Congressional Hearings
THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN MONTENEGRO AND MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN EUROPE
Congressional Hearings
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| AUTHORITYID | CHAMBER | TYPE | COMMITTEENAME |
|---|---|---|---|
| ssas00 | S | S | Committee on Armed Services |
[Senate Hearing 115-459]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-459
THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN MONTENEGRO AND MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 13, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
July 13, 2017
Page
The Attempted Coup in Montenegro and Malign Russian Influence in 1
Europe.
Kaludjerovic, His Excellency Nebojsa, Ambassador of Montenegro to 1
the United States.
Bugajski, Janusz, Senior Fellow, Center for European Policy 10
Analysis.
Samp, Lisa Sawyer, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, 15
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Wilson, Damon, Executive Vice President, The Atlantic Council.... 23
(iii)
THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN MONTENEGRO AND MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN EUROPE
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Strange, Reed,
Nelson, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
receive testimony on the attempted coup in Montenegro and
malign Russian influence in Europe.
Before we continue with the usual proceedings of the
hearing, I am pleased to welcome to the committee Montenegro's
Ambassador to the United States who will present an official
statement to the committee on behalf of the Government of
Montenegro. Mr. Ambassador, we are honored to have you here
with us this morning. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY NEBOJSA KALUDJEROVIC, AMBASSADOR OF
MONTENEGRO TO THE UNITED STATES
Ambassador Kaludjerovic. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of
the committee. I wish to thank you for the opportunity to
address you today on behalf of my government, and I extend
especially our appreciation for the committee's hearing on this
important topic. Your interest and dedication to the issue of
security in Europe, the Western Balkans, and Montenegro in this
case, amid the ongoing challenges we are all facing is a
considerable contribution in itself to the valued support of
the United States to our region towards its future as a full
part of the Euro-Atlantic community.
We are talking today about one serious destabilizing
scenario orchestrated from the outside that fortunately never
materialized in Montenegro on the eve of the parliamentary
elections that took place in October last year. The plot in
question, which virtually amounted to a coup d'etat, now
subject of a trial in front of courts in Montenegro, consisted
of planned terrorist attacks to overthrow the legitimately
elected government and to illegally detain or even assassinate
the Prime Minister. In the worst case scenario, if the plans
had succeeded, there would have been chaos and serious violence
and extremely dangerous instability with intention to undermine
the constitutional order and institutions of Montenegro. This
would also have been a derailment of the progress of Montenegro
and the entire region towards NATO and EU integration, which
was a presumed motive for carrying out the entire plot.
At this moment, the public trial is ongoing, following
months of investigation. The Special Chief Prosecutor in charge
of the case has publicly stated that the evidence in this case
is ``undisputable and ironclad.''
Indictments that include two Russian nationals--evidence
points to that, that they were members of military intelligence
services--as well as two leading politicians and MPs [Members
of Parliment] from the opposition party, Democratic Front, for
conspiracy to form a criminal organization and attempt at
terrorist attacks, as well as the acts against the
constitutional order and public safety. Nine people so far have
admitted their guilt via the plea bargain mechanism. Their
confessions were included in the indictment. The witnesses
identified one of the Russian nationals, former Deputy Military
Attache of Russian Federation in Poland, who was declared
persona non grata in that country for acts of espionage, as the
organizer of the plot.
The involvement of Russian nationals is undisputed and
Montenegrin authorities are waiting for the feedback from the
Russian authorities, which acknowledged the requests, regarding
the questions on the involvement of these nationals and their
role in the events. By the way, so far, Russian authorities
have informed us that one of the other suspects, who is not a
Russian national but is currently at large in Russia, is being
subjected to pre-extradition background checks following a
request for the extradition by the Ministry of Justice of
Montenegro. This suspect, by the way, is also banned from
traveling outside the territory of Russia.
Had the plot in October succeeded, the instability would
have been created not only within Montenegro's boundaries, but
would, for sure, have had a spillover effect in a region that
is still not on a fully irreversible path to stability.
Gratefully, the opposite the happened. First of all,
Montenegrin citizens, once again like at every election since
restoring our independence in 2006, have elected pro-NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and pro-European
Government.
As we all know, Montenegro joined NATO on June 5th this
year, and another spillover effect happened but a positive one.
The example of another Western Balkans, or Southeast European,
country joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions is immeasurable.
It will create a long-term positive effect, offer motivation
and encouragement to other aspirants from the region for EU
[European Union] and NATO membership, that the prospective of
membership in these organizations is alive based on merits,
standards and values. No better example could have been given
to our region.
Aside from the outcome of this particular matter, Russia's
view on NATO enlargement and the accession of its 29th member
is not a secret, nor is their support to the opposition parties
and actors in Montenegro that are against NATO membership.
Leading to the elections in October, there was a well-organized
and financed public campaign to that effect. But these
influences Montenegro experienced before, during, and after
elections is not an isolated fact but a pattern based on
notions that the facts on the ground could be changed.
Membership of Montenegro to NATO is often perceived by some
high level Russian officials as a temporary setback through the
false narrative that NATO does not have support in Montenegro,
et cetera. Therefore, we expect a continuation of pressure both
aimed at Montenegro and at the region, especially those
countries that have not yet become members of NATO or the
European Union.
I wish to point out that Montenegro has been able to
succeed in achieving its goals in becoming a member of NATO and
a frontrunner in EU accession by working very hard over the
past decade with friends and partners like the United States.
This is an alliance based on values, and that is why it
succeeds. The reforms, helped bilaterally by the United States,
part of achieving NATO and EU standards, made our society
better and firmly on a right path.
After all, it was thanks to those reforms aimed at
strengthening the capacities and independence of institutions
to uphold the rule of law that helped those very institutions
to tackle such a challenge we are talking about today that
would put to test much more established democracies than ours.
Where we did not have capacities ourselves, considering
that the attempts were multifaceted, involving propaganda and
cyberattacks, we were able to ask our partners in NATO or
bilaterally like the U.S. for assistance. As an ally, we will
work together with the Alliance on the capacities to address
new challenges like these.
We had and do have a right to determine our alliances and
our future, which we have always been clear about, as our
decisions are based on our strategic visions and goals not
against anybody or anything. Montenegro does not pose any sort
of threat to Russia and wants to be engaged in conversation, in
dialogue, and not in confrontation.
Montenegro in NATO can only mean peace and stability, and
expansion of the area of welfare, regional cooperation, and
good neighborly relations.
Distinguished members of the committee, what should be
done?
The United States role in Europe is extremely valuable and
necessary. The commitment to the vision of Europe whole, free,
and at peace is as relevant today as it was before. The United
States and its European partners should continue to reaffirm at
every opportunity the value of transatlantic bond, NATO, and
article 5 commitment, as President Trump reinforced that
valuable message in Poland a few days ago. As to the Western
Balkans, it is crucial to keep countering trends that seems to
encourage the countries or actors in the region to find
alternatives to the Euro-Atlantic integration and full
embracement of values and standards that they bring.
We are thankful and grateful for the U.S. support to our
NATO membership, as well as the increasing focus on the
Western Balkans issues. The support by the U.S. Congress--
and the Senate has been a particular champion--is very welcome
and needed, as well as from the U.S. Administration.
The upcoming visit to Montenegro by Vice President Pence is
a strong message that the United States is focused on Europe
and an opportunity to show continuous support to the stability
and security of the Western Balkans region by supporting a
clear perspective of membership both in NATO and EU as the best
way to achieve those goals.
On our side, Montenegro will continue to spread the area of
stability in the region and beyond and fulfill its
responsibilities as a new ally. We are ready to do our part.
I thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kaludjerovic
follows:]
Prepared Statement by H.E. Mr. Nebojsa Kaludjerovic
Mr. Chairman--Senator McCain, Ranking member Reed, distinguished
members of the Committee,
I wish to thank you for the opportunity to address you today on
behalf of my Government and I extend especially our appreciation for
the Committee's hearing on this important topic. Your interest and
dedication to the issue of security in Europe, the Western Balkans and
Montenegro in this case, amid the ongoing challenges we are all facing,
is a considerable contribution in itself to the valued support of the
United States to our region towards its future as a full part of the
Euro Atlantic community.
We are talking today about one serious, destabilizing scenario
orchestrated from the outside that fortunately never materialized in
Montenegro on the eve of the Parliamentary Elections that took place in
October last year. The plot in question, which virtually amounted to
coup d' etat, now subject of a trial in front of courts in Montenegro,
consisted of planned terrorist attacks to overthrow a legitimately
elected Government and to illegally detain or even assassinate its
Prime Minister. In the worst case scenario, if the plans had succeeded
there would have been chaos, serious violence and extremely dangerous
instability with intention to undermine the constitutional order and
institutions of Montenegro. That would also have been a derailment of
the progress of Montenegro and the entire region towards NATO and EU
integration, which was a presumed motive for carrying out the entire
plot.
At this moment, the public trial is ongoing, following months of
investigation. The Special Chief Prosecutor, in charge of the case, has
publicly stated that the evidence in this case is (I quote)
`undisputable' and `iron clad'.
Indictments that include two Russian nationals (evidence points to
that, that they were members of GRU-Military Intelligence Services) as
well as two leading politicians and MPs from the opposition party
Democratic Front, for conspiracy to form a criminal organization and
attempt at terrorist attacks, as well as the acts against the
Constitutional order and public safety. Nine people so far have
admitted their guilt via the plea--bargain mechanism. Their confessions
were included in the indictment. The witnesses identified one of the
Russian nationals, former Deputy Military Attache of Russian Federation
in Poland who was declared persona non grata in that country for acts
of espionage, as the organizer of the plot.
The involvement of Russian nationals is undisputed and Montenegrin
authorities are waiting for the feedback from the Russian authorities,
which acknowledged the requests, regarding the questions on the
involvement of these nationals and their role in the events. (So far,
Russian authorities have informed us that one of the other suspects,
who is not a Russian national but is currently at large in Russia, is
currently being subjected to pre-extradition background checks
following a request for extradition by the Ministry of Justice of
Montenegro. This suspect is also banned from traveling outside the
territory of Russia).
Had the plot in October succeeded, the instability would have been
created not only within Montenegro's boundaries but would, for sure,
have had a spillover effect, in a region that is still not on a fully
irreversible path to stability. Gratefully, the opposite happened.
First of all, Montenegrin citizens, once again like at every election
since restoring the statehood in 2006, have elected pro-NATO and pro-
European Government.
Montenegro joined NATO on June 5th, and another spillover effect
happened, but a positive one. The example of another Western Balkans,
or SEE country, joining the Euro Atlantic institutions is immeasurable.
It will create a long-term positive effect, offer motivation and
encouragement to other aspirants from the Region for EU and NATO
membership, that the perspective of membership in these organizations
is alive, based on merits, standards and values. No better example
could have been given to our region.
Aside from the outcome of this particular matter, Russia's view on
NATO enlargement and the accession of its 29th member is not a secret,
nor is their support to the opposition parties and actors in Montenegro
that are against NATO membership. Leading to the elections in October,
there was a well-organized and financed public campaign to that effect.
But these influences Montenegro experienced before, during and after
elections is not an isolated fact but a pattern based on notions that
the facts on the ground could be changed. Membership of Montenegro to
NATO is often perceived by some high level Russian officials as a
temporary setback, through the false narrative that NATO does not have
support in Montenegro etc. Therefore, we expect a continuation of
pressure both aimed at Montenegro and at the Region, especially those
countries that have not yet become members of NATO and/or EU.
I wish to point out that Montenegro has been able to succeed in
achieving its goals in becoming a member of NATO and a frontrunner in
EU accession by working hard over the past decade with friends and
partners like the United States. That is an alliance based on values,
and that is why it succeeds. The reforms, helped bilaterally by the
United States, part of achieving NATO and EU standards, made our
society better and firmly on a right path.
After all, it was thanks to those reforms aimed at strengthening
the capacities and independence of institutions to uphold the rule of
law that helped those very institutions to tackle such a challenge we
are talking about today that would put to test much more established
democracies than ours.
Where we did not have capacities ourselves, considering that the
attempts were multifaceted, involving propaganda and cyber-attacks, we
were able to ask our partners in NATO or bilaterally like U.S. for
assistance. As an ally, we will work together within the Alliance on
the capacities to address new challenges like these.
We had and do have a right to determine our alliances and our
future, which we have always been clear about, as our decisions are
based on our strategic visions and goals not against anybody or
anything. Montenegro does not pose any sort of threat to Russia and
wants to be engaged in conversation, in dialogue, and not in
confrontation.
Montenegro in NATO can only mean peace and stability, and expansion
of the area of welfare, of regional cooperation, and good, neighborly
relations.
Distinguished members of the Committee,
What should be done? The United States role in Europe is extremely
valuable and necessary. The commitment to the vision of Europe whole,
free and at peace is as relevant today as it was before. The United
States and its European partners, should continue to reaffirm at every
opportunity the value of Trans-Atlantic bond, NATO and article 5
commitment, as President Trump reinforced that valuable message in
Poland few days ago. As to the Western Balkans, it is crucial to keep
countering trends that seems to encourage the countries or actors in
the region to find alternatives to the Euro Atlantic integration and
full embracement of values and standards that they bring.
We are thankful and grateful for the U.S. support to our NATO
membership as well as the increasing focus on the Western Balkans
issues. The support by the U.S. Congress, and the Senate has been a
particular champion, is very welcome and needed, as well as from the
U.S. Administration.
The upcoming visit to Montenegro by Vice President Pence is a
strong message that the United States is focused on Europe, and an
opportunity to show continuous support to the stability and security of
the Western Balkans region, by supporting a clear perspective of
membership both in NATO and EU as the best way to achieve those goals.
On our side, Montenegro will continue to spread the area of
stability in the Region and beyond and fulfill its responsibilities as
a new Ally. We are ready to do our part.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Ambassador, for that statement.
Before you depart to preside over the festivities of
Montenegro's statehood day, let me just say I have had the
great fortune to travel to Montenegro a number of times over
the years. I know the citizens of your country to be a proud
and independent people, and that is the spirit you celebrate on
July 13th, the day your country earned independence in 1878,
the day Montenegrins defiantly rose up against fascist
occupiers in 1941.
On this July 13th, Montenegro remains determined as ever to
choose its own future. Montenegro has chosen the path of Euro-
Atlantic integration. Montenegro has joined the defense of the
free world as the 29th member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Someday, Montenegro hopes to join the European
Union. The pursuit of this Euro-Atlantic future has not been
without difficulty. But Montenegro has persevered and, in doing
so, has sent a powerful message to [Russian President] Vladimir
Putin and every other tyrant that they cannot and will not
control the destiny of free people, not in Montenegro, not in
Southeastern Europe, not anywhere else in the world. For that,
I hope all Americans will look to our newest ally, Montenegro,
with the same sense of gratitude, admiration, and solidarity
that I express to you now.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being with us this morning.
The committee is grateful to be joined by a distinguished
panel of expert witnesses: Janusz Bugajski, Senior Fellow at
the Center for European Policy Analysis; Lisa Sawyer Samp,
Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies; and Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President of the
Atlantic Council.
As the Ambassador clearly indicated, what happened in
Montenegro is perhaps the most disturbing evidence to date of
how far Vladimir Putin is willing to go to undermine the West,
bully other nations, and achieve his neo-imperial ambitions.
Russia's goals in Montenegro were clear: to stop the
country from joining NATO, to reverse its progress towards
Euro-Atlantic integration, and to end Montenegro's support for
sanctions against Russia imposed after its invasion of Ukraine.
The indictments in this case against the coup plotters in
Montenegro read like a spy novel. On October 16th, 2016,
Montenegro's election day, the coup plotters planned to storm
the parliament, capture and/or kill the Prime Minister, and
install a new government. With the coup underway, armed men
would ambush and kill members of Montenegro's Special Anti-
Terrorist Unit to prevent them from interfering with the coup.
To justify the coup, other plotters disguised as police would
fire into a crowd of peaceful demonstrators to create the
illusion of excessive force by the pro-NATO government.
Two Russian GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] agents,
allegedly in league with Montenegrin politicians and Serbian
nationalists, organized the coup plot. One of the GRU officers
has been identified as the same man who under a different name
served as a military attache in Poland until he was declared
persona non grata and thrown out of the country for espionage.
Perhaps he was more careful during the Montenegro plot, but not
by much. In one case, he sent money to one of his co-
conspirators from a Western Union on the same street as GRU
headquarters in Moscow.
But that brazenness should not fool anyone. The plot was
well along its way to succeeding. If it had not been for one
conspirator who got cold feet and informed the Montenegrin
authorities, it very well might have.
I believe it is critical that all Americans understand what
happened in Montenegro and its implications for our security
because, as I said, it shows how far Vladimir Putin is willing
to go to advance his dangerous view of the world, not just in
Montenegro, not just in Europe, but here in the United States
as well.
Russia is embarked on a campaign to weaken the United
States, to destabilize Europe, to break the NATO alliance, to
undermine confidence in Western values, and to erode any and
all resistance to Vladimir Putin's neo-imperial ambitions. He
is using the full range of capabilities available to him.
Of course, Putin has rapidly modernized his military and
grown increasingly willing to use force to achieve his
objectives, as we have seen in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria.
But even more important to the spread of malign Russian
influence has been the sophisticated employment of asymmetric,
non-kinetic, capabilities. Indeed, Russia's Chief of General
Staff has emphasized--``The role of non-military means in
achieving political and strategic goals has grown and, in many
cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in
their effectiveness.''
This is the key insight that underpins Russia's doctrine
of, ``new generation warfare.'' It is a strategy of influence,
not of brute force. Carefully tailored to local circumstances,
it seeks to undermine our societies and our institutions from
within through cyberattacks; psychological operations and
information warfare; propaganda, both overt and covert;
coercive economic pressure, especially using energy exports;
targeted use of corruption to buy influence; financing
political parties, think tanks, and other organizations; and
more.
But even as our awareness and understanding of malign
Russian influence has grown, the simple reality is that our
response has been inadequate to the scale and scope of this
challenge. We have to change course now because Vladimir Putin
is on the offensive, and he is enjoying success at relatively
low cost.
We must start by responding to aggression Russia has
already committed. That is why it is so important that the
House of Representatives pass the strong Russia sanctions bill
that already passed the Senate by the vote of 98 to 2. It is
long past time that Vladimir Putin paid a meaningful price for
his attack on American democracy.
We must also develop a coherent and political policy for
responding to any future aggression using the full range of
U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic tools.
This is especially true in cyberspace where the United States
still has no policy to deter, defend against, and respond to
cyberattacks.
We must continue to rebuild conventional military
deterrence in Europe. Building on the progress made through the
European Deterrence Initiative, we need to repeal the Budget
Control Act and make significant and sustained investments to
improve the capability, capacity, readiness, and responsiveness
of United States forces in Europe. We also have to continue
helping our allies better defend themselves, including by
providing Ukraine the defensive lethal assistance it needs and
deserves.
We have to keep the door to NATO open for those countries
that are willing to do what it takes to join the Alliance and
live up to the responsibilities it entails. Vladimir Putin will
not let another country go the way of Montenegro without a
fight. So we need to begin working with NATO aspirants to help
them withstand the inevitable onslaught of Russian pressure.
We also have to begin addressing the vulnerabilities in
Western societies, governments, and institutions that Russian
strategy is explicitly designed to exploit. Taking on Putin's
kleptocracy means enhancing the powers of our Treasury
Department to trace and crack down on corrupt and illicit
Russian financing that impacts the United States financial
system.
Most of all, we have to stop looking at Russia and its
threats to our security and our democracy through the warped
lens of politics. We cannot allow Vladimir Putin to divide us
from one another, weaken our resolve, undermine confidence in
ourselves, or erode our belief in our own values. We must take
our own side in this fight, not as Republicans, not as
Democrats, but as Americans.
Ambassador and members of this panel, I know that was a
long statement, and I apologize for that. It is very unusual
for this committee to have a hearing of this nature. But I
believe that it was a near thing. If it had not been an
informant on the inside, this coup attempt could very well have
succeeded not only with blood shed but with a message
throughout the region. So I thought it was important to have
this hearing. I thought it was important to have three
distinguished witnesses come before the committee so that we
have a record not only of what happened, but what we need to
do.
With that, Ambassador, you are certainly free to leave, and
I would like to welcome our witnesses after a statement by
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, the panel, and Mr. Ambassador, thank you very
much.
The chairman is holding a very important hearing on the
events in Montenegro and the Russian malign influence threat in
Europe. Let me add my welcome to the witnesses and thank them
for appearing this morning.
The events in Montenegro are deeply concerning both for
their impact within that country and their broader
implications. While a full accounting of what happened must
await the results of the criminal trial, the case laid out in
the Montenegrin indictment already makes clear that these
events are a pattern of Russian aggression that has occurred
repeatedly across Europe and the United States. Again and
again, Russia has used a range of coercive tools at its
disposal, including political pressure, economic manipulation,
collaboration with corrupt local networks, propaganda,
deception and denials, and increasingly military force to try
to intimidate democratic countries and undermine the further
integration of NATO, the European Union, and other Western
institutions.
Disturbingly Russia's plotting with proxies inside
Montenegro and the failed attempt to overthrow the pro-Western
government and assassinate the Prime Minister marks a dangerous
escalation of its malign influence activities.
Additionally, Russia's menacing actions in Montenegro have
implications for other Balkan nations including Serbia, Bosnia,
and Kosovo. We should do all we can to ensure that Montenegro's
accession to NATO sends a clear signal to other countries in
the region, that NATO maintains its open door policy so that
other countries can aspire to NATO membership without the fear
of becoming the target of violent Russian aggression.
The critical question for our witnesses is how the United
States and its European partners should counter the Russian
malign influence threat.
In January, the unanimous conclusion of our 17 intelligence
agencies was that President Putin directed an influence
campaign against the 2016 United States presidential election
with the aims of undermining the American people's faith in the
election process. The intelligence community also warned that
the significant escalation of Russian levels of interference in
United States and European elections represents a new normal.
As long as Moscow believes that their actions in the United
States and Europe will be consequence-free, Putin and his
associates will continue to escalate Russia's hybrid tactics
against us and our partners to advance their interests.
We have a duty to confront Russia over its malign
activities to protect our national security. Unfortunately,
despite mounting evidence, the White House fails to recognize
the seriousness of the national security threat posed by
Russia's malign influence activities. President Trump continues
to cast doubt on the unanimous collusion of our intelligence
community and has failed to direct that the Kremlin be held
accountable for its actions to damage our democratic processes.
Numerous witnesses have testified to Congress, including
Attorney General Sessions and Secretary Mattis, that they have
received no guidance from President Trump on a strategy for
countering interference with our elections.
President Trump's recent meeting with President Putin at
the G20 [Group of 20 Summit] was another missed opportunity to
deliver a clear message to the Kremlin that its attacks on our
democracy are unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Instead
of confronting the President, President Putin, President Trump
appeased Mr. Putin accepting at face value his denials that
Russia has interfered with the United States elections. This
will only encourage further reckless Kremlin adventurism toward
its neighboring states and efforts to claim a great power role
in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Now is certainly not the time to ignore Russian
interference in elections in Montenegro, France, Germany, the
United States, or elsewhere and simply move forward.
Fortunately, the United States Senate has stepped up to
provide leadership on this issue. Recently an overwhelming
bipartisan majority in the Senate passed long overdue Russian
sanctions. This legislation would codify existing sanctions and
expand authorities for additional ones. It is now incumbent
upon the House to pass the Russian sanctions bill without delay
and send it to the President for signature.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about
additional efforts that are needed to craft a whole-of-
government strategy to defend against and deter this growing
Russian threat. Also, I hope you will address how the United
States might coordinate with our allies and partners, many of
whom have decades of experience in this fight, to effectively
counter the Russian malign influence threat while remaining
true to the core values and principles that the United States
upholds.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Welcome to the witnesses.
Mr. Bugajski, could you begin--either you or Ms. Samp or
Mr. Wilson--describe the events that took place again for the
record, which is the reason for this hearing and then proceed
with your statement?
STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member and the members of the committee.
In terms of Montenegro, you have heard from the Ambassador
the details as we know them now.
It should not come really as a surprise to us that Russia
is determined to prevent new countries from entering NATO. They
have cultivated their relationship with Montenegro for several
years in terms of investment, in terms of propaganda, in terms
of trying to corrupt the country, and they have basically
failed. So one of the last resorts I think for the Russian
Government was to try and change the government in Montenegro
to prevent that country from moving into NATO.
As I say in my statement, this may be a trial run. We
should not assume that this is the only case that Russia is
going to try to unsettle a government in the region. In fact, I
am sure they are preparing other scenarios of destabilization
and government replacement.
So with that said, without going into----
Chairman McCain. Could I just mention that scenario
included people in uniform, killing of opposition? I mean, this
was a very complex plot with months, if not years, in the
planning. That is what is so compelling about what happened
here.
Mr. Bugajski. It reminds me a little bit of what happened
in Crimea. Remember, Putin denied that they had planned the
Crimean operation, the annexation of Crimea. In fact, they had
been rehearsing this for quite a while and it has been admitted
by Russian sources since.
Chairman McCain. Please go ahead.
Mr. Bugajski. Okay. Let me begin by outlining the
fundamental threats posed by the Kremlin and then place the
Balkans in a broader strategic context because I think it is
worth remembering it is not simply the Balkans. It is a wider
Europe.
Moscow is engaged in a global shadow war in which the
primary goal is to dismantle the West and project Russia as a
pole of power on an equal global footing with the United
States. Europe is one of the core battlegrounds of this
struggle for dominance, in which Moscow does not recognize the
independence or integrity of any targeted state. There are
three main components of Moscow's anti-Western offensive.
First, Russia defines itself as a distinct Eurasian pole of
power, defending itself against Western encroachment, proud of
its anti-Americanism and authoritarianism, determined to
delegitimize the Western democratic model, and intent on
playing a vanguard role among governments that reject political
influence from Washington and Brussels.
Second, a key Kremlin goal is to reverse United States
influences within the wider Europe. This would help Putin exert
leverage over the foreign and security policies of key states,
and unlike during the Cold War, there is no accepted division
of Europe into Western and Russian spheres. Instead, numerous
states are coerced or enticed either to join the Russian zone,
to turn neutral, or to oppose United States policy. Moscow
pressures former Soviet republics to relinquish their western
aspirations. It promotes conflicts within and between the
Balkan states. It fosters and exploits disputes over occupied
territories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, and it
subverts members of both NATO and the EU.
Third, while its goals are imperial, Kremlin strategies are
flexible. A diverse assortment of weapons are deployed to
disarm the adversary, whether energy, business, trade,
corruption, blackmail, cyberspace, espionage, politics,
religion, ideology, disinformation, proxy conflicts, or
outright warfare.
Moscow views both NATO and the European Union as threats to
its expansionist ambitions. NATO's commitment to collective
defense obstructs Russia's revisionism and its divide and
conquer policy. European Union standards of legality and
transparency challenge Russia's opaque business model. Western
political and human rights standards undermine Russia's
autocratic political model. Hence, Brexit and other problems
within the EU are welcomed by Moscow as they divide the union,
encourage bilateral deals with Russia, and potentially limit
further EU enlargement.
Moscow benefits from political, ethnic, and social
turbulence in Europe. Lucrative business deals and campaign
donations enable the Kremlin to corrupt and influence targeted
officials. Democratic regression or the upsurge of nationalist
populism favors Russia's objectives by weakening state
institutions and deepening EU divisions. Putin appeals both to
leftist anti-American and ultra-nationalist Euroskeptics to
foster turmoil. During election cycles, Moscow aims to
discredit politicians that do not favor its interests. This can
involve blackmail, fabricated news reports, and disclosure of
stolen personal communications.
Briefly, the Balkan dimension. The Balkans are viewed in
Moscow as Europe's soft underbelly where latent conflicts are
inflamed, potential new allies courted, and economic
opportunities exploited. Russia possesses four main channels of
influence in the region: energy, corruption, nationalism, and
propaganda. We can go into this in question time if you like
because I want to be as brief as possible.
Moscow aims to disqualify the West Balkan states from NATO
and EU membership. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it encourages the
Serb entity government to keep the country divided. In Kosovo,
it uses the Serbian minority to uphold the specter of partition
and blocks Kosovo from entering the United Nations. In
Macedonia, it manipulates internal turmoil and the country's
obstructed path towards NATO and the EU to gain political
influence.
The coup attempt in Montenegro during national elections in
October 2016 was organized by Russian military intelligence
operatives to prevent the country from attaining NATO
membership. The plot was uncovered in time or it could have led
to mass bloodshed in Podgorica. While the Russians evaded
arrest, Montenegrin courts have begun trials of suspected Serb
nationalists, including members of the pro-Moscow opposition.
Tellingly, the Serbian Government has been helpful to
Montenegro in its efforts to investigate the plot. Belgrade I
think realizes that Serbia could face a similar scenario of
destabilization if it decides to loosen its links with Moscow.
We must be better prepared for future violent scenarios in
the region. The Montenegrin putsch attempt could be a trial run
and a warning to the region. Moscow's next conspiracy is likely
to be more sophisticated and broad-based, whether to incite
Serbian leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Muslim
population, engineering ethnic clashes between Macedonians and
Albanians inside Macedonia, or provoking Serbian-Montenegrin
conflicts. If it serves his interests, Putin would not be
averse to igniting a regional war to test NATO resolve,
distract attention from Russia's interventions elsewhere, and
to undermine the process of Western integration.
Very briefly now, in the Balkans, current security
challenges are not simply military, not even primarily
military. They are political, ethnic, economic, financial, and
informational, particularly where local disputes can be ignited
through outside subversion. The United States and NATO must
prevent conflict by identifying vulnerabilities, promoting
interstate cooperation, bolstering energy diversification,
including gas supplies from Azerbaijan, combating Russian
subversion, and furnishing steps towards NATO entry.
Paradoxically, Moscow's attack on democratic elections in
the United States and in Europe awakened a new sense of realism
about Putin's Russia, dispelling illusions about our so-called
common interests. Washington must grasp the leadership role
just as it did during the Cold War because Europe remains
divided and is perceived by Moscow as weak and indecisive. If
the United States forfeits its role, we could witness regional
crisis not only in the Balkans that shatter European stability
and damage the NATO alliance.
My last word is, if you have time, I would like to include
my recent co-authored book with Margarita Assenova for the
record entitled ``Eurasian Disunion: Russia's Vulnerable
Flanks.'' It provides a comprehensive analysis of Moscow's
strategies and ambitions toward Europe and the United States.
It was published a few weeks ago--a few months ago. I have
copies both for the chair and the ranking member.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows:]
Prepared Statement by Janusz Bugajski
Chairman John McCain, Ranking Member Jack Reed, and members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak
with you today about the growing threat from Vladimir Putin's Russia to
European security and our trans-Atlantic alliance.
I will begin by outlining the fundamental threats posed by the
Kremlin and then place the Balkans in this broader strategic context.
Moscow is engaged in a global Shadow War in which the primary goal is
to dismantle the West and project Russia as a pole of power on an equal
global footing with the United States. Europe is the core battleground
of this struggle for dominance, in which Moscow does not recognize the
independence or integrity of any targeted state.
moscow's objectives
Putin's Russia is engaged in a concerted campaign to restore a
Moscow-centered bloc, undermine the stability of several regions
stretching from the Arctic to the Caspian Basin, weaken NATO as a
security provider, and devolve the European Union. There are three main
components of Moscow's anti-Western offensive.
1. Russia defines itself as a distinct ``Eurasian pole of power,''
defending itself against Western encroachment, proud of its anti-
Americanism and authoritarianism, determined to delegitimize the
Western democratic model, and intent on playing a vanguard role among
governments that reject political influence from Washington and
Brussels.
2. A key Kremlin goal is to reverse United States influences
within the wider Europe. This would help Putin exert leverage over the
foreign and security policies of key states. Unlike during the Cold
War, there is no accepted division of Europe into Western and Russian
spheres. Instead, numerous states are coerced or enticed either to join
the Russian zone, turn neutral, or oppose United States policy. Moscow
pressures former Soviet republics to relinquish their Western
aspirations, promotes conflicts within and between the Balkan states,
fosters and exploits disputes over occupied territories in Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Moldova, and subverts members of both NATO and the EU.
3. While its goals are imperial, Kremlin strategies are flexible.
A diverse assortment of weapons are deployed to disarm the adversary,
whether energy, business, trade, corruption, blackmail, cyberspace,
espionage, politics, religion, ideology, disinformation, proxy
conflicts, or outright warfare.
russia targets europe
Moscow views both NATO and the EU as threats to its expansionist
ambitions. NATO's commitment to collective defense obstructs Russia's
revisionism and its ``divide and conquer'' policy. EU standards of
legality and transparency challenge Russia's opaque business model.
Western political and human rights standards undermine Russia's
autocratic political model. Hence ``Brexit'' and other problems within
the EU are welcomed by Moscow as they divide the Union, encourage
bilateral deals with Russia, and limit further enlargement.
Moscow benefits from political, ethnic, and social turbulence in
Europe. Lucrative business deals and campaign donations enable the
Kremlin to corrupt and influence targeted officials. Democratic
regression or the upsurge of nationalist populism favors Russia's
objectives by weakening state institutions and deepening EU divisions.
Putin appeals both to leftist anti-Americans and ultra-nationalist
Euroskeptics to foster turmoil. During election cycles Moscow aims to
discredit politicians that do not favor its interests. This can involve
blackmail, fabricated news reports, and disclosure of stolen personal
communications.
moscow's balkan dimension
The Balkans are viewed in Moscow as Europe's ``soft underbelly''
where latent conflicts are enflamed, potential new allies courted, and
economic opportunities exploited. Russia possesses four main channels
of influence in the region: energy, corruption, nationalism, and
propaganda.
1. Moscow fosters energy dependence by tying Balkan countries into
energy projects, including gas supplies, pipelines, and refineries.
Energy dependence can undergird diplomatic and political compliance by
exposing countries to blackmail and coercion.
2. Political leaders and businesspeople are corrupted to favor
Russia's interests and to either remain neutral or support Moscow's
positions in its foreign policy offensives.
3. Local nationalisms are promoted to stir conflicts between rival
nationalist projects, undermine support for NATO, the United States,
and EU, and strengthen Moscow's role as mediator. This enables the
Kremlin to retard the region's progress toward Western institutions.
4. The Kremlin engages in propaganda offensives through local
media, internet, and social networks to enhance Russia's prestige and
undermine state institutions. Its messages are designed to appeal to
Euroskeptic, anti-American, and ultra-conservative elements in which
Russia poses as the defender of traditional values.
Moscow aims to disqualify the West Balkan states from NATO and EU
membership. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it encourages the Serb entity
government to keep the country divided. In Kosova, it uses the Serbian
minority to uphold the specter of partition and blocks Kosova from
entering the UN [United Nations]. In Macedonia, it manipulates internal
turmoil and the country's obstructed path toward NATO and the EU to
gain political influence.
The coup attempt in Montenegro during national elections in October
2016 was reportedly organized by Russian military intelligence
operatives to prevent the country from attaining NATO membership. The
plot was uncovered in time or it could have led to mass bloodshed in
Podgorica. While the Russians evaded arrest, Montenegrin courts have
begun trials of suspected Serb nationalist participants, including
members of the pro-Moscow opposition. Tellingly, the Serbian Government
has been helpful in Montenegro's efforts to investigate the plot.
Belgrade realizes that Serbia could face a similar scenario of
destabilization if it decides to loosen its links with Moscow.
We must better prepare for future violent scenarios. The
Montenegrin putsch attempt could be a trial run and a warning to the
region. Moscow's next conspiracy is likely to be more sophisticated and
broad-based, whether by inciting Serbian leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina
against the Muslim population, engineering ethnic clashes between
Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia, or provoking Serbian-
Montenegrin conflicts. If it serves his interests, Putin would not be
averse to igniting a regional war to test NATO resolve, distract
attention from Russia's interventions, and undermine Western
integration.
western responses
United States and EU officials have claimed that there is no zero-
sum competition with Russia over the allegiance of any European
country. In reality, the contradiction between a country's freedom to
choose its international alliances, which the West espouses, and
limitations on state sovereignty, on which Moscow insists, lies at the
core of the current struggle. While Putin remains at the helm, Western
policy must be geared toward long-term support for the independence and
integrity of countries throughout the Wider Europe.
In the Balkans, current security challenges are not primarily
military but political, ethnic, economic, financial, and informational,
particularly where local disputes can be ignited through outside
subversion. The United States and NATO must prevent conflict by
identifying vulnerabilities, promoting interstate cooperation,
bolstering energy diversification (including gas supplies from
Azerbaijan), combating Russian subversion, and furnishing steps toward
NATO entry.
Paradoxically, Moscow's attack on democratic elections in the
United States and Europe awakened a new sense of realism about Putin's
Russia, dispelling illusions about common interests. Washington must
grasp the leadership role just as it did during the Cold War, because
Europe remains divided and is perceived by Moscow as weak and
indecisive. If the United States forfeits its role we could witness
regional crises that shatter European stability and damage the NATO
alliance.
conclusions
The United States and NATO need to be armed for the Shadow War with
Moscow. In addition to deterrence, the most effective form of defense
is offense with a focus on Russia's numerous vulnerabilities: economic,
political informational, and cyber. The Russian Federation faces
prolonged internal decay because of its structural, economic, and
demographic failures. To deceive its citizens the Kremlin engages in
foreign adventures: when it cannot provide bread it offers circuses.
The Trump administration can craft an enduring legacy by reversing the
Kremlin offensive in Europe and rebuilding a more resilient trans-
Atlantic alliance. This would raise the stature of the United States as
the most effective international leader and make America stronger and
greater.
Lastly, I would like to include my recent co-authored book with
Margarita Assenova for the record. Entitled Eurasian Disunion: Russia's
Vulnerable Flanks, it provides a comprehensive analysis of Moscow's
strategies and ambitions toward Europe and the United States.
Chairman McCain. Without objection, it will be included in
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[The received publication will be retained in the committees
files.]
Chairman McCain. Ms. Samp?
STATEMENT OF LISA SAWYER SAMP, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Ms. Samp. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, good morning. I would
like to begin by thanking you for holding this hearing and,
more broadly, for the steps the Senate has taken to assert its
oversight role and voice related to issues of Russia and
Europe, including your overwhelming bipartisan support for
Montenegro's accession to the NATO alliance and more recently
for the Russia sanctions resolution. I do hope as well, sir,
that the House will pass it quickly and in matching form.
With that said, I would like to make two brief points
regarding the topic of today's hearing.
First, Russia is becoming increasingly aggressive and
ambitious. The coup attempt in Montenegro and Russia's role in
it is illustrative, but it is by no means unprecedented.
Montenegro was not the first----
Chairman McCain. When you say ``unprecedented,'' I think it
was almost unprecedented in the extent and the complexity and
the willingness to kill people.
Ms. Samp. I mean more in these terms of it is not the first
time Russia has attempted to undermine the sovereign right of a
nation to freely choose its political associations----
Chairman McCain. I got you.
Ms. Samp.--which we saw in both Georgia and Ukraine. But I
agree it was an audacious attack.
Russia's tactics, as you know, are broad in nature. They
include things like disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks.
The list goes on. A Polish colleague once described these tools
to me as ``not the enemy at the gates, but the enemy in your
pocket.'' This was a reference to all the ways that Russia can
now reach you through your cell phone.
Putin likely does not want a war with the West, but he is
finding he can get a lot done without one. For this reason, he
has no intention of stopping now. He is experimenting along the
way, growing increasingly comfortable taking risks and getting
better.
Three years ago, if you had asked anyone in Washington
about the Russia challenge, you likely would have gotten an
answer almost exclusively focused on the eastern flank, Ukraine
in particular where Putin annexed Crimea and has continued to
stoke violence in the country's east. Since then, thousands
have died and over a million have been displaced.
Next Monday, July 17, will be the third anniversary of a
day a Russian-provided missile brought down a civilian airliner
in the skies over eastern Ukraine killing all 298 people
aboard, including one American.
Two years ago, if you had asked the same question about the
Russia challenge of either me or one of my colleagues, our
answers would have expanded to include Syria where Russia has
killed thousands in indiscriminate bombing runs and extended
the civil war and distracted from the fight against the Islamic
State.
As of last fall, our answers would now have to reference
the brazen assault that took aim at the very heart of United
States democracy and another that took aim at Montenegro's.
One has to wonder what is Putin up to right now. What is he
planning that we will be discussing at a hearing like this a
year from now?
The steady drumbeat of increasingly aggressive and
opportunistic Russian behavior means we can no longer blame
surprise or ignorance for inadequate and slow responses. The
coup attempt in Montenegro serves to further reinforce what we
should already know, that more must urgently be done to better
protect ourselves and our allies from Russia's systemic
campaign to undermine the very foundations of Western society.
My second and final point gets at what to do about it. We
are not outmatched, but we are being outplayed. I will pause
here and ask you to think about why Russia is trying to sow
instability and undermine the global order. There has been a
lot written on it. I, like my colleague, also just added a bit
more, and we have some copies for the chair and the ranking.
But it boils down to an easy answer. It wants to and it can
without major consequences. I discuss in more detail in my
written testimony the ``wants to and can'' part of that
equation. But I want to pause for a moment and focus on the
``without major consequences'' part.
The steps taken by the West since 2014 remain insufficient.
We are not doing enough to change Russia's calculus. Putin is
still seeing more reward than risk. It is, therefore, time to
increase the credibility of our threats and promises and
decrease our sensitivity to Russia's knee-jerk protest to any
and all NATO activity. It is time to draw a firmer line and to
speak to Putin in the language he bests understands: power and
resolve.
How do we do that? Well, there are no silver bullet
solutions precisely because Russian aggression has manifested
in so many different ways. We need a combination of measures
that aim to shore up our own vulnerabilities to Russian
coercion and apply greater pressure to contest it. We need more
defense and, importantly, offense across the spectrum of our
toolkit. This means shaping a new relationship paradigm that
puts more onus on Moscow to comply with international norms
rather than simply imposing consequences for breaching them.
What do I mean by that? Well, instead of saying we will
lift sanctions when Russia decides to comply with the Minsk
Agreements, say that we will raise them until they do. Instead
of kowtowing to Russia's supposed spheres of influence, provide
Ukraine the lethal assistance it so desperately needs and
increase United States support to vulnerable nations in the
gray zone. Instead of simply accepting Russia's unfounded
claims of Western provocation, recognize the vast disparity in
the size of our force posture and exercises and begin to
enhance deterrence.
Here it is important to step back and recall that the
United States combat presence in Europe is a full brigade
strength below what it was in 2012 prior to renewed tensions
with Russia and that NATO's largest exercise conducted since
the end of the Cold War peaked at about 30,000 troops.
Meanwhile, Russia's Zapad exercise planned for later this fall
may reach up to 100,000.
Instead of discussing cooperation on an impenetrable
cybersecurity unit, we should be doing more to both defend our
systems and employ offensive cyber techniques to expose and
undermine Russia in the cyber domain.
Instead of delegitimizing or demonizing the free press, we
should be doing more to promote accurate and truthful
narratives using all the tools at our disposal, including those
available covertly.
Instead of casting doubt on the efficacy of our alliances,
we should be educating our publics on the importance of the
international order and the value of the transatlantic bond. We
should be strengthening and investing in NATO, not tearing it
down. Our alliances are our greatest foreign policy advantage,
and I think it behooves us all to remember that.
Finally, we should be practicing what we preach. The United
States cannot be a credible critic of Russian aggression if it
does not provide a strong alternative example. Continued United
States leadership of the international order is at stake.
Now, none of this means we cannot still cooperate with
Russia where it is in our interest to do so like on arms
control or nuclear nonproliferation. But we must approach
engagement cautiously, selectively, and with firm limits.
Changing Russia's behavior will not be quick or easy, but the
stakes are simply too high not to try. If Russia can be
creative and adaptive, then surely we can too.
In conclusion, Russia may just be looking out for what it
considers to be in its national interest, but then we need to
do the same. That entails pushing back harder to protect
ourselves, our allies, and the international order.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Samp follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lisa Sawyer Samp
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, it is an honor to testify before you today alongside His
Excellency Nebojsa Kaludjerovic, Mr. Janusz Bugajski, and Mr. Damon
Wilson regarding the attempted coup in Montenegro and malign Russian
influence in Europe.
This testimony is informed by a study conducted in my capacity as a
Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
entitled ``Recalibrating United States Strategy toward Russia: A New
Time for Choosing,'' released in March 2017. It also draws from my
previous experience working European security issues on the National
Security Council staff and at the Department of Defense. Given the deep
expertise of my fellow witnesses on Montenegro, I will focus my remarks
on the broader Russia challenge, the response of the United States and
Europe, and areas in need of Congressional attention.
russia's actions in perspective
The 2016 coup attempt in Montenegro was not the first, nor likely
will it be the last, of Russia's attempts to undermine the sovereign
right of a nation to freely choose its political associations--a right
Russia itself affirmed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and reaffirmed in
the 1990 Charter of Paris. It represents a single data point on an
irrefutable trend line of increasingly aggressive and opportunistic
Russian behavior. To describe the incident as new or eye-opening would
be to dismiss all that has come before it. This is not meant to
minimize what occurred, but to put it in proper perspective. Given the
pervasiveness and severity of Moscow's known offenses, we can no longer
blame surprise or ignorance for inadequate and slow responses. The coup
attempt serves to further reinforce what we should already know: more
must urgently be done to better protect ourselves and our allies from
Russia's systemic campaign to undermine the international system that
would hold it accountable to the rule of law and deny its desired
spheres of influence.
President Putin has amassed a robust global toolkit comprised of a
variety of conventional and unconventional tactics, to include
disinformation and propaganda, cyber attacks, economic coercion,
political subversion and election meddling, deniable forces in the form
of ``little green men,'' nuclear saber-rattling, aggressive air and sea
maneuvers, and other malign activities. These tactics are designed to
circumvent United States and NATO redlines, confuse traditional
response options, and use the virtues of the West against it. Russia
has experimented with the application of these tactics in varying
combinations and at mutable levels of intensity--leveraging just enough
to create chaos and sow instability in an effort to undermine the
international system.
What began primarily as a challenge along NATO's eastern flank has
steadily expanded outward, subverting Western interests and influence
in all directions. To the North, Russia has increased its military
presence in the Arctic and laid formal claim to 460,000 square miles of
Arctic ocean seabed. \1\ To the East and South, Putin has employed
military force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. In Ukraine, he annexed
Crimea and continues to sow violence in the country's east. Thousands
of Ukrainians have died and over a million have been displaced. We must
also not forget the 298 people, including one American, who were killed
when a Russian-provided antiaircraft missile brought down a civilian
airliner in the skies over Eastern Ukraine. In Syria, Russia's support
for the Assad regime has extended the civil war, distracted from the
fight against the Islamic State, and exacerbated human suffering.
Russia is also a strategic ally of Iran and a key trading partner. Its
interest in selling $10 billion worth of arms to Iran--including T-90
tanks, artillery, aircraft, and helicopters--would increase Tehran's
military capability at a time when its malign activities are already
having significantly destabilizing effects across the Middle East. \2\
In Asia, there is growing evidence that Russia is supplying weapons to
the Taliban in Afghanistan. \3\ It is also expanding its military and
energy cooperation with China and India; moves that seek to advance its
interests while challenging the influence of the United States in the
region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Carol J. Williams, ``Russia claims vast Arctic territory, seeks
U.N. recognition,'' Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2015.
\2\ ``Russia and Iran in talks over $10 billion arms deal: RIA,''
Reuters, November 14, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-
iran-arms-idUSKBN1390UM
\3\ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ``Russia is sending weapons to Taliban,
top United States general confirms,'' Washington Post, April 24, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/04/24/russia-is-
sending-weapons-to-taliban-top-u-s-general-confirms/?utm--
term=.639d8c8b979f.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compounding all of this, Russia's attempts to confront the United
States in the cyber and space domains could have dangerous implications
for how Americans live and fight, according to former U.S. director of
national intelligence James Clapper. \4\ Its violation of the INF
[Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces] treaty and nuclear saber-rattling,
likewise, raise worrying questions about Russia's commitment to
strategic stability and to the norms that have preserved a certain
degree of caution in public discussions related to nuclear weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Tess Owen, ``US Spy Chief Warns of Space Wars, North Korean
Nukes, and Cyber Threats,'' Vice News, February 9, 2016, https://
news.vice.com/article/us-spy-chief-warns-of-space-wars-north-korean-
nukes-and-cyber-armageddon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's malign influence has also crossed an ocean to strike at
the heart of United States democracy with its interference in the 2016
presidential election. This brazen action shows that Putin is only
becoming more emboldened with time and growing increasingly comfortable
taking risks. Efforts to minimize or downplay Russia's attack against
the United States only increases the likelihood that similar and more
ambitious election interference will occur in the future, including
against our closest allies in Europe. Efforts to ``move on'' or ignore
the incident do not serve long term U.S. interests.
understanding russia's motivations
Why is Russia seeking to undermining the existing international
order by sowing instability abroad? The answer is simple: It wants to
and it can, while reaping more rewards than consequences.
First, it wants to for a variety of reasons that reflect a
combination of: (1) Putin's domestic political calculations; (2) a
desire to right historical wrongs borne of the ``humiliation'' that
ensued following the end of the Cold War; (3) longstanding distrust of
Western intentions, especially as it relates to NATO enlargement, that
engender a zero-sum world view in which American's gains are seen as
Russia's losses and vice versa; and (4) the need to protect a
geopolitical sphere of influence that is seen as central to Russia's
own security.
Second, Moscow is now more able to act on these motives than in the
past due to a mix of growing strengths inside Russia and growing
weaknesses inside the West. Russia, for its part, has partially
recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union. High energy prices in
the 2000s helped stabilize the economy, and Putin's consolidation of
political power has minimized domestic opposition that might otherwise
constrain a confrontational foreign policy. Moscow's reinvestments in
its armed forces since 2008 have helped Russia reemerge as a formidable
military power. Though not a peer competitor to the United States
military, the Russian military does enjoy local superiority across the
span of its western borders in Europe. This, combined with the creative
employment of niche capabilities and a low bar for the use of force,
allows Russia to play to its advantages and yield considerable bang for
its buck--especially since destabilization is a comparatively limited
and achievable goal.
For the West's part, we have failed to adequately invest in the
health of our democracies, institutions, and defenses. The end of the
Cold War lulled Western societies into complacency and promoted a
misguided faith in the sustaining power of good intentions absent
proper upkeep. Russia has exposed and exploited the cracks in our
foundation, likely with more success than even it thought possible.
Russian disinformation campaigns, for example, benefit from
domestic political efforts to delegitimize or demonize the free press
and intelligence agencies. Russian attempts to break Western unity is
abetted by populist narratives that cast doubt on the efficacy of our
alliances and institutions. Russian political and economic coercion is
helped along by the ease with which assets can be held in obscurity in
developed democracies and by illiberal trends that spurn transparency
and oversight while rewarding corruption. Russian military threats and
posturing are made more threatening by Europe's lack of defense
investment and military readiness. Russian manipulation and
whataboutism is legitimized by Presidential statements that draw moral
equivalencies between the West and Russia. Instead of educating our
publics--who have largely forgotten why NATO and the European Union
were created--on the importance of the international order and the
value of our alliances, some in our own societies are eager to turn
public unawareness into anger in exchange for short term political
gains. Sadly, Russia can only look at this and laugh.
The final piece of the equation is that Russia's current incentive
structure appears to encourage more action rather than less. In other
words, it is reaping more rewards than consequences. Consider, for
example, that Ukraine and Georgia's progress toward NATO membership
appears indefinitely stalled; Russia now controls Crimea; transatlantic
cohesion is straining under the growing political divisions; and Assad
has been pulled back from the brink. Meanwhile, Putin is more popular
at home than ever. Sanctions have proven a convenient scapegoat for
greater structural problems within Russia's economy. Russia's status as
an international power player has been renewed. Russia's pattern of
provocative behavior will not change until the West imposes greater
consequences--until Moscow sees more risk than reward.
united states and european response
Following Russia's 2014 aggression in Ukraine, the United States
and its allies imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia
and quickly established an enhanced and persistent air, land, and sea
presence in Eastern Europe to reassure nervous allies. All of these
measures have evolved from their initial formulation.
The United States sanctions levied against Russia in response to
its seizure of Crimea and continuing support of violence in Eastern
Ukraine were matched by the European Union, along with every non-EU
member of NATO (with the exception of Turkey) and major non-NATO
partners Australia, Japan, and South Korea. It is the participation of
partners and allies that has given the sanctions their bite. The trade
in goods between the EU and Russia in 2015, for example, totaled $222
billion. This is compared to $22 billion between the United States and
Russia. In late December 2016, President Obama authorized additional
United States sanctions in response to Russia's cyber operations aimed
at the presidential election. President Trump could rescind these
sanctions, imposed by Executive Order, at any time. Should the United
States unilaterally pull its support, the international sanctions
regime would likely collapse in short order.
In the security realm, NATO agreed to assurance and deterrence
measures at the 2014 Wales Summit and the 2016 Warsaw Summit that aimed
to enhance alliance readiness against all threats. These efforts
include additional force presence in NATO's east, enhanced training and
exercises, prepositioned equipment, and military infrastructure
improvements. The most recent commitments have transitioned the
alliance from reassurance-focused measures to those that seek to
establish a longer-term credible deterrence in NATO's east. This
includes, among other things, expanding the number of troops in each
Baltic State from a company-sized force (approximately 150 troops) to a
more capable battalion-sized force (approximately 1,000 multinational
troops); updating war plans; reconfiguring prepositioned equipment to
support war plan requirements (as opposed to training and exercises);
standing up a rapid reaction force that would be able to quickly surge
reinforcements in a crisis; establishing eight reception and staging
centers along NATO's eastern flank to receive those reinforcements;
updating alliance threat assessments; improving logistics to reduce
barriers to the freedom of movement for troops and equipment across
Europe; and reinvesting in the defense capabilities needed for
territorial defense (vice expeditionary operations).
Much of the United States contribution to broader NATO assurance
and deterrence efforts--known collectively as the Readiness Action
Plan--has been funded by the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and
conducted under the auspices of the Defense Department's Atlantic
Resolve mission. ERI was initiated in fiscal year (FY) 2015 as a $1
billion appropriation within the Defense Department's Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) budget. \5\ Former President Obama's
fiscal year 2017 budget request proposed quadrupling ERI funding to
$3.4 billion, up from $789 million in fiscal year 2016, in
acknowledgement of the threat Russia poses to United States interests
in Europe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ White House, ``Fact Sheet: European Reassurance Initiative and
Other United States Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners,''
June 3, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-
efforts-support-.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite continuing to reside in the one-year OCO budget, ERI is now
considered a multi-year effort aimed at enhancing the United States
presence, capability, and readiness in Europe after decades of decline.
The most recent defense authorization bill would further expand ERI to
a total of $4.8 billion, allowing for additional prepositioned
equipment and infrastructure investments. ERI does not aspire to return
the United States to a Cold War-era posture. It does, however, aim to
allow the United States to better defend its interests and allies and
to begin to contend with Russia's military advantages in Eastern Europe
by taking steps deemed minimally necessary for credible deterrence.
These steps are prudent given the security environment and are neither
hostile nor provocative toward Russia, regardless of Moscow's reflexive
cries to the contrary.
The sum total of the measures taken by the United States and its
European allies since 2014 are a good start, but they are not enough to
adequately manage the Russia challenge. Notwithstanding rotational
increases made possible through ERI, the United States Army combat
presence in Europe remains a full brigade strength below what it was in
2012--prior to renewed tensions with Russia. Defense spending among
NATO allies (not including the United States) will collectively
increase by 4.3 percent in 2017 with a total increase of $46 billion
since 2014, though arguably this can and should be happening more
quickly in certain cases. \6\ The European Union (EU) has held firm on
sanctions (recently renewed through January 2018), though the $11
billion, 745-mile Nord Stream 2 pipeline project remains a
possibility--in violation of both the spirit of the sanctions and
stated EU desires to diversify away from Russian gas supplies. Energy
cooperation is likewise expanding between Russia and the increasingly
autocratic governments in Turkey and Hungary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Ellen Mitchell, ``NATO pledges to up defense spending after
Trump pressure,'' The Hill, June 28, 2017. http://thehill.com/policy/
defense/339832-nato-pledges-to-up-defense-spending-after-trump-
pressure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that Russia's malign influence continues unabated and with
growing ambition, the yardstick for measuring the success of the
Western response can no longer be the ability to reach and maintain
consensus around a NATO table. Rather, it must be tied to outcomes;
i.e., changing Russia's behavior. There remains much that can be done
to press the West's advantages vis-a-vis Russia without sparking a
conflict or even coming close. It is time to draw a firmer line--to
decrease our sensitivity to Russia's reflexive protests and increase
the credibility of our threats and promises. As Lenin reminds us about
the Russian attitude toward power, ``You probe with bayonets. If you
find mush, you push. If you find steel you withdraw.'' A steel spine is
required in defense of the international system that has served the
United States and its allies so well over the past 70 years.
the way forward
I, along with my co-authors, offer a comprehensive strategy for
managing the Russia challenge in a CSIS report entitled ``Recalibrating
United States Strategy toward Russia: A New Time for Choosing.'' This
strategy seeks to strengthen Western institutions, contest Russia's
aggression, and pursue cooperation where advantageous and feasible
(such as in the areas of arms control and nuclear nonproliferation)
without degenerating into endless accommodation.
Without recreating that work here, I wish to highlight a few of the
high priority recommendations that Congress can advance:
Pass the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017. The
Senate's overwhelming bipartisan support (98-2) for the ``Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017'' in Senate Resolution 722 on June 15,
2017, is a necessary and appropriate step that will ensure Russia
continues to be held accountable for its aggressive and destabilizing
actions; further deter it from undertaking similar acts in the future;
and positively assert Congress's vital oversight role in matters
pertaining to United States national security.
Beyond codifying the current sanctions regime, the Senate
resolution seeks to dissuade those that would do business with the
Russian intelligence and defense sectors, a vital element of the
legislation that would both further punish Russia for its interference
in the 2016 United States elections and inhibit the growth and
development of its defense capabilities. The legislation also expands
sanctions related to Russia's energy sector and further restricts
access to debt financing; levies new sanctions against Russian actors
engaged in corruption and human rights abuses, and those supplying
weapons to the Assad regime or conducting cyberattacks on behalf of the
Russian Government; and, importantly, authorizes assistance to allies
and partners in Central and Eastern Europe to counter malign Russian
influence and disinformation. These are needed steps that will help
provide the United States with leverage in managing the Russia
challenge.
The United States Congress--Republicans and Democrats alike--
must unite to send a clear message to Russia and others that our core
democratic practices are not a playground for bullies and dictators--
that we will punish and oppose any violation of our sovereignty and
that of our allies and partners. The United States House of
Representatives should take immediate action to pass a matching
resolution.
Increase and optimize the United States conventional
military presence in Europe. United States forces in Europe today are
not adequate to deter Russian aggression at a remaining level of risk
that should be acceptable to United States policymakers or members of
Congress. This does not mean that the United States should return to
the massive Cold War-era military presence it once kept in Europe.
There are reasonable steps, however, that could be taken to enhance the
credibility of our deterrence in Europe. To start, The United States
should forward station an armored brigade combat team and additional
Army enabling units in Europe; restore a full-strength combat aviation
brigade; retain at least six Air Force fighter squadrons in Europe with
the ability to rapidly flow in more aircraft as necessary; and ensure a
robust naval presence in and around European waters. There should be at
least as many combat forces in Europe today as there were in 2012.
The European Reassurance Initiative--or rather its successor,
the European Deterrence Initiative--will need to continue to be funded
at similar or slightly higher levels and should be codified in the
Defense Department's base budget, rather than be considered as part of
the Overseas Contingency Operations account. This will provide greater
stability and predictability to the Defense Department's Europe
planning. The Russia threat is not going away anytime soon and the
budget should reflect this reality.
Support Ukraine and other partners in the so-called gray
zone. The United States has committed more than $600 million in
security assistance to Ukraine--the cornerstone of which is train,
equip, and advise efforts that help build the capacity of Ukraine's
forces, while also advancing institutional reform. Ukraine will require
additional support--conditioned on its continued progress in
implementing necessary anticorruption and transparency reforms--across
the spectrum of its security, economic, and governance needs.
Congress should continue the authorization of lethal aid to
Ukraine as a signal of support for necessary policy changes that would
increase the costs to Russia for any further aggression. Also needed is
greater engagement with and support to the other vulnerable non-NATO
partners in the Caucasus, Balkans, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe as
a means to check Russia attempts to undermine their sovereignty and
foment regional instability. Funding for State Department resilience
efforts in Europe will be key.
A Reinforcement Model for Deterrence in Europe
NATO's conventional deterrence strategy in Europe is based upon a
reinforcement model that depends on: (1) small, yet capable, tripwire
forces; (2) rapid-response forces that can be mobilized on short
notice; and (3) the ability to get follow-on forces to the fight
quickly. While much of the alliance's focus has been on ground forces,
the United States and its allies would also be expected to surge air
and naval forces to the region in a crisis, both of which add
significant capabilities to counter Russia.
The tripwire forces in the Baltic States and Poland are
known as NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), which began deploying
in February 2017 and recently reached full operational capability. The
eFP is comprised of four multinational battalions, or battlegroups, led
by the United States (in Poland), the UK (in Estonia), Canada (in
Latvia), and Germany (in Lithuania), with contributions from several
other nations augmenting or in some cases rounding out the deployments
by these framework nations. NATO's eFP framework essentially replaces
the continuous United States deployments of company-sized elements to
each of the Baltic States and Poland. The United States troop presence
that was once thinly spread across the eastern flank is smartly being
consolidated in Poland as the United States-led eFP battalion. Outside
of the eFP framework, the United State has separately deployed to
Poland elements of a rotational armored brigade, which will have other
elements available for exercises and training elsewhere. Additionally,
NATO has established eight NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIUs) in
countries along NATO's eastern flank--the three Baltic States, Poland,
Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary--that will be able to act as
rapidly expandable reception and staging centers for arriving
reinforcements.
The rapid response forces are comprised of NATO's Very
High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), an approximately brigade-sized
multinational force led on a rotational basis by participating allies;
headquarter elements comprising NATO's Rapid Deployable Corps; and
other immediately available support elements found within the NATO
Force Structure. The United States Army forces permanently stationed in
Europe--the 2nd Calvary Regiment (Stryker brigade) based in Vilseck,
Germany, and the 173rd Airborne brigade based in Vicenza, Italy--would
also be able to quickly respond in a crisis, along with the United
States' rotational armored brigade, made possible by ERI. Given NATO's
requirement for political consensus before deploying the VJTF, the U.S.
Forces would likely be the most readily available first responders in
certain contingencies.
The follow-on forces would be comprised of forces based
in the United States that could relatively quickly fall in on the war-
fighting equipment that has been prepositioned in Western Europe
(Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium). These Army Prepositioned
Stocks were added under the fiscal year 2017 ERI. Follow-on forces
could also potentially include the expanded NATO Response Force,
including its Initial Follow-on Forces Group and its air, maritime, and
SOF components, along with any allied national forces joining the
fight.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson?
STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, THE
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman McCain, Ranking
Member Reed, members of the committee. I want to begin and bed
this in a little bit of the story of understanding what
happened and why it matters.
In June 2014, NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels to
consider Montenegro's accession to NATO. Just 3 months prior,
the Russian Federation had annexed Crimea. So many argued at
the time that the NATO's decision to invite Montenegro into the
Alliance was not only merited on its own terms, but would also
contribute to a decisive response to Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. Others, however, urged delay, emphasizing de-
escalation of the crisis unfolding in Ukraine.
In the end, it was ambivalence among key allies and,
frankly, opposition by the United States that led the Alliance
to punt the decision, agreeing to reconsider the issue by the
end of 2015, which would be 18 months later.
So as NATO ministers failed to reach consensus on
Montenegro that tumultuous summer, Moscow saw an opening. NATO
had blinked. With the successful seizure of Crimea and the
emergence of what the Kremlin believed would become
Novorossiya, Russia was on offense. The West was stunned, and
true to form, Moscow's success emboldened the Kremlin to pursue
further success. The thinking in Moscow was that the seizure of
Ukrainian territory would surely block Ukraine's move towards
NATO and the EU. But might the Kremlin also be able to stop the
integration process in Southeast Europe?
So it is during this period that the plot for Montenegro
was hatched when Aleksandar Sindjelic, the leader of the
paramilitary Serbian Wolves, began Serbian fighters to fight in
Ukraine, himself included. It is there that Russian
nationalists introduced him to two Russian military
intelligence agents, GRU agents, Eduard Shirokov and Vladimir
Popov. Open source reporting provides a compelling case that
the GRU and its associates were directly involved in
orchestrating the attempted coup. Sindjelic received money from
these Russian contacts to purchase weapons and supplies used in
the Montenegro operation and to recruit participants. The
details are sensational, and since, Senator McCain, you asked,
I will add a few more of the details to put that in the record.
We should remember that this was plan B. Plan A was for the
Russians to tip the balance of the elections. I have had the
opportunity to travel to Montenegro regularly, almost every
year for the past several years, and in the run-up to this
election, it was pretty remarkable to see street signs,
billboards all across the country anti-NATO campaign. So the
plan was to defeat the pro-NATO forces in this election through
using the Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, a
telecommunications company, and a media empire. This small
country of 600,000 was flooded with resources to tip the
balance. In fact, the main Serbian opposition party was not
radical enough, and the Russians sidelined them, picked a
fringe party called the Democratic Front and, through its
resources, it went from being irrelevant on the Montenegro
political scene to now being the leading opposition. Two of its
leaders now are being tried for the coup attempt. That was plan
A.
Plan B was that on October 16th, 2016, if the pro-NATO
forces were to succeed at the election, to enter parliament
dressed as Montenegro security services, open fire on
opposition supporters that the organizers had cynically
gathered and called to convene in front of the parliament
themselves, kidnap or assassinate the Prime Minister, declare
the elections invalid, and install the Democratic Front taking
power, this followed very rapidly by a series of very strange
developments.
On October 24th, after Serbs doubting it, announced that
they had found complicit information about co-conspirators in
Belgrade. 2 days later, the head of the--Patrushev, the head of
the Russian National Security Council, arrives in Belgrade,
supposedly privately to apologize for a botched operation, but
also to provide cover for the deportation of two Russians that
departed Belgrade, some just before and some again on November
11th. December 12th, Lavrov is there seen pictured with one of
the co-conspirators in this coup.
It is a spy novel. It is hard to believe.
If the coup would have succeeded, it would have dealt an
immeasurable blow to the Alliance. It would have brought a halt
to the process of NATO enlargement as well.
This incident is part of Russia's strategy to make the
world safe for autocracy and kleptocracy. Russia seeks to
reverse the Cold War order and undermine both NATO and the EU
from within through malign influence operations.
In response, the United States and the European Union have
enacted tough sanctions. I very much support the congressional
effort to toughen those sanctions with the bill that is
pending. But sanctions should be part of a strategy rather than
the strategy. This administration has yet to articulate clearly
the nature of the Russian challenge, much less the strategy to
counter it. Nonetheless, I believe the key elements of a
response are in place or within reach.
To tackle malign Russian influence, I would advocate a
five-part strategy: promoting prosperity, bolstering our
defense capabilities, pursuing a concerted engagement strategy
exposing Russian actions, and anchoring our actions and our
ideals. That is offering our vision of what it is we are
seeking to achieve rather than simply countering Russian moves.
Russia is able to advance its malign influence where there
is a nexus of corruption, organized crime, and under-
development. To tackle this, the head of an allied intelligence
service recently told me that prosperity is the best antidote,
as it increases the resilience of nations particularly in the
Balkans and Southeast and Eastern Europe.
I think this is why President Trump's endorsement of the
Three Seas Initiative in Warsaw is important. It is an
initiative that brings together the 12 EU member states between
the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Seas with the aim of
advancing cross-border energy, transportation, and
telecommunications infrastructure to better integrate their
economies, unlock growth potential, and ensure that Russia
cannot hold their economies hostage. This is why the
congressional move to lift restrictions on LNG [Liquefied
Natural Gas] exports to Europe is so important as well.
So I actually believe an American prosperity agenda should
advance U.S. investment in the region, putting economic ties on
par with our security ties. It is entrepreneurship, after all,
that provides jobs outside the control of political patronage
networks, which are subject to Russian manipulation.
Second, we need to project our military strength as a
stabilizing force. The $4.8 billion European Deterrence
Initiative request is a great contribution, especially on the
eastern flank. But just as we have positioned forces, modest
forces, in the east, we should do so in the southeast. This
means transforming our forces that are in KFOR [Kosovo Forces],
modest as they are, at Camp Bondsteel into what I would call a
permanent presence to project security throughout the region
and bolstering Black Sea security by approving the pending
Patriot sale to Romania and providing lethal military
assistance to Ukraine and Georgia.
Third, the United States needs a sustained diplomatic
offensive in the region. Our engagement is too episodic and not
at a sufficient political level. Vice President Pence will soon
visit Tallinn, Podgorica, and Tbilisi where he can follow up on
the Three Seas prosperity agenda and I hope announce more steps
to bolster our security commitments. But even as we work to
ensure Montenegro's NATO membership is a success, we should
have a diplomatic strategy that pursues a historic
rapprochement with Serbia that ends Belgrade's dangerous
hedging, which is why President [Aleksandar] Vucic's visit to
Washington next week is so important.
The United States should also resume its leadership in
resolving the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia, paving
the way for the latter's membership in NATO. To start, we
should welcome the Greek Prime Minister to Washington to ensure
Athens is a partner rather than an obstacle in the region, not
tempted by Russian manipulation.
Fourth, the most effective means to counter Russian malign
influence is to expose it. As our electorates become educated
on Russian influence operations, they become inoculated to its
impact. This is why the Atlantic Council just last week in
Warsaw convened the first-ever Open Source Summit to train
journalists and activists on using unclassified techniques to
expose and combat Russian influence. Through this work, we have
been able to document in great detail what unfolded in
Montenegro in an unclassified setting. We need to empower this
type of work across the Alliance as it makes our democracies
more resilient and our electorates less susceptible to
manipulation.
But most importantly, I think we need to keep our values as
our guiding star and restore a credible vision of a Europe
whole and free. Our message should be clear that as a result of
reforms at home, all European states can ultimately be part of
a secure and prosperous transatlantic community. Advancing a
Europe whole and free should be a central plank of a broader
effort to rally the West, as President Trump perhaps suggested
in his Warsaw speech. I prefer the term ``free world'' to
connote our community is not one of geography but one of ideas.
Senator McCain, you put it, defense of the free world is the
purpose where we try to rally folks around democratic
institutions, rule of law, free media.
As part of this strategy, the United States itself must
remain a force for integration, not fragmentation in Europe. We
cannot be ambivalent about this. We should never become an
enabler of the Kremlin strategy to divide and weaken the
European Union.
Excluding the invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, the coup in
Montenegro may be among the most brazen of Russia's influence
operations. Its significance is that the Russians almost got
away with it. But it is not unique. There are incidents. In
October 2014, Russian Cossacks entered Banja Luka poised to
intervene if Milorad Dodik had lost his election. Arms caches
have been found in Hungary with ties to GRU agents. Russian
fingerprints are on spectacular kidnappings in Estonia,
instability and violence in Macedonia, efforts to stoke
separatism in Gagauzia in Moldova, and to delegitimize Kosovo
as a state, on top of the financing of extreme political
parties across the continent.
The Kremlin has drawn its own lessons from the muted
response of the free world. I think it is important that we
must end the cycle of impunity, continuing to raise the costs
of not only Russia's actions in Ukraine, but also its
interference in our democratic societies, even as we work to
eliminate the opportunities for its malign influence throughout
Europe.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Damon M. Wilson
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
In June 2014, NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels to consider
Montenegro's accession to NATO. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
was working hard toward a consensus that Montenegro would be invited to
begin accession talks to become NATO's next ally.
Just three months prior, the Russian Federation had annexed Crimea.
Many, including me, argued at the time that a NATO decision to invite
Montenegro into the Alliance was not only merited on its own terms, but
would also contribute to a decisive response to Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. Others urged a delay, emphasizing de-escalation of the crisis
unfolding in Ukraine.
In the end, ambivalence among key allies and opposition by the
United States led the Alliance to punt, forcing an exasperated
Secretary General to announce that NATO would reconsider the issue by
the end of 2015, 18 months later, removing this decision from the
agenda of NATO leaders who would meet in Wales that September.
As NATO ministers failed to reach consensus on Montenegro that
tumultuous summer, Moscow saw an opening. NATO had blinked. With the
successful seizure of Crimea and the emergence of what the Kremlin
believed would become Novorossiya, Russia was on offense. The West was
stunned. True to form, Moscow's success emboldened the Kremlin. The
thinking in Moscow was that its seizure of Ukrainian territory would
surely block Ukraine's move toward NATO and the European Union (EU).
But might the Kremlin also be able to stop the integration process in
Southeast Europe? The lack of a NATO decision on Montenegro signaled
ambivalence, leaving a vacuum which Moscow was intent to fill.
It was during this time that Aleksandar Sindjelic, leader of the
paramilitary ``Serbian Wolves,'' began sending Serbian fighters to
Ukraine to support Russia's seizure of Crimea and insurgency in the
Donbass. While in Ukraine, Sindjelic worked with Russian nationalists
who introduced him to Eduard Shirokov (he is also known as Eduard
Shishmakov) and Vladimir Popov. Open source reporting has verified both
as Russian military intelligence, or GRU, agents. \1\ Their encounter
set in train the attempted coup in Montenegro.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/25/
balkan-gambit-part-2-montenegro-zugzwang/
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Thanks to what we at the Atlantic Council call #DigitalSherlocks,
or our digital forensic open source researchers, we know that Shirokov
formerly served as deputy military attache at the Russian Embassy in
Warsaw, where he was accused of espionage, declared persona non grata,
and expelled in June 2014. His registered address in Russia is a GRU-
owned residence. He was issued a false passport in August 2016, two
months before traveling to the Balkans. Popov, who had been spotted in
Moldova with Gagauzian separatists in 2014, joined Shirokov in hosting
Sindjelic in Moscow in September 2015, where they proposed the plot to
derail Montenegro's NATO bid. Sindjelic received money from these
Russian contacts to purchase weapons and supplies used in the
operation, and to recruit participants.
These events set in motion the extraordinarily brazen attempted
coup in Montenegro last October. Open source reporting provides a
compelling case that the GRU and its associates were directly involved
in orchestrating this attempted coup in an effort to install a
government friendly to Moscow and derail Montenegro's NATO accession.
If the coup would have succeeded, it would have dealt an immeasurable
blow to the Alliance and its credibility. It also would have brought to
a halt the process of NATO enlargement.
This incident is part of Russia's strategy to, in effect, make the
world safe for autocracy and kleptocracy. As Russia itself has become
more of an authoritarian kleptocracy, it has sought to reverse the
post-Cold War order that has been so successful in advancing freedom,
prosperity, and security in Europe. To achieve its objectives, Russia
need only disrupt this process. Moscow however escalates its objectives
with success, meaning that Russia has seen an opportunity to undermine
both NATO and the EU from within through its malign influence
operations.
To date, the West has been flat footed. During the Obama
administration, the United States and the EU enacted tough sanctions.
But sanctions should be part of a strategy, not the entire strategy.
The Trump administration has yet to articulate the nature of the
Russian challenge, much less a strategy to counter it. Nonetheless, key
elements of a response are in place or within reach.
I would argue that the best defense is offense. Building on the
president's recent address in Warsaw, we should focus on rallying the
free world to defend itself and the values that underpin our freedom.
To tackle malign Russian influence, I advocate a five-part strategy:
promoting prosperity, bolstering our deterrent capabilities, pursuing a
concerted diplomatic engagement strategy, exposing Russian actions, and
anchoring our actions in our ideals--that is, offering our vision of
what it is we are seeking to achieve rather than simply countering
Russian moves.
Russia is able to advance its malign influence where there is a
nexus of corruption, organized crime, and underdevelopment. To tackle
this, the head of an allied intelligence service recently told me that
the best answer is to promote economic growth. Prosperity is the
antidote as it increases the resilience of nations, particularly in
Europe's East and Southeast.
This is why President Trump's endorsement of the Three Seas
Initiative in Warsaw is important. This initiative brings together the
12 EU members between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas with the aim
of advancing cross-border energy, transportation, and
telecommunications infrastructure to better integrate their economies,
unlock growth potential, and ensure Russia cannot hold their economies
hostage. In effect, this Initiative is about completing Europe within
these currently segmented markets. At the same time, this effort should
aim to connect these EU members to non-EU members in Southeast Europe
and Europe's East, helping to integrate structurally these economies
into Europe.
An American prosperity agenda should advance U.S. investment and
financing in the region, putting our economic relationship on par with
our security relationship in many of these nations. Furthermore, a
United States policy of advancing one of our soft power strengths,
entrepreneurship, would also help provide job growth outside the
control of political patronage networks which are subject to Russian
manipulation.
Second, we need to project our military strength as a stabilizing
force, especially in Europe's East and Southeast. I applaud the
request, and urge Congressional approval, of the increase in funding
for the European Deterrence Initiative from $3.4 billion to nearly $4.8
billion. In addition, to counter malign Russian influence in Southeast
Europe, the United States should transform its presence within KFOR
into a permanent United States military presence at Camp Bondsteel,
aimed at projecting security throughout the region. Congress should
also approve the sale of the Patriot system to Romania, reinforcing the
deterrent effect of the recent agreement to sell Patriots to Poland.
Furthermore, Congress should return to the idea of providing
substantial defensive lethal weaponry and combat training for Ukraine
and Georgia.
Third, the United States has an opportunity to build on President
Trump's visit to Warsaw with a sustained diplomatic offensive in the
region. Our engagement in the region is too episodic and not at a
sufficient political level. Vice President Pence will soon visit
Tallinn, Podgorica, and Tbilisi--providing an excellent opportunity to
offer concrete follow up on the Three Seas prosperity agenda and
announcing steps to bolster our security commitments. The President
should agree to meet with Three Seas leaders at their summit in
Bucharest next year, and end the isolation of the Hungarian Government
which has only made its leaders more susceptible to Russian pressure.
We must work to ensure Montenegro's NATO membership is a success and
sharpen the message that reforms at home can lead to membership in NATO
and the EU. We should pursue an historic rapprochement with Serbia that
ends Belgrade's dangerous hedging. In this regard, I applaud the Vice
President's hosting of Serbian President Vucic on Monday. The United
States should also resume its leadership in resolving the name dispute
between Greece and Macedonia, paving the way for the latter's
membership in NATO as it consolidates domestic reforms. To start, we
should welcome Greek Prime Minister Tsipras to Washington and work to
ensure Athens is a joint partner in the region rather than an obstacle.
Robust United States engagement deprives Russia's strategy of the void
it seeks to fill.
Fourth, in our open democratic societies, often the most effective
means to counter Russian malign influence is to expose it. We do not
need to counter disinformation with propaganda of our own. However, we
need our own citizens to expose Russian actions and disinformation. As
our electorates become educated on Russian influence operations, they
become inoculated to its impact. To this end, the Atlantic Council's
Digital Forensic Research Lab with its partner Bellingcat last week
hosted in Warsaw the first Open Source (``OS 360") summit to train
journalists and activists on using unclassified techniques to expose
and combat Russian influence. We need to empower this type of work
across our Alliance as it makes our democracies more resilient and our
electorates less susceptible to manipulation.
Most importantly, we need to keep our values as our guiding star
and restore a credible vision of a Europe whole and free. The lack of a
North Star has opened a tempting new front for the Kremlin's efforts to
rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War era. The United States should
join with the EU to re-establish a clear, common vision for the
continent. Our message should be that as a result of reforms at home,
all European states can ultimately be part of a secure and prosperous
transatlantic community. Advancing a Europe whole and free should be a
central plank of a broader effort to rally the West, as President Trump
suggested in his Warsaw Speech. I prefer the term ``free world'' to
connote our community is not one of geography, but one of ideals--
democratic institutions, human rights, rule of law, free media, and a
vibrant civil society.
As part of this strategy, the United States must remain a force for
integration, not fragmentation, in Europe. Russia's strategy is to
undermine the EU. The administration cannot be ambivalent about this.
We should never become an enabler of the Kremlin strategy to divide and
weaken the EU.
Excluding the invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, the coup in
Montenegro may be among the most brazen of Russia's influence
operations. Its significance is that the Russians almost got away with
it. But it is by no means unique. In October 2014, Russian Cossacks
entered Banja Luka poised to intervene if Milorad Dodik had lost his
election. Arms caches have been found in Hungary with ties to GRU
agents. Russian fingerprints are on a spectacular kidnapping in
Estonia, instability and violence in Macedonia, efforts to stoke
separatism in Moldova and delegitimize Kosovo as a state, and financing
of extreme political parties across the continent.
The Kremlin has drawn its own lessons from the muted response of
the free world. We must end the cycle of impunity, continuing to raise
the costs of not only Russia's actions in Ukraine, but also its
interference in our own societies, even as we work to eliminate
opportunities for its malign influence throughout Europe.
The painful lesson of the 20th century is that American ambivalence
only increases the likelihood of conflict in Europe and a direct
challenge to our national interests. Through sustained leadership and
engagement, anchored in our own values and vision, we can counter the
malign influence of Putin's Russia.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, Mr. Wilson, and thank the
witnesses.
Let us talk for a minute, Mr. Wilson, about Serbia. There
are unique ties between Serbia and Russia. Mr. Vucic seems to
be almost schizophrenic. He wants good relations with the
United States. Yet he also understands the Serbian people's
affinity to Russia. Yet he also understands the Serbian
people's look is to the West, not to the East. As you say, he
is coming to town next week. That could be a very seminal
event. I had a long lunch with him in Belgrade.
How do you think we should treat Mr. Vucic?
Mr. Wilson. I think this is a strategic opening and we
should play, play for Serbia, not in a way that--I am not
unaware of some of the challenges to Serbian democracy
internally. But I think we need to recognize that Vucic has
been hedging between Russia and Europe and the West in part
because he sees the EU as distant and uncertain in its
commitment to Serbia's place in Europe and the United States is
an inconsistent and somewhat distant partner. But we have an
opportunity right now.
I had the opportunity to meet with President Vucic in
Belgrade at the beginning of this year. This coup in Montenegro
is a wakeup call not just for us but for those sitting in
Belgrade. It was forces within his intelligence services, for
which he probably was completely unaware, that were complicit
in this. Shortly after the exposure of this coup, an arms cache
was found in Belgrade on the route that is driven from his
family's house. I think this has had a psychological impact.
The Serbs believe that they can hedge and play both sides.
Most Serbs know the reality is their economy is overwhelmingly
anchored in Europe. Their interests are overwhelmingly anchored
in Europe. I think with clarity from the United States,
coordinated with Germany and the European Union, that we can
help Mr. Vucic understand that hedging is actually playing with
fire and that their ability to maneuver this poses actually
risk to Serbia and its future over time.
One of the challenges we have is that unfortunately Serbia
allowed the opening of a civilian emergency response base in
Nis in southern Serbia where the Russians have been breathing
down his neck to obtain diplomatic immunity for their--it is
the Ministry of Emergencies. The Ministry of Emergencies has a
notorious record of being involved in nefarious activities in
this region. I think part of what our presence can do by
transforming our own presence at Bondsteel, saying it is a
presence for the region, is to help signal to Serbia that we
will not be a fair-weather friend. This is not a partisan
issue. We can have a consistent American strategy of
engagement, supporting their transformation at home and
welcoming them in our community.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Samp, do you have anything to add to
that?
Ms. Samp. I am sorry. I thought you were asking a separate
question.
I completely endorse what Damon said and I do not have
anything of substance to add.
Chairman McCain. What about the influence of the church,
Ms. Samp, which is clearly Russia-aligned?
Ms. Samp. It is yet another tool. It is yet another way
that they can--you know, attempts at coercion. It is one they
leverage to great success with the people. I think it is not
something that gives them an advantage that cannot be overcome,
but it certainly does create strong ties, both historical,
cultural, and other, with the region. It is yet another tool
that the Russians have in the region.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Bugajski?
Mr. Bugajski. I fully agree with Damon. I would simply add
a couple of things about Serbia's position.
I think Serbia now stands in front of a choice. Does it
ally itself with a Russia that is increasingly aggressive,
assertive, and expansionist in Europe and anti-American? Or
does it align itself with the European Union, with the Western
community, with the international alliance, including NATO,
which does not mean NATO membership straight away but
eventually?
I would add this also. Vucic has to be careful because
Putin could possibly pull Serbia into a conflict that he
engineers in a neighboring country, whether in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, if he pushes for separatism. We have already heard
about this in terms of Russian activities in Republika Srpska,
in the Serbian entity in Bosnia. Both Croatia and Serbia could
be brought into a conflict. Similarly in Kosovo. If Russia were
to provoke some sort of conflict with the minority, Serbia
itself could be drawn into the conflict. Similarly in
Macedonia.
So what I would say to Vucic is be on the right side of
history here. Russia does not have your interests at heart. We
do. Russia does not want you to make an independent choice in
terms of your international alliances. Russia is willing to
drag you into a conflict. We want to give you security.
Chairman McCain. Yet the ethnic and historic affinity
between Russia and Serbia is also very well known.
Mr. Bugajski. Can I add to that?
Chairman McCain. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Bugajski. I think that is exaggerated. If you look at
history, even recent history, which country broke first with
Stalin? It was Yugoslavia. It was Tito. So it was a relatively
non-aligned country.
Chairman McCain. Good point.
Mr. Bugajski. If you look through history, Russia has
manipulated both Serbia and Bulgaria in its policies in the
Balkans at different times. Of course, it taps into that
historical memory and exaggerates it in order to have influence
in both countries.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the panel for excellent testimony.
Ms. Samp, you raised an interesting sort of situation where
you said a year ago, we would have predicted that or we would
not have predicted. So let us look ahead. What is their plan,
more or less--the Russians? What is the vulnerable point that
they are trying to exploit right now or points?
Ms. Samp. I mean, I wish I knew, sir, where we could expect
them to go next precisely. I think what we know for sure is
that they will continue what they are doing. They will continue
to try to undermine the international order. They want to cut
the United States down a notch. They want to break Western
unity. So we cannot call shots they do not like or hold them
accountable to the rule of law. So what we can say is this kind
of destabilizing activity will continue.
I think if you look across the map, there is instability in
Central Asia. I think the Balkans are a target-rich
environment. They already have peacekeepers in Moldova. So I
think continued agitation in Ukraine is something that we can
expect. It is hard to know exactly precisely because they like
to experiment, but the one thing that we do know for sure is
that they will continue to sow instability. So we have to
better prepare for it.
Senator Reed. Mr. Wilson, any specific details you would
add?
Ms. Samp. In terms of better preparing?
Senator Reed. No, no. To Mr. Wilson, are you picking up
anything where they are beginning to focus or coalesce on a
particular target or targets, or is it just instability
everywhere, exploit ad hoc what you can?
Mr. Wilson. I do have specific concerns. I think we have
seen Russian tactics actually quite savvy in that they know
they cannot actually compete head on and they cannot compete
against tough targets. So they go for the vulnerable targets,
places where they know where our response would be mixed, weak,
or the pushback would be ambiguous because they do appreciate
they would fail in a head-on confrontation.
That raises for me two concerns. One is Belarus. Ms. Samp
mentioned the Zapad exercise. This is traditionally the largest
exercise in the western military district of Russia. In the
past, they have used it to exercise a nuclear strike on Warsaw,
for example. My fear right now is given the tenuous
relationship between President Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus and
Mr. Putin, that with a major movement of Russian forces on the
territory of Belarus as part of Zapad, that perhaps they do not
leave or that perhaps they do something that tightens their
grip around Belarus, knowing that this is a soft target. This
would allow actually Putin to continue to rally the nationalist
card at home, demonstrate his greatness, and probably not
encounter the wrath of the West in the way that Donbas has
turned into a bigger problem for him.
Second, I do watch very closely on Moldova. There is an
agreement right now between the Moldovans and the Ukrainians to
finally try to impose border controls on the eastern flank of
Transnistria, the slice of territory where Russian troops are
stationed. It is an agreement that the Ukrainians would allow
the Moldovan border units to be based on Ukrainian territory
since they cannot be on Transnistrian territory. This would be
an excellent way to control illicit flows across that border,
but it also would put up a greater barrier to Russia's
potential freedom of maneuver. I do not think they would accept
that very easily. They were hoping to do that this summer, and
I think it could be a flashpoint.
Senator Reed. Mr. Bugajski, please. Any comments? I have
just a minute.
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you. I would reiterate what Damon has
said in terms of flashpoints.
I would add one more. South Caucasus. Even as we speak,
Russia has been moving the border of South Ossetia, which is
occupied territory, deeper into Georgia. The danger there is--I
think the objective is eventually to threaten and cut off
pipelines and transportation systems between the Caspian Basin
and Europe because there is a thin wedge of Georgia through
which major energy, gas and oil, resources go through
transportation to the coast and then out to Turkey to the
Balkans and into Europe. Russia is now within a few hundred
yards of capabilities of cutting off this pipeline in the event
of conflict.
In addition, the conflict over Nagorna-Karabakh between
Armenia and Azerbaijan--that has to be watched extremely
carefully. Every so often it flares up. I think the Azeris are
coming to a point where they are now extremely frustrated with
ever getting these occupied territories back. There seems to be
no progress in any agreements. It is a bit like the Minsk
process. It is their own Minsk process that is frozen.
So these potential flashpoints either Russia engineers or
some local conflict mushrooms into a Russian intervention.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson, you touched on this very briefly, and I think
my overemphasizing it, which I have been doing admittedly, is
not because I am from an oil and gas State, because it seems so
obvious to me that what is going right now could have a huge
impact on Russia and on everything we have been talking about
this morning. General [Philip M.] Breedlove, when he was
talking to this committee just the other day--he said Russia is
very apt to use energy dependence and energy capabilities as
one of the tools, and so more available sources I think would
help to defuse the tool that they use. We are talking about all
the dependency that those countries that we are so concerned
with have on Russia because they have the control. Now, to a
lesser degree, I guess you could argue that Iran also has
exports. But in the case of Russia, 68 percent of their exports
are oil and gas.
I was very proud of the President the other day when he was
in Poland and he drove this home. For all those people who
think maybe he is too cozy with Putin, this statement did not
help him any. They should defuse some of that notion. He said
we are committed to securing your access to energy so Poland
and its neighbors are never again held hostage to a single
supplier of energy.
So I would like to hear from each one of you how
significant you think this is. The ban has lifted. We now no
longer have the war on fossil fuels. So I think good things are
going to happen. What do you think?
Mr. Wilson. Senator, I think it is terrific. I had the
opportunity--I was at the President's speech in Warsaw, and
that particular line was received extremely well. Many of our
friends in this region remember the two dramatic gas cutoffs
that sent literal shivers through their populations, that the
Russians have undoubtedly proved that they will use this as a
weapon not just as a tool of coercion, which they do on a daily
basis.
The lifting of the LNG export restrictions was significant
both for psychological impact, as well as for a commercial
impact. At the end of the day, we do not need to force all of
Russian natural resources out of the market. We need Russia to
be restricted so that it has to play by the market. I think
this is where it is a fairly significant thing. The beginning
of an American LNG shipment had arrived in Poland just in the
past 6 weeks. This is the news of the year in Poland.
The announcement last month of a breakthrough in
negotiating an LNG terminal on Kirk Island in Croatia that
would be linked up to Hungary through a small pipeline is the
lifeline that Hungary needs itself. So there are two areas
where we have real problems, Hungary and Serbia, in large part
because the Russians have a stranglehold on both energy
supplies and energy distribution.
Senator Inhofe. I think others agree with the significance
of that.
I was actually invited to Lithuania by the President when
they were opening their first LNG terminal, and they had other
countries coming in who were just elated with that.
Mr. Bugajski, when you look at the other aspirants, of
course, we saw that Montenegro went through all kinds of
coercion. I am kind of thinking now how the fact that they were
able to come out ahead on this thing--what affect do you think
this has on the other countries, Bosnia and Macedonia, Kosovo
and the others, the fact that they won, Russia lost? What do
you think?
Mr. Bugajski. There are two things I would say. Montenegro,
the fact that it withstood a Russian attempt at overthrowing
the government, sends a warning, if you like, to the region
that Russia may not be averse to attempting a similar scenario
in other countries. So in other words, they are going to be
better prepared, hopefully with our assistance, to withstand
such an assault.
Secondly, I would say the positive results of Montenegro's
NATO membership. In other words, remember, this is a country
that only recently regained its independence, that many
dismissed as being unviable, too small. Now this country is
becoming successful. It has entered our security alliance. It
is part of our security system.
Senator Inhofe. The others are watching.
Mr. Bugajski. The others are watching carefully. There are
several countries that would like to join, at least most of
Bosnia would. Certainly Kosovo would. Macedonia is desperate
for NATO membership, but it is blocked, unfortunately, by this
name dispute with Greece.
I think we have to refocus attention on the region to see--
and this I think would be the best way to push the Russians
back, to try and move these countries as quickly as possible
and as effectively as possible into the Alliance because they
will contribute. They are very pro-American. They want to
contribute to the Alliance.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that.
My time has expired, but one last question to Ms. Samp. You
made the comment, ``The Army combat presence in Europe remains
a full brigade strength below what it was in 2012 prior to the
renewed tensions with Russia.'' I am wondering what some of our
allies over there think because the budget that the President
came out with is about the same as we were criticizing, you and
I was also prior to this. What kind of effect that might have
on our allies over there.
Ms. Samp. So United States combat force presence in Europe,
as you know, has decreased quite dramatically since the end of
the Cold War. This was a recognition of a new threat
environment, and so it rightfully went down from about 35,000
troops in the mid-1980s. We are now at about 62,000 troops. The
rotational forces that we have added under the European
Reassurance Initiative has brought us by about 6,000. So for
the first time in 25 years, the trend line of combat forces in
Europe has begun to tick up.
There was a decision made in 2012 that was quite
controversial at the time to remove two heavy brigades, two
armored brigade combat teams from the European continent, which
left us with only two BCTs [Brigade Combat Team], one infantry
airborne and another striker. So we have no heavy armored
forces in Europe at the moment, save for a rotational force
added under ERI.
At the time the decision was not well received by allies.
If U.S. troops are the most physical manifestation of the
commitment of the United States, then the removal of those
forces did send a message that the United States is ready to
leave Europe and pivot perhaps to Asia.
With a return of forces to the continent, I think the
message would be welcomed by allies for one and also be seen by
Russia as a symbol of commitment to deterrence. I think it
would increase our leverage in the region.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
Earlier this year, Senator Gardner and I introduced a
resolution reaffirming the United States' unwavering commitment
to NATO. As you well know, questions have been raised, notably
in the White House by the President, about that commitment. The
resolution is cosponsored by Senators Rubio, McCaskill,
Portman, Feinstein, Johnson, Kaine, Shaheen, and Booker, a good
bipartisan group.
During these times of extraordinary global uncertainty,
even as our President is in France as we speak, and
increasingly troubling Russian aggression, I believe--and many
of my colleagues do as well--that we need to reassure our NATO
allies that the United States remains strongly committed to
this essential alliance.
I understand the Ambassador from Montenegro has left and
decided, understandably, not to take questions. But I wonder
how Montenegro's accession to NATO benefits the Alliance and
the United States in particular. If you have comments on that
topic, I would appreciate them, to all of the witnesses.
Ms. Samp. Thank you for that question.
I was firmly in the camp of supporting Montenegro's
accession to the Alliance. Not only did I think it added more
assets than liabilities in terms of its geography, it plugged
an important hole in the NATO map along the Adriatic, which a
couple years earlier Russia had tried to exploit and put ships
in a port there. Their military forces are small but they do
bring niche capabilities. They only have about 2,000 forces.
They spend about 1.6 percent on defense. None of this makes
them a super star new ally, but it also does not make them the
least in any of the categories that NATO ranks allies against.
That is one. That is kind of the more, I guess, concrete
considerations.
Now there are also symbolic considerations, and these I
think were even more important in Montenegro's case because it
affirmed NATO's open door which, as we just discussed, are
important to other aspirants for the Alliance. More
importantly, it showed that Russia is not going to have veto
power over the decisions of NATO. So I think for both concrete
and symbolic reasons, allowing Montenegro into the Alliance
made us all stronger.
Senator Blumenthal. By symbolic, I assume you mean moral
reasons as well. Here is a people who wants to defend
themselves against Russian aggression. We do not care whether
it is a small country. We do not care whether it is a large
country. We do not care whether it is powerful or not. America
believes in defending freedom, and NATO is a means to do it in
Europe. Our commitment to NATO is based not just on the
strength of specific allies in numbers of troops or tanks or
planes, but on their will to defend themselves and their
commitment to freedom.
Ms. Samp. Exactly. We gave them a list of things that they
needed to do to join this club. They did it. They met their
commitments, and we needed to meet ours and, as I said,
reinforce NATO's open door, which is a tenet of the Washington
Treaty.
Senator Blumenthal. I welcome other comments if you have
any.
Mr. Bugajski. I would add that it also sends a very
positive signal to other countries in the region to meet the
standards for NATO entry. Remember, entering NATO is not just a
question of asking for it. You have to meet certain standards,
civil military standards, military organization, and so forth.
If Montenegro can do it, then other countries can do it.
Also to Serbia it sends a very positive signal. In other
words, would you want to be linked with the most modern,
sophisticated, effective military organization in the world, or
with an increasingly obsolete Russian military? In other words,
I know Serbia has been training with NATO, but it has also
participated in exercises with Russian and Belarussian forces.
They have to be weaned away from that dependency relationship
that Russia is trying to create with them, and I think NATO is
one of the ways it can be done.
Mr. Wilson. I just briefly would add, sir, I think the
decision to welcome Montenegro not only sort of projects
confidence in our Alliance, but I think it was in part because
of some of our ambivalence in the process that the Russians
smelled an opening. So I think it is the clarity of our views
on this that it actually is part of our preventive defense.
It does do some things that are strategically useful,
closing the northern littoral of the Mediterranean. This is the
last strip of land, which does not sound all that significant
to us, and yet that is why the Russians were focused on the
potential of Bar Port, potentially as the one place where their
fleet could have port call rights. They pressured the
government several years ago to give them that and the
government turned them down. This was significant for the
Russians, and we have taken that off the board.
Senator McCain mentioned the role of the Orthodox Church. A
country like Montenegro has a deeply sophisticated
understanding of how the Orthodox Church is used as an
instrument of advancing Russian geopolitical instruments. That
is a pretty useful contribution to the Alliance for them to be
in that network and to be sharing that type of information.
Importantly, I think it is the stabilizing force for the
region.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses today. This has been a very,
very helpful discussion I think not only for the folks here but
also those that serve on other various important committees
here in the United States Senate as well.
As we witness continued Russian influence throughout the
Baltics and the Balkans, I am really worried that we are going
to see another Crimea-like scenario. Specifically, I am
concerned about Russia's activities in Serbia and its impact on
Iowa's sister state, Kosovo. In fact, just this March, General
Scaparrotti echoed these very same concerns.
This is for all of our panelists, please. Can you describe
to me how Serbia is attempting to undermine Kosovo and what
that means for the stability of the region overall?
Mr. Bugajski. Well, to begin with, thank you for the
question.
To begin with, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an
independent state.
Senator Ernst. Exactly.
Mr. Bugajski. Neither do five European Union countries.
This is where I think we could be more effective in trying to
convince those five countries that do not recognize Kosovo to
go ahead and do so. That would complete the picture in European
Union.
Russia blocks Kosovo's entry into the United Nations and to
the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]
and other international organizations. There has to be pushback
on this as well. If we are serious about creating and
consolidating a democratic state in Kosovo, I think it has to
be a member of all international organizations.
Serbia will not recognize Kosovo anytime soon, but there
are things that can be done. Quite a few things have been done
in recent years to try and normalize relations. But I think
ultimately Serbia's entry into the European Union and eventual
entry into NATO hinges on recognizing Kosovo as an equal, in
other words, as an independent state. I think, again, we could
do more with Vucic to try and persuade him, if not recognition,
at least to not allow Russia to use Serbia to put pressure on
Kosovo.
I will tell you one very interesting thing from the Russian
angle. We have this idea that the Russian-Serbian relationship
is so close. Do you know that the Russians have threatened
Serbia that if you petition to join NATO, we will no longer
block Kosovo's entry into the United Nations? In other words,
they are using Kosovo as a tool against Serbia. We have to
think of creative ways in which we deny them that tool to
influence Serbia.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you for that input.
Yes, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. I might just add to Mr. Bugajski that we have
seen Russian efforts and sometimes Russian through Serbia
efforts to delegitimize Kosovo as a state, to block it as it
tries to join UNESCO [United States Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization], things like that that have to
trappings of state hold. We have seen more disturbingly sort of
provocations, this extraordinary Orthodox draped train that
sent down to the border over the summer very much as a
provocation. It is true that Belgrade now has sort of
extinguished democratic choice among the Serbs in Kosovo, and
they really are under control of Belgrade right now.
Our task should be to work with the EU to broker this
agreement, a more durable agreement, between Serbia and Kosovo
to orchestrate our own historic reconciliation with Serbia,
recognizing that the story of our NATO alliance as former
adversaries coming together as allies. That is the entire
narrative of what this process has been.
I do think that we could do something further. We have
about maybe 700 forces in KFOR at Camp Bondsteel, and
oftentimes the--I remember when I served at NATO, it was always
the pressure. Every 6 months, the U.S. Defense Secretary would
want to know how can we draw down these forces, how many more
troops can come out. I think if we actually just with some
clarity said that our presence there is an enduring presence to
project stability for the region, capacity building for the
region, that Camp Bondsteel remains, it actually would change
the mentality of the region not just seeing it limited as a
stabilizing force in Kosovo, but as an expression of America's
security commitment to the entire region. I think this would
both, strangely enough, reassure Serbia that Kosovo will be
under control while also actually providing incentives for
Serbia to work with us.
Senator Ernst. I think our Kosovo friends would greatly
appreciate that as well.
Ms. Samp, as you mentioned, just very briefly in your
testimony, Russia has been engaged in a lot of nefarious
activities in the gray zone, including propaganda, economic
coercion, and political subversion and various types of
interference. In your opinion, what should the United States
and our NATO allies be doing to discourage the type of
activities that we see at the gray zone?
Ms. Samp. Thank you for that question.
The gray zone is one of our hardest challenges. Obviously,
it does not have the article 5 guarantee that Russia so
respects and that keeps Russia's conventional interference in
allied territory at bay. We saw them push into the gray zone in
Georgia, Ukraine, and in other ways in countries that we are
talking about in the Balkans today.
So what can we do to help shore up their defenses? A lot of
this is going to be things not by the U.S. Military, but by the
U.S. State Department. It is going to be things that build
their resistance, their resilience, increase their media train
so that their journalists are able to identify and attribute
stories instead of just copying and pasting from RT [Russia
Today] or Sputnik. It is going to be things that enhance and
share lessons learned on cyber defenses. It is going to be
doing things that add oversight to their processes to decrease
corruption and increase transparency. So I would not say there
is a huge role for NATO in the gray zone other than to continue
to partner with these countries, continue to build their
capacity, their capability, involve them in exercises. I do not
see a U.S. troop presence, for example, in gray zone territory,
but I think this is going to be a lot of work on the resilience
side and through the State Department.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. I am going to take the opportunity here
to sort of follow up on Senator Ernst's questions with regard
to the gray zone in particular. Have you had a chance, Ms.
Samp, to look at any of the authorization language that we
recently passed trying to get our hands around better tools for
working in that kind of an environment in Eastern Europe and
trying to apply some of the lessons learned from other
conflicts in the world?
Ms. Samp. I was happy to see that the fiscal year 2017 NDAA
approved the Global Engagement Center. I was less happy to see
that its funding was cut at the same time its mandate was
expanded. But I know that there have been other efforts.
Senator Heinrich. I would love to, in follow-up to this,
share some language that we incorporated--Senator Ernst and I--
in the Emerging Threats Subcommittee to try and wrap our hands
around some of these challenges and see what you think of that,
really for all of you.
I was glad to hear you talk about the importance of our
State Department and public diplomacy efforts in this region.
You know, a major part of our strategy for Russian malign
influence has to be proactive not just reactive, and we
certainly need a robust public diplomacy effort and
transparency if we are going to be able to combat the kind of
propaganda vacuum that they often operate in. In some places,
there just is not a counterbalancing communications effort to
RT or Sputnik.
Can you talk a little bit about the strength and capability
of that? What authorities and, frankly, resources do we lack in
terms of that effort? Go ahead, Ms. Samp.
Ms. Samp. So I would say our officials who conduct public
diplomacy are very skilled. When I say that we lack capacity in
the region, it is not to in any way impugn----
Senator Heinrich. It is not the quality of the individuals.
Ms. Samp.--the quality of the people doing the work. That
said, there is not enough of them. It is not coordinated
enough. It does not have enough money. Russia spends a billion
dollars a year on propaganda efforts. I would say we are also
not using every tool that we have available to us. Why are we
not using military information support teams in Eastern Europe?
Why are we not using that? That is a tool that would allow us
to present truthful information to publics that would otherwise
be impenetrable to a U.S. message. It does this by veiling
attribution. This is not against our values, but it does allow
us to press advantages. Why are we not doing that? Why are we
not working more with the public sector, with social media,
with advertising? Again, as I said, I think if Russia can be
creative, then we need to be too, and this is an area where we
have not gotten our act together, quite frankly.
Senator Heinrich. Mr. Wilson, you listed exposing Russian
actions as one of your five--the list of things that we should
be doing aggressively. Can you talk a little bit more about
that and how we make that more robust and more assertive and
fill that vacuum?
Mr. Wilson. Certainly. Let me pick up on that last word,
the ``vacuum.'' I actually think the gray zone, as you call it,
is one of the most important parts of where this will play out
because it is where Russia sees its buffer. It is where Russia
intentionally sows chaos and insecurity. From our interests, if
these countries not just survive but if they thrive, this is an
existential challenge to the model of corrupt authoritarianism.
Therefore, Mr. Putin sees their success as something that
actually painfully knocks on his door close to home.
That is why I think part of our strategy, yes, is to
expose. Ukrainian journalists are actually at the forefront of
actually understanding how to manage this now. We can learn
from them.
But I think more importantly the people in the region
understand that their future is uncertain, that Brussels and
Washington are not quite certain what to do about it. I think
the best thing we could do to fill the vacuum is to actually
have clarity that our goal ultimately is to eliminate the
uncertainty of where these countries lie, that they are not
going to be in some gray zone between East and West. They have
an opportunity to gain a rightful place as part of the free
world, if you will, and thereby a concerted joint NATO-United
States-EU strategy that is focused on growing their economies,
strengthening their defense capacities and their militaries,
and helping to create Europe on their ground, visa-free travel,
independent media, this I think is part of the broader strategy
if they could see a coordinated effort out of Washington,
Brussels, Berlin that was committed to operationalizing the
fact that they have a future option in the free world if they
can get it right at home.
Senator Heinrich. I am out of time, but just a real quick
yes or no. Is it a problem that we seem to be sending all of
our allies mixed messages, that we undermine transparency, and
we are creating overtures--the President to Vladimir Putin--at
the same time as we are saying, hey, we are going to be with
you, you can rely on us?
Mr. Wilson. I think it is a problem.
Mr. Bugajski. I would say there is a lot of confusion in
Europe what is going on.
Ms. Samp. It only helps Putin.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the witnesses? testimony here on a very
important topic.
I wanted to go back to the issue Senator Inhofe raised on
energy, and being from an energy-producing State like he is, I
think we are just scratching the surface on finally realizing
how important this instrument of United States power can be to
bolster our allies and push back on the Russians, to be
perfectly honest.
Mr. Wilson, you and I worked in the Bush administration on
an important energy project, the southern corridor pipeline, or
the B-T-C pipeline that a lot of people know it by, Baku-
Tblisi-Ceyhan, that is a dual oil and gas pipeline from the
Caspian Sea out into the Mediterranean into southern Europe.
When we worked on that, the Russians certainly were not
supportive of that initiative. Were they?
Mr. Wilson. Dramatically opposed.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, and that was U.S. diplomacy and
leadership that drove that very important southern corridor
strategy.
We passed, and I was a big supporter recently of the Iran
and Russia sanctions bill. There are elements of that, though--
it is now becoming apparent--that could possibly undermine the
completion of that southern corridor pipeline, particularly on
the gas side. Are you aware of that at all?
Mr. Wilson. In the legislation or----
Senator Sullivan. Yes, in the legislation.
Mr. Wilson. I do not know the details of that.
Senator Sullivan. We can get that to you. I would welcome
the panel's opinion. There might be an opportunity to tweak
some of the legislation on the House side or in the conference
to make sure that we are not undermining actually one of the
big geostrategic plays that we undertook against Russia, which
was to help those countries to develop that southern corridor.
Would you be supportive of that if we were somehow
inadvertently undermining actually a very good energy strategy
that we have been undertaking?
By the way, the Clinton administration, then the Bush
administration, and even the Obama administration were all
supporters of the southern corridor pipeline.
Mr. Wilson. I think we have yet to fully maximize our
harnessing of America's energy strength. You cited the example
of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, which was a huge strategic and
commercial success. We have not had the win that we need still
in finishing the southern corridor effort, and it is in part--I
think as Senator Inhofe mentioned, adding LNG exports into the
mix is useful. But there are still real challenges in the
pipeline structure, particularly when it comes to the Western
Balkans, Serbia, Hungary in particular. I think this is an area
where in the absence of a combined, concerted diplomatic effort
that is based in the commerciality, it is really hard to get
these done. At the same time, we have undermined our own
interests and efforts because Nordstream 1, Nordstream 2 have
really helped drain--negatively impacted some of the economics
that would be required to get this right.
Senator Sullivan. Let me turn to the issue of allies that I
think most members of the committee here are focused on. Would
you agree that one of the most important strategic advantages
that we have as a country globally, but particularly in Europe,
is that the United States is an ally-rich nation and our
adversaries and potential adversaries like Russia are ally-
poor?
Mr. Wilson. I think this is sometimes something that we do
not fully as a Nation appreciate, the historically unique asset
we have in a global network of alliances of countries that will
stand with us, go into the fight with us, and that this is a
huge force multiplying effect for our influence and our power
in the world.
Senator Sullivan. Is it not also true that we--do you not
believe that we should be looking to deepen those alliances and
expand them particularly when it is very clear that Russia's--
one of their top strategic goals, as was pointed out in
testimony, is to undermine and split our alliances?
Mr. Wilson. I think that is right. I mean, nations around
the world understand that Russia's strong relationships are
often based on coercion and intimidation. That is not how we
operate. So I think the value that these alliances represent
for us means that we actually have to invest in them--they do
not work without our leadership--and look for opportunities to
actually be able to welcome others into those camps.
Senator Sullivan. Let me just pose one final question to
the entire panel on this issue of allies. You know, a number of
us, myself included, had some concerns about when President
Trump was a candidate talking about alliances, he did not seem
to understand the importance, and a number of us had concerns
about maybe the Trump administration was not focusing enough on
our alliances. This is in addition to the Obama administration.
Some of you might remember the Atlantic piece last year
entitled ``The Obama Doctrine,'' and if you read it, it
essentially was President Obama openly being dismissive of most
of the leaders of our key allies. It certainly was not an ally-
building exercise as well.
What more can the Trump administration or the Members of
Congress be doing to enable us to deepen and expand our
alliances, which clearly would help advance the national
security interests of the United States?
Ms. Samp. Thank you for that question.
I think it is incredibly important that we strengthen our
alliances. Our alliances are our greatest foreign policy
advantage. Period. Full stop. It is what other authoritarian
states look at and say I want that. Can I have that? There is
no magnetism. As Damon said, Russia's alliances are built off
of coercion. So we need to protect them. The way that we can do
that--Damon also mentioned U.S. leadership--is incredibly
important in NATO. NATO does not work without U.S. leadership.
Deterrence does not work without U.S. leadership, and so
attending meetings, holding back maybe when you would like to
criticize aloud, and keeping things inside a room, I think
these all are important signals. Right? It is optics but it is
important when you are talking about alliance because you are
not just sending messages to friends. You are sending messages
to adversaries about the U.S. commitment.
As you know, credible deterrence is built off of two
things: capability and intent. Putin has to believe that we not
only have the power to defend our alliances, but that we have
the will and intent to defend our alliances. The statements
that I have seen so far I think undermine that deterrence.
Mr. Bugajski. If I could add, I think this administration
has actually quite a strong national security team. The next
step, though, would be for that national security team to
devise a strong national security doctrine, which includes the
purpose and capabilities of the NATO alliance. I think deeds
are more important than words as well. In other words, this
enhanced forward presence that we are now building in the
Baltic states, in Poland, extremely important, started late,
unfortunately, but at least started under Obama. It is
important that this administration, Trump administration, is
reinforcing and continuing with that.
But I think we need to look at other factors. Look at our
allies, particularly those most vulnerable along the eastern
flank and ask them what is it that you need. Air defense,
missile defense, territorial defense? We can help you in all
this. So I think deed, as well as word, is essential.
Mr. Wilson. I would just add I think it is absolutely right
to keep the pressure on our allies to do more in terms of
defense investment, as has been a consistent bipartisan policy
and certainly from this body. But I also think there is a
difference in understanding that our alliances, our
relationships are not just transactional with them. These are
long-term relationships. In fact, we have permanent alliances.
Understanding the value of consulting them on big decisions and
recognizing that a third of the forces, for example, in
Afghanistan are provided by our allies. They are in the fight
with us. These are not transactional relationships alone.
I also think the more that this body can help actually make
the case to your constituents as well about how alliances are
force multipliers for our interests and our values and not just
a taxpayer burden, I think it is an important message to take
to the American people as well.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Very helpful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, we all on this side of the dais are often prone to
bragging about our own States, but in this case, I cannot fail
to mention that a lot of the preparation for Montenegro's
accession to NATO on the military and security side came
through the partnership with the Maine National Guard. We have
been working with Montenegro since 2006, and I am extremely
proud of the work that our men and women have done in order to
facilitate a very important geopolitical development. So I
wanted to preface my remarks with a real recognition of the
work that was done by those good people from Maine.
I have often thought that if you woke up somebody in 1780
in England and said when are you living, very few would have
said, oh, the industrial revolution, or an Italian in 1500, oh,
the renaissance, of course. In other words, we are not really
aware of the era in which we live.
But listening to you today has helped me to focus my
thinking. I think we are in a new era of conflict. We talk
about the Cold War. We talk about hot war. We are in a warm war
with Russia that involves everything from cyber to
disinformation to political disruption to coup attempts and
military invasion in the Ukraine, for example. I think that is
a very important insight that we cannot just act like this is a
continuation of what has gone on for the past 10 years or 20
years or 50 years.
The second piece of that recognition--and this goes to your
testimony--Mr. Wilson, you had a chilling observation I wrote
down. The Kremlin has drawn its own lessons from the muted
response of the free world. We are not treating this with the
seriousness that it deserves.
Mr. Bugajski, would you comment on those thoughts?
Mr. Bugajski. Absolutely. The Kremlin knows that it cannot
confront this directly. So it uses every available, if you
like, soft power tool to conduct a campaign of subversion to
divide and eventually dismantle the West. I actually put this
in my----
Senator King. This is an active strategy.
Mr. Bugajski. Active strategy from the very top around the
presidential administration. There is a strategy. We often
heard that Putin is an opportunist. He uses opportunities to
conduct his strategy, but there is a strategy. There is a
purpose. There is an ambition. It does not necessarily mean
Russia will be successful. In fact, many times, as we have seen
in Montenegro, it has had the reverse effect.
Senator King. But they will be if we do not respond.
Mr. Bugajski. We have to respond. We have to respond. We
have to not only push back, I would say even further we have to
go more on the offensive vis-a-vis Russia, not militarily but
in the soft power tools. Where they use disinformation, we
should use counter-disinformation, in other words, to inform
the Russian public more accurately what the Russian Government
is not telling them.
Senator King. Well, in 1999, we dismantled USIA [United
States Information Agency], for example, a terrible
geopolitical mistake in my opinion.
Mr. Bugajski. Absolutely. I think VOA [Voice of America],
RFE [Radio Free Europe], any other tool of information that we
have either at our disposal or that we fund I think we should
be helping. Throughout the countries that are most vulnerable,
we should be strengthening their institutions. One of the main
institutions is a free media. Also the social media. We have
not touched on this, but the social media--there are
initiatives in different parts of central eastern Europe, for
example, the elves in Lithuania that are fighting the trolls on
the Internet to get accurate information across. This is
something we should be focusing on. We actually could learn
quite a bit from the Central Europeans that are, let us say,
the most vulnerable countries on the border of Russia.
Senator King. I have always thought it was ironic that we
seem to be losing the information war, and we are the people
that invented Facebook and Hollywood.
Mr. Bugajski. Precisely because they have subverted that
and used it for their purposes. You know, these instruments are
neutral. It depends on how they are used. We assume they will
be used for the right purposes, that people would be smarter
and get more intelligent. That is not necessarily the case.
Senator King. In a few seconds, I want to go to a much more
specific question. Mr. Wilson, we have been talking a lot about
gas and energy as a geopolitical--``weapon'' is not the right
word, but a geopolitical force. The difference is, though--and
I wanted to ask you in more detail and maybe you can get back
to me on the record. The differential between the price of
pipeline-delivered gas and LNG--there is a $3 to $4 premium on
LNG, to liquefy, ship, and de-liquefy. My question is can the
Russians counter the LNG threat, if you will, simply by
lowering the price of their pipeline-delivered gas, which
currently in the U.S.--Henry Hub I think is about 3 bucks. So a
brief answer if you would on that question. In other words, is
LNG the weapon we think--I hate to use the word ``weapon''--the
force that we think it might be because of the price
differential delivered to the customer?
Mr. Wilson. Right. It does have an impact. I have just come
back from Hungary, which is a particular challenge with this.
What LNG has done in the region, both psychological--American
LNG is in the game--and commercial--Gazprom has already said in
Hungary we will sell $1 cheaper than any offer you get in LNG
through Kirk Island terminal----
Senator King. Which they can do because they do not have to
pay the shipping.
Mr. Wilson. But that still has a real concrete effect of
introducing market economics into pricing. Frankly, if they are
taking Russian gas, but they have an option of others, if the
Russians are forced to play into the market, that is where we
win, and that is the problem we have right now.
Senator King. People are willing to make those pretty
substantial capital investments for LNG liquification and de-
liquification.
Mr. Wilson. I would say it is not a simple answer. It took
far, far too long to build the first LNG terminal to get this
Kirk Island pipeline going. So it is not clean cut. This is
partly why we have been focused on these infrastructure
connections running north-south through Central and Eastern
Europe because the Soviets built everything west-east, and the
EU structural fund started to do east-west. There are these
major gaps in the energy corridors running north-south through
the eastern flank of our Alliance, and that is a problem here.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for your holding
this hearing. I think this is a very, very important hearing.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. I too agree. This is a profoundly important
hearing, and I want to thank the chairman and ranking member
for scheduling it, for taking the time to make sure it was
thorough.
This was a scandalous, outrageous act on the part of
Vladimir Putin's Russia. The fact that it largely went under
the radar screen here in the West is indicative of a lot of
things about our foreign policy.
Let me just make an observation or two and then perhaps you
can comment.
I happen to be chairman of the Helsinki Commission. That is
the American participation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
We just got back from Minsk, Belarus with a delegation of 11
House and Senate Members, Republicans and Democrats, and of
course, we in the Parliamentary Assembly are part of the larger
diplomatic OSCE organization which only day before yesterday
now has a complete diplomatic corps of leadership at the four
top positions.
If any of you want to comment about the value of OSCE, feel
free to do so.
The military exercise in Belarus was mentioned by one of
you. I was told by President Lukashenko that this would be
about 15,000 military personnel. One of you, I think,
speculated 100,000 personnel. I was also told in no uncertain
terms by President Lukashenko that Americans were welcomed as
observers, and I have not yet gotten that back to the
administration, but at least from the President, we are
welcomed as observers. What is the significance and what do we
need to worry about about this military exercise in Belarus?
Then maybe I can start by recognizing Mr. Wilson because,
Mr. Wilson, you talked about the five-part strategy, one of
which was exposing Russian actions. I think someone today said
let us not counter their disinformation with our version of
disinformation. I do not think we do very well in public
diplomacy in the United States, and part of that is that we
resist propaganda. There is a lot to be said for letting the
light shine on what is happening, and so if any of you could
comment about a better way of thinking of how our Government
can let the light of day shine internationally on what is
coming out of Putin's Russia. So I will start with you, Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Senator.
Let me connect your last point to your opening with the
Helsinki Commission. Thank you. Kudos for the Helsinki
Commission. It plays an extraordinarily important role on many
of the key issues.
There is a connection to the information propaganda issue.
Sometimes I think we lose the information war not because we do
not have enough assets or better public diplomacy offers. It is
because we have lost the clarity of what our purpose is and to
be able to have a unity of message coming from leaders across
Europe, the United States.
What we have witnessed over the past years is the advance
of authoritarian kleptocracy on the one hand and radical
extremism out of ISIS on the other in a way that has come to
challenge the sense of the free world. We have had a rough
patch. We have had economic troubles. We have had long wars,
and there are reasons that our populations have been
rambunctious, if you will. But the power of the free world is
that we can rejuvenate ourselves. We are self-correcting.
I think the key to the information war is not the next
budget cycle, although that is not insignificant. It is can we
find the clarity of voice across the Atlantic on the purpose of
how to actually adapt--yes, adapt--revitalize and defend the
free world, and that this onslaught of authoritarian
kleptocracy or radical extremism--that is not the future. I
think uniformity in that messaging would actually go far more
effective in helping us to get the propaganda wars right
because we do not fight propaganda with propaganda. We fight it
with who we are and what our purpose is, which is why the
Helsinki Commission values matter.
Just very briefly on Zapad, the observer offer is
significant because, as far as I am aware of, the Russians
always turn us down for observers at some of these. So that
would be significant to take President Lukashenko up on his
offer.
The exercise itself is concerning because it is a tool of
intimidation of its neighbors. It is a real exercising of
massive troop movements to demonstrate the utility and
potential for them to use their military modernization program.
Frankly, I worry about what this means for Belarus' own
sovereignty.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join my colleagues in thanking you and Ranking
Member Reed for holding this hearing. I think it is very
important that we continue to, as the Senate Armed Services
Committee, raise the concerns about what is happening in the
Balkans and Russia's intent in going after Western democracies.
Ms. Samp, I want to go back to something I understand you
said while I was out at another hearing, and that is that
credible deterrence is a combination of capabilities and intent
and that we have to wary of how we are signaling intent to
friends and adversaries.
It is my understanding that shortly after Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov threatened that we must return the two dachas
that were seized back in December as the result of Russian
interference in our elections, that the State Department
rescheduled a meeting that had been pulled down between Deputy
Secretary Shannon and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. One of
the reasons that meeting had been pulled down in St. Petersburg
was because of our seizure of the dachas and our, so far,
unwillingness to give those back to Russia.
Can you talk about what it suggests that we have now
suddenly rescheduled this meeting shortly after Russian Foreign
Secretary Lavrov threatened us around those two dachas?
Ms. Samp. Yes, I would be happy to because I can tell you
it does not send a good signal, a strong signal to Russia that
we are going to be doing what it takes to push back against
their aggression. Quite frankly, it only emboldens them to
further action.
The seizure of those two facilities were part of the United
States response in the wake of Russia's interference in our
elections. This was something undertaken by President Obama in
2016, along with the imposition of additional sanctions. So
overturning those decisions I think sends a message that we are
going to let Russia get away with it, that we want to move on,
and that we are not going to stand up in any real way or push
back. I think that is absolutely the wrong signal to be sending
at the worst possible time.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that. Can I ask,
Mr. Wilson, do you share that view?
Mr. Wilson. I do. I think the Russians have come to have an
expectation that through American political transitions, they
can gain some leverage. Water under the bridge, new team. We
have seen this, frankly, through the past three transitions. I
can think of very specific examples where the Russians have
leveraged this. They will respect our coming to the table in a
position of confidence and strength, and I think that is what
we need to take to the table with the Russians.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Bugajski, do you also agree?
Mr. Bugajski. I agree, and I would like to put in a broader
context. I think the Russians increasingly see us as a soft
target, not forcefully enough, not resilient enough to Russian
pressure not only overseas but maybe even here. They are
exploiting our own divisions, our political polarization,
access to our media, let us say, financial greed and political
ambition. This is exactly what they exploit in Western
democracies, and it has come here now, and it is time to act.
It is time to push back.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
You all have talked about the various hybrid tools that
Russia uses, whether it is disinformation, cyber, illicit
financing, the various tools that they have been using. In your
opinion, which of those tools is the most difficult for us to
respond to, and can you describe any areas where we have been
successful? I would throw that out to any of you to respond or
all of you.
Ms. Samp. I want to highlight the propaganda issue not
because we have not already spoken about it but because I do
think it is a serious challenge. The lack of objective truth in
our society is a serious challenge. It makes it easier for
Russia to be able to manipulate the narrative. If we are not
even speaking with one voice inside the United States
Government, how much more difficult does it make it for the
American people to understand how they should be thinking about
and looking at Russia. So I think this discontinuity in the
message, the lack of objective truth, and Russia's preying upon
that weakness in our society with propaganda, disinformation,
and influence operations is one of the harder challenges we
face.
I think going back to our strengths, of course, this is
nothing that we do not have the tools to address. It is whether
or not we have the will to address it. Our allies, our
institutions, we have the strongest military in the world. We
have the strongest economy in the world. We should not be
falling victim to these sorts of tactics, and I think if we
really leverage the advantages that we have and harness them in
a single direction instead of multiple directions, that would
help us to be able to manage the Russia challenge.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I am actually out of time, but I could not agree more that
disinformation is I think the biggest challenge we face.
Actually, Mr. Wilson, I would argue that the Atlantic Council
needs to do its open source summit in the United States.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Perdue, please.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chair.
I just want to thank the witnesses today for their careers
of work in this area. This is a really important area right now
and we need help.
Mr. Bugajski, you have written about these frozen conflicts
in Eastern Europe. We have seen Russia ignore territorial
sovereignty, occupy land in Moldova, eastern Ukraine, Crimea,
Georgia. It has been 9 years since Russian troops invaded
Georgia, and they have created a frozen conflict. I never heard
of that before coming to the Senate. But this is outrageous.
I would like all of you to comment on this question. We
have seen Russia from Murmansk to--Kaliningrad right now is
bristling. It is a bristling military enclave. We have seen
them in Sebastapol have access to warm waters and now in
Latakia and Tortus in Syria build permanent installations
circling Eastern Europe. I mean, it looks to me like--from a
tactical standpoint it is pretty obvious what they are doing.
My questions, though, are very specific about these frozen
conflicts. What is NATO doing? What are we doing? What should
we be doing to make sure that the Georgia conflict does not
remain frozen and that the Ukraine/Crimea conflict does not
become a frozen conflict?
Mr. Bugajski. Excellent question. Thank you, Senator.
I would say this. We need to understand what Russia is up
to with these so-called frozen conflicts, or unresolved
conflicts. The idea is to freeze the state within which the
conflict is taking place, and we see this clearly in the case
of Ukraine and Georgia to prevent these countries from moving
into NATO; in the Moldovan case, to prevent Moldova from moving
into the European Union; in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh,
keeping both Azerbaijan and Armenia dependent on Russia to try
and resolve the conflict. We can be more active in some of
the--particularly I would say in Georgia and between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. In the case of Ukraine, I would say it is very
important for the Ukrainian Government to be able to prevent
Russia from expanding its territorial hold on Ukraine and using
the frozen conflict as a tool of pressure to prevent Ukraine
from moving into Western institutions.
Senator Perdue. I am sorry. Should the United States arm
the Ukraine with offensive weapons?
Mr. Bugajski. Absolutely. I would give them any weapons
they want. In a way, you could say Ukraine is a test for our
resolve in stopping Putin. If Putin is successful in Ukraine,
can you imagine the ambition that will be raised? If he is
stopped in Ukraine, that will not only stop him from meddling
in other countries, but could have a blowback inside Russia as
well.
Ms. Samp. I would just add that I think Putin has already
been successful in Ukraine. I do not think his intention was
ever to take Kiev. I think it was to destabilize just enough to
make Ukraine an unattractive partner for NATO and for the West.
How do we support these governments? I support arming them not
quite to giving them any weapon they would want, but they do
need lethal assistance.
A bigger challenge, though, is making sure the part of the
country that has not fallen under Russian control continues to
integrate with the West, continues on its path of anti-
corruption and transparency measures to be the best model of
governance it can be so that the part of the country that is
inside of a frozen conflict sort of falls under the weight of
its own corruption and problems and challenges. Now you have
sort of the other half--three-fourths of a country that is
successful and that creates its own magnetism and draw.
Then finally, the most probably important piece of the
equation is patience. None of these frozen conflicts are going
to be resolved in the near future. But having a clear non-
recognition policy which is tied up in our sanctions I think is
important. We had a non-recognition policy with the Baltic
states for 50 years, and that was very important to their
prospects for one day integrating with the West.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Senator. I would just add that the
frozen conflicts are a means for the Russians to take out a
long-term insurance policy that these countries will never be
able to join NATO or the EU because they have been occupied.
This is their objective. They do not need to depend on the word
or commitment of one political leader that may come or go with
an election. It is their insurance policy.
The status quo in these endless negotiations, five plus two
for Transnistria, the Geneva process in Georgia, Minsk with
Ukraine--suit the Russian interests and get us trapped in a
kabuki game. Many of our allies are quite pleased to have a
process at least ongoing, but I actually do not think they
serve our interests. So I think we need to change the equation.
In part, we told the Russians or the Russians read our own
doctrines that say if there is occupied territory in a country,
it cannot join our Alliance. That is in NATO study in 1996 as
we were beginning our enlargement process to incentivize
nations, essentially Europe, to resolve their borders. It made
sense at that time.
I think we should be a little bit more brazen and change
that and say Russian occupation will not stand as a permanent
block on nations joining the EU and NATO even if that means the
jurisdiction of the EU or NATO may not apply to those
territories. Simply the rhetorical switch of that is how you
begin to change Russia's calculations.
I do agree with my colleagues on I think it is important
that we give them the strength of a porcupine defense and help
arm them in a way that it makes the costs too high for the
Russians to invade.
Senator Perdue. Thank you all.
Thank you, Chair.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Peters, please, on behalf of the chairman.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you to each of our panelists today for some excellent
testimony, very thought-provoking testimony.
I serve as the co-chair of the Senate Albanian Issues
Caucus with my colleague Senator Ernst, who you heard from
earlier. I am certainly very proud to represent a very dynamic,
very active Albanian American community in Michigan, many of
which have very strong roots to Montenegro. So I am sure they
are watching and following the discussion here today. But they
also have roots in Kosovo and in Macedonia as well. I know
Senator Ernst brought up the issue of Kosovo. So I would like
to talk a little bit about what we are seeing in Macedonia.
Mr. Bugajski, you suggested in your opening statement the
clashes between Albanians and Macedonians may be engineered by
Moscow as part of its efforts to destabilize the region, as we
have been discussing today, test NATO resolve, which is a huge
issue, and distract attention from their other interventions.
I understand that ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have been
frustrated with government policy and political polarization
and are demanding greater rights for their community in
Macedonia. In turn, Macedonian politics has been increasingly
disruptive, and there is a growing nationalist movement as well
that threatens to fracture the society and perhaps weaken
government structures.
If you could provide some more context to us on the
tensions between Albanians and Macedonians, the current level
of severity of that tension, and expand on possible Russian
involvement fostering that.
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you very much, Senator.
Macedonia is stuck because of its name dispute with Greece.
A country that has actually qualified for NATO cannot make any
progress because of the fact that it cannot resolve that name
dispute. That is having an effect on internal politics and
inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia because, as you know from
your constituents, Albanians, being probably some of the most
pro-American and pro-NATO populations anywhere in Europe, would
like to follow Albania in pulling Macedonia into NATO as well.
The longer that conflict continues, that standoff
continues, the more that nationalists will exploit them. We saw
this during the previous administration that nationalism was
manipulated in an international but also a domestic context.
Macedonia now has a new chance. It has a new government. It
is a coalition government with an Albanian partner. I think it
is very important--and I know Vice President Pence has talked
to Zaev--for the United States to become more closely involved
in resolving this name dispute, or at least getting Macedonia
into NATO even if that dispute is not finally resolved. That
would help to if not settle at least to pacify any
possibilities for inter-ethnic conflicts within Macedonia.
Senator Peters. You mentioned the strong relationship
between Albania and the United States. Do you want to elaborate
on how important our relationship with Albania is to securing
that region?
Mr. Bugajski. Albania is one of the key countries in the
region. Let us say it is still a developing democracy. It is a
NATO member. It contributes to security. It is very pro-
American. It sends a very positive message to other Albanian
communities in terms of their Western and NATO aspirations.
The problems, of course, they have internally are problems
common to many Balkan states, lack of judicial reform,
corruption, poor governance in some places. Again, these are
areas where we have to, let us say, not cut our funding but
help them to achieve the standards of other European countries,
not only in Albania but elsewhere. As I said earlier, there is
not a more pro-American population--maybe in Kosovo. But we had
a strong role in helping to create--President Berisha, as you
know, in creating the first Albania and several recent
presidents in creating--consolidating Kosovo as a state, and
they remember that and they will always remember that.
The Albanian population, I would say, in the Balkans is one
of the key factors that we need to keep our eye on and to make
sure that any kind of program for greater Albania is resisted,
but the Albanians are integrated and empowered in each of the
countries that should be part of NATO, including, as we have
said, Macedonia and Montenegro, which has already entered.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you.
I am running out of time. So I am not going to have an
opportunity to get an answer to this question, but I will
submit it to you and hopefully we will hear back.
I just recently returned from a trip to Latvia and
Lithuania, folks who have been dealing with miscommunication
and propaganda from Russian media. In fact, when I was there at
the NATO STRATCOM [Strategic Command], they showed me a
Facebook post that the Russians were sending around the country
that the Americans had apparently bombed a building in Latvia.
It had pictures of a burning building, but of course, did not
exist, but nevertheless, was being used to create anti-American
tensions.
I know, however, that the Baltic states have also been
pretty effective in pushing back against some of that
misinformation. I met with a group of journalists who are
working actively to get folks to question what they see and
what they hear.
But I would certainly love to have each of your assessments
as to lessons learned in the Baltics that may apply to us
broadly. We are out of time, but would hope that you could
respond in written form to me. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
On behalf of the chairman, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you all for your work for many decades.
It looks like I am in final position here. So I just want
to start by summarizing where I think we are from this. Russia
is actively working to destabilize countries along its borders
and to undermine European Union and NATO. They are doing it
through indirect tactics like enabling separatist forces and
disseminating propaganda and fake news, as well as launching
cyberattacks against the American electoral system and others
in Europe.
Now, all of you have said this requires a strong response,
and last month, the Senate tried to do something about it by
passing a bill that both expands sanctions and ensures
enforcement of existing sanctions against Russia. I know you
touched on this in your testimony, but I just want to draw a
line under it because I think it is so important right now.
Ms. Samp and Mr. Wilson, would these new Russia sanctions
passed by the Senate be helpful or harmful in responding to
Russian aggression? Ms. Samp?
Ms. Samp. Thank you.
I think they would be extremely helpful. We have to do more
to change Russia's risk calculus. We are all saying the same
thing here, Democrats and Republicans alike. Ultimately, this
comes down to how serious do we want to be about Russia's
interference in our election? If this was a fundamental assault
on our democracy, then we need to be pretty serious. The Russia
Sanctions Act is a monumental piece of legislation that says to
Russia, enough. You are not going to get away with it anymore.
I know that the longer we wait to act, the more emboldened
Russia is going to feel. The Germans have elections coming up.
I do not think we want them feeling emboldened going into the
fall or even into 2018 in our own society.
So I think the House should take immediate action to pass
the bill as is. I think any efforts to water it down or delay
it should be considered a dereliction of duty on their part.
Senator Warren. Thank you. That is pretty strong, and I
appreciate that and agree with it.
Mr. Wilson, would you like to add anything?
Mr. Wilson. Yes. I very much agree that it is
extraordinarily helpful. I am in Europe a lot, and one of the
things that is coming through is despite sometimes the nature
of our partisan debate and lack of clarity in messaging, it is
coming through loud and clear, an extraordinarily strong
bipartisan consensus in the United States on standing up to
Russian revisionism and aggression. That is coming through loud
and clear. Essentially the vote for Montenegro, 97 to 2, was
whether the United States would leave a vacuum in the Balkans
and stand up to Russia. The vote on the sanctions--every one we
speak to, when we were traveling through Europe, watches that
in great detail and sees it is very helpful to get done.
We do need to recognize that Russia is doing this in part
because Putin is insecure at home. He does want to demonize the
West as a threat to Russia, and so he will use what we do to
play up the nationalist card at home, and so we need to combine
raising the costs with Russia with a real strength of
confidence in our own democracies and democratic institutions
because that is actually what he is afraid of.
Senator Warren. I very much appreciate your comments on
this, and you are right. This was strongly bipartisan. I was
one of the cosponsors. Many others were, both sides of the
aisle.
The fact that the House is dragging its feet is not only
bad for us here at home, but as you say, this sends a terrible
signal both to Europe and to NATO and to Russia, and I think it
is time for the House just to do this, to pass this bill and
for the President to sign it into law.
I am really concerned, after the President's behavior at
the G20, that we cannot keep waiting for the President of the
United States to take leadership on this. I think this is a
place where Congress has to step up, and we have really got to
put it out there and get this bill passed and put it on the
President's desk and urge the President to sign it.
Did you want to add here?
Mr. Bugajski. I just want to add one thing. We keep talking
about information and disinformation. I think it is very
important that we underscore why sanctions are important, and I
do not think we have done enough of that. I think a lot of
times people will say--in fact, the Russians are saying, well,
the sanctions do not really affect us. You should lift them
because they are actually just spoiling relations. But they are
having an impact on the oligarchs, the companies that are
closely tied to the Kremlin that engage in some of these human
rights and subversive activities abroad. We need to be a little
bit clear in getting the information out on why sanctions are
important and why this bill is now extremely important.
Senator Warren. I very embrace your point on this. You
know, we had hearings on this over in the Banking Committee,
and one of the points raised there is it does have an economic
impact. But as you all say, it also has a powerful political
impact.
So I think we speak with one voice on both sides of the
aisle. The House needs to pass the sanctions bill now, and we
need to get it over to the President to be signed.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank you for your
excellence testimony. We look forward to working with you as we
go forward on these issues and many more. But, again, thank you
very much.
On behalf of the chairman, let me call this hearing
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[all]
| MEMBERNAME | BIOGUIDEID | GPOID | CHAMBER | PARTY | ROLE | STATE | CONGRESS | AUTHORITYID |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wicker, Roger F. | W000437 | 8263 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | MS | 115 | 1226 |
| Cotton, Tom | C001095 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | AR | 115 | 2098 | |
| Cruz, Ted | C001098 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | TX | 115 | 2175 | |
| Fischer, Deb | F000463 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | NE | 115 | 2179 | |
| Ernst, Joni | E000295 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | IA | 115 | 2283 | |
| Perdue, David | P000612 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | GA | 115 | 2286 | |
| Rounds, Mike | R000605 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | SD | 115 | 2288 | |
| Sasse, Ben | S001197 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | NE | 115 | 2289 | |
| Sullivan, Dan | S001198 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | AK | 115 | 2290 | |
| Tillis, Thom | T000476 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | NC | 115 | 2291 | |
| Strange, Luther | S001202 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | AL | 115 | 2357 | |
| Graham, Lindsey | G000359 | 8335 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | SC | 115 | 452 |
| Inhofe, James M. | I000024 | 8322 | S | R | COMMMEMBER | OK | 115 | 583 |
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