Friday or Saturday that they were
pulling out of the global dialogue on refugee issues in Mexico
this week.
Every Nation in the U.N. General Assembly voted on a
nonbinding compact in September of 2016, it was even called the
New York compact, to basically say this refugee issue is
getting out of hand, and we ought to come up with best
practices to deal with it.
The nations of the world were gathering in Mexico this week
to talk about, what are new best practices for dealing with
migrants and refugees?
A principals meeting was called by the administration last
week to try to decide what to do about the compact and about
the meeting this week.
My own investigation as to what happened suggested that,
going into that meeting, the State Department, the Department
of Defense, CIA Director Pompeo, and U.N. Ambassador Haley all
believed that the U.S. should participate, that solving this
problem was more likely to happen in an effective way if the
U.S. was at the table rather than not.
But my own discussions with people who were there suggested
that others, the chief of staff of the White House, the White
House advisor Steve Miller, and the Attorney General said, no,
we should pull out of even having a dialogue with other nations
about refugees. And reporting from folks in the meeting was
that the reason advanced was this was an issue that was part of
the Obama administration, and we should not stay with it.
Given your brief, both of you, in working on
counterterrorism issues, do you think that we will be able to
better deal with those issues if the U.S. is absent from a
global dialogue about the extent of the problem and how we
should handle it? Or do you think we are more likely to come up
with good answers to this problem, if the U.S. is at the table?
Ambassador Sales. Senator, I cannot speak specifically to
the decision about the IOM. But what I can tell you is that,
regardless of what multilateral fora the United States is
engaged in, we are constantly undertaking robust, bilateral
dialogues with other countries that face the same problems and
share the same values as us. That is especially true when it
comes to the movement of persons related to the foreign
terrorist fighter phenomenon.
So we are constantly having conversations with countries in
the Middle East that can be transit countries for the movement
of persons, legitimate refugees who need our assistance, but
also terrorists who might seek to exploit our hospitality. We
are working with and dialoguing with countries that are sources
of foreign terrorist fighters, including in North Africa. And
we are also in conversations with countries that could be the
targets of attacks mounted by foreign fighters who have tried
to exploit refugee flows in Europe and elsewhere around the
world.
So I would just caution that, whatever the United States'
engagement is in certain multilateral institutions, there are
other conversations that are taking place, very robust
conversations that are taking place, to address these matters
of global concern.
Senator Kaine. And I understand that, but would either of
you care to offer a defense for why the United States should
not be participating in this global compact that we agreed to
support less than a year and a half ago?
Ambassador Polaschik. Senator, from the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs' perspective, we would have to take that
question for the record. I have not been following the issue
myself personally.
Senator Kaine. That is fair.
Ambassador Sales. Likewise.
Senator Kaine. We will ask it for the record, then.
Thank you.
Ambassador Sales. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator.
I have some questions, but given the lateness of the hour,
I am going to submit them for the record.
Senator Risch. Thank you so much for being here. Thank you
for your service.
We do a number of these hearings, and I have to tell you
that your focus and your command of these issues is impressive.
We sincerely appreciate that.
Anything else, for the good of the order? If not, we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Joan Polaschik by Senator James E. Risch
Question 1. ISIS is the most prominent Salafi-jihadi group in
Libya, but other groups are also active there, including al-Qa'ida.
What conditions allow Salafi-jihadi groups to operate in Libya? And
what threat do groups like AQIM and Ansar al Sharia pose to the U.S.
and its allies?
Answer. While the Government of Prime Minister Sarraj remains a
committed counterterrorism partner, the Libyan Government lacks
effective border and internal security forces to prevent terrorist
groups such as ISIS, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other
al-Qa'ida affiliates such as Ansar al Sharia from operating in under-
governed spaces to plot, inspire, and direct terrorist attacks. These
groups represent a substantial threat to the United States, our
interests, and our allies. In particular, AQIM and its associates
aspire to conduct attacks against U.S. interests and those of our
allies and partners in North Africa and Europe. We continue to develop
our counterterrorism relationship with Libya to ensure that ISIS and
other terrorist groups are not in a position to threaten to regional
security. In the long term, the Libyans must achieve greater political
stability and build unified and effective national security forces to
counter terrorism from these groups.
Question 2. The peace process in Libya is deadlocked. The
involvement of foreign backers, including U.S. allies and partners that
back different factions, is prolonging the conflict. What are the
implications for U.S. interests if the Libya conflict continues to drag
on? What role should the U.S. play to bring our partners together
behind a single process?
Answer. The only viable way to achieve a stable transition to a
more permanent, unified Libyan Government is through an inclusive,
Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process, based on the Libyan
Political Agreement (LPA). Any attempts to impose a military solution
or bypass the political process will only further destabilize Libya.
Armed conflict among Libyans will only benefit ISIS and other
terrorists and empower criminal networks that profit from smuggling
irregular migrants and illicit arms. Prolonged conflict in Libya would
continue to threaten U.S. interests and those of our allies, and
exacerbate an already dire humanitarian situation.
We strongly support U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) for Libya Ghassan Salame's Action Plan for Libya, which
offers a roadmap for helping Libyans negotiate amendments to the LPA
and make the necessary preparations for successful national
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018. We have urged the
international community to unite behind the U.N.'s mediation efforts.
Proliferating international initiatives will complicate rather than
advance the cause of peace and stability. Our key regional partners
have a particularly important role to play in encouraging their Libyan
contacts to exercise restraint and engage constructively with the U.N.-
facilitated political process.
The United States also supports Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-
Sarraj's efforts to promote dialogue and reconciliation. During Prime
Minister al-Sarraj's visit to Washington earlier this month, President
Trump, Secretary Tillerson, and other senior U.S. officials underscored
our commitment to helping Libyans achieve political stability, defeat
ISIS and other terrorists, and build a better, more prosperous future
for the Libyan people.
Question 3. While Khalifa Haftar rejects political Islam, and has
the support of the Egyptians and the Emiratis, there is concern his
position on political Islam further fuels extremism as there is no
place for Islamic political factions to go. How do you see Haftar's
role in bringing stability to Libya? If we are trying to counter
terrorism, do efforts to work with Haftar support that goal?
Answer. There is no military solution to Libya's problems. We
continue to believe General Haftar should be a part of a negotiated
political solution to the Libya political crisis, but this will need to
result from negotiations and compromise from all sides. We remain
concerned about the potential for conflict between General Haftar and
forces aligned with Prime Minister al-Sarraj's Government of National
Accord (GNA), if Libyans do not reach a political solution. Fighting
among Libyan armed groups will only prolong the suffering of the Libyan
people and could enable ISIS to reassert itself.
Prime Minister al-Sarraj has been a reliable partner for the United
States on counterterrorism. GNA-aligned forces made great sacrifices in
eradicating ISIS from Sirte, making Libya and the world safer. The
United States supported those efforts by conducting nearly 500 air
strikes at the request of Prime Minister al-Sarraj, and we continue to
coordinate with the GNA on air strikes on ISIS desert camps and other
targets to prevent ISIS from reestablishing control over territory. To
defeat ISIS in the long term, Libyans, including General Haftar, must
come together to achieve political reconciliation and build a more
unified government and unified national security forces, under civilian
control. We urge all Libyan forces to unite and turn their guns against
the real threat of ISIS and other terrorist groups.
Question 4. The human trafficking problem in Libya is massive.
Trafficking and smuggling also fund militias in Libya, which fuels the
conflict. ISIS and al Qaeda also benefit from this smuggling and
trafficking. How should the U.S. target these smuggling networks and
other pipelines? How would this affect both the Libyan conflict and the
ISIS and al Qaeda threat?
Answer. Transnational crime networks and terrorist groups have
extended across Africa due to advances in global trade, transportation,
and communications networks. Despite divergent goals, these groups
engage in activities that could be mutually reinforcing. Both terrorist
groups and criminal human trafficking networks have attempted to
exploit Libya's instability. The only sustainable solution to human
trafficking in Libya is an inclusive, unified government and unified
national security forces capable of providing security to the Libyan
people and controlling Libya's territory and borders. The international
community must therefore provide full backing to the U.N.-facilitated
political process, while ensuring that all efforts to counter migration
in Libya support this process and overall stability.
Since 2011, the United States has contributed more than $150
million in humanitarian assistance in Libya. In addition to
humanitarian assistance that will be determined in FY 2018, this year
we intend to invest $43 million on stabilization efforts and increased
border security. We coordinate our assistance with the U.N. and other
partners, who also have active programs aimed at restoring stability to
Libya to advance our shared national security interests.
On December 7, the United States joined with partners at the U.N.
Security Council in adopting a Presidential Statement to call attention
to reports of migrants being sold into slavery in Libya. The Security
Council welcomed the Libyan Government of National Accord's
announcement that it will investigate the allegations and hold
perpetrators to account. We will continue to work with Libya and the
international community to combat human trafficking.
Question 5. Given the attacks that have occurred in the Sinai, and
especially the recent Rawdah attack, have the Egyptians requested U.S.
support in their fight against terrorism? What specifically have they
requested?
Answer. We continue to see strong interest from Egypt in
counterterrorism cooperation and we have a robust set of training and
security assistance programs to support their efforts. Even prior to
the November 24 attack, the United States was responding to many of
Egypt's counterterrorism-focused procurement requests. For example,
nearly 1000 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, seen by
Egypt as a key counterterrorism tool, have been provided to the
Egyptians under the Excess Defense Articles program over the past year.
Over the past two years, the United States has also provided increased
counter-IED training to Egypt.
The United States continues to work with Egypt to address the
challenges posed by terrorism, as we seek to enhance Egyptian capacity
through multiple avenues. In September 2017, for the first time since
2009, the United States and Egypt conducted the joint military exercise
``Bright Star'' with a new focus on counterterrorism operations. Egypt
and the United States also recently concluded our first Defense
Resourcing Conference, in which we agreed on a Five Year Security
Assistance Roadmap (FYSAR) that identified key procurement requests
based on Egypt's capability gaps and operational needs. The FYSAR
prioritizes U.S. security assistance to Egypt within a framework of
counterterrorism, Sinai security, maritime security, and border
security. However, it will take time for Egypt to adopt strategies,
doctrine, tactics, systems, and technologies that are more appropriate
and effective for addressing their current security challenges. Our
renewed engagement through the FYSAR is an important tool to facilitate
that transition and reorient our mutual security assistance priorities.
Question 6. How effective are Egyptian counterterrorism forces in
providing the types of proactive surveillance and patrolling necessary
to identify and prevent attacks?
Answer. Egypt remains an important strategic partner, which
continues to face a number of security challenges. Building on decades
of strong security ties, we are seeing growing counterterrorism
cooperation across a wide range of programs. In particular, we are
working with Egyptian counterterrorism forces to build their capacity
to effectively provide the types of proactive surveillance and
patrolling necessary to identify and prevent attacks. Our efforts
include training Egyptian law enforcement instructors on Explosive
Incident Countermeasures (EIC), to include practical exercises against
a wide range of explosive targets. In the coming year, Law Enforcement
Units will be trained in improving counterterrorism tactics, improving
aviation security through the provision and training of new equipment
and bomb sniffing canines, and modernization of Egypt's doctrine away
from conventional conflict towards the asymmetrical threat it now
faces. We stand ready to continue to assist Egypt to improve its
effectiveness at countering terrorism.
Question 7. Do these attacks mark a new phase for ISIS and CT
efforts in the region? How concerned are you that ISIS is now turning
its attention toward Israel, especially its cooperation with Hamas?
Answer. The United States is concerned about the increasing
sophistication and lethality of ISIS attacks in the Sinai. We have
growing concern that ISIS's Sinai affiliate is gaining strength in the
Nile River Valley and mainland Egypt, as evidenced by double church
bombings in early 2017 and the mosque attack on November 24. To date,
ISIS-Sinai has focused its attacks on Egyptian security forces,
tourists, and religious minority groups in an effort to destabilize and
discredit the Egyptian Government. We are committed to helping Egypt
defeat the threat from ISIS-Sinai through increased security
cooperation.
The United States is also concerned about the threat ISIS poses to
the security and stability of the entire region. Israel is a long
standing U.S. counterterrorism partner with sophisticated
counterterrorism capabilities, and we support Israel and other partner
nations in the region in their counterterrorism efforts against a range
of terrorist groups. While at this time we do not assess that Hamas and
ISIS are cooperating, we closely monitor both ISIS's and Hamas's
strategy and tactics and adjust our approaches accordingly. Exploiting
fissures between terrorist groups is can be an effective
counterterrorism strategy.
Question 8. What is your assessment of Tunisia's political
stability and efforts to improve its security forces?
Answer. Tunisia has made important progress in political reform
since the 2011 revolution. It held successful presidential and
parliamentary elections, finalized a progressive new constitution in
2014, and has a vibrant civil society and free press. Tunisia is also
building the capacity of its security forces, which have demonstrated
improved performance, particularly in border security and
counterterrorism operations.
Tunisia's transition to democracy is nevertheless fragile. Economic
opportunities have lagged. There is intense public frustration over
unemployment, perceived corruption, and the slow pace of reform. We are
encouraged by Prime Minister Chahed's efforts to press forward with
critical reforms to address these challenges, in partnership with the
International Monetary Fund. We also have encouraged Tunisia to move
ahead with municipal elections, currently scheduled for March 25, 2018.
The municipal elections are an important step for consolidating
Tunisia's democracy, and offering an opportunity to re-engage youth in
the political process. We maintain an ongoing dialogue with government
officials and civil society members about a full range of political
issues in Tunisia.
The United States is helping consolidate stability and democracy in
Tunisia by promoting business growth, job creation, and bilateral
trade; urging Tunisia leaders to continue to strengthen governance,
respect for the rule of law, and human rights protections; assisting
civil society to effectively interact with government and helping
Tunisia reorient its military and civilian security forces to be more
responsive to the ongoing terrorist threat.
Question 9. What is the status of the joint NATO-Tunisia
Intelligence Fusion Center?
Answer. There is not currently a joint NATO-Tunisia Intelligence
Fusion Center, and we are not aware of any plans to establish one. NATO
provided limited, unclassified advisory support when the Tunisian
military established its own intelligence fusion center three years
ago.
Regional Cooperation
Question 10. Can you please describe some of the specific actions
the Europeans are taking to confront these security challenges?
Answer 10. We work closely with our European partners to advance
efforts in resolving conflicts across the region. The United States
European allies are key financial, material, and diplomatic
contributors to stabilization efforts, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and
Libya. This helps combat the conditions that enabled organizations like
ISIS and al-Qa'ida to flourish. Our European partners are also a vital
source of manpower for a number of counterterrorism initiatives
currently taking place across the Middle East, which the Department can
brief in a classified setting.
In addition, NATO has been a critical partner for the United States
and is a cornerstone of U.S. national security. NATO adds unique value
in the fight against terrorism and recently increased its overall
counterterrorism efforts at the NATO's Leaders Meeting in May. NATO is
working its way through a robust combating terrorism action plan, is a
member of the D-ISIS Coalition, has established a high level CT
coordinator, and is doing important work on sharing information to
address foreign terrorist fighter and other terrorism-related
challenges.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Nathan Sales by Senator Robert Menendez
Libya
Like many of my colleagues in the Senate, I am alarmed by the
awful conditions migrants face in Libya as well as the
abhorrent slave markets that recently were prominently featured
in U.S. and international media outlets. You mentioned during
the hearing that Secretary Tillerson raised the issue with
Libyan Prime Minister Sarraj during his meeting on December 1.
Question 1. Could you provide us with more specifics about that
conversation? What efforts, if any, is the Libyan Government taking to
address the issue?
Answer. Secretary Tillerson and other senior U.S. officials
discussed allegations of trafficking in persons with Libyan Prime
Minister Fayez al-Sarraj during his November 30-December 5 visit to
Washington. Prime Minister al-Sarraj reiterated the commitment that his
Government of National Accord (GNA) made publicly to investigate the
allegations of trafficking in persons and hold perpetrators
accountable. We understand that the GNA's interagency committee is
actively carrying out this investigation. Since December 6, the GNA has
also encouraged U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other agencies to
open offices in Libya and invited the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) to regularly monitor and report on refugees and migrants
in Libya, including those detained in official detention centers.
U.S. efforts are focused on reinforcing the GNA's condemnation of
human trafficking and its commitment to investigate fully these reports
and hold those responsible to account. The United States supported a
December 7 U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement that expressed
grave concern about these reports, condemned such actions as heinous
human rights abuses, and called upon authorities to investigate such
activities and bring perpetrators to justice. The United States
continues to contribute to assistance programs that support the
humanitarian needs of refugees, migrants, and individuals in detention
in Libya. Prime Minister al-Sarraj and the GNA are a vital partner in
efforts against human trafficking.
Question 2. You also noted some of the steps the United States has
taken to mitigate the crisis such as working with IOM but underscored
the importance of a multifaceted approach. In what ways can we engage
with our allies to address this situation? Has Secretary Tillerson
raised this issue with our regional partners?
Answer. To address the irregular migration crisis emanating from
Libya, the United States continues to engage with our allies
bilaterally and multilaterally. On December 7, the United States joined
with partners at the U.N. Security Council in adopting a Presidential
Statement to call attention to reports of migrants being sold into
slavery in Libya and condemn such actions as heinous abuses of human
rights. The Security Council welcomed the Libyan Government of National
Accord's (GNA) announcement that it will investigate the allegations
and hold perpetrators to account. The United States has consistently
worked to address the migration issue in Libya, through both
humanitarian assistance and support for the stabilization process.
Since 2011, the United States has contributed more than $150 million in
humanitarian assistance for Libya to help refugees and migrants, as
well as those displaced by violence. We coordinate our assistance with
the U.N. and other partners, who have active programs aimed at
supporting the humanitarian needs of refugees and migrants and
restoring stability to Libya to advance our shared national security
interests. In addition, we continue to coordinate our border security
assistance with European partners through the EU Border Assistance
Mission (EUBAM) to Libya. EUBAM was originally established in 2013 and
continues to engage with Libyan officials to counter the trafficking of
persons from Libya to Europe. We are also supporting the efforts of the
G5 Sahel to counter terrorism and improve security in the Sahel region.
In October, Secretary Tillerson announced that the United States will
contribute $60 million in bilateral to support the G5 Sahel's joint
counterterrorism force.
We also strongly support U.N. Special Representative Ghassan
Salame's efforts to advance political reconciliation and help end the
conflict in Libya. The only long-term solution to the challenge of
migration through Libya is to help Libyans build a more unified
government and unified national security forces capable of stabilizing
the country and securing its borders.
Tunisia
Question 3. I am extremely concerned with the multiple delays in
Tunisia's local elections originally scheduled for 2016 and most
recently postponed until March 2018. What is the State Department's
position on the delayed elections?
Answer.Municipal elections are an important step in Tunisia's
democratic consolidation, and we support the Tunisian Government's
efforts to proceed as quickly as possible. Following a series of
technical delays, we are encouraging Tunisian leaders at the highest
levels to move ahead with what will be the country's first municipal
elections. The latest announced date for municipal elections is May 6,
2018 based on a formal decree issued by President Beji Caid Essebsi on
December 19, 2017.
The Tunisian parliament also has an important role to play in
creating an appropriate legal framework for municipal authorities to
work within after elections. We expect the Tunisian parliament will
soon finalize and pass legislation that will define the mandate of the
municipal authorities.
Question 4:. Do you view these postponements as a worrisome sign?
What are we doing in country to encourage a continuation of the
democratic process?
Answer. Tunisia has made important progress in political reform
since the 2011 revolution. It held successful presidential and
parliamentary elections, finalized a progressive new constitution in
2014, and has a vibrant civil society and free press. This year,
Tunisia passed numerous laws enhancing personal and economic rights,
including a law against gender-based violence. President Beji Caid
Essebsi also repealed a decree banning Muslim women from marrying non-
Muslims. Municipal elections will be another important step in
Tunisia's democratic transition, and we are encouraging Tunisian
leaders to move ahead. The election is currently scheduled to take
place on May 6, 2018 based on a formal decree issued by President
Essebsi on December 19, 2017.
We assess that Tunisia remains on a positive track in its political
transition, but its democracy is still fragile and it continues to
require international support. We regularly collaborate with the
Government of Tunisia and civil society on a range of democratic
governance and human rights issues. Our assistance programs support
Tunisian efforts to promote open and transparent governance, improve
how government ministries and parliament communicate with citizens,
organize and administer successful elections, and strengthen the
effectiveness of civil society organizations.
Question 5. We have heard concerning reports about a draft law in
Tunisia similar to Egypt's restrictive NGO law that limits foreign
funding. What can the State Department tell us about this draft
legislation and what are we doing in Tunisia to encourage a strong and
vibrant civil society?
Answer. We understand the Tunisian Government is considering new
proposed legislation that would aim to create a more efficient and
transparent mechanism for registering and administering civil society
groups, and to address illicit foreign financing.
The Tunisian Government has committed to draft the new law with
input from civil society organizations; at this stage no new
legislation has been drafted. The Tunisian Government has confirmed to
us that any new legislation would respect freedom of association and
would not impose any cap on foreign funding. We meet frequently with
Tunisian Government officials and civil society activists to discuss
this proposed legislation as well as the status of civic engagement in
Tunisia.
In addition, to date the democratically elected and independent
Parliament has shown its commitment to an iterative and consultative
legislative process.
Recognizing the importance of this proposed law to the development
and empowerment of Tunisian civil society, U.S. foreign assistance
supports programs that develop a strong and vibrant civil society in
Tunisia. Current U.S. funded programs in Tunisia, implemented by State
and USAID, foster dialogue between the Government and civil society
actors to ensure that their perspectives are incorporated in the
resulting legislation, strengthen civil society and citizens' capacity
to engage the Tunisian Government on local governance issues, prepare
marginalized Tunisian communities to play an active role in the
political process, support training for local government officials as
well as journalists and other media professionals, and foster community
dialogues about security sector and legal reform.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Joan Polaschik by Senator Tim Kaine
Embassy Security
Question 1a. In light of the President's announcement on the
relocation of our Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, please detail: [What
are] The additional security measures that have been put in place to
prepare for any violence or instability?
Answer. The Department identified a number of countries that were
considered to be most likely or possible to experience unrest. These
were then categorized into High and Medium tiers. Posts assessed as
being at the highest risk were required to convene Emergency Action
Committees (EACs) and assess security; posts assessed at lesser risk
were also notified of the impending decision and were encouraged to
convene EACs. In the EAC, posts reviewed and enhanced their security
profiles for threats from demonstrations and terrorist attacks, and
sought additional assistance and resources from both the U.S.
Government and host nation authorities.
For posts that requested additional U.S. resources, the State
Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) Office of Mobile
Security Deployments (MSD) sent DS Special Agents with additional
training to Algiers, Algeria; Amman, Jordan; Cairo, Egypt; Entebbe,
Uganda; and Muscat, Oman. Operational Medicine personnel were located
with each team, and agents in Entebbe and Muscat were deployed with
contract aviation assets to provide a shorter response time to the
surrounding region. Additional DS Agents augmented security support in
Tel Aviv, Israel, Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. At each
step, DS closely coordinated with Department regional and functional
bureau counterparts, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and other
interagency colleagues to ensure shared awareness of plans and the
disposition of available resources for potential contingency response.
In addition, DS augmented the U.S. Secretary of State's (SECSTATE)
protective detail, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nation's
protective detail, the Saudi Ambassador and Foreign Minister's details,
and the Israeli Ambassador and Defense Attache details. This included
counterassault and counter-surveillance teams, additional local
uniformed police, and local law enforcement augmentation at foreign
missions across the United States.
Question 1b. What military assets, including additional Marine
Security Guards, have been deployed to the region and globally to
augment Embassy security?
Answer. The State Department deployed Marine Security Augmentation
Units (MSAU) to Amman, Jordan; Cairo, Egypt; Jerusalem and Tel Aviv,
Israel; and Khartoum, Sudan. The units in Cairo, Tel Aviv, and
Jerusalem were originally tasked with supporting the Vice President's
visit, but were also available to support the posts, if required. For
information on other military assets deployed, the Department defers to
DoD.
Question 1c. Please detail the Department's risk assessment of
terrorist groups (such as Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS) using this
announcement to incite further violence and acts of terrorism.
Answer. Please see the classified response to this question.
Global Compact on Migration
Question 2. I was stunned with President Trump's decision to
withdraw from a global international dialogue on migration. Every
nation in the world signed on to a non-binding declaration in September
2016 to determine best practices for a global migrant and refugee
process that is growing exponentially and only getting worse. A
conference in Mexico the first week in December intended to bring
together global stakeholders to begin this dialogue on best practices.
Did the State Department send any representatives to the conference?
Answer. No. The United States did not send representatives to this
conference because we withdrew from engagement in the Global Compact on
Migration discussions.
Question 3. Do you believe we will be better able to deal with
these issues if the U.S. is absent from a global dialogue about the
extent of the problem?
Answer. Yes. National sovereignty is the fundamental basis for
international cooperation. The United States will continue to cooperate
internationally on migration issues, but it is the responsibility of
sovereign states to ensure that migration is managed consistent with
national laws and policies, while complying with their international
obligations.
Question 4. Do you believe that if the United States remained a
part of the Compact on Migration, we could have shaped the discussion
to align with U.S. interests?
Answer. No. The negotiations on the GCM will be based on the New
York Declaration, a document adopted by the U.N. in 2016 that sets
forth contributions to the ``global governance'' of international
migration as among the goals for the GCM and contains a number of
policy goals that are inconsistent with U.S. law and policy.
Question 5. Do you believe a non-binding treaty, which includes
voluntary commitments impinges on U.S. sovereignty?
Answer. Primary jurisdiction to set their respective domestic
immigration laws and policies rests with sovereign nations. A global
instrument like the GCM that aspires to strengthen ``global
governance'' of migration could contain commitments related to the
entry and stay of migrants that are inconsistent with the United
States' immigration laws and policies, which are within the United
States sovereign authority.
Counterterrorism in North Africa
Question 6. The U.S. military presence continues to grow across
North Africa and the Sahel mainly for counterterrorism operations. The
events in Niger that resulted in the death of four U.S. service members
highlight the blurring line between ``advise and assist'' missions and
combat operations. Please discuss the threat in this region and CT and
border coordination between Niger with Algeria and Libya.
Answer. Please discuss the threat in this region and CT and border
coordination between Niger with Algeria and Libya. Counterterrorism
(CT) efforts in North Africa are a crucial part of our global campaign
against ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates, as these organizations
continue to threaten U.S. interests and those of our allies. Our
primary goal in the region is to prevent terrorist organizations from
establishing safe havens from which they can threaten the United States
and its interests. As ISIS loses control over territory in its core, it
is essential that we prevent it from reconstituting itself elsewhere.
ISIS maintains networks in North Africa that seek to conduct or inspire
attacks on the continent and in Europe. Furthermore, there are many
North African foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) among the ranks of ISIS
militants in Iraq and Syria, and we must remain vigilant against the
threat posed by FTFs returning home. We also remain concerned about al-
Qa'ida's affiliates in the region, especially al-Qa'ida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), and their growing reach into other parts of Africa.
Cooperation on counterterrorism, information sharing, and border
security is important to counter the terrorist threat in North Africa.
Algeria is one of our most capable CT partners in the region, and the
Algerian Government is working to mitigate the FTF threat and enhance
security on its border with Libya and Niger. We are encouraging Algeria
to continue to use its considerable expertise to help other Trans-
Saharan states build their capacity to counter terrorism.
Libya's ongoing political divisions and instability remain a
significant challenge. Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj's
Government and its aligned forces have been stalwart U.S. CT partners.
With support from U.S. airstrikes, our Libyan partners expelled ISIS
from Sirte, which was once its principal stronghold outside Iraq and
Syria. We continue to coordinate with Prime Minister al-Sarraj's
Government on strikes on ISIS desert camps and other targets to prevent
it from regrouping. To defeat ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and other terrorists in
the longer term, and establish effective control over their country's
borders, Libyans must achieve political reconciliation to build a more
stable, unified government and national security forces, under civilian
control.
Niger maintains a relatively small 17,000-person security force
charged with securing the country's borders, among other security
priorities. Terrorist organizations and transnational traffickers use
Niger's northern spaces to travel between Libya and Mali. In addition,
terrorist organizations operate in Niger's western tri-border region
with Mali and Burkina Faso and along its southern border where ISIS-WA
and Boko Haram operate. This three-pronged threat remains difficult for
Niger to address. The G-5 Sahel Joint Force (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina
Faso, Niger and Chad) and the Multinational Joint Task Force (Nigeria,
Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin) assist Niger to fight these threats.
The United States maintains a robust bilateral assistance program with
Niger through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and other
mechanisms.
Question 7. How frequent are high risk CT raids involving U.S.
personnel becoming in North Africa as we work to combat ISIS and al-
Qaeda affiliates?
Answer. I would defer to the Department of Defense for the details
of their counterterrorism operations involving U.S. personnel in North
Africa.
Question 8. What is the role of State CT in reviewing and providing
input on counterterrorism operations in Niger? Does the Embassy have a
role in reviewing these decisions?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) provides advise/assist/
accompany support to counterterrorism elements of the armed forces of
Niger. On the civilian side, a number of State Department bureaus-
including African Affairs, CT, Near Eastern Affairs, Legal, and
Political-Military Affairs-develop counter-terrorism strategy and
implement approved policies and programs related to Niger and its
neighbors. Embassy Niamey and other relevant diplomatic posts in the
region join these interagency discussions and provide input on drafted
materials, coordinated through their State Department country desks.
In addition to its role in strategy and policy development, the CT
Bureau also provides foreign assistance to help Nigerien civil
authorities build their civilian counterterrorism capacities. We
support border security-related training, the Personal Identification
Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), Anti-Terrorism
Assistance, a DOJ special prosecutor as a Resident Legal Advisor, and
countering violent extremism programs. The CT Bureau and the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security manage the law enforcement component of the annual
FLINTLOCK-series of DoD exercises that seeks to improve the military-
law enforcement interface of Niger and other west African states that
participate in the exercises.
Question 9. What is your assessment of the larger long-term threat
to the region, al-Qaeda or ISIS? Or more local groups, such as Boko
Haram that adopt transnational causes. Do they compete for the same
resource pool? How do their goals overlap and differ?
Answer. Both ISIS and al-Qa'ida (AQ) have affiliated and associated
groups in northern Africa. In almost all cases, ISIS and AQ have either
managed to graft themselves on to existing terrorist groups, or those
groups have chosen to affiliate with them. Accordingly, the nature and
goals of these ISIS and AQ offshoots tend to be highly context- and
region-specific.
Our most immediate concern is that ISIS will attempt to disperse or
relocate fighters to Africa from its collapsing core in Syria and Iraq,
and that this will allow it to reinforce existing groups and enhance
their ability to threaten the region, Europe, and U.S. interests.
We also remain concerned about the continuing threat from AQ's
affiliates in the region-especially al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), which is the outgrowth of the Armed Islamic Group that
terrorized Algeria in the 1990s, and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-
Muslimin' (JNIM), a consortium of three terrorist groups responsible
for attacks on hotels and resorts, including ones in which U.S. persons
were killed.
While ISIS remains largely estranged from local populations in
North Africa, AQIM has more successfully melded into local dynamics.
While these organizations compete for recruits and ideological primacy,
their distinct networks do not necessarily compete for financial
resources. Both organizations seek to take over the region, attack our
allies and interests, and impose their harsh ideology.
Stability in North Africa:
Question 10. How do you think the region will be able to deal with
its rising income inequality, youth bulge, and financial crisis in the
next few years? Is it headed for a major crisis? What is the State
Department doing [to] help with economic reforms? Do you think we
could/should do more?
Answer. The State Department continues to monitor the region
closely and recognizes the significant challenges to regional stability
posed by social and economic issues. The State Department, through
bilateral dialogues and support of economic reform programs guided by
international financial institutions, continues to encourage
sustainable, long-term economic growth that will contribute to a more
stable, resilient North Africa, and the region as a whole. However, we
recognize that development assistance alone is not enough to secure the
region's future economic growth. We are encouraging governments to
create an enabling environment for the private sector to make its
contribution to development goals. With the right opportunities, the
region's growing population will be an engine of economic growth, as
young people contribute to a productive labor force.
States across North Africa continue to contend with a variety of
economic challenges, including unemployment, income inequality, and a
growing youth population. Many of these countries are taking proactive
steps to address their economic challenges.
For instance, in Morocco, the Government continues to promote
economic growth by encouraging private investment and diversification.
The Government of Morocco is working to address inequality by
decentralizing government, holding public officials accountable for the
implementation of development projects, and working to improve
vocational training and access to economic opportunities.
In Algeria, the Government is working to diversify the economy away
from its traditional reliance on hydrocarbons to spur growth and create
new opportunities for youth employment. Algeria is concurrently seeking
to reform its hydrocarbon sector to attract new foreign investment and
exploring the possibility of developing shale gas to drive additional
economic growth.
In Tunisia, economic opportunities have lagged behind the
unprecedented opening for free political expression that followed the
2011 revolution. With U.S. encouragement, the Government is focusing on
advancing economic reforms, which include restructuring the banking
sector and reducing public sector expenditures in coordination with its
$2.9 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility loan. These reforms are the key
to spurring long-term, private sector-led economic development and
addressing the economic grievances that sparked the revolution.
Post-revolution Libya's political and security problems have
created steep economic challenges, including significantly reduced oil
production, dwindling foreign reserves, exchange rate distortions, a
bank liquidity crisis, and contested leadership of the country's key
economic institutions. Over the past 15 months, however, Libya has
begun to rebuild its oil sector, tripling output since September 2016.
We have worked closely with key stakeholders from the Government of
National Accord and Libyan economic institutions, including the Central
Bank of Libya and the National Oil Company, to help them reach
agreement on key economic policy measures. In 2017, Libya passed its
first annual budget since 2013, an important step toward restoring the
Government's ability to provide basic services to the Libyan people.
In Egypt, the Government implemented a series of politically
difficult reforms in 2016 that saved the economy from crisis. Since
then, Egypt's economy has stabilized and financial markets have
improved markedly. Egypt has significant structural issues to tackle
such as a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy. Still, the IMF assesses
Egypt's reform program is broadly on track.
In addition to bilateral programs, the State Department works
across the region through Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
funding for the Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development
Program (CLDP). Through this program, we are engaging on business
formation, contract enforcement, insolvency law, currency conversion,
royalty repatriation issues, and franchising. Improving these economic
and legal issues will strengthen economies and make them more resilient
in the face of financial shocks.
Tunisia:
Question 11. How fragile is Tunisia's democracy and what more can
be done to shore it up? Should we be concerned that Tunisia may be
backsliding?
Answer. Tunisia has made important progress on social and political
reform since the 2011 revolution. It held successful presidential and
parliamentary elections, finalized a progressive new constitution in
2014, and has a vibrant civil society and free press. This year,
Tunisia passed a law against gender-based violence, and the President
repealed a decree banning Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims,
making it the only country in the Middle East and North Africa that
legally allows women to marry non-Muslims.
Despite this, Tunisia's transition to democracy remains fragile.
U.S. assistance employs a balanced approach to help Tunisia meet its
interrelated political, security, and economic challenges. Since 2011,
the United States has provided nearly $575 million to help Tunisia
enhance its national security, as well as over $580 million for
programs focused on economic growth and economic reform. We have also
provided over $235 million for programs that promote democracy, good
governance and human rights, and we regularly engage with senior
government officials on these issues. We encourage Tunisian leaders to
continue to make progress on political reforms, for example, by moving
ahead with municipal elections. We regularly consult with Tunisian
civil society and support its critical role in contributing to public
debate and advancing democracy.
To consolidate the country's democracy, the Tunisian Government
needs to maintain the pace of progress it has made in addressing
security concerns and must also make further headway in addressing
Tunisia's significant economic challenges. Intense frustration over
high unemployment and perceived corruption continues to undermine
public confidence in the democratic transition.
Question 12. Tunisia's Parliament is currently considering a draft
law that would criminalize even mild criticism of Tunisian security
services with significant prison time as well as grant security
personnel impunity for use of excessive force against civilians. If
Tunisia moves forward with such a draconian law, how would this impact
the U.S.-Tunisian partnership?
Answer. We are closely monitoring this draft law. In November, the
Tunisian Parliament conducted public hearings with Tunisian and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society
groups on the contents of this draft legislation. During these
hearings, the NGOs and civil society groups clearly voiced their
concerns about the draft law. Following this exchange, Parliament
tabled the law for further review to take into account the concerns
voiced by civil society and to ensure that the resulting draft strikes
a balance between supporting Tunisia's security forces and upholding
Tunisia's commitment to protect human rights. We will continue to
engage with the Tunisian Government, Tunisian parliamentarians, and
civil society actors to track the progress and content of this
legislation. We maintain an ongoing dialogue with Tunisian Government
officials on democracy and human rights issues, including the values of
government transparency and respect for freedom of speech that have
been central aspirations of Tunisia's revolution.
Question 13. The human rights situation in Egypt remains
concerning. Under a new law signed by President al-Sisi last May, NGOs
have been severely restricted from operating in the country. Egypt also
continues repression against the LGBT community, with reports of
arrests and invasive medical exams on perceived LGBT individuals
bordering on torture. Free speech and assembly have been curtailed and
many minority groups fear persecution and violence. What is State doing
to express concern over this kind of repression and what has been the
Egyptian Government response? What leverage do we have to pressure the
Egyptian Government to better address these issues?
Answer. The Trump administration remains deeply committed to our
strategic relationship with Egypt. However, we continue to have serious
concerns about the human rights situation, including restrictions on
freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, and expression. President
al-Sisi's signature of the restrictive NGO law, which threatens the
ability of civil society to function without interference, and the
arrests targeting the LGBTI community are just two examples of this
broader problem. We continue to raise our serious concerns about these
issues with senior Egyptian Government officials, and stress the
fundamental importance of respect for human rights and the need for a
robust civil society for Egyptian stability and prosperity. We are also
engaged in a frank dialogue about the 2013 convictions of 41 employees
of U.S. NGOs. We consider resolution of these issues to be fundamental
to advancing our bilateral relationship.
The lack of progress in response to U.S. policy concerns thus far
contributed to Secretary Tillerson's August 2017 decision to withhold
the expenditure of $195 million in Fiscal Year 2016 Foreign Military
Funds after issuing a national security waiver. The Secretary was
unable to certify that Egypt was advancing democracy and human rights,
but the Secretary issued the waiver because maintaining our security
relationship with Egypt remains in our national interest. The Secretary
also decided at that time to reprogram $95.7 million in economic and
military assistance for use in other high priority countries as another
way to indicate our concern. The Secretary is focused on ensuring that
our foreign assistance delivers on U.S. interests, and delivers value
for the American people, and the decision to withhold expenditure of
the $195 million in FMF reinforced our determination in this regard.
The Government of Egypt and the Trump administration are committed
to improving our partnership, and that desire, and the mutual benefits
for both our nations from a strong relationship, are powerful
incentive. We will continue to engage the Egyptian Government at the
most senior levels on how it plans to better address U.S. concerns,
hopefully preventing a recurrence of this situation.
Algeria
Question 14. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who is nearly 80 years old and
has been largely incapacitated by a stroke, has been President of
Algeria since 1999 and removed term limits allowing him to be President
for life. What is State's assessment of the likely succession plan for
Boutefilka and Algeria's preparations for a peaceful transition of
power?
Answer. Algeria's next presidential election is in 2019.
Constitutional reforms announced in January 2016 reinstituted a two-
term limit on the presidency, a limit previously removed before
President Bouteflika ran for a third term in 2009. Algeria has clearly
delineated, constitutionally mandated succession procedures. We fully
expect the Government will follow them if the need arises.
Morocco
Question 15. Morocco has been a leader in the region for promoting
counter-radicalization and sponsoring moderate representations of
Islam. King Mohammed VI in particular has been particularly vocal in
this space. Do you think Morocco can lead the rest of the region in
this effort? How can the Sunni Arab countries better work together to
address shared concerns of extremism?
Answer. The Moroccan Government actively implements its national
strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE) and promoting
traditional Maliki Islam. King Mohammed VI's descent from the Prophet
Mohammed and his constitutional role as Morocco's ``Commander of the
Faithful'' give him religious legitimacy to advance CVE efforts. To
help other countries in Africa develop their capacity to counter
violent extremist ideology, Morocco has opened an international imam
training center in Rabat that has provided a moderate religious
curriculum to over 700 imams and preachers from Mali, Cote d'Ivoire,
France, Tunisia, Guinea, Libya, and Nigeria. Morocco's efforts to
counter flows of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) include counter-
radicalization programs, especially within prisons.
Morocco co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and
previously co-chaired the GCTF FTF working group under the auspices of
which Morocco co-led the effort to develop The Hague-Marrakech
Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF
Phenomenon, which the U.N. Security Council drew upon when drafting
U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178. As a member of the
GCTF's CVE Working Group, Morocco shares good practices on messaging
with other GCTF members and non-members. Morocco has valuable lessons
to share with its neighbors and it can play a particularly effective
leadership role in Africa. Several other Sunni Arab countries have
similar domestic, regional, and even international programs to counter
violent extremist ideology and promote traditional religious
interpretations and discourse.
Western Sahara
Question 16. Do you see any progress in the near future in
resolving the dispute over Western Sahara? What role can the United
States play in the peace process?
Answer. We support the U.N.-led diplomatic process for Western
Sahara and efforts to find a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually
acceptable political solution to the conflict that provides for the
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. We support the work
of the U.N. Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara,
as well as the mandate of the U.N. Mission for the Referendum on
Western Sahara (MINURSO) peacekeeping mission.
In August, the U.N. Secretary General appointed former German
President Horst Kohler as his new Personal Envoy for Western Sahara. To
date, Personal Envoy Kohler has met with the heads of state of Morocco,
Algeria, and Mauritania and with the Polisario's leadership. However,
Morocco and the Polisario have not met directly since 2012, and
tangible progress in resolving the dispute over Western Sahara will
require the parties to work together.
Libya
Question 17. What is the long-term political solution for Libya and
are neighboring and regional states playing a helpful or harmful role?
Answer. The United States desired end-state in Libya is a more
inclusive government capable of providing security to the Libyan
people, addressing their economic and humanitarian needs, and
partnering with the international community to defeat ISIS and other
terrorists. President Trump and Secretary Tillerson welcomed Prime
Minister Fayez al-Sarraj to Washington on December 1 and discussed the
need to move forward with political reconciliation.
The United States strongly supports U.N. Special Representative
Ghassan Salame's efforts to help the Libyan parties negotiate a
political solution within the framework of the Libyan Political
Agreement and prepare for successful national elections in 2018. Prime
Minister al-Sarraj's Government continues to face many challenges, but
it has also taken important steps to stabilize the country, including
through counterterrorism partnership with the United States to defeat
ISIS. Ultimately, only a political solution and a peaceful transition
can stabilize Libya. Attempts to bypass the U.N.-facilitated process or
impose a military solution would only destabilize Libya and benefit
only ISIS and other terrorists.
Increased international alignment is critical to stabilizing Libya,
and it has been a core goal of our diplomatic efforts. The United
States urges the international community and all states in the region
to support U.N. mediation efforts. We continue to closely coordinate
with our partners in the region on how to address the situation in
Libya. Libya's neighbors and other key countries in region have a
critical role to play in urging Libyan contacts to engage
constructively with the U.N.-facilitated process.
Question 18. How are peace talks between the warring factions
progressing?
Answer. The only viable way to achieve a stable transition to a
more permanent, unified Libyan Government is through the Libyan-led,
U.N.-facilitated political process, within the framework of the Libyan
Political Agreement (LPA). We strongly support U.N. Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Libya Ghassan
Salame's Action Plan for Libya, which offers a roadmap for helping
Libyans negotiate amendments to the LPA and make the necessary
preparations for credible national presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2018.
Since unveiling the Action Plan in September, SRSG Salame has
convened a joint committee composed of representatives of the Libyan
House of Representatives (HoR) and the advisory State Council for a
series of meetings to discuss amendments to LPA provisions on the
structure of Libya's transitional executive government and security
structures. In an important step forward, the HoR voted to approve SRSG
Salame's compromise package of amendments in November. While State
Council leadership has so far withheld its approval, we understand many
members of the State Council support the proposal. We are urging all
Libyans and the international community to engage constructively with
SRSG Salame and fully support his efforts to broker final agreement on
a package of amendments.
SRSG Salame envisions the Action Plan's second step as a National
Conference bringing together a broader range of Libyan actors for
expanded reconciliation talks. The Action Plan also calls for
simultaneous efforts to finalize a new Libyan constitution and lay the
technical groundwork for elections in late 2018. Prime Minister Fayez
al-Sarraj and other Libyan leaders have also called for elections in
2018. The United States continues to urge Libyan leaders on all sides
to take part in dialogue and refrain from military confrontation. Much
work remains necessary to bring the parties to a workable compromise,
but only a political solution and a peaceful transition can provide
stability for the Libyan people.
Question 19. Do you believe the State Department should restart a
diplomatic presence inside Libya? Are we able to effectively engage
without one?
Answer. Diplomatic engagement inside Libya is important for U.S.
interests. Ambassador Peter Bodde met with Libyan Government of
National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli on May
23--the first such visit by a U.S. diplomat since 2014. The visit
demonstrated the continued commitment of the United States to political
reconciliation in Libya and to our ongoing partnership with Prime
Minister al-Sarraj's Government to defeat ISIS and other terrorists and
support the Libyan people's efforts to build a more stable, unified,
and prosperous future.
We continue to plan for resuming our operations in Libya when
security conditions permit. In July 2014, our Embassy in Tripoli
suspended operations due to security concerns and staff initially
relocated to the U.S. Embassy in Valetta, Malta as the Libya External
Office (LEO). In 2015, the LEO moved to its current location in
Tunisia, where it operates as a separate mission hosted by the U.S.
Embassy in Tunis. Despite their status as a ``mission-in-exile,''
Ambassador Bodde and his dedicated team at the LEO engage with a wide
range of Libyan interlocutors and international partners in Tunis and
throughout the Middle East and Europe in order to advance U.S.
interests in Libya. When security conditions permit, increased
diplomatic engagement within Libya will undoubtedly bolster these
efforts.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Nathan Sales by Senator Edward J. Markey
Other Areas for Potential ISIS Expansion in Southeast Asia--Burma
Southeast Asia is also vulnerable to ISIS expansion, especially
in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Burma.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote
after Burma's security forces began so-called ``clearance
operations'' in the Rakhine State that ``The repression visited
upon the Rohingya by a powerful government largely consisting
of leaders from another religion present a potential,
transnational flash-point for jihadi-Salafi organizations.''
The United Nations Human Rights Council resolution yesterday
condemning ``the very likely commission of crimes against
humanity'' by Burma's security forces and others against
Rohingya is a good first step toward accountability, but I
remained concerned about the potential for radicalization among
the Rohingya in Burma and in the camps in Bangladesh.
Question 1. Ambassador Sales, are you concerned that the refugee
camps in Bangladesh and the displaced populations in Burma could become
fruitful recruiting grounds for ISIS or similar violent extremist
groups?
Answer. We are concerned about terrorist groups' ability to recruit
and inspire new followers from vulnerable populations, and we know that
ISIS and Al-Qaeda are seeking to exploit the Rohingya crisis. For these
reasons, we are actively engaging with the Government of Burma and the
international community to address the situation in northern Rakhine
State and allow Rohingya refugees who have fled to Bangladesh and
others internally displaced in Rakhine State to return to their homes
in safety and with dignity. We are encouraged by the November 23
voluntary repatriation agreement between Bangladesh and Burma and
encourage their bilateral cooperation to continue to ensure the
voluntary, dignified return of the displaced.
The United States continues to support Burma's nascent democracy
and we look to the Burmese government to commit to bringing long-term
peace and security to Rakhine State by implementing the recommendations
of the Annan Commission report. We are ready to support these efforts
and we also urge the Government of Burma to cooperate with the UN fact-
finding mission.
Question 2. To what extent do draconian responses by the security
forces reinforce the ISIS narrative that the modern world, led by the
United States, is at war with Islam and Muslim people?
Answer. We are concerned about violent extremist groups' ability to
leverage real or perceived grievances to recruit vulnerable populations
to join terrorist groups or commit acts of violence. Real or perceived
targeting of Muslim groups reinforces the victimization narratives that
terrorist organizations use for recruitment. Conversely, U.S. actions
that empower disenfranchised groups can undermine efforts to exploit
these narratives. To this end, the State Department is coordinating
efforts to publicly highlight U.S. humanitarian assistance to support
refugees, displaced persons, and other affected communities, which
totals nearly $151 million since the start of FY 2017. In Bangladesh,
the Department is highlighting the United States' close coordination
with UN agencies, other humanitarian organizations, and donor
governments to support Rohingya refugees who have fled atrocities in
Burma.
Question 3. What can the United States do to help Burma and other
partner governments in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa address the
underlying grievances that have fueled insurgencies among their people?
Answer. When working to prevent or mitigate the drivers of conflict
and violence, we first stress to our partners that political
marginalization, discrimination, the treatment of political opposition
as terrorists, repression of human rights, corruption, lack of redress
or accountability for past human rights violations or abuses and other
governance-related factors can create rich conditions for fueling
conflict and terrorism. We stress that harsh counterterrorism and other
security responses that violate or abuse human rights can significantly
exacerbate conflicts and raise the risk of violent extremism. We also
urge partners to investigate and hold accountable those responsible for
human rights violations and abuses because failure to redress human
rights violations and abuses, particularly those committed by security
forces, undermines security in partner countries and, ultimately, in
the United States. Conversely, fostering good governance, building
disciplined and accountable security forces that partner with local
communities, and inculcating respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, tolerance, and social inclusion are critical bulwarks against
violence and terrorism and necessary complements to countering
terrorist activities.
The United State is working to understand and address the
underlying grievances that have fueled insurgencies, terrorism, and
other forms of violence across the globe, including in the Sahel, East
Africa, Iraq, Southeast Asia, and other regions. Some countries lack
the will or capacity to effectively address underlying drivers of
violence in accordance with good practices while fully respecting human
rights. Wherever possible, we engage such countries to move them in the
right direction. When countries are reluctant to frankly identify and
address drivers of violence, effective diplomacy is the first priority.
When partner countries have the political will but lack human and
financial resources, we support and enhance those capacities. These
measures may include civil society-focused programs, governance and
security sector reforms designed to help partners conduct their work in
an accountable and transparent manner, and amplifying credible voices
to speak out against violent extremism. We also engage partner nations
to address the rehabilitation and reintegration of former violent
extremists, including by working with the criminal justice sector and
prison systems in these regions.
Syria and Russia--ISIS No Longer a Threat?
Russia claimed today that Syria had been completely liberated
from ISIS. Despite Syria's Foreign Ministry statement earlier
in November that with ISIS effectively defeated, the U.S.
presence in Syria was in violation of international law, the
Pentagon yesterday announced that the U.S. military mission in
Syria would continue until areas reclaimed from ISIS are
stabilized.
Question 4. Please describe the nature of our conversations with
the Russians, especially with respect to Russia's claim it can
challenge the continued presence of U.S. forces in Syria. What is
Russia's troop presence in Syria?
Answer. Our priorities in Syria are the enduring defeat of ISIS and
degrading al-Qa'ida, and de-escalating the Syrian conflict to create
the necessary space for a political solution to the crisis. The
Coalition deconflicts the complex and congested battlespace over
eastern Syria with Russian officials. Communication between the
Coalition and the Russians ensures the safety of our collective
aircrews and assets, and supports our operations on the ground. The
deconfliction line enables counter-ISIS operations by all parties while
ensuring physical separation between the various forces fighting ISIS.
Ultimately, this deconfliction allows us all to focus on our mission:
to defeat ISIS.
The President directed that we coordinate with Russia to enhance
the pre-existing deconfliction mechanism and de-escalate the broader
conflict in Syria--both of which dramatically accelerated the speed and
efficiency of the counter-ISIS campaign. We support any genuine effort
to de-escalate the levels of violence in Syria. Efforts such as the
southwest ceasefire agreement -negotiated by the United States, Jordan
and Russia--are instrumental in reducing violence and setting the
necessary though still not sufficient foundation for a political
solution through the Geneva process. The United States actively
supports efforts by Staffan de Mistura and his team to facilitate the
UN-led talks in Geneva. We will continue to support his work and call
upon Russia to help ensure the Syrian regime's serious participation in
the Geneva process, in line with the spirit of the U.S.-Russia joint
November 10 Presidential statement issued in Vietnam.
Russia's public comments about removal of their forces do not
change U.S. priorities in Syria and the broader region. Open source
reporting indicates that, at present, Russian forces in Syria number
around 4,000 to 5,000 personnel. Our focus in Syria remains the
enduring defeat of ISIS and support for a credible and enduring
political solution. The fight is not over. Hard work remains to ensure
ISIS's lasting defeat. A continued Coalition military presence in Syria
is required to root out and destroy remaining pockets of ISIS and to
stabilize liberated areas to ensure ISIS is unable to re-emerge.
Question 5. With ISIS in retreat, what does stabilization look like
in Syria? What will ``enduring defeat of ISIS'' entail? What are the
conditions on the ground that would point to ``enduring defeat?''
Answer. Coalition-backed military operations have liberated nearly
all of the territory ISIS once controlled in Syria and Iraq and freed
an estimated 7.7 million people from ISIS's oppressive rule. ISIS has
been unable to recapture a single inch of the over 106,000 square
kilometers of territory liberated in Coalition-backed military
operations including important Syria urban areas Manbij, Tabqa, and
Raqqa. Globally, we are enhancing cooperation and border security,
aviation security, law enforcement, financial sanctions, counter-
messaging, and intelligence sharing to prevent ISIS from carrying out
attacks in our homelands. However, realizing that military operations,
while necessary, are insufficient to achieve ISIS's enduring defeat,
the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS is committed to helping
stabilize liberated communities and preventing ISIS's reemergence.
The United States and our Coalition partners are now working with
an array of local actors, including the Raqqa Civil Council, to
coordinate and implement stabilization efforts. We are funding efforts
to remove explosive remnant of war and to restore essential services,
including water, power, and some health and education services. We are
also maintaining needs-based humanitarian support. The longer it takes
to establish the conditions that allow for the return or local
integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the higher the risk
for a potential re-emergence of ISIS or another violent extremist
organization.
We are also training local security forces to hold liberated
terrain, which enables stabilization activities to commence and
provides stability conducive to the voluntary return of refugees and
IDPs. To date, we have trained over 2,500 members of the Raqqa Internal
Security Force. These forces will be a vital component of our partnered
forces' efforts to combat a likely ISIS insurgency in the weeks,
months, and even years ahead.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Joan Polaschik and Hon. Nathan Sales by Senator Cory A. Booker
In recent years, hundreds of thousands of migrants from West
Africa, have been loaded into the backs of pickup trucks for
the deadly journey towards Libya--and eventually Europe.
But last year, the European Union began working with the
Government of Niger and others in the Sahel to crack down on
such smuggling.
A recent EU report notes that while there has supposedly been
a reduction in migrants, ``the decrease registered does not
necessarily translate into a one-on-one reduction of the
overall flow reaching Libya, as new routes by-passing the
reinforced border controls are being exploited. These new
routes are more difficult to use and riskier, leading . . .
higher risks for the migrants.''
Question 1. How would you assess both U.S. and EU efforts to deal
with the underlying causes of irregular migration in the Sahel and West
Africa?
Answer. The search for better economic opportunities and large,
well-established West African diaspora populations in Western countries
draw irregular migrants. The underlying causes for irregular migration
from West Africa and the Sahel include the huge youth population bulge;
limited economic opportunities; restricted political freedoms;
instability and chronic insecurity; and easy access to information
through social media portraying migration as positive. West Africa
includes some of the least developed countries in the world. Assisting
countries in West Africa and the Sahel to reduce the disparities with
more developed countries is a long-term project with many challenges.
The United States continues to encourage West African governments
to adopt policies that will lead to inclusive economic growth and
reduced incentives for migration. We also help resolve conflict, combat
terrorism, and enable safe and dignified returns of the displaced. We
build the capacity of governments to manage their migration flows,
reduce vulnerabilities and exploitation of migrants and counter
trafficking in persons. U.S. assistance in West Africa and the Sahel
addresses the challenges of irregular migration through strengthening
natural resource management; promoting conflict mitigation and
prevention; enhancing agricultural production and market access; and
promoting improved nutrition and health.
The EU has focused on building law enforcement and border
protection capacity, working with host governments to reduce irregular
migration, improving migration management, and strengthening
resilience. The EU also prioritizes programs that provide economic
opportunities and more open societies in Africa, and those that address
the humanitarian challenges posed by criminals and traffickers who prey
on migrants during the long journey to Europe. At the recent AU-EU
Summit, European countries noted both the responsibility of African
governments to provide a favorable environment and the responsibility
of the EU to assist.
Question 2. My concern is that such programs to clampdown on
smuggling may not address the reason such migrants are making the
treacherous journey. Do such programs simply increase the cost and
risks for these migrants?
Answer. All sovereign nations must maintain control over their
borders and identify, investigate, and prosecute human smuggling and
trafficking. Human traffickers and smugglers put the lives and safety
of those they are transporting at risk. Employing human smugglers is an
inherently risky endeavor--which can lead to death and injury and the
exposure of migrants to other forms of crime. In addition, some human
traffickers pose as smugglers but instead subject intending migrants to
forced labor or sexual exploitation. Interdicting smuggling and
trafficking through effective border security prevents harm to
trafficking victims and intending migrants, in addition to improving
overall national and regional security. At the same time, we urge
countries to avoid punishing trafficking victims for crimes committed
as a result of being subjected to trafficking. We emphasize to
governments around the world that efforts to stem the flow of migrants
should also proactively reduce and prevent vulnerability to
exploitation such as human trafficking; identify and protect potential
trafficking victims; and provide victims with appropriate services.
Opportunities for legal migration drastically reduce the costs and
risks that migrants face--and represent the preferred method of
migration--subject to the sovereign right of all nations to decide if,
how, and for what purposes they will accept migrants. Efforts to clamp
down on smuggling go hand-in-hand with longer-term U.S. objectives of
helping countries develop economic opportunities, promoting stability,
and increasing political freedom.
Question 3. We know that while Sahel countries like Mali and Niger
continue to experience violence, poverty, and lack of institutional
capacity, North African countries, such as Libya, will feel the
effects. What efforts are you taking to disrupt traffickers in the
Sahel and create a more enabling environment for legitimate economic
activities?
Answer. The United States recognizes that this complex challenge
requires a multifaceted approach, and we are working with our Sahelian
partners to disrupt and prosecute traffickers and smugglers, improve
economic opportunities for youth and others in the region, and enhance
stability and governance.
Most law enforcement agencies in the region are weak, under-
resourced, and face severe challenges in addressing this multifaceted
problem across an area of more than a million square miles. Through
training and mentorship, we help law enforcement partners strengthen
their institutional foundations, including strategy and coordination,
and mobilize their scarce human and physical resources to meet growing
threats. We are also providing assistance to improve connectivity and
peer learning among law enforcement officials in the region.
Partnerships with Niger and Mali that began as part of the Security
Governance Initiative (SGI) focus on enhancing the management and
oversight of defense, law enforcement, and justice institutions for
these governments to more efficiently, effectively, and responsibly
provide security and justice services to the population. For example,
through SGI, Niger has undertaken reforms to improve the management of
its human, financial, and material resources, and to ensure that
defense and law enforcement resources align to meet strategic
priorities. Similarly, SGI supports Mali to improve defense and police
human resource management systems, as well as defense planning and
logistics capabilities; the country is making some small signs of
progress despite the continued insecurity and peace process challenges.
As part of the Sahel Development Initiative (SDI), USAID is
designing programs to reduce vulnerability to violent extremism (VE) in
the Sahel by enhancing government legitimacy and increasing economic
opportunities. SDI targets both communities most at risk of VE
recruitment and influence and the broader enabling environment that
allows VE to flourish.
We also support international organizations, including the
International Organization for Migration and the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees in the region to provide humanitarian assistance and
protection to vulnerable migrants and refugees, including emergency
evacuations of stranded and abused migrants out of Libya to Niger and
other countries in the Sahel. Other activities related to migrants
include medical screening and consultation, training for authorities on
humane migration practices, protection monitoring of detention centers,
collaboration with governments on the U.N. Migration Working Group, and
rescues at sea and in the desert.
In Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, 86 percent of
citizens say that democracy, despite its problems, remains the best
system of governance--even more than the 70 percent polled after the
Arab Spring. Yet, Tunisia was also the source of the greatest number of
ISIS foreign fighters, with over 4,000 at the height.
What concerns me, however, is that over 40 percent of the
population is under the age of 24 and suffers from 35.5 percent
unemployment, despite largely being well-educated. As we've seen,
however, without opportunities this youth budge can turn towards
extremism. Even the CIA warns, ``In the near term, Tunisia's large
number of jobless young, working-age adults . and the ongoing lack of
job creation and skills mismatches could contribute to future unrest.''
Question 4. We cannot afford to lose focus on improving the
livelihoods of Tunisia's youth: Ambassador Sales, can you speak about
how the CT bureau ranks youth as a priority in addressing extremism and
your specific engagement with Tunisia on the issue of foreign fighters?
Answer. Engaging vulnerable groups, including youth, is a critical
element of our countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts in Tunisia
and elsewhere. We regularly engage the Government of Tunisia on this
issue as well as the issue of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). We
support a variety of locally-implemented programs that are designed to
address these challenges. Some examples include an NGO-implemented
grant to foster critical thinking skills among youth around the country
to help them resist terrorist narratives and recruitment. Another
program guards against recruiters' efforts to use local cafes to target
vulnerable, unemployed youth. We see value to supporting such Tunisian-
developed, Tunisian-led programs that have credibility in the local
community.
We also have a number of training and capacity-building programs to
help Tunisian law enforcement address FTF-related challenges. These
include advanced counterterrorism investigative training, support to a
fusion center to do FTF-focused analytical work, prosecution and
adjudication of terrorism cases, and border security training designed
to stem the movement of FTFs. These programs are implemented by the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance,
the FBI, the Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training
Program, and the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program.
Question 5. Ambassador Polaschik, more broadly how is the State
department, and specifically USAID, engaging with Tunisia to encourage
further reforms and U.S. investments that spur economic opportunities?
Answer. A top U.S. priority is to encourage Tunisia to implement
necessary economic reforms, including restructuring its banking sector
and reducing its public sector expenditures, in coordination with its
$2.9 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility loan program. These reforms are
the key to spurring long-term, private sector-led economic development
and addressing the economic grievances that sparked the 2011
revolution, including unemployment rates that range from 15 percent to
over 30 percent in some regions.
Since the revolution, the United States has provided $418 million
in assistance to encourage Tunisia's economic growth and reform. In
addition, the United States has granted Tunisia access to nearly $1.5
billion in financing at favorable rates through three Sovereign Loan
Guarantees, the most recent in August 2016.
A primary focus of U.S. assistance, implemented by USAID, is to
promote business growth, competitiveness, and economic inclusiveness
through projects that bolster small and medium enterprises (SMEs),
develop work force skills, and provide technical skills on key economic
reforms. Specific programs include: the Business Reform and
Competitiveness Program that has helped create over 20,000 jobs for
Tunisians; the $100 million Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund which has
invested $22 million in 19 SMEs to date; a franchise development
project that paved the way for U.S. franchises to establish themselves
in Tunisia; and entrepreneurial training and mentoring projects that
supported the development of small businesses in the interior of the
country. We also advocate actively for U.S. firms, engaging the
Tunisian Government on improving the business climate, reducing
bureaucratic hurdles, and ensuring our companies are treated well so
they can invest in Tunisia and create economic opportunities that
benefit both Americans and Tunisians. Finally, the Embassy works with
universities and the Ministry of Higher Education to encourage the
development of a culture of entrepreneurship on university campuses as
well as educational reforms that connect educational institutions and
the private sector and provide students the skills most needed in the
job market.
Question 6. In October, the Carnegie Endowment released a report
noting that ``corruption is a destabilizing force in Tunisia,
inflicting all levels of its economy, security, and political system.''
In what ways, if at all are you integrating anti-corruption measures
into our foreign aid?
Answer. Promoting good governance and transparency, and
strengthening the effectiveness of civil society organizations (CSOs)
and their capacity to hold the Government accountable, are key
objectives of U.S. assistance in Tunisia.
To support the Tunisian Government's fight against corruption, the
United States is providing $2 million to help the Financial Judicial
Pole, the judicial authority for the investigation, prosecution, and
adjudication of corruption cases, develop its institutional framework
and technical capacity to investigate and prosecute financial
corruption cases in Tunisia. We are also helping the Tunisian
Government and Tunisian CSOs implement the Open Government Action Plan
to build trust between the Government, business, and civil society and
improve the business environment. We are working with Tunisia to
develop a Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact to help Tunisia
alleviate poverty and meet good governance and anti-corruption
benchmarks. Our Embassy in Tunis actively engages Tunisian journalists,
civil society, and the public on issues of corruption and transparency,
including by sponsoring expert speaker programs and an information
campaign focused on U.S. approaches to fighting corruption. Similarly,
the State Department recently sponsored ten Tunisian civil society
leaders and government officials to participate in a three week
International Visitor Leadership Program specifically targeted towards
improving Tunisian understanding of anti-corruption efforts and
legislation in the United States.
U.S. Migrant-Related Assistance
I am sure you have both seen the recent reports, most notably
by CNN, on the horrifying videos of West Africans being sold at
auctions in Libya, reminiscent of some of the darkest days in
the history of mankind.
These desperate people, seeking better opportunities and
fleeing corruption in their homes countries, are now held in
debt bondage by smugglers and militias. I can hardly imagine
the indignity of being propped up on an auction block, being
sold over and over for my labor. It's absolutely sickening and
should shake us to the core to act.
Question 7. What assistance is the U.S. providing to relieve the
situation, in terms of humanitarian aid and other migration-related
assistance?
Answer. The deplorable conditions of migrants in Libya have
endangered the lives of thousands of migrants from West Africa, as well
as migrating refugees fleeing conflict and persecution from Central and
East Africa. As part of our overall assistance to Libya since the 2011
revolution, the United States has contributed more than $150 million in
humanitarian assistance to meet the humanitarian and protection needs
of internally displaced Libyans, refugees, and vulnerable migrants
inside Libya. With contributions from the United States and others, the
Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International
Committee of the Red Cross, and International Organization for
Migration are responding to the humanitarian situation of Libyans,
refugees, and migrants through local non-governmental organizations
such as the Libyan Red Crescent, and conducting detention visits to
monitor conditions of detained migrants and compliance with
International Humanitarian Law. The United States is also providing
emergency assistance to migrants, including those who are victims of
human trafficking, to help with their return to their home countries.
Question 8. And what steps has the State Department considered to
hold the perpetrators of such abuses accountable, including sanctions
under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act or other
authorities?
Answer. We have seen the reports of slavery, trafficking, and other
human rights abuses in Libya. We strive with all of our partners,
governmental or otherwise, to hold the perpetrators of human rights
abuses accountable.
In an effort to fully and faithfully implement the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights and Accountability Act, the administration, through a
Presidential Executive Order (E.O.) issued on December 21, 2017,
launched a new sanctions regime targeting human rights abusers and
corrupt actors around the world. In an Annex to the Order, the
President imposed sanctions on 13 serious human rights abusers and
corrupt actors. In addition, the Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting on behalf of the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, imposed sanctions on an additional 39 affiliated individuals
and entities under the newly-issued Order. The Department of State
concurrently submitted the ``Report to Congress Pursuant to the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.''
The interagency engages in extensive dialogue regarding potential
targets under the E.O., including regular consultation with our
embassies abroad and our experts here in Washington, NGO's, and
Congress, to identify persons whose actions meet the E.O. standards of
significant human rights abuse or acts of corruption. Potential
designations are assessed as part of a whole of government endeavor and
implemented in a manner appropriate to achieve our foreign policy
objectives.
Our aim is to send a strong message of condemnation that will impel
the designated individuals to change their behavior and deter others
from engaging in similar behavior.
The State Department and DOD have significantly increased security
assistance levels for Tunisia since the 2011 political transition, and
in the context of a significant domestic and Libya-based terrorist
threat.
Tunisian security forces appear to have improved their capacity and
internal coordination since the large-scale attacks in 2015 and early
2016, but at the same time, Tunisia's political leaders have been slow
to advance structural governance reforms and anti-corruption efforts
that could help address grassroots grievances that may contribute to
radicalization.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Joan Polaschik by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question 1. Has the emphasis on counterterrorism come at a cost for
Tunisia's democratic progress and accountability?
Answer. U.S. policy toward Tunisia focuses on three mutually-
reinforcing goals: encouraging continued democratic progress and good
governance; helping Tunisia implement economic reforms, spur private
sector-led growth, and expand economic opportunities; and bolstering
Tunisia's security and counterterrorism capacity. To deliver on the
promise of its revolution, Tunisia must achieve progress simultaneously
in all three of these areas. Because terrorist attacks have the
potential to undermine Tunisia's economy and its fragile democracy,
counterterrorism assistance is, in fact, a critical part of advancing
and supporting Tunisia's democratic progress. By the same token,
achieving accountability, democratic progress and good governance are
key to economic progress, maintaining stability, and preventing and
combatting violent extremism.
Terrorists seek to exploit perceptions of disenfranchisement,
limited economic opportunities, and poor governance. In our assistance
to Tunisia since the revolution, we have employed a balanced approach,
providing nearly $575 million for security cooperation, as well as $580
million for encouraging economic growth and economic reform, and over
$235 million for promoting democracy, good governance and human rights,
including $90 million for rule of law and security sector reform. By
providing targeted security assistance to Tunisia, we are bolstering
the capacity of an impartial force to secure the country's borders,
conduct counterterrorism operations, and secure an environment in which
democracy can flourish. Moreover, U.S. assistance programs to Tunisia's
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice are helping Tunisia's
civilian security forces become not only more effective, but also more
transparent, accountable and compliant with international human rights
standards.
Question 2. What have U.S. diplomats messaged to Tunisian
counterparts regarding the problematic administrative reconciliation
law, which gives ``blanket impunity'' for civil servants implicated in
corruption, and other corruption and accountability concerns?
Answer. The State Department regularly engages with Tunisian
officials and civil society on democracy and governance issues and the
importance of transparency and holding officials accountable for
corruption. We are aware of the concerns raised by some Tunisians about
the administrative reconciliation law. We are encouraged by the robust
debate associated with this matter in the Tunisian Parliament and
broader society.
More broadly, we maintain an ongoing dialogue with senior leaders
in Tunisia's executive and legislative branches on the importance of
continuing Tunisia's democratic consolidation and efforts to meet the
aspirations for better governance that the Tunisian people expressed
during the revolution. We re-inforce these messages during regular
meetings with the independent constitutional commissions which have
responsibility for investigations into allegations of government
corruption and other abuses during current and previous political
regimes. Tunisians demanded an end to corruption, but recent
International Republican Institute (IRI) polling shows that they remain
dissatisfied with their government's performance on this important
issue: nearly 90 percent of Tunisians believe corruption has become
worse since the revolution.
Prime Minister Chahed has committed to tackle this problem more
effectively, and he launched an important, high-profile anti-corruption
campaign in May. We have supported him and the Tunisian Government as
they strive to hold individuals involved in corruption accountable.
U.S. assistance programs also support anti-corruption efforts by
building the capacity of the judiciary and police, developing jointly
with Tunisia a Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact that
prioritizes anti-corruption benchmarks, and building the capacity of
civil society organizations and journalists to monitor government
activities and hold government officials accountable.
Question 3. To what extent has Tunisia's emergent status as an
important U.S. counterterrorism partner in North Africa inhibited U.S.
constructive criticism regarding governance issues?
Answer. Bolstering our counterterrorism partnership with Tunisia
has not hindered our continued, constructive engagement on democracy
and governance issues with Tunisian Government officials and civil
society members. During the most recent Universal Periodic Review of
Tunisia, the United States raised concerns regarding lack of
transparency in investigating security forces abuses, arbitrary
detentions, and arrests under the state of emergency and
counterterrorism laws. We also use our annual Human Rights Reports to
highlight concerns.
Continued democratic consolidation and implementation of good
governance practices are vital to ensuring security and stability in
Tunisia and therefore its effectiveness as a security partner to the
U.S. Since Tunisia's revolution, we have employed a balanced approach
to our assistance, providing nearly $575 million for security
cooperation, as well as $580 million for encouraging economic growth
and economic reform, and over $235 million for promoting democracy,
good governance and human rights, including $90 million for rule of law
and security sector reform.
We also maintain an ongoing dialogue with senior government
officials and civil society members about the full range of political
issues, including Tunisia's progress in achieving its democratic
consolidation and meeting the aspirations the Tunisian people expressed
during the revolution.
Question 4. DOD funding for counterterrorism assistance has
increased significantly in North Africa in the past decade.
Transnational Salafist-jihadist organizations as well as ISIS took
root in Libya following the ouster of Qadhafi. The State Department
describes Libya as a permissive environment for terrorists and a number
of terrorist attacks in Tunisia and other areas have been planned in
Libya or by individuals of Libyan descent.
Ms. Polaschik, in the hearing, you reiterated U.S. support for the
U.N. Action Plan in Libya and stated that attempts to impose a military
solution to Libya's political problems would create opportunities for
extremists, including the Islamic State.
What if anything the U.S. is prepared to do to actively dissuade
such an attempt or respond to any attempts to impose such a solution?
Answer. The United States has been very clear in our discussions
with all Libyan parties and our international partners that any
attempts to impose a military solution or bypass the political process
will only further destabilize Libya. We have urged Libyans to exercise
military restraint and engage constructively with U.N. efforts to help
them reach a political solution, prepare for successful national
elections, and build unified government and security institutions
capable of providing security for the Libyan people and partnering with
the international community to defeat ISIS and other terrorists.
Renewed civil conflict would set back these efforts and benefit only
the terrorists.
The United States has a strong partnership with Libyan Prime
Minister Fayez al-Sarraj's Government. We cooperate closely with the
Government of National Accord and its aligned forces against ISIS, and
we support Prime Minister al-Sarraj's efforts to promote dialogue and
national political reconciliation. During Prime Minister al-Sarraj's
visit to Washington in early December, President Trump, Secretary
Tillerson, and other senior U.S. officials underscored our commitment
to helping Libyans defeat ISIS and other terrorists, advance political
reconciliation through the U.N. political process, and build a more
stable, unified, and prosperous future for the Libyan people.
The U.N. Security Council's Presidential Statement on Libya on
December 14 also sent a strong message that the Libyan Political
Agreement (LPA) will remain the framework for a political settlement
throughout Libya's transitional period. The Security Council rejected
efforts to impose incorrect deadlines on the LPA, which threatened to
undermine the U.N.-facilitated political process and justify
destabilizing military action.
Question 5. How would the United States respond to attempts to
military-led solution to the political challenges?
Answer. The United States has been very clear in our discussions
with all Libyan parties and our international partners that there is no
military solution to Libya's challenges. Renewed civil conflict will
only benefit ISIS and other terrorists. The only sustainable solution
to the political, economic, security, and humanitarian challenges in
Libya is an inclusive, unified government that can control and govern
its territory and provide a more stable and prosperous future for the
Libyan people.
The United States joined the U.N. Security Council on December 14
in reaffirming the international community's commitment to a political
solution based on the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). We will
continue to work with our international partners help Libyans advance
toward political reconciliation through the U.N.-facilitated process
and stabilize their country.
Question 5. What is the State Department doing now to dissuade
spoilers?
Answer. The State Department urges all Libyan parties and our
international partners to fully support the U.N.'s efforts to achieve
national political reconciliation and restore stability in Libya. We
are actively involved with all Libyan parties, underscoring that any
attempts to impose a military solution or bypass the political process
will only further destabilize Libya.
We have worked closely with partners on the U.N. Security Council
to ensure that the international community sends a unified message on
the need for a political solution in Libya. Since December 6, the
Security Council's December 14 Presidential Statement reaffirmed that
the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) will remain the framework for a
political settlement throughout Libya's transitional period and
rejected incorrect deadlines for it. We will continue to work closely
with our international partners to make clear that any attempts,
including by Libyan parties, to undermine the Libyan-led, U.N.
facilitated political process are unacceptable to the international
community.
[all]
| MEMBERNAME | BIOGUIDEID | GPOID | CHAMBER | PARTY | ROLE | STATE | CONGRESS | AUTHORITYID |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Udall, Tom | U000039 | 8260 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NM | 115 | 1567 |
| Isakson, Johnny | I000055 | 8323 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | GA | 115 | 1608 |
| Flake, Jeff | F000444 | 7803 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | AZ | 115 | 1633 |
| Cardin, Benjamin L. | C000141 | 8287 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MD | 115 | 174 |
| Corker, Bob | C001071 | 8294 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | TN | 115 | 1825 |
| Murphy, Christopher | M001169 | 7870 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | CT | 115 | 1837 |
| Barrasso, John | B001261 | 8300 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | WY | 115 | 1881 |
| Risch, James E. | R000584 | 8274 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | ID | 115 | 1896 |
| Merkley, Jeff | M001176 | 8238 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | OR | 115 | 1900 |
| Shaheen, Jeanne | S001181 | 8276 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NH | 115 | 1901 |
| Coons, Christopher A. | C001088 | 8297 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | DE | 115 | 1984 |
| Gardner, Cory | G000562 | 7862 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | CO | 115 | 1998 |
| Young, Todd | Y000064 | 7948 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | IN | 115 | 2019 |
| Paul, Rand | P000603 | 8308 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | KY | 115 | 2082 |
| Rubio, Marco | R000595 | 8242 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | FL | 115 | 2084 |
| Johnson, Ron | J000293 | 8355 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | WI | 115 | 2086 |
| Kaine, Tim | K000384 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | VA | 115 | 2176 | |
| Booker, Cory A. | B001288 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NJ | 115 | 2194 | |
| Markey, Edward J. | M000133 | 7972 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | MA | 115 | 735 |
| Menendez, Robert | M000639 | 8239 | S | D | COMMMEMBER | NJ | 115 | 791 |
| Portman, Rob | P000449 | 8266 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | OH | 115 | 924 |
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