Congressional Hearings

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S PRESENCE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

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AUTHORITYID	CHAMBER	TYPE	COMMITTEENAME
ssas00	S	S	Committee on Armed Services

- IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S PRESENCE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

[Senate Hearing 115-542]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 115-542

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S PRESENCE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

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HEARING

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

of the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

DECEMBER 12, 2018

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/

__________

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35-460 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan

Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

_________________________________________________________________

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

JONI ERNST, Iowa, Chairman MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED CRUZ, Texas
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

_________________________________________________________________

December 12, 2018

Page

Implications of China's Presence and Investment in Africa........ 1

Sun, Yun, Co-Director, East Asia Program and Director of the 3
China Program, The Stimson Center.
Devermont, Judd, Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic 11
and International Studies.
Meservey, Josh, Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle 19
East, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy,
Heritage Foundation.

(iii)

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S PRESENCE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2018

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joni
Ernst (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Senators Ernst, Heinrich, and Peters.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI ERNST

Senator Ernst. Good morning, everyone. The Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities will come to order.
This morning, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities will meet to receive testimony on the implications
of China's investment and activities in Africa to United States
national security interests.
We are joined today by Yun Sun, Director of the China
Program at The Stimson Center; Judd Devermont, Director of the
Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies; and Josh Meservey, Senior Policy Analyst for Africa
and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation.
I welcome our distinguished panel of experts, and thank
them for being with us today.
The rise of China as a strategic competitor to the United
States presents an array of challenges to our national security
interests around the globe. China is rapidly modernizing its
military and eroding America's military advantage. Its
aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas have
unnerved our Indo-Pacific allies and partners. And, as its
economic influence grows around the world, the Chinese
military's presence and activity grows, as well, from manmade
islands in the South China Sea to Indian Ocean ports to a
military base in the African nation of Djibouti.
But, China's strategic challenge to the United States is
much more than a military problem. China is pursuing a notable
expansion in its foreign assistance and investments in support
of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multi-decade, multi-
trillion-dollar initiative focused on increasing Chinese
influence and market access worldwide. In pursuit of its
objectives, we have seen China engage in heavyhanded economic
tactics to exert leverage and extract favorable concessions
from nations in strategically important regions. China is
racing to seize the commanding heights of the 21st century
global economy by any means necessary, including unfair trade
practices, cyberattacks, and industrial espionage.
Earlier this year, in testimony before the committee, the
former Commander of INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command], Admiral
Harry Harris, stated that he's, quote, ``concerned China will
now work to undermine the rules-based international order, not
just in the Indo-Pacific, but on a global scale, as China
expands its presence in Central Asia, the Arctic, Africa, South
America, and Europe,'' end quote. I share Admiral Harris's
concern, and that's why we have convened today's hearing.
During our time today, I'd like to focus on gaining a
better understanding of China's objectives and ongoing
activities in Africa, and what it means for our national
security interests. While China has long maintained a presence
in Africa, we are seeing an increase in the scope and intensity
of their activities across the continent. I look to our
witnesses to help the committee better understand China's
strategic objectives in Africa and how China seeks to achieve
those objectives; specifically, what aspects of China's
approach to Africa are most concerning to our security,
diplomatic, and economic interests, while also identifying
potential opportunities for cooperation with China in pursuit
of shared interests on the continent.
While I agree with our witnesses that we cannot view China
as 10 feet tall, we cannot underestimate China's growing
ambition and capabilities, as well as the long-term challenges
they pose to our interest and those of our allies.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for being with us
today, and I look forward to their testimony.
I will now turn it over to the Ranking Member, Senator
Heinrich.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

Senator Heinrich. Good morning, everyone. Let me join the
Chair in welcoming our witnesses before the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee to discuss the implications of
China's presence and investments in Africa.
This hearing comes at an important moment. The current
administration is set to roll out a new strategy for Africa
this week in an effort to better align United States policy in
Africa with the priorities outlined in the National Defense
Strategy and the National Security Strategy. With regard to
Africa, our National Security Strategy states that, quote, ``We
will expand trade and commercial ties to create jobs and build
wealth for Americans and Africans, both because it is
profitable for us and because it serves as an alternative to
China's often extractive economic footprint on the continent,''
end quote. Such an effort will require a reversal of current
U.S. efforts, which have focused primarily on counterterrorism
in recent years, and investment trends, which continue to
decline, year on year. Contrast that with China's investments
in Africa, which have been on an upward trajectory for nearly
two decades, and its security engagements, which have focused
on facilitating arms sales and providing educational
opportunities for senior African defense personnel in China.
These trends suggest a need for several reforms if we are to
ensure that the United States remains the security and
commercial partner of choice for African nations.
It's also important to be mindful that not all Chinese
activities in Africa are in direct conflict with United States
interests. Viewing every Chinese effort as a potential threat
clouds our strategic vision. I hope our witnesses will help the
committee better understand China's strategic vision for Africa
and the implications for United States objectives across the
continent.
Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony this
morning.
Senator Ernst. Wonderful. Thank you.
We'll go ahead and get started with our witness testimony,
and then we'll move into questions and answers.
Mrs. Sun, we will start with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF YUN SUN, CO-DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA PROGRAM AND
DIRECTOR OF THE CHINA PROGRAM, THE STIMSON CENTER

Mrs. Sun. Thank you, to the members of the Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, for this opportunity to
testify on the strategic implications of the Chinese investment
in Africa.
This testimony seeks to examine what types of political,
ideological, and military interests China pursues in Africa,
and how China utilizes economic statecraft, such as investment,
to pursue them. It also aims--analyze how China's evolving
approach to Africa will affect the great-power competition with
the United States.
Traditionally, Africa, as a part of the developing-country
bloc with which China identifies, has been regarded as the
foundation of China's foreign policy. China's economic
statecraft, from the free aid during the Cold War to loans and
investments to Africa today, has been an effective instrument
to secure Africa's support of China's multifaceted agenda.
China has three types of strategic interests that it
pursues in Africa: political, ideological, and the military.
Politically, China relies heavily on the diplomatic support and
appropriation from African countries on key issues in the
international arena and in multilateral forums. As China's
global ambition grows rapidly under President Xi Jinping, China
has grown increasingly interested in portraying Africa as a
strong supporter and a living testament of China's great-power
status, its reputation as a responsible stakeholder, and the
leader of the developing-country bloc. China's economic
engagement with Africa has been constantly cited to demonstrate
the generosity of China as the largest developing country and
the desirability of a new world order led by China. This agenda
strengthens Xi Jinping's prestige and authority at home and
abroad.
Ideologically, China actively promotes China's development
model, a combination of authoritarianism and state capitalism,
through government fellowships and capacity-building programs
for African elites. The goal is to educate African elites on
China's experience in economic development and political
governance as well as help them to replicate such policies in
their home countries. This ideological push in Africa is
geographically expensive, institutionally systematic, and will
have a profound psychological and political impact over the
choices and preferences of African elites. That's over the
political landscape of the African continent.
In our concept, in the Western concept, the Chinese
political capacity-building programs equate to the export of
Chinese ideology, but in the more implicit and indirect format.
However, in this case, China's power does not lie in its
imposition, but in its inspiration.
Before the opening of China's first overseas military base
in Djibouti in 2017, China's security interests in Africa were
primarily limited to the protection of Chinese nationals and
assets in politically unstable countries. However, China's base
in Djibouti signals a new era of China's security and military
ambitions in Africa. Djibouti is a critical first step in the
global ambition of the Chinese military and attests to
increasingly sophisticated approach that China has adopted to
pursue such a goal. The hidden-agenda approach China has
deployed using U.N. (United Nations) mandate and debt-trap
diplomacy to achieve its military agenda simply defies the
rules of the game.
China's strategic aspirations are causally related to its
economic engagement in Africa and are mutually reinforcing each
other. China's economic capacity and its willingness to use
such capacity to cater to African elites' demand lays the
foundation for Africa's benevolent interpretation and warm
welcoming of China's agendas.
The political support of China's policy can usually be
acquired through generous offer of Chinese aid, loans, and
investments. Such a benevolent perception of China and the
popularity of China's development model due to its perceived
effectiveness significantly enhances its appeal of the Chinese
style of state capitalism in Africa. China is building itself
an image as a contributor to peace and stability in Africa,
boosting its image as a responsible stakeholder while
materializing, legitimizing, and expanding its own military
presence on the continent. Chinese financial contributions have
not only made these endeavors possible, but also desirable for
some countries and obligatory for some other countries.
In turn, China's political, military, and ideology
influence deepens and broadens the scope and scale of Chinese
economic activities in Africa. As a result, Africa is
increasingly tied into the Chinese orbit.
China's complex approach toward Africa may not have
originated from a desire to compete with the United States for
global influence. However, the sophisticated Chinese approach
interweaves its economic engagement with political,
ideological, and security aspirations, which, consequently,
creates a reality of China's expanding and strategic influence
on the African continent. The growing willingness of African
countries to support Beijing's political agenda, their
eagerness to embrace China's development model, and their
welcoming accommodation of China's military ambitions in Africa
will signify the strength, reach, and influence that China is
gaining as a great power. As it currently stands, Africa is
indispensable in China's bid for global superpower status, and
Beijing has worked it diligently to tie Africa into the Chinese
orbit through economic statecraft, political friendship, as
well as ideological influence. If the United States and China
are indeed engaged in a zero-sum rivalry for global hegemony,
Africa's alignment choices has a critical impact on the result
of this power equilibrium.
I will stop there. Thank you very much, again.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Sun follows:]

Prepared Statement by Yun Sun
Thank you to the members of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities of the Senate Armed Services Committee for the
opportunity to testify on the strategic implications of the Chinese
investment in Africa. This testimony seeks to answer what types of
political, ideological and military interests China pursues in Africa
and how China utilizes economic statecraft such as investment to pursue
them. It also aims to analyze how China's evolving approach to Africa
will affect United States national interests.
Traditionally, Africa as a part of the developing country bloc with
which China identifies has been regarded as the foundation of China's
foreign policy. China's economic statecraft, from the free aid during
the Cold War to loans and investment to Africa today, has been an
effective instrument to ensure Africa's support of China's multifaceted
agenda. Indeed, the popular but erroneous perception that China is
solely interested in African natural resources no longer stands today.
Twenty years after the launch of the ``Going Out'' strategy where China
encouraged its companies to seek overseas markets and supplies of raw
materials, China's engagement strategy toward Africa has become much
more sophisticated, expansive, and synchronized. Through its economic
engagement, China is pursuing a targeted list of political, ideological
and strategic goals in Africa. As China's global ambition grows under
President Xi Jinping, Africa is increasingly tied into the Chinese
orbit that advocates for a new international order and a community of
common destiny.
the status of chinese investment in africa
According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, by the end of 2017,
China's cumulative investment in Africa had surpassed 100 billion USD.
\1\ In 2017, China's total direct investment in Africa was 3.1 billion
USD, 2.5% of China's global total that year. \2\ The percentage that
Africa occupies in China's global foreign direct investment has been
fairly consistent in recent years, rarely exceeding 4%. The areas of
such investment also cover a broad range of industries, including
mining, manufacturing, construction, retail, agriculture, construction,
infrastructure, and real estate. In terms of the fora, most of China's
Government economic pledges to Africa have been made through the Forum
on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which takes place every three
years and alternates between Beijing and African capitals. Up until the
most recent FOCAC Summit in Beijing in September of 2018, China had had
a pattern of doubling or tripling its most recent FOCAC pledge: from 5
billion USD in 2006 to 10 billion USD in 2009, then to 20 billion USD
in 2012 and 60 billion USD in 2015. However, in the most recent Beijing
Summit this past September, China's financial pledge remained the same
as in 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Chinese Cumulative Investment to Africa Surpassing 100
Billion USD'', August 28, 2018, China News, http://www.chinanews.com/
cj/2018/08-28/8612575.shtml.
\2\ ``Brief Summary of China's FDI in 2017'', Ministry of Commerce,
January 16, 2018, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjsj/ydjm/jwtz/
201801/20180102699445.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the official data suggests a relatively low level of
Chinese economic interests in Africa compared to other regions, the
reality is far more complex, complicated by the dearth of reliable
data. The Chinese official investment data includes only the committed
amount of investment during the calendar year rather than the actual
disbursed amount. More problematically, the official investment data
tends to underreport the actual volume due to its failure to capture
investments made by Chinese companies through subsidiaries in offshore
financial centers such as British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and
Hong Kong. Contributing to the understatement of Chinese investment in
Africa are the unregistered investments made by small and medium-sized
Chinese companies or private individuals, sometimes through their local
African partners for tax purposes.
Another caveat of China's economic engagement with Africa
originates from the composition of Chinese financial ties with the
continent. Indeed, the majority of China's financing to Africa are
neither grants nor investments, but loans of various forms. For
example, within the 60 billion USD FOCAC financial pledge China made in
2015, the majority of the commitment (35 billion USD) was designated
for concessional loans and export credits. Given that only 5 billion
USD was reserved for grants and zero-interest loans, and that Chinese
investment in Africa was 3.3 billion USD in 2016 and 3.1 billion USD in
2017, these numbers reveal that the overwhelming majority of Chinese
financing is in the category of loans. This does serve to justify the
wide-spread concern about the debt burden and sustainability of the
African countries and China exacerbating the problem, although China's
counterargument is that the long-term economic capacity building effect
of the Chinese loans significantly outweighs the downsides.
Despite the overwhelming rhetoric and attention paid to ``China
going Africa'', China's investment in Africa is small compared to other
regions. While China's foreign direct investment toward Africa was 3.1
billion USD in 2017, Chinese companies' acquisitions in Latin America
alone was as high as 18 billion USD during the same year. \3\ In terms
of investment stock, Chinese investment in Latin America had surpassed
200 billion USD by the end of 2017, twice that of Chinese investment in
Africa. \4\
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\3\ WU Hao, ``Report Shows Chinese Companies Have Become Key
Investors in Acquisitions of Latin American Companies,'' Xinhua News,
July 7, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2018-07/07/
c_1123092902.htm.
\4\ HE Jia, WU Jierui, ``Chinese Direct Investment to Latin America
Surpassing 200 Billion USD,'' 21st Century Business Herald, February 5,
2018, http://silkroad.news.cn/2018/0205/83169.shtml.
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The smaller quantity of Chinese investment toward Africa does not
in any sense suggest less qualitative impact. In fact, due to the
unique appeal of the Chinese model of economic development that
combines political authoritarianism and state capitalism, in many
fragile and volatile states in Africa, China's economic engagement has
played a significant role in shaping the future political and economic
choices of the African elites.
Furthermore, despite the consistent verbal dedication China has
expressed to support African industrialization and export of non-
resource products to China, the reality does not support such a claim.
The Chinese official statistics no longer provide the specifics of
different categories of Chinese imports from Africa. However, the top
African exporters to China are indeed resource-rich countries, ranking
down from South Africa to Angola, Zambia, Republic of Congo, DRC in
2017. \5\ If South Africa, China's biggest trading partner in Africa
and the largest African exporter to China, could serve as an example,
according to data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, natural
resources (mineral resources and base metals) together accounted for
86.2% of the country's export to China in 2017, up from the 83.7% in
2016. \6\ While China argues that it is making significant
contributions to Africa's industrialization and is shifting away from
its traditional focus on African natural resources, there is still a
long way to go for China to substantiate this claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Trade Data and Ranking of China's Trade with African
Countries in 2017,'' China-Africa Trade Research Center, February 2,
2018, http://news.afrindex.com/zixun/article10384.html.
\6\ Yun Sun, ``China's 2018 Financial Commitments to Africa:
Adjustment and Recalibration,'' Brookings, September 5, 2018, https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/05/chinas-2018-
financial-commitments-to-africa-adjustment-and-recalibration/.
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china's political aspirations in africa
On the issue of Africa's political importance, China's overarching
goal historically has been the diplomatic recognition from African
nations and the reinforcement of official ties that strengthen the
political legitimacy of the Communist regime. Throughout the 1960s, the
period when China was ``striking with both fists'' (in two directions:
toward the United States and the Soviet Union), its support for African
countries greatly reduced the pressure on China brought about by the
international isolation imposed by the two major powers. The emotional
affinity of China toward Africa has since then been a constant factor
in the relationship.
China relies heavily on diplomatic support and cooperation from
African countries on key issues in the international arena and in
multilateral forums. Currently, the 54 African states account for more
than one-quarter of UN member states and votes. China has relied on
African countries' support at the UN for its political agenda,
including Beijing's assumption of its seat at the UN. In 2008, before
the Beijing Olympics, the issue of Tibet became a controversial sore
spot for China at the UN Human Rights Council. China relied on the
African countries to remain silent or issue statements supportive of
China's Tibet policy in order to defuse and preempt hostile discussions
or actions. \7\ Today, on issues ranging from human rights to UN
reform, and from regional security to China's core national interests,
China looks to Africa to be on its side.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ David H. Shinn, ``China's Growing Role in Africa: Implications
for United States Policy,'' testimony before Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, November 1, 2011.
www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David_Shinn_Testimony.pdf.
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As China's global ambition grows rapidly under President Xi
Jinping, China has grown increasingly interested in portraying Africa
as a strong supporter and a living testament of China's great power
status, its reputation as a responsible stakeholder, and the leader of
the developing country bloc. Chinese economic engagement with Africa
has been constantly cited to demonstrate the generosity of China as the
largest developing country and the desirability of a new international
order led by China. These agendas strengthen Xi Jinping's prestige and
authority at home and abroad.
Another of China's key political aspirations in the relationship
with Africa is to end Taiwan's diplomatic presence on the continent.
For Beijing, it is a matter of fundamental regime legitimacy that
Africa embraces the One China policy and accepts Beijing rather than
Taipei as the only lawful representative of China. The tug-of-war
between Beijing and Taipei over diplomatic ties with African countries
has lasted more than six decades since the founding of the People's
Republic of China. Currently, Eswatini is the only African country that
still maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan. It is worth noting that
since the Democratic Progressive Party assumed office in Taiwan in
2016, China has successfully established diplomatic ties with three of
Taiwan's diplomatic allies: Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Burkina
Faso. It is widely believed that China's economic enticement,
especially the promises of aid and loans, has played a key role in
China's winning the diplomatic tug of war.
china's ideological aspirations in africa
As the largest and perhaps the most effective authoritarian regime
in the world, Beijing has always viewed foreign governments'
recognition of the Chinese Communist Party's successful political and
economic policies as a powerful reinforcement of its legitimacy at
home. In recent years, China has begun to actively promote other
developing countries to adopt such political and economic policies.
China uses its own development model, which combines political
authoritarianism and economic capitalism, to prove to some African
countries that economic development and political stability could exist
without a democratic system. In many countries, ``China's economic
progress is cited by statists, protectionists, and thugs alike to
`prove' that keeping the state's grip on companies, trade, and
political freedoms need not stop a country growing by 8%-plus a year.''
\8\ From Beijing's perspective, the popularity of the China's
development model is the best way to validate the viability of the
Chinese system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``Wrong Model, Right Continent'', October 26, 2006, The
Economist, http://www. economist.com/node/8080804.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this sense, China's ideological interest in Africa did not
disappear after it directed its priorities towards economic
development. Instead, it has taken a different and more subtle form,
one that supports Beijing's legitimacy through spreading and
popularizing China's development model. The more countries identify
with and adopt Beijing's approach, the less isolated China feels.
Beijing would like to see non-Western, non-democratic governments grow
and prosper in Africa, simply because they help to validate China's
political system and mitigate its international isolation by showing
that Western democracy is not a universal value, and that the Western
democratic system does not have to apply in every country.
China is actively promoting this new model of political and
economic development in Africa through government fellowships and
training programs for African elites, which constitute a key component
of Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. The goal is to educate African
elites on China's experience in economic development and political
governance, as well as help them to replicate such policies in their
home countries. China states that the training programs are strictly
exchanges of opinions rather than an imposition of the China model on
African countries. In other words, China invites African elites to
China to study the Chinese way of governance on issues they are
interested in, but whether they eventually adopt the Chinese way is
purely at their own discretion. This approach does constitute capacity
building, but it is perhaps less dogmatic compared to Western capacity-
building programs.
China actively encourages African elites to personally experience
China's economic success and systematically trains them on how to
emulate China's paths to success. The conscious effort made by China to
help African elites absorb, assimilate, and duplicate the Chinese
experience does constitute a different type of ideological push. It is
geographically expansive, institutionally systematic, and will have a
profound psychological and political impact over the choices and
preferences of African political parties, and thus over the African
political landscape.
In a Western concept, the Chinese political capacity building
program equates to the export of Chinese ideology, albeit in a more
implicit and indirect form. However, in this case, China's power does
not lie in its imposition, but in its inspiration. It is noteworthy
that China under President Xi Jinping is rapidly expanding the scope
and scale of such capacity building programs in Africa. In the 2015
FOCAC commitment, China committed to a total of 2,000 degree program
opportunities, 30,000 government fellowships, visits by 200 African
scholars, and training for 500 African youths and 1,000 media
personnel. However, in the 2018 FOCAC commitment, the number of
government fellowships jumped from 30,000 to 50,000 in addition to
1,000 African elites China will train for Africa. Demonstrating China's
keen interests in shaping the affinity of the next generation African
leaders, China has quadrupled the number of African youths to be
invited to China for exchanges. While these numbers are impressive,
none are as jaw-dropping as the number of capacity building and
training opportunities China has agreed to provide: 50,000 additional
training opportunities to African countries, including government
officials, opinion leaders, scholars, journalists as well as technical
experts. These are essentially the African political, economic, social
elites, and opinion leaders that will shape the future of the continent
and its relations with China.
china's military aspirations in africa
Before the opening of China's first overseas military base in
Djibouti in 2017, China's security interests in Africa were primarily
limited to the protection of Chinese nationals and assets in
politically unstable African countries where China has important
economic interests. However, China's base in Djibouti signals a new era
of China's security and military ambitions not only in Africa, but also
globally. Djibouti is a critical first step in the global ambitions of
the Chinese military, and attests to the increasingly sophisticated
approach that China has adopted to pursue such a goal.
China has consistently downplayed the importance of its outpost, as
well as the capacity and purpose of the base. Before construction was
completed, China called it an ``overseas logistical supply facility.''
That term gradually morphed, and now the Chinese characterize it as a
``supply base''--still, however, not a ``military'' outpost. The
Chinese media has been at pains to detail how the base cannot
conceivably be compared to British and American facilities, for
example, in terms of infrastructure, equipment on-hand and on-base
capabilities. The reason Beijing intentionally avoids the term
``military base'' is to dodge attention, suspicion and threat. However,
the undeniable truth remains that the base has been dominated,
developed and used by the Chinese military.
China has always had a hard time squaring its desire for an
overseas military presence with its state ideology of ``non-
interference'' in extra sovereign matters and non-alignment. It has
sought, therefore, the cover of legitimacy through United Nations
Security Council mandates for peacekeeping missions, which come with
host-country consent. In 2008, China began naval-escort missions in the
Gulf of Aden, following a series of UN Security Council resolutions
authorizing countries to conduct counter-piracy operations in the area.
In the 10-year period from 2008, China dispatched 30 naval-escort
taskforces to the region, at a steady rate of three a year. The
missions provided grounds for China to claim it needed a logistical
center to provide support and supplies for its forces in the area.
Hence, Djibouti entered the picture with its unique geographical
location and popularity with other foreign military forces operating in
the area.
The problem is that China's story does not hold water. Piracy off
the Somali coast fell sharply between 2012 and 2017--precisely the
period when China negotiated and built its ``supply base'' in Djibouti.
In other words, although China predicated its need for a logistics hub
when serving on UN-authorized counter-piracy missions, the development
of the base happened when the threat of piracy was in rapid decline.
Following the opening of the base, China has been consolidating its
control and capacity of the facility. This is being achieved in
parallel with generous Chinese financing for a new port, a free-trade
zone, as well as railway, energy-transportation and water-supply
projects. This May, the Chinese military acknowledged it was building a
new wharf at the Djibouti base. The development of infrastructure
supports the operation of the Chinese base, and also hitches the
Djibouti Government into the Chinese orbit. Djibouti is taking on a
public debt that is equivalent to 88 percent of its GDP, with China
owning most of this. \9\ With that much debt owed to China, Djibouti's
ability to defy or reject Chinese demands is significantly hindered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Amy Cheng, ``Will Djibouti Become Latest Country to Fall Into
China's Debt Trap,'' Foreign Policy, July 31, 2018, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/31/will-djibouti-become-latest-country-to-
fall-into-chinas-debt-trap/.
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Although China has portrayed the base as logistics-oriented, its
own actions suggest less benign uses. Two months after its opening,
China began military training and live-fire drills. The PLA explained
this development on the grounds that it must ``explore the model of
overseas military deployment and improve the Chinese troops' ability to
comprehensively maneuver weapons and conduct diversified military
missions.'' \10\ It has also expanded the scope of its troops stationed
there. Now, they are to provide ``humanitarian assistance'' and to
``[contribute] to the peace and stability of Africa.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Zhang Baoqing, Chen Ping, ``Live-Fire Drills Organized at Our
Support Base in Djibouti,'' China Military, May 15, 2018, http://
www.81.cn/jwsj/2018-05/15/content_8032424.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no rule in international law against China developing
overseas military bases, just as there is no reason that China should
be judged any differently from other great powers with bases in
Djibouti. However, the manner in which China has gone about building
out its military capacity invites suspicion. Moreover, China cannot
definitively prove and defend its supposed benevolent intentions. The
hidden-agenda approach China has deployed--using UN mandates and debt--
to get what it wants in Djibouti is worrisome. China's playbook simply
defies the rules of the game.
the strategic implications of chinese investment in africa
China's strategic aspirations, including its political, ideological
and military agendas, are causally related to its economic engagement
in Africa and are mutually reinforcing for each other. China's economic
capacity and its willingness to use such capacity to cater to African
needs lays the foundation for Africa's warm reception and benevolent
interpretation of China's agendas. The political support of Chinese
policies can usually be acquired through generous offers of Chinese
aid, loans and investment. Such a benevolent perception of China and
the popularity of China's development model due to its perceived
effectiveness significantly enhances the appeal of the Chinese style of
state capitalism in Africa. China is building an image of itself as a
contributor to the peace and stability in Africa, boosting its image as
a responsible stakeholder while materializing, legitimizing and
expanding its own military presence on the continent. Chinese financial
contributions have not only made these endeavors possible, but also
desirable for some African governments. In turn, China's political,
military and ideological influence anchors, deepens and broadens the
scope and scale of China's economic activities in Africa. As the
result, Africa is increasingly tied into the Chinese orbit.
China's financial contribution to African governments has played a
significant role in securing Africa's support of China's political
agenda regionally and globally. There is a popular perception in China
that Africa's support of China's foreign policies can be easily
acquired through economic enticement and reward. Such a transactional
approach has often blurred the principles of international politics.
Instead, mercantilism prevails. For example, Chinese promises of
economic reward or the perception of pending Chinese economic reward
have greatly shaped the alignment choice and normalization decisions of
Taiwan's former African diplomatic allies. \11\ Similarly, African
countries that maintain close economic cooperation with China were
called upon to support China's positions on key security issues such as
the South China Sea: more than ten African countries expressed support
of China's position on the South China Sea before the 2016 ruling
according to official Chinese statement, including Tanzania, Uganda,
Gambia, and Kenya. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Lisa Schlein, ``Africa Misses Out on Taiwan's Development Aid
Due to `One China' Policy'', April 8, 2018, Voice of America, https://
www.voanews.com/a/africa-misses-out-on-taiwan-development-aid-one-
china-policy/4337530.html.
\12\ Lu Miaogeng, ``African Countries Support China's Positions on
the South China Sea'', June 14, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/
chn/zxxx/t1371916.htm.
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China's economic statecraft in Africa has become one of the most
prioritized and effective instruments in China's challenge to the
current international order. With Africa on China's side, China regards
Africa as China's ``natural ally'' in international affairs vis-a-vis
the developed countries. China believes that it shares with Africa the
same agenda on defending the interests of developing countries and
emerging markets, promoting the so-called ``democratization of the
international relations'' and reforming the global governance system.
\13\ In the context of the great power competition, the support China
rallies from African countries greatly enhances China's ability to
effectively compete with the United States over the legitimacy,
credibility, and capability of the new model of international relations
that China advocates for. China would like to portray that African
support of China's leadership within the global South springs from
their shared history and grievances vis-a-vis the global North.
However, in reality, such a claim of leadership has been primarily
based upon China's ``benevolence'' as manifested through its aid, loans
and investments as public goods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Wang Yi, ``Building a Closer Sino-Africa Community of Common
Destiny,'' Qiushi, September 16, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/
2018-09/16/c_1123429190.htm.
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China's economic engagement with Africa has also had a major
exemplary effect on the strength of China's development model. In an
authoritarian system, the centralization of power does confer upon the
state the ability to make and implement policies without a lengthy
democratic process, ostensibly enhancing its efficiency and
effectiveness. For African countries that struggle with political
instability and economic stagnation, China uses its infrastructure
projects and training opportunities in China to inspire admiration and
imitation from African people and elites. Although a successful example
of African adoption of China's political and economic system is yet to
emerge (as China's ``best student'' Ethiopia remains a debatable case)
, the China model offers Africa a seemingly viable alternative to a
democratic system, good governance, and a free market economy.
Beyond the philosophical conviction, China's active promotion of
its own development model in Africa also creates opportunities for
China to play a key role in the economic development plans of African
countries upon witnessing the ``miracle'' of China's economic
development. Once African countries are convinced of the need for
expensive infrastructure projects to jump start their agricultural
growth and industrialization, China stands ready to provide the loans
(often backed by African natural resources) and Chinese service
contractors to build the projects. From 2000 to 2017, China loaned
around $143 billion to the continent, as data from the China-Africa
Research Initiative (CARI) at Washington's Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies shows. \14\ The predatory
aspect of this practice lies in the lack of consideration of African
countries' realistic needs for mega-infrastructure projects on the
ground, creating debt traps for vulnerable African economies, such as
Congo Republic, Djibouti and Zambia. \15\ While the governments of
these countries appear to be of the belief that they will eventually
receive debt leniency or forgiveness from China, such leniency is never
free but rather is conditioned upon other political and strategic
concessions that China demands from Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``Data: Chinese Loans to Africa,'' China Africa Research
Initiative, http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-
africa.
\15\ George Tubei, ``The Sad Similarity between Sri Lanka, Zambia
and Now Djibouti That Best Exemplifies China's Debt Trap Diplomacy,''
Business Insider, September 11, 2018, https://www.pulse.ng/bi/politics/
how-djibouti-like-zambia-is-about-to-lose-its-port-to-china-id8839335.
html.
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In terms of China's overseas military ambitions, China's apparent
generosity with economic lending to Djibouti secured the consent and
support from the local government for China's military base. As China
expands its economic presence on the African continent, including in
those unstable and volatile countries, the protection of those assets
and Chinese nationals will be increasingly used to justify China's
further military deployment and potential intervention on the ground.
Due to the political and economic influence China enjoys in Africa, the
continent has become a fertile test ground for China's overseas
military ambitions, including its blue water navy.
It is worth noting that from the very beginning, China's economic
activities in Africa originate from the innate demand by the Chinese
domestic economy for overseas markets and suppliers of raw materials,
rather than the desire for overseas expansion or to compete with the
United States. However, as China's economic engagement with Africa
broadens and deepens, its nature becomes intrinsically blurred. The
sophisticated Chinese approach interweaves its economic interests with
political, ideological and security aspirations, which consequently
creates a reality of China expanding its strategic influence on the
African continent. The growing willingness of African countries to
support Beijing's political agendas, their eagerness to embrace China's
development model, and their welcoming accommodation of China's
security and military ambitions in Africa all signify the strength,
reach, and influence that China is gaining as a great power. As it
currently stands, Africa is indispensable in China's bid for global
superpower status and Beijing has worked diligently to tie Africa into
China's orbit through economic statecrafts, political friendship, as
well as ideological influence. If the United States and China are
indeed engaged in a zero-sum competition for global hegemony, Africa's
alignment choice has a critical impact on the endgame.

Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mrs. Sun.
We will move to Mr. Devermont.

STATEMENT OF JUDD DEVERMONT, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Devermont. Great. Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member
Heinrich, distinguished members, thank you so much for the
invitation to speak on this important topic.
In my judgment, Chinese engagement in sub-Saharan Africa
undercuts and potentially degrades United States capabilities
and influence. That said, Chinese is neither 10 foot tall nor
do all of its activities harm United States interests in the
region. I believe it's essential to draw a clear distinction
between Chinese activities that threaten United States
strategic national interests and Chinese activities that are
neutral or even complementary. If we portray all Chinese
endeavors as antithetical to United States goals, we fail to
develop and implement an effective policy.
In my mind, there's no doubt that several of Chinese
activities pose unmistakable threats to United States interests
in sub-Saharan Africa, and I will talk specifically about three
key areas of concern:
First, U.S. military operations and access. The Chinese
military base in Djibouti sits at the edge of one of the most
important maritime chokeholds in the world; 12.5 to 20 percent
of global trade passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits. It's
also just miles away from our own critical United States base,
and there have been reports of rising tension between China and
the United States. In May, the United States officially
complained to China about the use of a military-grade laser to
distract United States pilots. It's also possible that China
will build additional bases in sub-Saharan Africa. They
currently have invested, or have plans to invest, in ports in
Cameroon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, and
Tanzania.
Second, United States information and communication
platforms. China's leading role in Africa's telecommunication
and infrastructure poses a considerable counterintelligence
threat to the United States. ZTE and Huawei have been active in
the region for two decades, raising concerns about Chinese
access to cellphones, networks, and data. In May, the wireless
net carrier MTN said it was reviewing its operations, given
exposure to ZTE. MTN is a South African-based carrier all
across sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. China is also
building undersea cables to Djibouti and Kenya, as well as to
Cameroon.
Third, United States relations with current and emerging
African leaders. China's courtship of African political and
military leaders, as well as promising young Africans, is
another strategic challenge for the United States. Since
January 2017, China's leadership, including its President and
Foreign Minister, have made 19 trips to sub-Saharan Africa. In
contrast, only the U.S. Secretary of State has visited the
continent, where he visited six countries.
In addition, China is now issuing more scholarships to
African students than the United States or the United Kingdom.
These relationship investments are likely to have tactical and
strategic effects, enabling China to influence allies and
cultivate support amongst the next generation of African
leaders.
Now, in contrast to these significant threats, I believe
some of the current uproar over Chinese investment in Africa is
overblown. Not all Chinese activities in sub-Saharan Africa are
a threat to the United States. And it's not axiomatic that
every Chinese loan and infrastructure project will result in
another Hambantota. Many of Chinese projects address the
region's desperate need for roads, rails, and ports. The World
Bank, in 2017, reported that Africa has some of the lowest road
and rail densities in the world. The issue, then, is whether
Chinese companies are constructing durable roads, rails, and
ports; whether they're including the sufficient environment and
social safeguards; and whether they're pursuing discriminatory
practices towards U.S. firms. In my view, infrastructure is
neutral, but it's its operation that's political. The problem
is that, when China builds roads and rail in Africa, the
question becomes, Can the U.S. transparently compete for those
projects? And, if China does build the road, are our companies
able to put an engine on that rail, connect additional lines to
that main artery?
Turning to the issue of debt traps, there's been a lot of
hand-wringing recently about this issue. Former Secretary of
State Tillerson, in March of 2018, warned that China's
predatory loan practices mire nations in debt and undercut
their sovereignty. I am deeply troubled by the lack of
transparency in many Chinese loans, but I think the debt-trap
narrative glosses over some key facts.
Africa faces the risk of debt distress, but China is only
the disproportionate contributor to three countries' debt:
Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, and Zambia. According to the
Jubilee Debt Campaign, on average, about a third of African
external debt is to private lenders, another third is to the
international financial institutions, and about 20 percent is
to China. So, when we talk about Chinese debt in a vacuum, we
leave ourselves open to criticisms about the United States and
the broader international community's role in Africa's larger
debt problem.
I want to make a final point about Africa--how African
elites and publics view Chinese engagement, in general, and
then strategic competition, in particular.
African governments, for economic, political, and security
reasons, regard China as a key partner. As the President of
Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, said in October ``It's in our interest
to deal with China. Everyone is dealing with China.'' But, that
doesn't mean that Africans are oblivious to the risks of
partnering with China. In that same speech, Akufo-Addo said
he's doing business with China with open eyes. And Cote
d'Ivoire recently instituted a panel to monitor Chinese
investments in their country.
Some governments are increasingly demanding that China hire
more African laborers. They're insisting on better
environmental practices. And, in Kenya, just very recently,
they arrested both Kenyans and Chinese for corruption over the
Standard Gauge Railway that was built between Nairobi and
Mombasa.
African publics have an equally nuanced view about Chinese
engagement. According to an Afrobarometer poll, 63 percent of
Africans thought China's economic and political influence in
their country was positive. They cited infrastructure and
development. At this same poll, though, they complained about
the quality of Chinese products, and they blame Chinese for
taking jobs and businesses. There's been communal violence
against Chinese immigrants in the DRC [Democratic Republic of
the Congo], in Madagascar, in South Africa, and in Zambia. For
many Africans, it's the small Chinese shopowner, the miner, and
the factory owner that represent the worst aspects to the
China-Africa relationship.
Finally, Africa's attitudes towards strategic competition
between United States and China is similarly complex. The
majority of African capitals anticipate they will benefit from
this rivalry. It is an opportunity to increase access to
resources, generate new leverage, and lessen dependency on any
single foreign lender. Many leaders recognize that renewed
geopolitical rivalry has increased their country's strategic
importance, and they expect to profit, as a government or as
individuals, from this uptick in attention. United States
policymakers should be mindful that pressing Africans to pick a
side is likely to fail, and the region's governments will seek
to balance and, when necessary, play the two capitals off one
another, with the goal of securing the best-possible deal.
African leaders routinely and publicly make pointed
comparisons between China and the United States, complaining
when one is loading them down with too many conditions or
failing to live up to their agreements. For instance, nine
African leaders told President Trump, in September of 2017 at
the U.N. General Assembly, ``We prefer to do business with the
United States and other countries, but you aren't here, unlike
China.''
In conclusion, I believe the United States has a vital role
in shaping Chinese-African relations, but it must adopt a more
strategic and realistic approach to its messaging and
engagement. And let me just give you five suggestions:
First, I think we need to update our talking points. Our
talking points generally give off the impression of talking
down to African counterparts. Chiding them often is interpreted
by Africans as being paternalistic.
Two, we need to focus on our strategic advantages. I don't
think that United States companies should be trying to build
roads in some farflung, dusty place in sub-Saharan Africa. We
should focus on the service sector, financial services,
agricultural, agribusiness, and renewed energy. And I also
think there's a play for U.S. technology.
Three, we should invest in soft power and democracy in
governance. The United States has traditionally had an edge
over China, because of United States values and its people-to-
people engagement. It's essential that we not only continue the
Young African Leaders Initiative, YALI, but also ratchet up
United States engagement with African leaders and publics.
Equally important, the United States should support African
democracy, democratic institutions, civil society, and
journalists to check China's malign activities, including
corruption. In Kenya, in Ghana, in Zambia, reporters are
exposing Chinese misdeeds and negative behavior. This is
critically important, because there's also been examples of
China trying to silence anti-Chinese statements out of African
press. Washington can call out what China's doing, but it's
much more powerful if we're reaffirming and validating African
voices criticizing what China's doing in Africa.
Fourth, we should reconsider African-Chinese cooperation in
very narrow spaces, particularly on development issues. Many of
our key partners are doing this already: Italy, France, Japan,
and the United Kingdom.
And, finally, we should be engaging a broader set of
countries that are looking at Africa. There's been an uptick in
engagement in sub-Saharan Africa across the world, from Turkey
to the Gulf states to East Asian countries, like Indonesia and
Thailand. And, in many cases, their concern is about China
crowding them out of the market. I think having a larger set--a
coalition, a consensus around a rules-order approach to
investment in Africa is a more effective way to achieve our
goals.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Devermont follows:]

Prepared Statement by Judd Devermont
Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
members of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the invitation to speak
on a topic of considerable significance to United States interests:
China's growing presence and investment in sub-Saharan Africa.
I believe Chinese engagement undercuts and potentially degrades
United States capacities and influence in sub-Saharan Africa. That
said, China is neither ten feet tall nor do all its activities harm
United States interests in the region.
Therefore, it is important to draw a finer distinction between
which Chinese activities threaten United States national security
priorities and which Chinese engagements are neutral or complimentary
to United States objectives. If we portray all Chinese endeavors as
antithetical to United States goals, we will fail to develop and
implement an effective policy response.
First, I believe Chinese activities pose the greatest danger to
United States military access and operations, U.S. information and
communication platforms, and United States relations with current and
emerging African leaders.
Second, it is my view that Chinese investments and loans are not
necessarily contrary to United States interests. When executed in a
transparent and responsible manner, Chinese infrastructure projects
address a critical deficiency and persistent drag on African economies.
Third, it is imperative to understand African perspectives of
Chinese engagement in Africa in general and of the United States-
Chinese rivalry in particular. The United States runs the risk of
alienating its partners and pushing them further into China's orbit if
it adopts an ``us-versus-them'' approach.
china's long history in africa
Discussions of China's growing influence in Africa tend to overlook
its historic presence on the continent. China is both a long-
established diplomatic partner and a new power in Africa. The Chinese
regularly note how the Ming Dynasty fleet visited East Africa in the
15th Century. In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing provided modest financial
assistance and material support to several African governments,
militaries, and liberation movements. For instance, China was the
primary source of aid for the Tanzanian military, furnishing it with
small arms, trucks, antiaircraft guns, medium tanks, patrol boats, and
landing craft.
China's ties with Africa evolved and deepened in the intervening
decades, and it has emerged as the main United States competitor on the
continent. While Chinese foreign direct investment is comparatively
less than the United States, it grew by 40 percent annually for most of
the past decade. In 2009, China surpassed the United States as the
region's largest trading partner. In May, Beijing swayed one of the
last holdouts, the small West African country of Burkina Faso, to
abandon Taipei. In September, it hosted the seventh Forum for China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) where President Xi Jinping pledged $60
billion in financing and encouraged Chinese companies to invest no less
than $10 billion over the next three years. \1\ Many observers have
noted that twice as many African leaders attended FOCAC than the United
Nations General Assembly in New York a few weeks later. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Christian Shepherd and Ben Blanchard, ``China's Xi offers
another $60 billion to Africa, but says no to `vanity' projects,''
Reuters, September 3, 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idAFKCN1LJ0IO-OZATP.
\2\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``Twice as many African Presidents made it to
China's Africa summit than to the UN general assembly,'' Quartz,
October 5, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1414004/more-african-presidents-
went-to-chinas-africaforum-than-un-general-assembly.
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unpacking chinese activities
The challenge of assessing to what degree China's presence and
investments threaten United States national security interests stems in
part from Beijing's integrated approach to Africa. Its activities,
especially as it pertains to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have
security, commercial, diplomatic, and strategic dimensions. This blend
of objectives, consequently, makes it difficult to separate malign
activities from benign behavior.
I believe that several of China's activities pose unmistakable
threats to United States interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically,
some Chinese engagements undercut United States military access and
operations, U.S. information and communication platforms, and United
States relations with current and emerging African leaders.

U.S. military access and operations. The Chinese
military base in Djibouti sits at the edge of one of the most important
maritime chokepoints in the world; an estimated 12.5 to 20 percent of
trade passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits in the Gulf of Aden. It
is also just miles from a critical U.S. base, and there have already
been reports of rising tension between the two powers. In May, the
United States officially complained to China about its use of a
military grade laser to distract United States pilots in 10 separate
incidents; two pilots experienced minor eye injuries after being
exposed to the laser beam. \3\ In the same month, AFRICOM commander
Thomas Waldhauser told Congress that he was concerned about Chinese
moves to assume control of Djibouti's commercial port, warning that
there could be restrictions on United States access. He added that he
expects the Chinese will build more bases across the continent. \4\ For
instance, China has invested or has plans to invest in ports in
Cameroon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tanzania.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``United States-China tensions are escalating
in Africa as laser are pointed at United States places over Djibouti,''
Quartz, May 5, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1271069/us-says-china-
pointed-laser-at-pilots-over-djibouti-base/
\4\ John Vandiver, ``AFRICOM Chief: Expect more Chinese bases in
Africa,'' Stars and Stripes, March 6, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/
news/africom-chief-expect-more-chinese-bases-in-africa-1.515263.

U.S. information and communication platforms. China's
leading role in Africa's telecommunication infrastructure poses a
considerable counterintelligence threat. ZTE and Huawei have been
active in the region for two decades, raising concerns about Chinese
Government access to cell phone networks and data. In May, the wireless
carrier MTN, which serves 220 million people in Africa and the Middle
East, said it was reviewing its operations ``given our exposure to ZTE
in our networks.'' \5\ Chinese companies are building an underseas
cable to Djibouti and Kenya from Pakistan (with a terrestrial extension
to China) and another one from Brazil to Cameroon, \6\ which will
almost certainly provide Beijing with access to critical metadata.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Raymond Zhong, ``Chinese Tech Giant on Brink of Collapse in New
United States Cold War,'' New York Times, May 9, 2018, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/technology/zte-china-us-trade-war.html.
\6\ Suvesh Chattapadhyaya, ``How is Digital Economy of Africa
Enabled by Subsea Cable Connectivity,'' Submarine Cable Networks, March
30, 2018, https://www.submarinenetworks. com/en/insights/how-is-
digital-economy-ofafrica-enabled-by-subsea-cable-connectivity

U.S. relations with current and emerging African leaders.
China's courtship of African political and military leaders, as well as
of promising young Africans, is another strategic advantage vis-a-vis
the United States. Since January 2017, China's top leadership,
including its president and foreign minister, made 19 trips to sub-
Saharan African countries. In contrast, only the secretary of state has
visited the continent during the same period, stopping in six countries
with an attenuated itinerary. \7\ In July, high-ranking military
officials from 50 African states attended the two week-long China-
Africa Defense and Security forum. \8\ While the U.S. military
routinely hosts its counterparts, it is rarely as long in duration. In
addition, China is issuing more scholarships to African students than
the United States and the United Kingdom. \9\ These relationship
investments between Chinese and Africans are likely to have tactical
and strategic effects, enabling China to influence its allies to back
its policies and cultivate support amongst the next generation of
African leaders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ U.S. Office of the Historian, ``Presidential and Secretaries
Travels Abroad,'' United States Office of the Historian, December 10,
2018, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, ``The Department of
African Affairs, News,'' December 10, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fzs_663828/xwlb_663830/.
\8\ Lina Benabdallah, ``China-Africa military ties have deepened.
Here are 4 things to know,'' Washington Post, July 6, 2018, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/06/china-africa-
military-ties-havedeepened-here-are-4-things-to-know/?utm_term=.94b2444
c11c9.
\9\ Victoria Breeze and Nathan Moore, ``China has overtaken the US
and the UK as the top destination for anglophone Africans.'' Quartz,
June 30, 2017, https://qz.com/africa/1017926/china-has-overtaken-the-
us-and-uk-as-the-topdestination-for-anglophone-african-students/.

In contrast to the points above, I believe some of the current
uproar over Chinese investment in Africa is overblown and ill-informed.
Not all Chinese activities are a threat to the United States, and it is
not axiomatic that every Chinese loan and infrastructure project will
result in another Hambantota. Many of China's projects address the
region's desperate need for roads, railways, and power. The World Bank
in 2017 reported that Africa has some of the lowest road and rail
densities in the world and lags behind other developing regions in all
dimensions of infrastructure performance. \10\ If sub-Saharan Africa
can catch up to the median quality and quantity of infrastructure in
the developing world, the World Bank estimates it will increase growth
of GDP per capita by 1.7 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The World Bank, ``Africa Pulse: an analysis of issues shaping
Africa's economic future.'' April 2017. http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/348741492463112162/pdf/114375-REVISED-4-18-PMWB-
AfricasPulse-Sping2017-vol15-ENGLISH-FINAL-web.pdf.
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The issue, then, is whether Chinese companies will construct
durable roads, rails, and ports; whether they will include sufficient
environmental and social safeguards; and whether they will pursue
discriminatory practices towards United States firms. The quality of
Chinese projects varies wildly, but a 2016 study from the China Africa
Research Initiative (CARI) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) in Washington indicates that Chinese
companies under World Bank contracts perform as well as OECD companies.
\11\ More worrisome is the prospect that Chinese firms could operate
its road, rail, and sea links in a manner that disadvantages United
States businesses. Infrastructure is neutral, but its operation is
political. The problem is not that China builds railways in Africa, it
is when a United States company cannot bid for the contract or cannot
install its engines and connect branch lines to the main artery.
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\11\ Jamie Farrell, ``How do Chinese Contractors Perform in Africa?
Evidence from World Bank Projects,'' SAIS China-Africa Research
Initiative Working Paper, February 2016, https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/
573c970bf8baf3591b05253f/14635 88620386/
Working+Paper_Jamie+Farrell.pdf.
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Recently there has been a lot of hand-wringing over Chinese ``debt
traps'' in sub-Saharan Africa. Former Secretary of State Tillerson in
March 2018 warned that China's approach encourages dependency by using
predatory loan practices ``to mire nations in debt and undercut their
sovereignty.'' \12\ While I am very troubled about the opacity of many
Chinese contracts, I believe the debt trap narrative is overdone and
glosses over the facts. Africa indeed faces growing risk of debt
distress, but China is the principal contributor to debt in only three
countries: Republic of Congo, Djibouti, and Zambia. On average, 32
percent of African Government external debt is owed to private lenders
while 35 percent is owed to multilateral institutions such as the World
Bank; only 20 percent of African Government external debt is owed to
China. \13\ Moreover, Beijing has made some adjustments in response to
this criticism from Western and African capitals on the debt issue. At
FOCAC, China claimed it will exempt certain countries from outstanding
debt. It reportedly erased some of Zimbabwe's debt in April and
Botswana's in August, and it agreed to restructured Ethiopia's debt in
September.
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\12\ U.S. Department of State, ``Remarks--Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson on United States-Africa Relations: A New Framework,'' U.S.
Department of State, March 6, 2018, https://translations.state.gov/
2018/03/06/remarks-secretaryof-state-rex-tillerson-on-u-s-africa-
relations-a-new-framework/
\13\ Jubilee Debt Campaign, ``Africa's growing debt crisis: who is
the debt owed to?'' Jubilee Debt Campaign, October 7, 2018, https://
jubileedebt.org.uk/report/africas-growing-debt-crisis-who-is-the-debt-
owed-to
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african views on china and great power competition
As the United States mulls how to counter China's growing influence
in Africa, it is instructive to understand the view African elites and
publics hold of Chinese engagement in general and strategic competition
between Washington and Beijing in particular. African governments, for
economic, political, and security reasons, regard China as a key
partner. As the President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, said in October,
``it is in our interest to deal with China. It is the second biggest
economy of the world. Everyone is dealing with China.'' \14\ Other
countries, such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, have expressed admiration for
China's political model and state-driven economy. In addition, African
leaders appreciate China's growing contributions to the region's
security; China is second-largest (after the United States) in
financial support of peacekeeping operations and first among the U.N.
Security Council's permanent members for contributing peacekeepers. As
of October 2018, China has deployed more than 2,000 soldiers, police,
and advisors to peacekeeping missions in Sub-Saharan Africa--more than
double the number of Chinese personnel assigned to UN missions in 2005.
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\14\ Selcuk Gokoluk, ``Ghana Agreeing China Deals With `Eyes
Open,' Says President,'' Bloomberg, October 8, 2018, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-08/ghana-agreeing-china-deals-
with-eyes-open-says-president
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This does not mean that African leaders are oblivious to the risks
of partnering with China. President Akufo-Addo, in the same speech,
added that his country is doing business with China with its ``eyes
open.'' Cote d'Ivoire recently instituted a panel to monitor close to
$6 billion Chinese projects. Some governments are requiring Chinese
firms to hire more African laborers and insisting on more protections
for Africa's fragile ecosystems. In November, South Africa's House
Chairperson for Committees, Oversight, and ICT argued that, ``we won't
have this win-win relationship if the environment is not protected.''
\15\ In Kenya, the government recently accused Chinese and local
officials of corruption related to the construction and operation of
the $3 billion Nairobi-Mombasa Standard Gauge Railroad. \16\
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\15\ Kevin Bloom, ``China's `Belt and Road': The noose around
Africa's neck,'' The Daily Maverick, 29 November 2018, https://
www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-29-chinas-belt-and-road-the-
noose-around-africas-neck/.
\16\ Tom Odula, ``Kenya; 3 Chinese to be charged with bribing
investigators,'' Associated Press, November 25, 2018, https://
apnews.com/61d346e3143e491880e30749c42e85e0
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African publics have an equally nuanced understanding of Chinese
engagement. According to a 2016 report by Afrobarometer, 63 percent of
respondents in 36 African countries thought China's economic and
political influence in their country was positive. \17\ Indeed, in
three of five African regions, China either matches or surpasses the
United States in popularity as a development model. Many responders
lauded China for its investments in infrastructure and business
development. Nonetheless, in the same study, Africans complained about
the quality of Chinese products and blamed the Chinese for taking jobs
or business from locals. There has been community violence against
Chinese immigrants in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar,
South Africa, and Zambia. This animus is often directed at Chinese
individuals, not necessarily at Beijing. In 2017, McKinsey reported
that the vast majority of 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa are
privately owned. \18\ For many Africans, it is the small Chinese shop
owner, factory boss, and wildcat miner that represent the worst aspects
of the China-Africa relationship.
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\17\ Mogopodi Lekorwe, Anyway Chingwete, Mina Okuru, and Romaric
Samson, ``China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive
popular reviews,'' Afrobarometer, October, 24, 2016, http://
afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/
ab_r6_dispatchno122_per- ceptions_of_china_in_a frica1.pdf
\18\ Irene Sun, Karik Jayaram, and Omid Kassiri, ``Dance of the
lions and dragons: How are Africa and China engaging, and how will the
partnership evolve? Mckinsey, June 2017, https://www.mckinsey.com/8/
media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Middle%20East%20and%20Africa /
The%20cl
osest%20look%20yet%20at%20Chinese%20economic%20engagement%20in%20Africa
/ Dance-of-the-lions-anddragons.ashx
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African attitudes toward strategic competition between Washington
and Beijing are similarly complex. The majority of African capitals
anticipate that they will benefit from this intensified rivalry. It is
an opportunity to increase access to resources, generate new leverage,
and lessen dependency on any single foreign backer. Many leaders
recognize that renewed geopolitical rivalries have increased their
country's strategic importance, and they expect to profit--either as a
government or personally--from the uptick in attention. According to
AidData, a research lab at the College of William & Mary, if an African
country votes with China in the UN General Assembly an extra 10 percent
of the time, it would receive on average an 86 percent bump in official
development assistance. \19\
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\19\ ``A Despot's Guide to Guide to Foreign Aid,'' The Economist,
April 16, 2016, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/
04/16/a-despots-guide-to-foreign-aid.
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African leaders routinely and often publicly make pointed
comparisons between China and the United States, complaining when a
foreign capital is saddling them with too many conditions or failing to
live up to agreements. For instance, Djiboutian President Ismail
Guelleh asserted, ``that no one but the Chinese offers a long-term
partnership in Djibouti.'' \20\ In the same vein, nine African leaders
told President Trump at the UN General Assembly in September 2017 that
``we would prefer to do business with the United States and other
western countries, but you aren't there . . . unlike China.'' \21\
United States policymakers should be mindful that pressing Africans to
pick a side is likely to fail, and that the region's governments will
seek to balance and, when necessary, play the two capitals off one
another with the goal of securing the best deal possible.
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\20\ Francois Soudan, ``Ismail Omar Guelleh: `Personne d'autre que
les Chinois d'offre un partenariat a long terme a Djibout''' Jeune
Afrique, April 4, 2017. https:// www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/421096/
politique/ismail-omar-guellehpersonne-dautre-chinois- noffre-
partenariat-a-long-terme-a-djibouti/
\21\ Oliver Casin, ``Afrique-Etats-Unis: recontre avec Cyril Sator,
le `Monsieur Afrique' de Trump,'' Jeune Afrique, June 12 2018, https://
www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/564959/politique/afrique-etats-unis-rencontre-
avec-cyril-sartorle-monsieur-afrique-de-trump/
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a more nuanced approach
The United States has a vital role in shaping Chinese-African
relationships, but it must adopt a more strategic and realistic
approach to its messaging and engagement. Instead of objecting to
Beijing's expanding footprint in sub-Saharan Africa, Washington must
accept that China has a long history and a secure future in the region.
Even within a strategic competition framework, there are better ways to
advance United States interests than criticism and knee-jerk
opposition. Below are five recommendations to manage China's rise in
Africa:

Update the talking points. The United States scores few
points by talking down to African counterparts about the perils of
Chinese engagement. First, as noted above, these critiques tend to be
outdated and, in some cases, factually wrong. Second, United States
chiding of African leaders who accept Chinese financing is often viewed
as paternalistic. President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone hit back
at critics in September, saying ``we are not fools in Africa.'' \22\
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\22\ Li Rouhan, ``Sierra Leonean president lauds China's help in
times of need,'' Global Times, September 4, 2018, http://
www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118108.shtml.

Focus on U.S. strategic advantages. The United States
and its business community have natural advantages in sub-Saharan
Africa. The United States should target sectors where United States
companies are best equipped to compete with Chinese ones. In 2017, the
Atlantic Council argued that U.S. firms are most apt to dominate in the
service sector, financial realm, agribusiness, and renewable energy.
\23\ In addition, there is a potential role for United States
technology companies, as well as venture capital and social impact
firms to play in Africa, especially if they adopt a royalty-based
financing model. \24\
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\23\ Aubrey Hruby, ``Escaping China's Shadow: Finding America's
Competitive Edge in Africa,'' Atlantic Council, September 2017, https:/
/www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Escaping_Chinas_ Shadow_web_0907.pdf
\24\ Aleksandra Gadzala, ``Powering Inclusive Growth in Africa,''
The Atlantic Council, April 2008, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
images/Fintech_Issue_Brief_WEB.pdf.

Invest in Soft Power and Democracy. The United States
has traditionally had an edge over China because of United States
values and its people-to-people engagement. It is essential not only to
continue the widely popular Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) but
also to ratchet up United States engagement with African leaders and
publics. Equally important, the United States should support Africa's
democratic institutions, civil society, and journalists to check
China's malign activities, including corruption. In countries such as
Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia, muck-racking reporters have exposed Chinese
misdeeds and negative behavior. This is critically important because
there have been recent examples of Beijing pressuring African newsrooms
to curb anti-Chinese stories. \25\ If Washington wants to call out
China's harmful role in Africa, it would be more effective to support
and showcase African voices than merely criticize Beijing on its own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Azad Essa, ``China is Buying Africa' Silence,'' Foreign
Policy, September 14, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/china-
is-buying-african-medias-silence/

Reconsider Joint United States-China Projects. United
States officials have indicated that they are increasingly opposed to
working with China on development projects, \26\ but the rest of the
world views cooperation as a more effective approach to leverage
China's assets and ideally constrain bad behavior. Italy, France,
Japan, and the United Kingdom collaborate with China or have expressed
an intent to do so. It seems evident that an inclusive approach to
dealing with China is preferable to sidelining Chinese actors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Michael Igoe, ``USAID adopts a hardline on China's development
approach,'' Devex, September 18, 2018, https://www.devex.com/news/
usaid-adopts-a-hard-line-on-china-s-development-approach-93453

Engage Africa's Global partners. Africa's governments are
forging closer ties with traditional partners and new entrants. From
Turkey and the Gulf States to East Asian countries such as Indonesia
and Thailand, there has been a considerable uptick in foreign
engagement with African states. Many of the region's interlocutors are
enticed by the opportunity for greater trade and investment, while also
concerned about growing threats emanating from the continent. In
several cases, Africa's partners fear that China's engagement will
crowd them out of these new markets. The United States has an
opportunity to enlist the help of these countries and develop a
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consensus on managing China's presence in Africa.

Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Devermont.
And now Mr. Meservey. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF JOSH MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, AFRICA AND
THE MIDDLE EAST, DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN
POLICY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Meservey. Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich,
and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify.
The views I express in this testimony are my own and should
not be construed as representing any official position of the
Heritage Foundation.
By many measures, China is the most significant foreign
actor in Africa. Its lending, trade, and diplomatic engagement
now mostly outstrip other world powers, including the United
States Beijing continues, as well, to ramp up its military
cooperation activities on the continent.
While all this Chinese engagement is an opportunity for
wise and responsible African governments, it is a challenge to
United States national interests. Since the time of Chairman
Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP, has viewed the U.S.
with varying levels of intensity as a competitor. President Xi
and much of the rest of the CCP leadership appear convinced
more than ever that the United States is trying to thwart
China's rise to what they believe is its rightful place as an
unassailable global power. This suggests the CCP will escalate
its many activities that challenge American interests,
including in Africa.
I'll focus on three of these challenges in the African
context:
First, Beijing's activity is creating influence towards,
and facilitation of, illiberal governance in Africa. This
undermines the United States' decades-long attempt to encourage
the global growth of democracy. Under President Xi, Beijing has
more boldly offered its own developmental model of limited
economic freedom and repressive government as best suited to
Africa. Chinese companies also provide governments the
technological means and training to repress their people in
countries such as Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. And their routine use
of corruption to curry favor at the highest level of African
governments subverts the social contract.
Second, China is establishing economic norms on the
continent and using economic practices that disadvantage United
States firms. I already referenced Chinese companies' prolific
use of bribes to win contracts and favors in Africa, which puts
American companies at an obvious disadvantage. African
governments' at-times irresponsible borrowing from China and
the routinely opaque nature of those transactions leaves fewer
opportunities for American companies, and makes them wary of
engaging in countries with unclear debt profiles.
Third, Beijing's influence in Africa makes it harder for
the United States to achieve its national interests on a
strategically important continent. As we've already discussed
this morning, Beijing built its first permanent overseas
military base in Djibouti, nearby to the United States' only
permanent African military base. Earlier this year, lasers
emanating from that base injured U.S. military aviators flying
in the area. And, while there has been no noticeable effect
yet, China's ownership of significant Djiboutian debt gives it
substantial leverage over a country key to U.S. interests.
China has ample other chances in Africa to surveil and
harass the United States CCP-linked telecom companies have
built telecom networks and national and government networks
across the continent. The Chinese Government has also financed,
and/or Chinese companies have built, sensitive government
installations, such as parliaments and military barracks, in at
least 19 African countries. This gives them the opportunity to
access the networks or bug at least some of the politically
sensitive buildings, as they did with the Chinese-built African
Union headquarters.
These are just a few of the challenges that CCP's plans for
Africa pose to U.S. interests. There is no single means to
effectively respond. It'll take a broadbased, strategic
approach that uses all elements of American power.
To start, the U.S. should focus on achievable goals. The
United States should not try to persuade African governments to
abandon their relationships with Beijing, as they are unlikely
to do so and because some of the investment and loans China
provides does help African countries. The United States should,
instead, focus on assisting governments in striking fair and
productive deals with Beijing and providing a realistic
alternative on the projects and in the sectors where the U.S.
or its companies have a competitive advantage or a strong
strategic reason for competing.
Second, the United States should craft a governmentwide
messaging strategy on Chinese activity in Africa. The CCP has a
coherent, disciplined messaging campaign in Africa that is also
frequently misleading. It is, frankly, propaganda, and the CCP
builds significant goodwill with African audiences by wielding
it. The United States should engage more strategically in the
debate by pointing out the inaccuracies in Chinese propaganda,
but also by unapologetically advocating for its foundational
values and its record of success in promoting prosperity and
freedom globally.
Third, the United States should increase its engagement
with Africa and reorient the focus of some existing
initiatives. Such measures should include focusing the U.S.'s
overseas development assistance on enhancing countries' free-
market systems and encouraging accountable and competent
governance, increasing the efficiency of U.S. assistance by
eliminating Buy American provisions and subsidies to United
States shipping companies that deliver aid, boosting trade
beyond the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and making the
United States-Africa Leaders Summit a regular event.
Finally, the U.S. should deepen cooperation with allies
whose interests align with those of the United States. Allies
such as Japan and India are increasingly active in Africa and
share the United States' concern about Chinese engagement on
the continent.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]

Prepared Statement by Joshua Meservey
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, and members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you. Thank
you as well for highlighting one of the most important issues facing
Africa, and by extension, United States interests on the continent.
With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony into
the record.
The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be
construed as representing any official position of The Heritage
Foundation.
the challenge of chinese engagement
By many measures, China's current engagement blitz with Africa has
made it the most significant foreign actor on the continent. Its
lending, trade, and diplomatic engagement on the continent has
dramatically increased since the turn of the century, in most cases
outstripping other world powers, including the U.S. \1\ Beijing
continues as well to ramp up its various ``soft power'' and military
cooperation activities, \2\ including arms sales, \3\ in Africa.
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\1\ China is the greatest source of imports for 19 of sub-Saharan
Africa's 48 countries, up from being the largest import source for only
1 sub-Saharan African country in 2001. Chinese trade volumes with
Africa are now three times larger than the continent's trade with
India, its second-largest trade partner. The stock of Chinese Foreign
Direct Investment grew from $491 million in 2003 to $40 billion in
2016, and there are as many as 10,000 Chinese owned firms now in
Africa. See, respectively, Daniel F. Runde and Christopher Metzger,
``Is the United States Prepared for China to be Africa's Main Business
Partner?,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 31,
2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-prepared-china-be-
africas-main-business-partner; Irene Yuan Sun, Kartik Jayaram, and Omid
Kassiri, ``Dance of the Lions and Dragons,'' McKinsey & Company,
https://www.africa-newsroom.com/files/download/aa9f2979a3dc18e; and
``The Path Ahead: The 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,'' China-
Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins SAIS, Briefing Paper No. 1,
2018,https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/
5b84311caa4a998051e685e3/153 5389980283/Briefing+Paper+1+-
+August+2018+-+Final.pdf.
\2\ These include exchange visits of defense and military
personnel, training for African military personnel in China and Africa,
construction of military training centers, joint military exercises,
and a two-week inaugural China-Africa Defense Forum in Beijing June-
July 2018.
\3\ From 2012-2015, China accounted for more than 32 percent of the
value of all arms deliveries to the continent, more than double the
value of what it supplied from 2008 to 2011. Today, two-thirds of
African countries use some Chinese military equipment. See Catherine A.
Theohary, ``Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-
2015,'' Congressional Research Service, December 19, 2016, https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf and Ashley Cowburn, ``Two-thirds of
African Countries Now Using Chinese Military Equipment, Report
Reveals,'' Independent, March 1, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/africa/two-thirds-of-african-countries-now-using-chinese-
military-equipment-a6905286.html.
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While all this Chinese engagement is an opportunity for wise and
responsible African governments, it is a challenge to United States
national security interests. I will focus on three of these challenges.
First, Beijing's activities create an influence towards, and
facilitation of, illiberal governance in Africa. This undermines the
U.S.'s decades-long attempts to encourage the global growth of
democracy. Chinese officials criticize democracy to African
counterparts, claiming that the West's advocacy of it is a Trojan horse
to enable meddling in African affairs. \4\ Chinese officials have also
blamed multi-party democracy for bringing chaos and poverty to Africa,
and cheer what they see as the continent's increasing rejection of
Western-style democracy. \5\ Chinese diplomats in Africa spread the
idea that ``economic rights'' trump fundamental, individual rights that
form the core of any successful democracy. \6\
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\4\ Ian Taylor, ``Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human
Rights,'' African Affairs, Vol. 107, No. 426 (January 1, 2008), pp. 63-
87, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm056.
\5\ Denis M. Tull, ``China's Engagement in Africa: Scope,
Significance and Consequences,'' The Journal of Modern African Studies,
Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 459-479, http://archives.cerium.ca/
IMG/pdf/Tull.pdf.
\6\ Ian Taylor, ``China's Foreign Policy towards Africa in the
1990s,'' The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep.,
1998), pp. 443-460, https://www.jstor.org/stable/161792.
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Beijing also increasingly offers its own model of development--some
economic freedom with repressive governance--as a solution for African
nations. As early as the 1950s, China at times pushed its economic and
political model as the one most suitable for developing countries. \7\
Since Xi Jinping's ascension, Beijing has pursued this course more
aggressively, \8\ and strengthened its propaganda and other
capabilities to make its case. \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Rosemary Foot, ``Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global
Order: Accommodating and Hedging,'' International Affairs, Vol. 82, No.
1, January 2006, pp. 77-94, http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/Foot_Chinese_Strategies_International_Affairs. pdf.
\8\ Aaron L. Friedberg, ``Competing with China,'' Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy, Vol. 60, No. 3 (June-July 2018), pp. 7-64,
https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/survival-global-
politics-and-strategy-junejuly-2018/603-02-friedberg, and Tull,
``China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences.''
\9\ Anne-Marie Brady, ``Magic Weapons: China's Political Influence
Activities under Xi Jinping,'' Wilson Center, September 2017, https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magic weaponsanne-
mariebradyseptember162017.pdf.
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As part of its effort to burnish its international image and build
support for its foreign policy goals, Beijing provides tens of
thousands of scholarships to African students to study in China. \10\
Under Xi, Chinese universities require students to take courses that
include heavy doses of Marxism and Maoism, \11\ increasing the
likelihood that African students in China are exposed to arguments
sympathetic to those authoritarian philosophies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ At the most recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Xi
Jinping announced that China would increase the number of government
scholarships it offers to African students to study in China from
30,000 to 50,000. ``Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's Speech
at Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit,'' Xinhua, September
3, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm.
\11\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``Mao 101: Inside a Chinese Classroom
Training the Communists of Tomorrow,'' The New York Times, June 28,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/asia/chinese-classrooms-
education-communists.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, Beijing sponsors trips to China for African scholars,
politicians, and media professionals. This charm offensive with African
intellectual leaders increases the likelihood they will be sympathetic
to, and perhaps even advocate in their home countries for, a political
system similar to what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created.
Chinese activity facilitates undemocratic governance in a number of
other ways as well. Beijing's supposed no-strings-attached policy makes
it easier for governments to use Chinese aid and investment to fuel
patronage networks that underpin their grip on power, \12\ and to avoid
the good governance requirements Western countries frequently attach to
aid and investment. \13\ The CCP's willingness to unreservedly
cooperate with repressive regimes, such as those in Zimbabwe and Sudan,
lessens those regimes' international isolation and likely increases
their longevity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Axel Dreher et al., ``Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the
Geography of China's Foreign Assistance,'' AidData Working Paper No. 3,
November 2014, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/files/
wps3_aid_on_demand_african_leaders_and_the_geography_of_chinas_foreign_a
ssistance.pdf.
\13\ Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, ``China, Filling a Void,
Drills for Riches in Chad,'' The New York Times, August 13, 2007,
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/world/africa/13chinaafrica.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese state-owned or--linked companies frequently bribe African
officials and political parties to win contracts and general favor.
\14\ Doing so subverts the social contract by tempting African leaders
to be more responsive to Chinese concerns than to those of their own
citizens. Similarly, the opaque lending and tendering arrangements that
characterize Chinese economic engagement in Africa facilitate
corruption and insulate leaders from being held accountable by their
citizens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ For documentation of a few of the myriad instances of this,
see Joshua Meservey, ``Chinese Corruption in Africa Undermines
Beijing's Rhetoric About Friendship with the Continent,'' The Heritage
Foundation Issue Brief No. 4895, https://www.heritage.org/global-
politics/report/chinese-corruption-africa-undermines-beijings-rhetoric-
about-friendship-the.
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China also exports to African governments the tools and training
for repressing their people. \15\ Beijing gave ``technical support'' on
issues such as state security to Zimbabwe's repressive ZANU-PF party,
\16\ and several of its companies reportedly provided equipment to jam
independent radio broadcasts \17\ and surveil telecommunications in
Zimbabwe. \18\ A Chinese company, Cloudwalk, has agreed to provide
facial recognition technology to the Zimbabwean Government, something
it has done for Chinese police involved in the draconian surveillance
of China's Xinjiang region. \19\ ZTE, the Chinese Government-linked
telecommunications giant, provided the Ethiopian regime--at the time
one of the continent's most oppressive--the technology to monitor its
citizens' telecommunications activity. \20\ Chinese technicians
allegedly helped the Zambian Government create a surveillance system
targeting political opponents and diplomats as well. \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Chinese President Xi Jinping recently remarked at the China-
Arab State Cooperation Forum, ``China will investigate extending a
total of one billion yuan to countries in the region, to support the
relevant countries build [sic] `social stability' capacity.'' ``Social
stability'' is the goal the Chinese Government says it is achieving
through its program of repressive surveillance, indoctrination, and
mass incarceration in Xinjiang. Matt Schrader (@tombschrader), ``The
translation: ``China will investigate extending a total of one billion
yuan to countries in the region, to support the relevant countries
build 'social stability' capacity''. August 5, 2018, 2:23pm, Tweet. For
an example of a Chinese official using ``social stability'' in remarks,
see Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's
Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,'' The Wall Street Journal,
December 19, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-
xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-
1513700355.
\16\ Alex Vines, ``What is the Extent of China's Influence in
Zimbabwe?'', BBC News, November 20, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-42012629.
\17\ ``All Communications Can Now be Intercepted under New Law
Signed by Mugabe,'' Reporters Without Borders, August 6, 2007, https://
rsf.org/en/news/all-communications-can-now-be-intercepted-under-new-
law-signed-mugabe.
\18\ Itai Mushekwe, ``China, Russia and Iran helping Zimbabwe to
Set-up Own NSA,'' Bulawayo 24 News, March 23, 2018, https://
bulawayo24.com/index-id-technology-sc-internet-byo-131135. html.
\19\ For reporting of Cloudwalk's agreement with Zimbabwe, see Shan
Jie, ``China Exports Facial ID Technology to Zimbabwe,'' Global Times,
April 12, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1097747.shtml. For
reporting of Cloudwalk's involvement in the surveillance in Xinjiang,
see Chin and Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance
State Overwhelms Daily Life.''
\20\ ``Ethiopia: Telecom Surveillance Chills Rights,'' Human Rights
Watch, March 25, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/25/ethiopia-
telecom-surveillance-chills-rights.
\21\ State of Internet Freedom in Zambia 2016, Collaboration on
International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, December 2016,
https://cipesa.org/?wpfb_dl=244; and ``China Media Bulletin: Issue No.
82,'' Freedom House, March 7, 2013, https://freedomhouse.org/china-
media/china-media-bulletin-issue-no-82#5.
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Finally, China provides an implicit influence towards illiberalism
merely by being an authoritarian, wealthy country in which hundreds of
millions have recently risen from poverty. That record of success is
attractive, particularly to African rulers with authoritarian
tendencies who see in China an example of how to achieve economic
growth while maintaining sweeping and indefinite rule. \22\
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\22\ Officials in Tanzania and Zimbabwe publicly expressed their
admiration for, and in some cases mimicked, elements of China's
repressive regime. For Tanzania, see Asterius Banzi, ``Tanzania: Govt
Seeks Chinese Help in Social Media,'' allAfrica, August 1, 2017,
https://allafrica.com/stories/201708020658.html and Amy Hawkins,
``Beijing's Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces,'' Foreign Policy,
July 24, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/beijings-big-
brother-tech-needs-african-faces/. For Zimbabwe, see Tawanda Karombo,
``Mugabe Lauds `Protective' Cyber Security Ministry,'' ITWeb Africa,
October 11, 2017, http://www. itwebafrica.com/security/887-zimbabwe/
240828-mugabe-lauds-protective-cyber-security-ministry.
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Second, China is establishing economic norms on the continent that
disadvantage U.S. firms. Chinese companies' willingness to offer bribes
gives them an advantage when competing for contracts against American
and other companies that are rightly forbidden by law from offering
bribes. \23\
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\23\ A Sierra Leonean newspaper reported in 2015 that corruption--
which the Chinese ``areencouraging and fueling''--has become so bad in
that country that honest investors have threatened to withdraw. Abdul
Rashid Thomas, ``Foreign Investors May Leave Sierra Leone Due to
Corruption and Lack of Rule of Law,'' The Sierra Leone Telegraph, April
3, 2015, https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/foreign-investors-may-
leave-sierra-leone-due-to-corruption-and-lack-of-the-rule-of-law/
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A number of African Governments have borrowed recklessly from
China, and the terms of those loans are frequently opaque.
Irresponsible borrowing is primarily the African Governments' fault,
but the Chinese practice of offering easy money with little regard for
debt sustainability exacerbates the problem. \24\ African Governments
overly burdened by debt will likely be unable or unwilling to launch
other projects in which U.S. companies might have been involved, and
U.S. companies will be wary of seeking opportunities in a country with
an unclear debt profile.
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\24\ Beijing's actions suggest it does not wish to be constrained
by international practices on lending. For instance, it has refused
invitations to join the Paris Club, a group of creditor nations that
abide by agreed standards on such issues as debt sustainability. For
discussion of Beijing's refusal to join the Paris Club, see
``Multilateral Economic Institutions and U.S. Foreign Policy,'' U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multilateral
International Development, Multilateral Institutions, and International
Economic, Energy, and Environmental Policy, November 27, 2018, https://
www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/multilateral-economic-institutions-and-
us-foreign-policy-11272018.
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Similarly, Chinese loans are frequently ``tied,'' meaning that
borrowing governments must select a Chinese company to lead the
project. One report claims that 70 percent of Chinese-backed contracts
are awarded to Chinese companies. \25\ This leaves fewer opportunities
for U.S. firms given that governments have a finite borrowing capacity,
which for some governments is increasingly taken up by Chinese loans
that primarily benefit Chinese companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Yun Sun, ``China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?,''
Brookings, February 7, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-
aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/.
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The present and future opportunities in Africa that United States
companies risk increasingly missing because of China's anti-competitive
activities are significant. By 2030, an estimated 19 African economies
will be growing by 5 percent or more per year, and the continent will
likely constitute a $3 trillion economy. \26\ The African Development
Bank predicts that consumer spending in Africa will grow to $1.4
trillion 2020. \27\ The continent also has 60 percent of the world's
uncultivated arable land, approximately 7.5 percent of the world's
known oil and gas reserves, and the largest or second-largest global
reserves of 10 key minerals. \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Michael Lalor, et al., ``Connectivity Redefined,'' EY's
Attractiveness Program Africa, May 2017, http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/eyafrica-attractiveness-report/$FILE/ey-africa
attractiveness-report.pdf.
\27\ ``Future of Africa's Youth Does Not Lie in Migration to
Europe, Adesina Tells G7,'' African Development Bank Group, May, 29,
2017, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/future-of-africas-youth-
does-not-lie-in-migration-to-europe-adesina-tells-g7-17056/.
\28\ 2014 Minerals Yearbook: Africa, United States Geological
Survey of the U.S. Department of Interior, December 2017, https://
minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2014/myb3-sum-2014-africa.pdf.
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Third, Beijing's influence in Africa makes it harder for the United
States to achieve its national interests on a strategically important
continent. Africa touches three of the world's eight maritime
chokepoints, abuts Europe and Asia, and has thousands of miles of
Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastline. Powers such as China, Russia,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India, and many others are jockeying for
influence on the continent. Furthermore, included in Africa's share of
the world's mineral reserves are 22 of the 33 mineral commodities the
United States deems critical to its economy and national defense, and
for which the U.S. is more than 50 percent import reliant. \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ The U.S. currently imports at least some of its supply of 15
of those 22 critical mineral commodities from China and/or Russia.
China dominates the global supply chain for cobalt--necessary for
making lithium-ion batteries which may be critical to powering self-
driving cars, a potentially massive industry in the near future--50
percent of which is produced in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For
the statistics on Cobalt, see Scott Patterson and Russell Gold,
``There's a Global Race to Control Batteries--and China Is Winning,''
The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/theres-a-global-race-to-control-batteriesand-china-is-winning-
1518374815?mod=e2tw. The 22 critical mineral commodities found in
Africa are Aluminum, Antimony, Arsenic, Barite, Cesium, Chromium,
Cobalt, Fluorspar, Graphite, Lithium, Manganese, Niobium, Platinum-
Group Metals, Rare Earths, Rubidium, Tantalum, Tin, Titanium Mineral
Concentrate, Tungsten, Uranium, Vanadium, and Zirconium. Variety of
sources compiled by author.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are already witnessing the consequences to United States
interests of China's growing Africa presence. One study finds that
increasing amounts of Chinese commercially-oriented financial flows to
countries correlates with those countries voting less frequently with
the United States, and more frequently with China, at the U.N. \30\
China has increasingly isolated Taiwan, an American ally, in part by
luring away all but one of its African supporters. Africans also on
average perceive the United States only slightly more positively as a
model of national development over China, suggesting that one element
of American ``soft power,'' that difficult to measure but important
facilitator of U.S. interests, is not as robust as we would wish.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Damian Raess, Wanlin Ren, and Patrick Wagner, ``Chinese
Commercially-Oriented Financial Flows and UN Voting Realignment,''
University of Reading, University of Bern, December 2017, http://
wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PEIO11_paper_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing also built its first permanent overseas military base in
Djibouti, nearby to the United States' only permanent African military
base. Earlier this year, high-powered lasers emanating from the Chinese
base injured United States military aviators flying in the area. And
while there has been no noticeable effect yet, China's ownership of
Djiboutian debt equivalent to about 75 percent of Djibouti's GDP \31\
gives it significant leverage over a country key to United States
interests in Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, ``Examining
the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy
Perspective,'' Center for Global Development, March 2018, https://
www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-
road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China has ample other opportunities in Africa to surveil and harass
the United States. Early this year, a French newspaper reported that
Beijing bugged the Chinese-built African Union headquarters in Addis
Ababa, and daily exploited its servers. It is a near certainty that
Beijing listened to, along with many others, United States officials'
sensitive conversations with African counterparts.
Huawei, the company that provided the compromised ICT equipment to
the African Union, is one of China's national champion companies. It,
along with ZTE, another major telecom company with close ties to the
CCP, \32\ has built more than 40 telecom networks in over 30 African
countries, and national and government networks in more than 20 African
countries. \33\ The Chinese Government has also financed, and/or
Chinese companies have built, sensitive government installations such
as state houses and parliaments in at least nineteen African countries.
\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Elsa Kania, ``Much Ado about Huawei (Part 1),'' Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, March 27, 2018, https://
www.aspistrategist.org.au/much-ado-huawei-part-1/ and Nick McKenzie and
Angus Grigg, ``China's ZTE was Built to Spy and Bribe, Court Documents
Allege,'' The Sydney Morning Herald, May 31, 2018, https://
www.smh.com.au/business/companies/china-s-zte-was-built-to-spy-and-
bribe-court-documents-allege-20180531-p4ziqd.html.
\33\ Andrea Marshall, ``China's Mighty Telecom Footprint in
Africa,'' New Security Learning, February 14, 2011, http://
www.newsecuritylearning.com/index.php/archive/75-chinas-mighty-telecom-
footprint-inafrica.
\34\ The countries are Burundi, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Variety of sources compiled
by author.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CCP may lack the capacity or inclination to monitor all the
buildings and ICT networks Chinese companies have built in Africa. Yet
it would be surprising if they did not create vulnerabilities in the
networks that allow them easy access, or bug at least some of the
politically sensitive buildings.
u.s. strategic priorities, and how to achieve them
Some elements of Chinese activity in Africa could indirectly
benefit the United States. The increased economic growth that comes
from some of China's engagements positively affects all countries
involved in Africa. Beijing also appears more willing to use its
influence with some African countries to try to achieve resolution to
conflicts, including those the United States seeks to end. Chinese
medical teams have as well served on the continent for decades,
contributing to improved public health on the continent.
In net, however, China's activities in Africa negatively affect
United States interests. Since the time of Mao, the CCP has viewed the
U.S., with varying levels of intensity according to the geopolitics of
the time, as a competitor. \35\ Xi and the coterie of CCP leadership
around him appear convinced more than ever that the United States is
trying to thwart China's rise to what they believe is its rightful
place as an unassailable global power. That suggests the CCP will
escalate its many activities that harm American interests, including in
Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Joshua Meservey, ``China's Propaganda in Africa Hurts United
States Interests--and the U.S. Must Counter It,'' The Heritage
Foundation Issue Brief No. 4920, November 19, 2018, https://
www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/IB4920.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three strategic priorities should guide the United States response
in Africa to this challenge:

1. Buttress democracy against Beijing's illiberal effect on
African governance;

2. Facilitate regulatory and normative environments that ensure
United States companies' ability to compete for the continent's rapidly
growing economic opportunities on an equal footing with Chinese
companies; and

3. Maintain and expand the status, means, and positioning of the
United States in Africa to protect its current and future interests.

There is no single means to achieve these priorities. It will take
a broad-based, strategic approach that uses all elements of American
power. To start, the U.S. should:

Focus on achievable goals. The United States should not
try to persuade African governments to abandon their relationships with
Beijing as they are unlikely to do so, and because some of the
investment and loans China provides does help African countries. The
United States should instead focus on assisting African countries in
striking fair and productive deals with Beijing; ameliorating the
negative effects of Chinese engagement in Africa; and providing a
realistic alternative for African governments on the projects and in
the sectors where the United States or its companies have a competitive
advantage or strong strategic reason for competing.

Craft a government-wide messaging strategy on Chinese
activity in Africa. The messages must be tailored to specific
audiences, and be delivered in the spirit of friendly concern from a
worried ally. Part of the messaging should include pointing out, in
appropriately subtle and sensitive ways, the misleading and self-
serving nature of Chinese propaganda, and the routine corruption in
which many Chinese companies engage, despite the frequent Chinese
rhetoric about pursuing a sincere friendship with Africa. This effort
should include seeking, compiling, and publicizing reports of Chinese
corruption scandals in Africa.

Mobilize the many United States civil society
organizations concerned about China's effect on democratic and economic
norms in Africa. Many of these organizations have deep Africa
experience, and can help to push back on Beijing's propaganda.

Deepen cooperation with allies whose interests align with
those of the United States. American allies such as Japan and India
are increasingly active in Africa, and share the United States'
concerns about Chinese engagement on the continent.

Prioritize the fight against African corruption.
Corruption is a competitive advantage for Chinese companies. Ideas for
ameliorating this problem include helping countries strengthen their
civil societies, promoting economic freedom, and elevating the fight
against graft as part of U.S. development assistance. The U.S. should
also leverage technology and the power of crowds by helping civil
society organizations create tools to track and publicize corruption.
Apps similar to Waze, which uses crowdsourced information to monitor
traffic, could track corruption, and even create heat maps and lists of
particularly corrupt government offices.

Call on China to abide by its commitments agreed to in
the U.N. Convention Against Corruption that requires countries to
establish laws criminalizing bribing foreign officials to gain business
advantage. Beijing is unlikely to heed such calls, but they are another
avenue by which the United States can demonstrate China's lack of
commitment to fighting corruption in Africa.

Encourage Beijing and its debtors to abide by
international norms on lending and to be transparent about terms and
conditions. The details of Chinese lending are frequently opaque,
making it harder for African publics to hold their leaders accountable
for economic decisions.

Ensure that the new United States International
Development Finance Corporation focuses on projects that directly
support the United States' efforts to protect its interest from China's
challenge. Supporting the United States in its strategic competition
with China was one of the stated purposes of USIDFC. \36\ Congress
should vigorously exercise its oversight authority to ensure it does
so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Brett D. Schaefer and James M. Roberts, ``Government's Track
Record Suggests BUILD Act Wouldn't `Pour Money' Into Africa,'' The
Heritage Foundation, August 7, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/africa/
commentary/governments-track-record-suggests-build-act-wouldnt-pour-
money-africa.

Increase its engagement with Africa and reorient the
focus of some extant initiatives. Such measures should include
focusing the U.S.'s overseas development assistance on enhancing
countries' free-market systems and encouraging accountable and
competent governance; increasing the efficiency of U.S. aid by
eliminating ``buy American'' provisions and subsidies to United States
shipping companies that deliver aid; boosting trade beyond the African
Growth and Opportunity Act; and making the United States-Africa Leaders
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summit a regular event.

Advocate for foundational American values. The United
States should take every opportunity to communicate to African publics
and leaders how its system promotes the values proven to best
facilitate human flourishing: representative government, rule of law,
free markets, and individual freedom.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward
to any questions you may have.

*******************

The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and
educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no
funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any
government or other contract work.
The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in
the United States. During 2016, it had hundreds of thousands of
individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every
state in the U.S. Its 2016 income came from the following sources:

Individuals 75.3%
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The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with
1.0% of its 2016 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited
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Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals
discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are
their own and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage
Foundation or its board of trustees.

Senator Ernst. Thank you very much. Very good testimony.
And what we will do now is open up for questions. And each
of the participants will have 5 minutes. And we'll rotate
through, as many times as we can. If we are joined by other
members, they will have the opportunity for questions, as well.
So, I will start with all of our witnesses, if you would.
What are China's military and broader security objectives in
Africa? And in what areas are their objectives then contrary to
our own United States interests?
Mrs. Sun, why don't we start with you, please.
Mrs. Sun. Thank you very much for the question.
So, looking broadly at China's global strategic and
military ambition, one of the key component of the Chinese
desire is to have a blue-water navy, and standing in the way is
the obstacle that China does not have a overseas base. And
traditionally, there is also this belief, in China, that not to
have deployment of Chinese troops in the military overseas is
one of the principles of the--operation. So, in order to build
China's maritime strong-power status, China needs a blue-water
navy. And to have the blue-water navy, China needs overseas
bases. And the Djibouti military base is the first step. And
the Chinese--senior officials have not been shy, at least
privately, in meetings with the American interlocutors to
express their desire to have more overseas bases, and have
Djibouti to be the first one.
Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Mr. Devermont.
Mr. Devermont. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
I think that China's military goals are multifaceted.
First, it's about strategic depth, as my colleague said, being
able to have a wider logistic network so they can project power
easy, quickly.
Two, I think it's to respond to the threats that are posed
towards Chinese nationals. Chinese nationals, like United
States nationals, are kidnapped. Chinese nationals, like United
States nationals, are caught up in instability. And China, I
think, has increasingly recognized that it wasn't properly
positioned. In fact, during the instability in Libya, they had
to commandeer a cruise ship and rent buses to do a non-
combatant evacuation of its citizens out of Libya; give you a
sense of its limitations.
Three, I think that it's also about a counter-narrative it
allows them to project, to argue that they're providing a
global good. China is now the second-largest financial
contributor out of the U.N. Security Council members to
peacekeeping, and the largest peacekeeping contributor of the
five Security Council members. They have about 2,000
peacekeepers, advisers, and police currently deployed sub-
Saharan Africa, and this allows China to say that they're
providing global good, contributing security. And it
particularly is relevant as they make the argument about the
U.S. position.
And then, third, their military is tied and integrated with
their economic advantages. Putting bases in Africa, and doing
these security engagements, gives them the opportunity to sell
weapons and to tie it to other projects that benefit the
Chinese economy.
Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Mr. Meservey.
Mr. Meservey. Yeah, I agree with all that my colleagues
said, and I'll just emphasize a few points, and reiterate some
others.
Yeah, China has become increasingly concerned about its
ability to protect its nationals. There have been some ugly
incidents, anti-Chinese riots and things of that nature, but
then there's also been the Libya meltdown, where thousands of
Chinese nationals were caught, had to be evacuated. South Sudan
has seen similar unrests that have compromised Chinese
nationals. They also want to enhance their prestige, like face
and prestige is very important to the CCP government. And, as
my colleague was saying, they can pose--or project themselves
as a responsible global actor by engaging in some of these
activities. They also want influence in critical regions.
That's why they chose Djibouti. That wasn't an accident. Bab-
el-Mandeb Strait actually carries about 50 percent of China's
oil imports. So, like the U.S., they want to ensure that their
prerogatives are protected at a global shipping chokepoint.
Weapons sales, yes. I also think that there is an element
of the Chinese military getting practice, frankly. So, as they
engage in these more complex operations, like evacuations, but
also operating in austere environments, in semi-arid
environments, environments they might not have access to in
China itself, that gives them valuable experience in
warfighting.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
And, just briefly, any one of you, Do we see any overlap
where their military presence would be a benefit to the United
States?
Mr. Devermont. I think that the peacekeeping side of the
house is important. The big conclusion of the 2015 Peacekeeping
Summit is that we need more specialized peacekeeping units. And
China, most of their units are engineering battalions; they
don't do a lot of fighters. And so, in that respect, under the
rubric of the U.N., I think that can be argued as a positive.
Senator Ernst. So, having some sort of oversight, then it
can be beneficial. But, I think maybe most of us would agree
that, for the better part, our interests are maybe not the same
as their interests.
Mr. Devermont. I agree, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much.
Next, we'll move to the Ranking Member.
Senator Heinrich. We have, rightfully, talked a lot about
China and what they are doing to seize the strategic high
ground across the continent. I want to flip that on its head a
little bit. And, Mr. Devermont, you've touched on this, but I
want to ask all of you. Let's talk about what the opportunities
are in Africa that, currently, we are missing. Because it seems
like much of this is a vacuum that China has been happy to
fill. So, why are we allowing that vacuum to occur? And what
are some strategic fairly-low-hanging-fruit kind of things that
we should be doing right now to make sure that they're not
operating in a vacuum across the continent?
And that's for all of you, frankly.
Mrs. Sun?
Mrs. Sun. Sure. I will go first.
I think for a very long time, the narrative about United
States and China sharing common interests in Africa is not new.
And that narrative has been present in both governments and in
both policy communities. And there have been many dialogues and
many communications between the two about how and on what
issues the two governments and two countries can cooperate with
each other.
However, having said that, on a lot of issues United States
and China simply share, there are convergent interests, but
there are also divergent interests. For example, in terms of
foreign aid, the Chinese implement a very different set of
criteria and a very different set of goals in their foreign aid
practice. More than half of their foreign aid is used to cover
the interest--the differences of the interests of----
Senator Heinrich. I get that. I want to know what the
United States should be doing.
Mr. Devermont, you mentioned a couple of things, where, for
example, the highest-ranking official to visit the----
Mr. Devermont. Yeah.
Senator Heinrich.----continent in the last couple of years
is the Secretary of State?
Mr. Devermont. Yes, sir. I think that we are falling down
on our engagement with African leaders. We have only hosted two
sub-Saharan leaders in the Oval Office at the start of this
administration, President Buhari, of Nigeria, and President
Uruhu Kenyatta, of Kenya. Only the Secretary of State has now
visited sub-Saharan Africa, former Secretary Tillerson. As my
colleague, Josh, said, I think that there is a value in another
United States-African Leaders Summit, which was in 2014, which
is an important engagement in the same way that FOCAC, the
Forum on Chinese-African Cooperation, is an important event for
Beijing. And then, I think, on soft power, we need to be
thinking about, How do we become the preeminent destination for
Africans to get an education and to make connection with the
United States? I also think, on our soft-power engagement, it
still is very old and lacks a freshness to it. I'll point to
President Macron of France's recent trip to Nigeria, where he
went to a music venue known as The Shrine and really engaged
with Nigerians in a very electrifying way. And most of our
engagement still is jazz ambassadors and bluegrass bands, and
it's not connecting to a really vibrant music, film, sports,
entertainment culture in sub-Saharan Africa that could allow us
to leverage one of our strengths, which is our cultural
exports.
Senator Heinrich. Mr. Meservey, do you have thoughts?
Mr. Meservey. Yeah. Again, to reemphasize, the Africa
Leaders Summit, I think, is a great idea. China does a similar
thing every 3 years, have been, for a number of years now, and
many other countries--India does--Japan, et cetera. I think
Oval Office visits, really important. I would like to see more
commercial attaches in Africa that can really facilitate some
of these United States companies getting into the continent. I
think embassies need to be more involved in proactively seeking
out opportunities for American companies, providing American
companies with information, facilitating relationships, things
of that nature. Make it more of a focus for these embassies.
Yeah, I agree that Hollywood actually--like our film
industry is a major soft-power tool that we have, and I think--
but, there is a huge entertainment industry in Africa--
Nollywood, of course, famously. So, I think looking for
synergies there. I actually saw, recently, I think Netflix is
going to show a Nollywood film for the first time. So, I think
that's positive. I think there's a lot more that we could be
doing there, that the government could be facilitating or
encouraging.
Senator Heinrich. Are we getting the tone right?
Mr. Meservey. The tone?
Senator Heinrich. Yeah. Or has----
Mr. Meservey. Some----
Senator Heinrich.----our engagement with Africa been
patronizing and, in some cases, downright denigrating?
Mr. Meservey. Yeah, I would agree with that. It really--it
can--the tone can vary. And I think that's--I mentioned the
messaging that we need to do, that the tone is really
important, because there's obvious sensitivities on the
continent. The U.S. is not a colonial power, but it's still
lumped in, frequently, with colonial power. So, very, very
important to get the tone right, to speak to them as partners,
to treat them as partners. But, that will also require
demanding some accountability----
Senator Heinrich. Absolutely.
Mr. Meservey.----and reorienting, as I mentioned, the focus
more away from aid and towards, you know, free enterprise
activities, things of that nature.
Senator Heinrich. Great.
Thank you all.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, to our witnesses here today.
I have recently read a report from--it's the Center for
International Private Enterprise, which talks about how we need
to protect democracies, particularly in Africa, from a flood of
what they call ``corrosive capital'' that corrodes these
emerging and developing democracies, primarily because of lack
of transparency. But, one issue in particular I'd like to have
of you comment on is that there is they talk about a widely-
held belief that Chinese loans come with no strings attached,
and that gives them an advantage in order to put these loans
out, relative to loans from either the U.S. or from
international organizations, which puts strings, such as human
rights, anticorruption, issues that we, of course, care very
deeply about, here in the United States, but that it's false
that Chinese have no strings, because they look for things to
be sole-sourced with Chinese firms, they want a dominant equity
share in projects, you have to have the mass importation of
Chinese workers into these countries. I mean, the list goes on.
Could each of you talk a little bit about this corrosive
capitalism, as referred to by this organization, whether or not
you believe that is something we should be concerned about,
and, more importantly, how do we deal with it?
Start with you, Mr. Meservey.
Mr. Meservey. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Yeah, I've read the report. I thought it was excellent. I
agree with its findings. And I referenced, in my written
testimony and my oral testimony, the routine corruption that
African companies engage in that wins them all sorts of favors
and makes it very hard for others to compete. There was an
interesting survey done that found anywhere from 60 to 87
percent of Chinese companies admit to paying bribes to obtain
licenses and things of that nature. U.S. companies will find--
or leaders will find themselves in jail if they do something
similar.
So, I think that the way to combat this--it's obviously
extraordinarily difficult, but you have to focus on civil
society, I would say, because, oftentimes, African governments,
themselves, are incentivized to engage in this behavior. One of
the scourges of the continent is corruption. And so, they're
frequently far too willing to engage in this corrupt game.
So, the biggest victims of corruption are the African
people, themselves. They're the ones left holding the bag. So,
focusing on civil society, increasing their technical capacity,
journalists, investigative journalists. There are some very
brave people on the continent, writing brave things, and
exposing all sorts of misdeeds. So, I think you have to really
focus in on civil society.
Senator Peters. Devermont?
Mr. Devermont. Yeah, thank you, Senator.
I agree that the idea of no strings is a false concept. Not
only is there strings in terms of the economic investments, but
increasingly there are strings regarding the politics. The
former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Linda Thomas-
Greenfield, publicly said that, for the first time, the Chinese
weren't even saying that we don't interfere in countries'
internal affairs anymore. And I think some of the instability
in South Sudan and in Zimbabwe have laid bare that, when China
has their economic interests at risk, they are going to do and
engage in ways to protect those interests. There has been a
number of recent exposes and convictions of Chinese corruption.
In fact, most recently in our courts, a Chinese businessman was
convicted for bribing the Ugandan and Chadian governments for
an investment. And we know, from data, such as AidData, a
research lab out of the College of William and Mary, that
Chinese investment in Africa disproportionally affects the
leader's home region or community.
I think the answer, as my colleague said, is civil society.
I also think it is urging Africans to ask for better deals. It
is possible. Andrew Alli, the former head of the African
Finance Corporation, recently talked about how you can get
better labor practices, more transparency, but an African
Government has to ask for it.
Thank you.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Mrs. Sun. In terms of the strings attached through Chinese
investment, there are political strings. For example, on the
issue of Taiwan and on the issue of Tibet, on the issue of
China's domestic human rights record, African countries are
expected to support China's position, or at least remain
silent. That was also demonstrated in Africans' attitude
towards China's position on the South China Sea.
In terms of the economic strings attached, the African
governments are supposed to take loans from China to finance
projects, which adds to the problem--sustainability. According
to Chinese official media, 70 percent of the contracts
associated with the infrastructure projects are supposed to
deliver to Chinese bidders. The Chinese infrastructure
contractors are the ones bringing these projects.
In terms of the participation in corruption in Africa, I
would say that China did not create this problem, that this
problem was already there before China went to Africa. But,
China's willingness to participate in those practices certainly
has exasperated the problem.
As for the reaction, of course, civil society free media
investigative journalism, I also propose that there should be
more understanding and more studies of specific Chinese
projects, especially the mega-infrastructure projects in
Africa, how they were reached, how they were negotiated, and
how the results are being received by the local community.
I'll stop there. Thank you.
Senator Peters. Great.
Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
We'll go ahead and do another round or two of questioning,
given time constraints.
Mr. Devermont, I'd like to address this question with you.
In your opening statement, you identify Chinese activities that
may undercut United States military access and operations as,
quote, ``an unmistakable threat,'' end quote, and you highlight
the Chinese military base in Djibouti as particularly
concerning, and note that China has invested, or has plans to
invest, in other ports. And you name those: Cameroon, Guinea,
Madagascar, Mozambique, and others. Will you please explain in
more detail how China might try to limit United States military
access and operations in Africa?
Mr. Devermont. Sure. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
So, looking at Djibouti, I mentioned the lasering of our
pilots. I think that's the clearest example. And there are, I
think, questions that remain about our ability to move up and
down the coast as they sit on that central chokepoint.
One of the challenges with looking at these ports and
divining which ones will become a military logistics hub and
which one will be just a commercial investment is that the
Chinese are doing economic, political, security investments at
the same time. And I think, as a good logician is doing--
logistician--they are creating options for themselves. And so,
I think, ultimately, they are going to look for a perch on the
Atlantic. I'm not sure which one of those places that is going
to be. At CSIS, we're interested in taking a much closer look
at all of the port investments in sub-Saharan Africa, and
trying to give a greater picture, both to the level of
investment, the opportunities for it to transition into a
military logistics base, and, as your questions asked, ma'am,
which of those could actually limit our ability to maneuver
through these key waters.
Thank you.
Senator Ernst. So, do you think it's the deterrence, then,
is their goal in seeking to keep United States interests from
moving freely along their coastline?
Mr. Devermont. I think it gives them the option, if things
could heat up, to close down some of those lands.
Senator Ernst. Okay.
And then, you mentioned the lasering, which is used to
disrupt our military presence and movement. Have there been
other instances that we can identify in the recent past?
Mr. Devermont. That's the only incident I know in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Senator Ernst. Okay.
And do you know of any others, Ms. Meservey?
Mr. Meservey. I've heard a related story, not involving
lasers, but that now the Chinese are complaining to the
Djiboutian Government about United States drones flying over
the base, and things of that nature. Obviously, Camp Lemonnier
and the drone operations out of there are critical to what the
United States is doing, not just in sub-Saharan Africa, but
also in the Middle East. So, I would not at all be surprised if
the Chinese are working to restrict what we can do with drones
in Djibouti.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate that.
So, we are talking about the activity around Djibouti. And
I'd like to dig in a little bit further, because it is
interesting how the Chinese do want to further develop a blue-
water navy. And, Mrs. Sun, maybe you can address this. How can
they use their presence in Djibouti to challenge the United
States? And what does this tell us about their military
ambitions elsewhere in Africa?
Mrs. Sun. Thank you very much, ma'am, for the question.
In terms of China's military ambition, I think Djibouti
serves as a learning experience for China, because this is
their first overseas base. And they have reached out to other
countries who already have the bases in Djibouti, in terms of
how to set it up, how to negotiate it with the Djiboutian
Government, and also how to operate such a base. So, in the
case of Djibouti, like I mentioned, China started it with a
U.N. mandate that was conferred to the naval escort in the Gulf
of Aden. When China first proposed to build the overseas base
in Djibouti, they used its U.N. mandate to legitimize their
demand, because they argued that the base would be serving a
U.N. purpose rather than China's own purpose. But, after the
base was established, the Chinese narrative started to change
and morph towards the--capability overseas. They have conducted
live-fire drills in the periphery of the base, and there are
discussions in China about potential intervention in African
countries to protect the Chinese assets and Chinese nationals
in the time of needs.
So, I would say that Djibouti serves as a first example of
the Chinese military stepping out of the Chinese territory, and
the--like the--has already manifested, this will not be the
first one, and it will be the first of a series of development
that China will seek.
Senator Ernst. And, just very briefly, as well, since the
Chinese messaging has changed over time with the establishment
of that base, does that serve as a disincentive for any of the
other regions or countries that might consider establishing a
Chinese base within their territory?
Mrs. Sun. I think, yes, that is very true, especially the
narrative about China's using debt-trap diplomacy to gain their
access to ports in Hambantota. That has already warned, for
example, the Burmese Government to reduce the size of the deep-
sea port that China has proposed to build in their country. We
believe this has also prevented the Russian Government from
accepting the Chinese proposal to build commercials ports in
Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. So, I think these Chinese narratives
and their ambition has already signed warning signals to
countries around the globe.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Has there been sufficient consequences
for China's breach of the protocol on the blinding laser
weapons in Djibouti? We're both signatories to that.
Mr. Meservey. There have been none that I know of.
Senator Heinrich. Would you have suggestions about what an
appropriate response might be?
Mr. Meservey. I think it's--obviously, you demarche them
and publicly protest as strongly as possible, as has already
happened. I think that you have to build in potential
countermeasures. My sense is that this was the Chinese
exploring technology and trying it out. Again, Africa is
somewhat of a testing ground for the Chinese military and
Chinese technology. Actually, in Zimbabwe, for instance,
they're doing--the Chinese company that is involved in facial
recognition. And they need dark-complected faces to----
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Mr. Meservey.----to refine that----
Senator Heinrich. To get the database.
Mr. Meservey.----technology. Yeah.
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
Mr. Meservey. But, as far as more robust measures, I'm not
sure.
Senator Heinrich. The administration intends to release its
new strategy for Africa this week. What changes do each of you
hope to see in that?
Anyone?
Mr. Devermont. I'll go.
I am looking for a strategy that thinks through--with
respect to the topic of today's conversation, that thinks
through a approach towards China's growing presence on the
continent that we can implement, that is realistic, that is
hardnosed when it needs to be, but has less bluster when it's
not necessary. And I think it also requires thinking more
broadly about the tools to counter China, and particularly
working with the Africans, not talking down to them, but to
leveraging their own concerns about Chinese debt or Chinese
malign activities, and finding partners globally. I think that
we can't do this alone, and we're not the only country or the
only member in the global community that's worried about China
in Africa.
Thank you.
Senator Heinrich. It seems like we concentrate a lot of our
effort and communications and strategy in Africa around the
African elite. And, Mr.--is it Me-SER-very or Me-ser-VERY? Me-
SER-very, sorry. You know, you mentioned the need to, at times,
shift from a USAID [United States Agency for International
Development] kind of approach to more of a business-based
approach. It seems like, in a continent where there are so many
people without basic services, like electricity, and where
there are real business cases now for doing, for example,
distributed energy in a way that jumps over the way we've
developed in the Western world, that this is a time that ought
to be ripe for business diplomacy on the continent in a way
that goes directly to the African people, as opposed to always
concentrating on the elite, and in places where, you know,
you're not reaching the broad numbers that exist there. Do you
agree with that observation?
Mr. Meservey. Yeah, I do. Part of the challenge, of course,
is that these economies are structured around the elites, so
engaging is difficult without the elites. And, obviously, we
would never be able to do it without them, but I absolutely
agree with your fundamental point that we do need to be
thinking creatively about how we reach the average African, so
to speak, both with our economic activities, but also with our
messaging that we've been talking about, and our soft power,
and all of our other activities. I think there's opportunities
there----
Senator Heinrich. Despite the fact that so many people
don't have basic lighting in their homes, a very large number
of people have access to a cellphone. And that----
Mr. Meservey. Yeah.
Senator Heinrich.----creates an awful lot of opportunities.
Mr. Meservey. Yeah.
Senator Heinrich. It seems, also, that the Chinese model of
development in Africa is something that we should be thinking
about as an opportunity, because some of the pushback that
we've seen has been from this model of, you know, when they
come in to do infrastructure, they bring Chinese contractors,
and they bring Chinese workers. And there's a lot of
frustration with that on the continent. And if the United
States or other Western democracies could provide an
alternative model for that development, that would seem like a
real opportunity.
Mr. Meservey. Yeah. Just very quickly. An American company
is in the final stages of finalizing a plan to build a
tarmacked road in Kenya----
Senator Heinrich. Kenya.
Mr. Meservey.----that's going to run parallel to the
Standard Gauge Railroad that the Chinese built. I've spoken
with the company, and they say that they are very aware of the
Chinese model, and so they are going to take every effort to
make sure that Kenya workers are employed at all levels of the
project, and it's going to be a first-rate project. So, I think
that's a real opportunity.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
I think we'll do just one more round of questioning so that
we can complete the hearing in the next 10 to 15 minutes.
I would like to build on something that Senator Heinrich
has brought up. And that is that we do have the President's
National Security Advisor, Ambassador Bolton, releasing a new
strategy for Africa in a speech tomorrow at the Heritage
Foundation. And we have talked a little bit about what the
United States can do through soft powers, other means. But, how
can we approach this as the United States by also engaging
other partner countries? Because it's not just the United
States and China engaging in Africa, or maybe should be
engaging more in Africa. What other allies, partners, can we
reach out to, to strengthen the pushback against the Chinese
and their influence in Africa?
Mr. Meservey, I'll start with you, since you're nodding.
Mr. Meservey. Yeah. Yeah, sure. No, I vigorously agree. I
had that recommendation in my written testimony and in my oral
testimony.
Yeah. One of the most skeptical countries of China's OBOR,
One Belt One Road, Initiative has been India, from the very
beginning. They've been deeply, deeply skeptical. And that's an
American ally that I think the United States should be working
with. Japan, very skeptical. South Korea, a number of Asian
countries, and, increasing, even European countries are
starting to become worried, I think. So, yeah, I think that
needs to be a conscious effort from the U.S. Government. And we
are cooperating on certain security matters. For instance, like
the G5-Sahel Security Group. That's very much a European,
African, American endeavor.
But, yeah, I think it, as I say, needs to be a conscious
effort. I'd like to see more thinking, more of these countries
sitting down with the U.S. and thinking through, ``Okay, where
do our interests align, and how do we maximize our
engagements?'' Because I think that will be the most effective
way of dealing with this problem, because some of our partners
have capabilities we don't, and vice versa.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Mrs. Sun, did you have any thoughts on that?
Mrs. Sun. Thank you for the question.
I think Japan and India will be two key partners with the
United States engagement in Africa, although there is the issue
of the size of the investment that the three countries will be
able to put on the table. When the Chinese are asked the
question that--for example, the four countries in the quad are
going to compete with China in terms of the development work in
the Indo-Pacific region. Chinese reaction is that we are
willing--we are capable of mobilizing Chinese Government
capitals to invest in these efforts. And, in comparison, the
size of the capital that the three governments can come up is
not really comparable in this sense. So, I particularly agree
with the recommendation that private sectors of the United
States, and of Japan, and of India, will have to be mobilized
to join this effort.
We can make our investment smart, because the Chinese tend
to invest in the mega projects that they are--for example, the
railway projects, they come with a very large bill. But, they
don't have to be for our investment. We can invest on the
grassroot level and help the African people on the grassroot
level, like the Chinese prioritizing the African elites, we can
target a very different audience. And Japan has formed a very
sophisticated network of aid projects and aid workers on the
ground. I think we should tap into that resource.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
I'm just going to briefly move to a different topic. Mr.
Meservey, in your remarks, you talk about the export of Chinese
tools and training to African governments for repressing their
people. Could you explain a little more in detail what you're
seeing in this regard? What does that mean directly to our
interests in Africa?
Mr. Meservey. Sure. So, the worst example of this is
probably Ethiopia, which built a very pervasive surveillance
state. And the Chinese provided some of the technology,
particularly online technology, for censoring and even shutting
down social media, for instance, or things of that nature. And
it's not just Ethiopia. We've seen it in a number of countries.
This is an unfortunate growing trend in Africa. And, again,
Chinese companies have built on the expertise that they've
developed in China doing this sort of thing, and are now
exporting it across the continent. So, jamming equipment, a
whole host of things. And again, I think this hurts United
States interests, because, one, it gives the Chinese
surveilling capabilities, where they might be able to eavesdrop
on U.S. activities, but it also hurts the U.S. decades-long
effort to encourage the global growth of democracy.
Senator Ernst. Yeah, very concerning. Thank you.
And, Mr. Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. I assume you all are familiar with the
Sri Lankan port situation. One of the things that worries me
about the situation in Djibouti is the combination of the
unique location of that site, the very close proximity of Camp
Lemonnier, and the new Chinese base, and then the overlay of
one of the examples of a real debt-leverage situation between
China and Djibouti. How much does the debt piece of that worry
each of you, in terms of where we go into the future on that
very crowded spit of land?
Mr. Devermont. I think, in Djibouti, it's the country that
I'm probably most worried about Chinese debt, because it's, you
know, upwards of 70 to 80 percent, and because, currently,
Djibouti has expelled Dubai's ports from Djibouti, and it looks
like it, potentially, will go into Chinese hands. Now, what was
behind all of that decision, I think is still unclear. But, you
can add up the debts, the strategic location, and, essentially,
the----
Senator Heinrich. In other words, the private port was
changed from----
Mr. Devermont. Yes.
Senator Heinrich.----being operated by----
Mr. Devermont. From--yeah, Dubai ports were--to currently
under the Djiboutian Government, but there's indications that
it----
Senator Heinrich. To Chinese----
Mr. Devermont.--there's indications that it may move to
China. So, I think that's a potent example of what's happening
in Djibouti right now.
Senator Heinrich. How much do you make of the pushback that
seems to be beginning to emerge in China, the frustration with
the scale of debt relief, of spending on mega projects? You
know, there have been some examples of influential university
professors and others starting to make a bigger deal in China
of the sort of flashy spending that China's doing in Africa. Is
that a real situation? Is that something that you view as
fairly widescale and legitimate pushback? Is it something that
President Xi is taking seriously?
Mrs. Sun. I think that is something that President Xi is
taking seriously, because the extravagant spending associated
with the Belt and Road Initiative has been criticized
constantly and repeatedly in China about economic viability and
whether the Chinese foreign reserve can actually afford such
squandering and wasteful spending--projects being economically
sustainable in the future.
The counterargument from the so-called strategists or the
politicians is that China is a great power, China needs to use
its financial resources to demonstrate its generosity and the
public good China, as a great power, is willing to provide.
But, the most important--that comes from the Chinese bank--
from the Chinese bankers, because eventually it will be the
China Development Bank and China EXIM Bank--they have to do
their spreadsheet, and they have to explain why their
investment or their loans are not making the profit that they
are supposed to make.
And coming to the example of Djibouti, Djiboutian officials
privately have expressed that, in the end, that they don't
believe that that will be a big problem, because the Chinese
eventually will forgive those debt. But, what they do not
mention is that those debt forgiveness or alleviation will come
with certain strategic and political compromises, and they will
not be in the position to say no to the Chinese.
Senator Heinrich. Thanks.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Well, I do thank all of our witnesses
today. I think we could spend an entire week or so talking
about the complications that we have in China--or in Africa
with the Chinese influence there. Thank you very much for your
time and your input. And we look forward to working with you on
these issues in an additional time.
So, thank you very much. Have a good day.
This concludes our hearing.
[Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[all]

MEMBERNAME	BIOGUIDEID	GPOID	CHAMBER	PARTY	ROLE	STATE	CONGRESS	AUTHORITYID
Wicker, Roger F.	W000437	8263	S	R	COMMMEMBER	MS	115	1226
Shaheen, Jeanne	S001181	8276	S	D	COMMMEMBER	NH	115	1901
Peters, Gary C.	P000595	7994	S	D	COMMMEMBER	MI	115	1929
Heinrich, Martin	H001046	8056	S	D	COMMMEMBER	NM	115	1937
Scott, Tim	S001184	8141	S	R	COMMMEMBER	SC	115	2056
Cotton, Tom	C001095		S	R	COMMMEMBER	AR	115	2098
Cruz, Ted	C001098		S	R	COMMMEMBER	TX	115	2175
Fischer, Deb	F000463		S	R	COMMMEMBER	NE	115	2179
Ernst, Joni	E000295		S	R	COMMMEMBER	IA	115	2283
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Rounds, Mike	R000605		S	R	COMMMEMBER	SD	115	2288
Sasse, Ben	S001197		S	R	COMMMEMBER	NE	115	2289
Sullivan, Dan	S001198		S	R	COMMMEMBER	AK	115	2290
Tillis, Thom	T000476		S	R	COMMMEMBER	NC	115	2291
Graham, Lindsey	G000359	8335	S	R	COMMMEMBER	SC	115	452
Inhofe, James M.	I000024	8322	S	R	COMMMEMBER	OK	115	583
Nelson, Bill	N000032	8236	S	D	COMMMEMBER	FL	115	859

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