Congressional Hearings

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Congressional Hearings

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AUTHORITYID	CHAMBER	TYPE	COMMITTEENAME
ssas00	S	S	Committee on Armed Services

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

[Senate Hearing 115-448, Part 3]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 115-448, Pt. 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1519

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

----------

PART 3

READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

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FEBRUARY 8 AND MARCH 29, 2017

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

S. Hrg. 115-448, Pt. 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1519

__________

PART 3

READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

__________

FEBRUARY 8 AND MARCH 29, 2017

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

34-389 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
TED CRUZ, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
BEN SASSE, Nebraska GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama

Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

_________

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
JONI ERNST, Iowa JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

_________

February 8, 2017

Page

The Current Readiness of U.S. Forces............................. 1

Allyn, General Daniel B., USA, Vice Chief of Staff............... 5
Moran, Admiral William F., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations... 10
Walters, General Glenn M., USMC, Assistant Commandant............ 12
Wilson, General Stephen W., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff............ 19

Questions for the Record......................................... 56

March 29, 2017

The Health of the Department of Defense Industrial Base and its 101
Role in Providing Readiness to the Warfighter.

Wyche, Lieutenant General Larry D., USA, Deputy Commanding 104
General, United States Army Materiel Command.
Grosklags, Vice Admiral Paul A., USN, Commander, United States 107
Naval Air Systems Command.
Moore, Vice Admiral Thomas J., USN, Commander, United States 108
Naval Sea Systems Command.
Dana, Lieutenant General Michael G., USMC, Deputy Commandant, 113
Installations and Logistics, United States Marine Corps.
Levy, Lieutenant General Lee K., II, USAF, Commander, Air Force 117
Sustainment Center, United States Air Force Materiel Command.

Questions for the Record......................................... 141

(iii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2017

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

THE CURRENT READINESS OF U.S. FORCES

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James
Inhofe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee members present: Senators Inhofe, McCain,
Rounds, Ernst, Perdue, Kaine, Shaheen, and Hirono.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. I call the meeting to order.
Let me share a couple of thoughts with you. Twenty-two
years ago I became the chairman of this committee, and I
haven't since that time, because under the rules on the
Republican side, if you chair and are a ranking member in
another committee, you can't chair a subcommittee. This is
really the committee where really everything is happening. The
problems that we're facing today are the ones that we deal
with, so Tim and I are going to do a good job with that, Joni
and the rest of the committee.
The committee meets for the first time in the new session
of Congress to receive testimony from you guys. I don't think
there's a member of this committee that hasn't read what
happened yesterday. I know I have.
We're joined by the same group. We have all the vices here,
General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters, and General
Wilson. I appreciate your sticking to this one more time here.
Last week General Mattis used the guidance on the
administration's plan to rebuild and strengthen our Armed
Forces. I looked at some of the things that were said
yesterday, some of the quotes, and I really do appreciate the
fact that you folks came out and said things that weren't easy
to say. We had General Allyn talking about the Army. Only 3 of
58 brigade combat teams are ready to fight. We had General
Wilson talked about the hollow force, actually used the term
``hollow force.'' That's what we're faced with right now. A lot
of the characteristics that we, who are old enough to remember
it, remember from the Carter administration, know what we had
to do the following years. That's very similar to what we are
going to have to do now. We had General Walters. You talked
about the operational tempo is as high as it was during the
peak of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. We know the problems
that are out there.
While I didn't always get along perfectly with Hagel when
he was in the Senate, and I wasn't one of his strongest
supporters when he came into being the Secretary of Defense,
when I read the statements that he has made from that position,
it's a wake-up call to the American people because otherwise
they don't know, they're not exposed to this.
This is what he said, quote, ``American dominance on the
seas, in the skies, and in space can no longer be taken for
granted.'' This is something we want to address, we want to
accept as a reality. We're going to have to improve our
readiness, achieve a balance in addressing shortfalls, and
build a larger and more capable and more lethal joint force.
Those are the statements that were made, the three priorities
that were given to this committee, the major committee, just a
week or so ago.
We have a lot of these problems that we're going to be
dealing with. During Secretary Mattis' nomination hearing he
stated that we are going to have to increase operation and
maintenance funding while adapting to strengthening our
military as the situation dictates. This means additional
resources are needed, and what I'd like from our witnesses
today is an outline of how you plan to restore the readiness to
our Armed Forces and how we re-grow our force, how do we
maintain the equipment that has been through 2 decades of war,
and how do we train that force to meet the national security
requirements.
This is the committee where most of the action is going to
be, and we've got a lot of work to do, and Tim and I have
already talked about this. We're going to see to it that we
start getting a bigger attendance here and that we start
addressing these problems that we should be addressing before
they hit the major committee.
Senator Kaine?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've done a
better job arm twisting on your side of the table than I have.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I guess so.
Senator Kaine. I have to up my game here.
Welcome to the witnesses. This is an interesting hearing.
The witnesses--did you know this, Mr. Chair? Our 4 witnesses
have a combined 142 years----
Senator Inhofe. No, I didn't know that.
Senator Kaine.--of combined military experience. That means
I know we're only going to hear the most astute wisdom today.
There is a limit to what we can discuss in open session.
I'd just say at the start that all colleagues on the committee
are encouraged to read the classified readiness reporting that
is available to members of this subcommittee.
I am pleased to be the ranking. I work very, very well with
the Chairman. We've got a good relationship, and I know this
subcommittee will continue the bipartisan tradition that is its
norm.
The military does suffer from an unacceptable level of
readiness. I said to the Chair as we walked in that some of
what we'll hear today we heard last year, and we heard two
years ago. Somebody said maybe if we listened, history wouldn't
have to repeat itself.
The first step we ought to take to address this
vulnerability is to provide more predictable and stable funding
for men and women in uniform. The new administration has made
some comments about spending that I agree with, a desire to
boost military spending and repeal sequestration for the DOD
[Department of Defense]. We haven't heard the same commitment
with respect to repealing sequestration for the whole
government. The chairman of this committee, Chairman McCain,
put out a report suggesting that should be done, and even if
your focus is specifically on national security, it's still
very important that sequestration, we look at it not just on
the DOD accounts but on the whole of government, because
whether we're talking about Homeland Security, State, the DEA
[Drug Enforcement Agency], the nuclear reactor portion of what
the Department of Energy does, there are so many things in the
non-defense discretionary side that really are integral to our
security challenges.
We've got the responsibility to help DOD restore readiness
as soon as possible. We'll be getting good information that we
can use as information to persuade our colleagues of this.
I am concerned about one recent development, the hiring
freeze that was issued on January 23rd for Federal civilian
employees. It was not a permanent hiring freeze. It was a
temporary hiring freeze to analyze what should be done, and I
hope it is, in fact, temporary because this does have a
readiness impact on shipyards, depots, air logistics centers,
but also on other Federal agencies because the Federal agency
is certainly the employer of choice for veterans. When you do a
hiring freeze at the Federal level, it falls most
disproportionately on the veterans that are hired so
significantly into the Federal Government.
At a time when we're losing shipyard depot workers and
others to retirement and sequestration-related attrition, I'm
afraid that a freeze like this, if it continues, could really
hurt us both on the readiness side and be unfavorable to our
veterans.
I am pleased in hearing from our witnesses today about
plans to rebuild readiness and what exactly does a fully funded
ready force look like. Each service branch has its own measures
of readiness, and some of the most interesting discussions
we've had in these hearings in the past is exactly what does a
readiness measure mean. I used to say as governor I can measure
everything, but the one thing that scared me was measures of
emergency readiness. I can measure an unemployment rate, I can
measure a graduation rate, but what was the measure for what we
would do if there was a hurricane tomorrow? Those measures are
tough, and the need for the committee to understand exactly how
we measure the readiness in the different branches is very
important.
I understand the hearing today from the Air Force, they
would like to increase the number of fighter squadrons from 55
to 60. What are the research requirements we have to grapple
with in the committee and those who are on budget and
appropriations to get to that? What's the appropriate timeframe
that we should be looking at to make that kind of advance?
This committee also deals with MILCON [military
construction] and facilities sustainment, and these are
important matters to readiness too. When we talk about
increasing military spending, I do think that there is this
area where we can do better, and that's increasing the O&M
[operation and maintenance] funding for facilities sustainment,
restoration, and modernization [FSRM]. We'll be getting into
some testimony that I'm really interested in on the
shipbuilding side. As a general matter, if we're resource
pressed and we end up having fewer facilities, then it becomes
even more important if we have fewer that we maintain those we
have to a higher level. That's not necessarily what we're doing
now in the MILCON area or in purchasing platforms.
Our installations for a long time have had to defer
necessary maintenance, and if we don't address backlogs soon,
it just leads to higher long-term costs and risks that decrease
the quality of life for our troops. I hope we can look at the
FSRM accounts, increase as much as possible in the fiscal year
2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. I hope we can
increase military construction across the Active and Reserve
components. If we can increase those two accounts in
particular, we not only improve the readiness in installations
in every state, it would also bolster the resiliency of
facilities, and we need to work together to make this happen.
One area that's important to me and I know important to the
Chairman, we have some slight differences on it, but it's the
area of energy. DOD is the largest user of energy in the
Federal Government, and I support the military's effort to
invest in technologies and alternative sources that not only
improve readiness but increase combat capabilities by extending
range, endurance, lethality, and energy resilience for our
installations, and especially in some ways for forward
operating bases.
Whether DOD is confronting cyber threats or vulnerabilities
in its energy supply or protecting against severe weather
events, from a readiness perspective we've got to make sure
that we make the investments in energy resiliency, and we did
those in section 2805 in the 2017 NDAA, and I hope we will
continue to do that.
Mr. Chairman, thanks again for today's hearing, to start
this discussion that will roll up into the NDAA work that we
will do as a full committee. I'm excited to work with you as
the ranking on this committee and very gratified that we have
the witnesses here today.
Senator Inhofe. Well, thank you. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
It will be easy for you guys because you can use the same
opening statements you used yesterday, if you want to.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. We want to hear it, and we want to get it
on record. Some of the things were very bold statements that
were made. It's worth repeating because this is for our record
over here. We're going to be very aggressive trying to make the
changes necessary to bring our defenses up, so feel free to do
it.
We'll start with you, General Allyn. Try to keep it down
somewhere around 5 minutes, all right?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DANIEL B. ALLYN, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF

General Allyn. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member
Kaine, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify on the readiness of your United
States Army. I appreciate your support and demonstrated
commitment to our soldiers, civilians, families, and our
veterans, and look forward to discussing the strength of our
Army with you today.
This is a challenging time for our nation, and certainly
for our Army. The unipolar moment is over, and replacing it is
a multi-polar world characterized by competition and
uncertainty. Today, the Army is globally engaged with more than
182,000 soldiers supporting combatant commanders in over 140
worldwide locations.
My recent travel--I have visited our soldiers in 15
countries since Veterans Day--reinforces that the Army is not
about programs; it is about people, our people executing
security missions all around the globe. The strength of the
all-volunteer force truly remains our soldiers. These young men
and women are trained, ready, and inspired. We must be
similarly inspired to provide for them commensurate with their
extraordinary service and sacrifice.
To meet the demands of today's unstable global environment
and maintain the trust placed in us by the American people, our
Army requires sustained, long-term, and predictable funding.
Absent additional legislation, the caps set by the Budget
Control Act of 2011 will return in fiscal year 2018--that would
be October of this year--forcing the Army to once again draw
down end strength, reduce funding for readiness, and increase
the risk of sending under-trained and poorly equipped soldiers
into harm's way, a preventable risk our nation can and must
prevent.
We thank all of you for recognizing that plans to reduce
the Army to 980,000 soldiers would threaten our national
security, and we appreciate all your work to stem the drawdown.
Nevertheless, the most important actions you can take, steps
that will have both positive and lasting impact, will be to
immediately repeal the 2011 Budget Control Act and ensure
sufficient funding to train, man, and equip the fiscal year
2017 NDAA authorized force.
Unless this is done, additional topline and OCO [overseas
contingency operations] funding, though nice in the short term,
will prove unsustainable, rendering all your hard work for
naught. In this uncertain environment, readiness remains our
number-one priority. Sufficient and consistent funding is
essential to build and sustain current readiness, progress
towards a more modern, capable force, sized to reduce risk for
contingencies, and to recruit and retain the best talent within
our ranks.
Readiness remains paramount because the Army does not have
the luxury of taking a day off. We must stand ready at a
moment's notice to defend the United States and its interests.
With your assistance, the Army will continue to resource the
best trained, best equipped, and best led fighting force in the
world.
We thank you for your steadfast support of our outstanding
men and women. Please accept my written testimony for the
record, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Allyn follows:]

Prepared Statement by General Daniel Allyn
introduction:
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the readiness
of your United States Army. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the
Honorable Robert Speer, and our Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley,
thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers,
Army civilians, families, and veterans.
To meet the demands of today's unstable global security environment
and maintain the trust placed in us by the American people, our Army
requires sustained, long term, and predictable funding. Absent
additional legislation, the caps set by the Budget Control Act of 2011
will return in fiscal year 2018, forcing the Army to once again draw
down end strength, reduce funding for readiness, and increase the risk
of sending under-trained and poorly equipped soldiers into harm's way--
a preventable risk our Nation must not accept. We all thank you for
recognizing that plans to reduce the Army to 980,000 soldiers would
threaten our national security, and we appreciate all your work to stem
the drawdown. Nevertheless, the most important actions you can take--
steps that will have both positive and lasting impact--will be to
immediately repeal the 2011 Budget Control Act and ensure sufficient
funding to train, man and equip the fiscal year 2017 NDAA authorized
force. Unless this is done, additional top-line and OCO funding, though
nice in the short-term, will prove unsustainable, rendering all your
hard work for naught.
This is a challenging time for our Nation and certainly for our
Army. The unipolar moment is over, and replacing it is a multi-polar
world characterized by competition and uncertainty. Today, the Army is
globally engaged with more than 182,000 soldiers supporting combatant
commanders in over 140 worldwide locations. To break this down a bit:
Over 5,000 soldiers are in the Middle East supporting the fight against
ISIL, a barbaric enemy intent on destabilizing the region and the
globe. Nearly 8,000 more remain in Afghanistan, providing critical
enabling support to Afghan National Security forces fighting a
persistent insurgent threat. Over 33,000 are assigned or allocated to
Europe to assure our Allies and deter a potentially grave threat to
freedom. Nearly 80,000 are assigned to PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command],
including nearly 20,000 soldiers on the Korean peninsula, prepared to
respond tonight with our ROK [Republic of Korea] allies. At the same
time thousands of soldiers are operating across Africa and Central and
South America, along with thousands more preparing right here in the
United States. At home and around the world, your Army stands ready.
My recent travel--I have visited our soldiers in 15 countries since
Veterans Day--reinforces that all this is not about programs . . . it
is about people . . . our people executing security missions for all of
us around the globe. In fact, the strength of the All Volunteer Force
truly remains our soldiers. These young men and women are trained,
ready and inspired. We must be similarly inspired to provide for them
commensurate with their extraordinary service and sacrifice.
readiness: manning, training, equipping/sustaining and leader
development
Readiness remains our number one priority. Sufficient and
consistent funding is essential to build and sustain current readiness,
progress towards a more modern, capable force sized to reduce risk for
contingencies, and recruit and retain the best talent within our ranks.
A ready Army enables the Joint Force to protect our Nation and win
decisively in combat. Unfortunately, fifteen years of sustained
counter-insurgency operations have degraded the Army's ability to
conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict and narrowed the
experience base of our leaders. The current global security environment
demands a shift in focus to support Joint operations against a broader
range of threats. In this uncertain world, combined arms maneuver,
which enables the Joint Force to deter, deny, compel, and defeat peer
competitors and execute hybrid warfare, represents the benchmark by
which we measure our future readiness.
manning:
The Total Force remains globally engaged with the Army set to meet
nearly half--48 percent--of combatant command base demand and forecast
to meet over two-thirds--70 percent--of emergent demand for forces in
fiscal year 2017. This trend, exacerbated by end strength reductions
and increasing global requirements, has been consistent for the past
three years and promises to continue. Looking ahead, any potential
future manpower increases to reduce military risk related to Defense
Planning Guidance and National Military Strategy requirements, must be
coupled with commensurate funding to ensure the long-term strength of
the force.
At today's end-strength, the Army risks consuming readiness as fast
as we build it. To alleviate some of the burden, we are reallocating
and reorganizing existing force structure and leveraging the Total
Force to meet operational demand. For example, recognizing the
importance of assuring our Allies and deterring our adversaries, last
month \3/4\ Armor Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) began heel-to-toe
rotations in Europe. This unit, representing a permanent armored
presence, enables our forces to exercise deployment systems and
processes while simultaneously demonstrating the United States'
commitment to the region. This ABCT deployment will be followed shortly
by a rotational heel-to-toe Combat Aviation Brigade to Europe to
provide aviation capacity and capability in that important part of the
world. We will also begin Heavy Aviation Reconnaissance Squadron
rotations to Korea, reestablishing full Combat Aviation Brigade
capacity and capability on the peninsula.
In fiscal year 2018 we will adjust our brigade combat team force
mix by converting an Active Army Infantry Brigade Combat Team into an
Armor Brigade Combat Team, marking the creation of our 15th ABCT. This
increased armor capacity will provide much needed flexibility to meet
extant threats around the globe. We will also build two Security Force
Assistance Brigades (SFABs), one in the Active Army and one in the Army
National Guard in fiscal year 2018 followed by another Active Component
SFAB in fiscal year 2019 to better support our partners and preserve
BCT readiness. These SFABs will also serve as the backbone of new
brigades if the Army is ever called to rapidly expand.
To address mounting challenges in the cyber domain, the Army is
building 41 Cyber Mission Force teams. Currently, 30 of the Army's 41
teams are at full operating capability (FOC), and 11 more will achieve
FOC by fiscal year 2018. In addition, the Reserve Component is building
21 Cyber Protection Teams, with 11 teams in the Army National Guard and
10 teams in the Army Reserve.
The Army has increased operational use of the Army National Guard
and the Army Reserve to support Joint Force requirements around the
globe, and this trend will continue. Today, three Army National Guard
Division Headquarters, along with numerous other formations, are
supporting geographic combatant commanders here at home and around the
world. With the support of Congress, the Army can maintain the
appropriate force mix and Total Force readiness to sustain these vital
operations worldwide.
Again, we appreciate the Congress' efforts to stem the continued
decrease in force structure, and we are underway to regrow the Army in
accordance with NDAA prescribed end strength. As we grow, however, we
will focus first on filling the holes in our existing units as our top
priority.
training:
Training is the bedrock of readiness. The Army must continue to
conduct realistic and rigorous training across multiple echelons to
provide trained and ready forces, and this realistic training regimen
is dependent upon predictable and sustained resources, both time and
money.
To maximize our resources, the Army has made significant progress
implementing the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) and restoring core
warfighting skills, and we remain focused on achieving full spectrum
readiness for combined arms maneuver proficiency against peer
competitors. SRM, the Army's solution to manage risk and fight and win
when called, is a Total Force effort to define readiness objectives for
current demand while mitigating risk for contingency requirements.
Because readiness objectives inform programmatic decisions, a key SRM
benefit is prevention of the ``readiness cliff'' as units redeploy from
named operations.
To ensure a trained and ready Army, the Army accepted considerable
risk by reducing end-strength while deferring modernization programs
and infrastructure investments. These trade-offs reflect constrained
resources, not strategic insight. Again, we appreciate your support in
helping stem the tide of force structure reductions, and our restored
strength must be coupled with sufficient and sustained funding to avoid
creating a hollow force.
Today, only about one-third of our BCTs, one-fourth of our Combat
Aviation Brigades and half of our Division Headquarters are ready. Of
the BCTs that are ready, only three could be called upon to fight
tonight in the event of a crisis. In total, only about two-thirds of
the Army's initial critical formations--the formations we would need at
the outset of a major conflict--are at acceptable levels of readiness
to conduct sustained ground combat in a full spectrum environment
against a highly lethal hybrid threat or near-peer adversary. Stated
more strategically, based on current readiness levels, the Army can
only accomplish Defense Planning Guidance Requirements at high military
risk. To address this vital readiness issue, the Army continues to
fully fund Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations, establish objective
training standards, reduce non-essential training requirements, and
protect home station training to increase training rigor and readiness
in our formations.
A ready Army requires highly trained units across all components.
To build sufficient operational and strategic depth, the Army continues
to explore ways to build increased readiness in our Reserve Component
units. This includes increasing the number of annual training days for
early deployers to provide sufficient repetition in core tasks;
building multi-component and round-out units to enhance Total Force
integration; and expanding Army National Guard BCT's CTC rotations from
two to four in fiscal year 2018. These initiatives, providing readiness
for current operations and ensuring strategic depth required for future
campaigns, will require sufficient resources.
Looking to the future, the Army continues to work with our Joint
Force partners to develop the multi-domain battle concept. This
emerging concept, though in the early stages of development, will
enable the Joint force to create temporary windows of opportunity
across multiple domains--air, land, sea, space and cyberspace--to
seize, retain and exploit the initiative, defeat enemies and achieve
military objectives. The Army is developing a Multi-Domain Task Force
to evolve and refine the concept, based on operational lessons and
experimentation that will ultimately inform future training.
equipping/sustaining:
Our Army requires modernized equipment to win decisively, but today
we are outranged, outgunned and outdated. We have prioritized our near-
term readiness to the detriment of equipment modernization and
infrastructure upgrades, assuming risk and mortgaging our future
readiness. Looking ahead, the Army will prioritize critical equipment
modernization and infrastructure upgrades while proceeding with
acquisition reform initiatives to deliver optimal readiness with
apportioned resources.
An unintended consequence of current fiscal constraints is that the
Army can no longer afford the most modern equipment, and we risk
falling behind near-peers in critical capabilities. Decreases to the
Army budget over the past several years significantly impacted Army
modernization. Given these trends, and to preserve readiness in the
short term, the Army has been forced to selectively modernize equipment
to counter our adversary's most pressing technological advances and
capabilities. At the same time, we have not modernized for warfare
against peer competitors, and today we risk losing overmatch in every
domain.
The Army developed the Army Equipment Modernization Strategy to
preserve readiness in the short term and manage risk in the mid- to
long-term. The strategy reflects those areas in which the Army will
focus its limited investments for future Army readiness. We request the
support of Congress to provide flexibility in current procurement
methods and to fund five capability areas--Long Range Precision Fires,
Cyber/Electronic Warfare, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Active
Protection Systems for combat vehicles and aircraft and Stryker
Lethality Upgrades--to provide the equipment the Army requires to fight
and win our Nation's wars.
Prioritizing readiness, given current fiscal constraints the Army
must assume risk in installation modernization and infrastructure
improvement. Installations are the Army's power projection platforms
and a key component in generating readiness. To build readiness,
however, the Army has been forced to cancel or delay military
construction, sustainment, restoration and modernization across our
posts, camps and stations. Right now 22 percent, or 33,000 Army
facilities require significant investment to address critical
infrastructure deficiencies. Additionally, the Army reduced key
installation services, individual training programs, and modernization
to a level that impacts future readiness and quality of life. The
deliberate decision to prioritize readiness over Army modernization and
installation improvement, though necessary, is an unfavorable one.
leader development:
The single most important factor in delivering Army readiness, both
now and in the future, is the development of decisive leaders of
character at every echelon. Our deep bench of combat experienced
leaders remain our asymmetric advantage. To that end, the Army will
continue to develop leader competencies for the breadth of missions
across the Total Force.
In a complex and uncertain world, the Army will cultivate leaders
who thrive in uncertainty and chaos. To ensure the Army retains this
decisive advantage, we continue to prioritize leader development across
the force . . . from the individual and unit to the institution level.
In fiscal year 2016, the Army trained over 500,000 soldiers and leaders
from all three components in its Professional Military Education
programs, along with nearly 30,000 more from our Joint Force teammates.
Despite budget constraints, we will continue to fund these priority
programs, targeted to develop soldiers and leaders who demonstrate the
necessary competence, commitment and character to win in a complex
world.
Decisive leaders strengthen the bond between our Army and the
Nation and preserve our All-Volunteer Force. As Army leaders, we
continue to express our enduring commitment to those who serve,
recognizing that attracting and retaining high quality individuals in
all three components is critical to readiness. The Army is expanding
our Soldier for Life-Transition Assistance Program (SFL-TAP) to drive
cultural change. Our soldiers will receive the tools, leveraging
resources from their time in service, to succeed in the civilian
sector. As they return to civilian life, soldiers will continue to
serve as ambassadors for the Army and, along with retired soldiers and
veterans, remain the vital link with our Nation's communities. We owe
it to our soldiers and their families to ensure our veterans strengthen
the prosperity of our Nation through rewarding and meaningful civilian
careers and service to their communities.
Committed and engaged leadership is the focal point of our Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) efforts. To that
end, we recently fielded the Emergent Leader Immersive Training
Environment (ELITE) Command Team Trainer and the Prevention and
Outreach Simulation Trainer to train Army SHARP professionals on how to
support command teams and units. The Army is also helping shape the
Department's Installation Prevention Project by sharing best practices
on case management methodology, Community Health Promotion Councils and
collaboration efforts. These holistic prevention and response efforts
strengthen our Army culture, enrich Army readiness and support
Department of Defense efforts.
Army leaders remain committed to building diverse teams. We
continue to fully integrate women into all combat roles throughout the
operational force and remain committed to a standards-based process to
maintain readiness. The Army's deliberate process validated standards,
grounded in real-world operational requirements, and will provide our
integrated professional force the highest level of readiness and
potential for mission success.
In this increasingly complex world, decisive leaders are essential
to maintaining a ready Army, composed of resilient individuals and
cohesive teams, capable of accomplishing a range of missions amidst
uncertainty and persistent danger.
closing:
Today, our Army stands ready to defend the United States and its
interests. This requires sustained, predictable funding. To rebuild
readiness today and prepare for tomorrow's challenges, the Army has
prioritized combined arms maneuver readiness against a peer competitor
as we prepare to respond to our Nation's security challenges. The
difficult trade-offs in modernization and installation improvements
reflect the hard realities of today's fiscal constraints.
In the immediate future, the Army looks forward to providing input
to the Department of Defense's 30-day Readiness Review, an important
document that will inform a new National Defense Strategy. More long
term and with your assistance, the Army will continue to resource the
best-trained, best-equipped and best-led fighting force in the world.
We thank Congress for the steadfast support of our outstanding men and
women in uniform. The Army is all about people . . . our soldiers,
families, civilians . . . and they deserve our best effort.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
All statements will be made a part of the record.
Good statement.
Admiral Moran?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS

Admiral Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon
to you and the members of the subcommittee. It's a real
privilege to be here with my fellow Vice Chiefs to talk about
the readiness of our military.
The crux of my testimony is that your Navy is less ready
because she is simply too small. It's a simple matter of supply
can't meet demand. The smallest Navy we've had in 99 years can
only answer 40 percent of combatant commander requirements
today.
On 9/11, we had 316 ships and over 400,000 sailors. Today
we have 275 ships and nearly 90,000 fewer sailors, and yet the
world has become a lot busier place today. A smaller fleet
operating at the same pace is wearing out faster, work is
increased, and we're asking an awful lot of our sailors and
Navy civilians.
That said, we are where we are, which makes it urgent to
pass an amended budget and remove sequestration so that we can
adequately fund, fix, and maintain the fleet that we do have.
It seems that every year, to Senator Kaine's point, we come
before you and talk about making tough choices, and more often
than not, we rightly choose to support those forward at the
expense of those at home. This year is more of the same as our
long-term readiness continues its insidious decline. While
we're still able to put our first team on the field, our bench
is largely depleted.
With your help, we have the opportunity to change all this.
It starts by strengthening the foundation of the Navy by
ensuring that the ships, aircraft, and submarines that we do
have are maintained and modernized so they provide the full
measure of their combat power. Then let's fill the holes by
eliminating the inventory shortfalls of ships, submarines, and
aircraft in the fleet. Together, by taking these two steps, we
can achieve the ultimate goal of sizing the Navy to meet the
strategic demands of this dynamic and changing world.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Moran follows:]

prepared statement by admiral william f. moran
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of
the Sub-Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the
current state of Navy readiness and the challenges we face today and in
the future.
Before we discuss Navy's readiness challenges and our plans to
address them, it is important to understand our present situation.
Globally present and modern, our Navy provides timely, agile, and
effective options to national leaders as they seek to advance American
security and prosperity. Today, however, the ongoing demand for naval
forces continues to grow, which will require the Navy to continue to
make tough choices. In the classic trade space for any service
(readiness, modernization and force structure), readiness has become
the bill payer in an increasingly complex and fast-paced security
environment. To address these realities, the Navy has identified
investments to restore the readiness of the fleet today to shore up
what we have. At the same time, we cannot restore the fleet to full
health without also updating our platforms and weapons to better
address current and future threats, and evaluating the right size of
the Navy so that it can sustain the tempo of operations that has become
the norm. The Navy is actively working on plans for the future fleet
with Secretary Mattis and his team, and we look forward to discussing
those plans with you when they are approved.
To characterize where we are today, I would say it's a tale of two
navies. As I travel to see our sailors in the United States and
overseas, it is clear to me that our deployed units are operationally
ready to respond to any challenge. They understand their role in our
nation's security and the security of our allies, and they have the
training and resources they need to win any fight that might arise.
Unfortunately, my visits to units and installations back home in the
United States paint a different picture. As our sailors and Navy
civilians, who are just as committed as their colleagues afloat,
prepare to ensure our next ships and aircraft squadrons deploy with all
that they need, the strain is significant and growing. For a variety of
reasons, our shipyards and aviation depots are struggling to get our
ships and airplanes through maintenance periods on time. In turn, these
delays directly impact the time sailors have to train and hone their
skills prior to deployment. These challenges are further exacerbated by
low stocks of critical parts and fleet-wide shortfalls in ordnance, and
an aging shore infrastructure. While our first team on deployment is
ready, our bench--the depth of our forces at home--is thin. It has
become clear to me that the Navy's overall readiness has reached its
lowest level in many years.
There are three main drivers of our readiness problems: 1)
persistent, high operational demand for naval forces; 2) funding
reductions; and 3) consistent uncertainty about when those reduced
budgets will be approved.
The operational demand for our Navy continues to be high, while the
fleet has gotten smaller. Between 2001 and 2015, the Navy was able to
keep an average of 100 ships at sea each day, despite a 14 percent
decrease in the size of the battle force. The Navy is smaller today
than it has been in the last 99 years. Maintaining these deployment
levels as ships have been retired has taken a significant toll on our
sailors and their families, as well as on our equipment.
The second factor degrading Navy readiness is the result of several
years of constrained funding levels for our major readiness accounts,
largely due to fiscal pressures imposed by the Budget Control Act of
2011. Although the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 provided temporary
relief, in fiscal year 2017 the Navy budget was $5 billion lower than
in fiscal year 2016. This major reduction drove very hard choices,
including the difficult decision to reduce readiness accounts by over
$2 billion this year.
The third primary driver of reduced readiness is the inefficiency
imposed by the uncertainty around when budgets will actually be
approved. The inability to adjust funding levels as planned, or to
commit to longer-term contracts, creates additional work and drives up
costs. This results in even less capability for any given dollar we
invest, and represents yet another tax on our readiness. We are paying
more money and spending more time to maintain a less capable Navy.
We have testified before about the maintenance and training
backlogs that result from high operational tempo, and how addressing
those backlogs has been further set back by budget cuts and fiscal
uncertainty. Our attempts to restore stability and predictability to
our deployment cycles have been challenged both by constrained funding
levels and by operational demands that remain unabated.
Although we remain committed to return to a seven month deployment
cycle as the norm, the need to support the fight against ISIS [Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria] in 2016 led us to extend the deployments of
the Harry S Truman and Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Groups to
eight and eight and a half months, respectively. Similar extensions
apply to the Amphibious Ready Groups which support Marine Expeditionary
Units. This collective pace of operations has increased wear and tear
on ships, aircraft and crews and, adding to the downward readiness
spiral, has decreased the time available for maintenance and
modernization. Deferred maintenance has led to equipment failures, and
to larger-than-projected work packages for our shipyards and aviation
depots. This has forced us to remove ships and aircraft from service
for extended periods, which in turn increases the tempo for the rest of
the fleet, which causes the fleets to utilize their ships and airframes
at higher-than-projected rates, which increases the maintenance work,
which adds to the backlogs, and so on.
Reversing this vicious cycle and restoring the short-term readiness
of the fleet will require sufficient and predictable funding. This
funding would allow our pilots to fly the hours they need to remain
proficient, and ensure that we can conduct the required maintenance on
our ships. It would also enable the Navy to restore stocks of necessary
parts, getting more ships to sea and better preparing them to stay
deployed as required.
Our readiness challenges go deeper than ship and aircraft
maintenance, directly affecting our ability to care for the Navy Team.
Our people are what make the U.S. Navy the best in the world, but our
actions do not reflect that reality. To meet the constraints of the
Balanced Budget Act, the Navy's fiscal year 2017 budget request was
forced to reduce funding for Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves.
These reductions have been compounded by the Continuing Resolution,
which imposed even further reductions on that account. Without
sufficient PCS funding, the Navy will be unable to move sailors to
replace ship and squadron crewmembers leaving service, increasing the
strain on those who remain. This is an area in which timing also
matters greatly. Even if the money comes eventually, if it is too late,
necessary moves will be delayed until the beginning of the new fiscal
year. That means our sailors with children will be forced to relocate
their children in the middle of a school year. Because we don't know if
and when additional PCS funding may come, we cannot give our sailors
and their families much time to prepare, often leaving them with weeks,
rather than months, to prepare for and conduct a move, often from one
coast, or even one country, to another.
Meanwhile, our shore infrastructure has become severely degraded
and is getting worse because it has been a repeated bill payer for
other readiness accounts in an effort to maintain afloat readiness.
Consequently, we continue to carry a substantial backlog of facilities
maintenance and replacement, approaching $8 billion.
summary
Time is running out. Years of sustained deployments and constrained
and uncertain funding have resulted in a readiness debt that will take
years to pay down. If the slow pace of readiness recovery continues,
unnecessary equipment damage, poorly trained operators at sea, and a
force improperly trained and equipped to sustain itself will result.
Absent sufficient funding for readiness, modernization and force
structure, the Navy cannot return to full health, where it can continue
to meet its mission on a sustainable basis. Even if additional
resources are made available, if they continue to be provided in a way
that cannot be counted on and planned for, some will be wasted. As we
strive to improve efficiency in our own internal business practices,
those efforts are being actively undermined by the absence of regular
budgets. Although we face many readiness challenges, your Navy remains
the finest Navy in the world. We are committed to maintaining that
position. That commitment will require constant vigilance and a
dedication to readiness recovery, in full partnership with the
Congress. On behalf of our sailors and civilians, thank you for your
continued support.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral. Excellent statement.
General Walters?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLENN M. WALTERS, USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT

General Walters. Good afternoon, sir. Chairman Inhofe,
Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of the Armed
Services Subcommittee on Readiness, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today and report on the readiness of your
Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps remains dedicated to our central role as
our nation's naval expeditionary force. During 15 years of
conflict, we've focused investment on ensuring our marines were
prepared for the fight, and they were. Today our operational
tempo remains as high as it was during the peak of operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Our continued focus on deployed unit readiness, combined
with fiscal uncertainty and funding reductions, leave your
Marine Corps facing substantial readiness challenges. Your
Marine Corps is insufficiently manned, trained, and equipped
across the depth of the force to operate in an evolving
operational environment. Due to years of fiscal constraints,
the Marine Corps is fundamentally optimized for the past and
has sacrificed modernization and infrastructure to sustain our
current readiness.
In addition to the increased resources for operations and
maintenance needed to improve current readiness across the
entirety of your Marine Corps, we require your support in three
key areas to regain the readiness levels our nation requires of
us. Over the past 18 months we have identified various end
strengths and associated capabilities and modernization
required to operate in the threat environment characterized by
complex terrain, information warfare, electromagnetic
signatures, and a contested maritime environment.
We need to increase our active component end strength. We
are confident that an increase of 3,000 marines per year
maintains a rate of growth consistent with effective recruiting
while maintaining our high standards. Our bases, stations, and
installations are the platforms where we train and generate our
readiness. The continued under-funding of our facilities
sustainment, restoration, modernization, and military
construction continues to cause progressive degradation of our
infrastructure and creates increased long-term costs. We have a
backlog of $9 billion in deferred infrastructure sustainment
requirements. We require up-to-date training systems, ranges,
and facilities to support the fielding of our new equipment,
and simulation systems that facilitate improved training
standards and readiness.
Supporting the joint force requirements over the past 15
years consumed much of the life of our legacy systems, while
fiscal uncertainty reduced defense spending for significant
delays in our modernization efforts. There are significant
costs associated with maintaining and sustaining any legacy
system without a proportional capability increase associated
with that investment. As we continue to spend limited fiscal
resources to sustain legacy systems developed for threats 20
years ago, we risk steadily losing our competitive advantage
against potential adversaries. We need to modernize our ground
tactical vehicle and aircraft fleets soonest. Accelerated
investments in amphibious ships is necessary to reach our
wartime requirement.
If forced to continue to pursue the path of investing in
legacy systems in lieu of modernizing our force, we will find
our Marine Corps optimized for the past and increasingly at
risk to deter and defeat our potential adversaries.
On behalf of all of our marines, sailors, and their
families, and the civilians who support their service, we thank
the Congress and this subcommittee for the opportunity to
discuss the key challenges our Marine Corps faces. I thank you
for your support as articulated in the recent 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act.
While much work needs to be done, the authorizations
within, coupled with sufficient funding and the repeal of the
Budget Control Act, will begin to put us on a path to rebuild
and sustain our Marine Corps for the 21st Century. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Walters follows:]

Prepared Statement by General Glenn M. Walters
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify on the current state of Marine Corps readiness.
The Marine Corps remains dedicated to our essential role as our
Nation's expeditionary force in readiness, chartered by the 82nd
Congress and reaffirmed by the 114th Congress. During 15 years of
conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, we focused investment on ensuring
marines were prepared for the fight, and they were. This was our task
and our focus. Those 15 years of conflict consumed much of the useful
life of many of our legacy systems while delaying replacement with new
equipment. A focus on those operations, the decrease in funding levels
from fiscal year (FY) 2012, fiscal instability and the lack of an
inter-war period have left your Marine Corps insufficiently manned,
trained and equipped across the depth of the force to operate in an
evolving operational environment. Under the current funding levels and
those we stand to face in the near future--the current Continuing
Resolution and the Budget Control Act (BCA)--your Marine Corps will
experience increasingly significant challenges to the institutional
readiness required to deter aggression and, when necessary, fight and
win our Nation's battles. Rebuilding the Marine Corps will require near
term actions that can be implemented in fiscal year 2017 and fiscal
year 2018 as well as longer term efforts in the Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP). I would like to take this opportunity to share with you
the accomplishments of your Marine Corps, provide our vision for the
Marine Corps of tomorrow, and to articulate the readiness challenges we
face as we strive to reach that vision. With the support of the 115th
Congress, we can begin the deliberate journey to overcome these
difficulties and rebuild your Marine Corps for the 21st Century.
your marine corps today
In 2016, your Marine Corps remained in high demand, forward
deployed, and at the same operational tempo as the past 15 years. With
an increasingly challenging and complex global security environment,
the Joint Force continues to require and actively employs our
expeditionary capabilities. During the past year, your marines executed
approximately 185 operations, 140 security cooperation events with our
partners and allies and participated in 65 major exercises.
Nearly 23,000 marines remain stationed or deployed west of the
International Date Line to maintain regional stability and deterrence
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Our Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs)
continue their support of Joint Force requirements around the globe.
Our MEUs have supported counterterrorism (CT) operations in Iraq and
North Africa, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) in
Japan and Haiti, and remain forward deployed to respond to the next
crisis. In partnership with the State Department, we employed Marine
Security Guards at 176 embassies and consulates in 146 countries.
Altogether, over 66 percent our operating forces have been deployed or
stationed overseas during calendar year 2016.
Since 2013, marines have increasingly deployed to land-based
locations due to the limited inventory of operationally available
amphibious ships. Joint Force requirements remain high, and the number
of available amphibious ships remains below the requirement. Despite
the limitations in available amphibious shipping, your Marine Corps
adapted to meet these requirements through land-based Special Purpose
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs). In 2016, we sourced SPMAGTFs
to Central Command, Africa Command and Southern Command. Our Black Sea
Rotational Force remains forward deployed in Europe. Although SPMAGTFs
have met a limited requirement for the Joint Force, they lack the full
capability, capacity and strategic and operational agility that results
when Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are embarked aboard Navy
amphibious ships.
what tomorrow's marine corps requires
Marine Corps institutional readiness is built upon five pillars:
Unit Readiness; Capability and Capacity to Meet Joint Force
Requirements; High Quality People; Installation Capability; and
Equipment Modernization. First, unit readiness is always our most
immediate concern. Cohesive unit teams are the instruments that
accomplish national security objectives, and we must ensure our ability
to successfully accomplish any mission when called. Second, when the
Joint Force requires naval expeditionary capabilities, we must answer
with both the capabilities and capacity necessary to meet their needs.
The third, most important pillar of our readiness remains our marines,
the product of a time-tested yet evolving transformation process
beginning with our Recruiting and Training Commands. The fourth, often
understated, pillar of our readiness is our infrastructure. Our bases,
stations, and installations, not only serve as locations where we train
our marines, but also where we sustain their equipment and support
their families. We have a backlog of $9 billion in deferred
infrastructure sustainment requirements. We require up-to-date training
systems, ranges and facilities. We need resources to sustain our
installation capabilities at a higher level than we have been able to
reach for the last 5 years. Fifth and finally, we must accelerate
equipment modernization, as it is essential in our transformation to a
21st Century, 5th generation Marine Corps.
We require proper balance across these pillars to achieve a force
capable not only of assuring allies and deterring threats, but able to
rapidly respond to crises and contingencies, while remaining good
stewards of the Nation's limited resources. Currently, readiness is not
where it needs to be. Resources that would have otherwise been applied
to installation capabilities and modernization were re-prioritized to
support deployed and next-to-deploy units to safeguard near-term
operational unit readiness. We are not only out of balance but are also
short of the resources required to rebalance.
We require a more stable and predictable fiscal planning horizon to
support increased end strength, equipment recapitalization and
modernization, amphibious ship capability and capacity, and the modern
infrastructure required to rebuild and sustain balanced readiness
across the depth of the force. Looming BCA implementation continues to
disrupt our planning and directly threatens our current and future
readiness.
unit readiness
Despite the existing fiscal constraints, we will continue to ensure
deployed units possess mission critical resources to the greatest
extent possible--trained personnel, operational equipment and vital
spare parts--required to accomplish their mission. Deployed and next-
to-deploy units will remain our priority in the current fiscally-
constrained environment while we increasingly experience risk to non-
deployed unit readiness.
The most acute readiness concerns are found in our aviation units.
Approximately 80 percent of our aviation units lack the minimum number
of ready basic aircraft (RBA) for training, and we are significantly
short ready aircraft for wartime requirements. Recapitalization of
attack helicopters and reset of heavy lift helicopters are two examples
of ways we are addressing RBA shortfalls. Our tactical fighter and
attack squadrons suffer from shortages in aircraft availability due to
increased wear on aging airframes subjected to continuing modernization
delays. The impact of reduced funding levels on our depot level
maintenance capacity still resonates today. We have temporarily reduced
the number of aircraft assigned to our fighter-attack and heavy lift
squadrons. We simply do not have the available aircraft to meet our
squadrons' requirements. This means that flight hour averages per crew
per month are below the minimum standards required to achieve and
maintain adequate flight time and training and readiness levels.
Although deployed squadrons remain trained for their assigned mission,
next-to-deploy squadrons are often achieving the minimum readiness
goals just prior to deployment. Reduced acquisition rates for the F-35
and the CH-53K require the Marine Corps to continue to operate legacy
aircraft well beyond their planned lifespan. Every dollar decremented
from our procurement of future systems increases both the cost and
complexity of maintaining our aged legacy systems beyond their
projected life. Every dollar spent on aviation modernization now has a
direct positive effect on current and future aviation readiness.
We currently maintain higher ground equipment readiness than what
we experience within our aviation community, but that is small
consolation given the age of most of this ground equipment. With
Congress' sustained support of our reset effort, the Marine Corps has
reset over 90 percent of its legacy ground equipment. Despite this
effort, underlying readiness issues exist. Non-deployed forces
experience supply degradation as they source low density equipment
requirements in support of deployed, task organized units such as our
SPMAGTFs. These equipment shortfalls create training gaps for non-
deployed units preparing for their next deployment. Our most important
ground legacy capabilities continue to age as modernization efforts are
at minimum production rates due to limited available resources. Our
Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) are a prime example. Our AAVs are
now more than four decades old. Our AAV Survivability Upgrade (SU)
Program will sustain and marginally enhance the capability of the
legacy AAV, but will not replace any of these nearly obsolete legacy
vehicles. The average age of our Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) fleet is
26 years; our oldest vehicle is 34 years old. There is currently no
program identified to replace this capable but outdated platform, and
yet we continue to incur increased costs with the LAV Obsolescence
Program to extend its life. Our AAVs and LAVs are two of the four
systems that consume 50 percent of the Marine Corps' annual depot
maintenance budget. There is significant cost associated with
maintaining and sustaining any legacy systems without a proportional
capability increase associated with that investment. As we continue to
spend limited fiscal resources to sustain legacy systems as a result of
deferred modernization, we risk steadily losing our capability
advantage against potential adversaries.
Current readiness shortfalls require additional operations and
maintenance resources, and we have exhausted our internal options.
Additional resources would facilitate exercises and training and
correct repair parts shortfalls, while specifically addressing aviation
specific operations and maintenance funding. In sum, the Marine Corps
has a plan to regain and sustain unit readiness. With your support, we
can execute our plan to achieve required organizational readiness.
joint force requirements and capacity to respond
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and fiscal constraints
directed the Marine Corps to decrease its end strength from 202,000 to
182,000. 2014 QDR assessments and assumptions identified limited global
security challenges compared to what we face today. We must continue to
counter violent extremist organizations and deter both an emboldened
China and a more aggressive Russia. As a result, the need for deployed
and forward stationed marines has not diminished while the size of the
force has decreased. Our current end strength challenges our ability to
support Joint Force requirements while simultaneously maintaining the
minimum adequate time at home stations and bases to reconstitute our
units and train for the full range of military operations prior to next
deployment. At our current end strength, the operational tempo is
creating significant and unsustainable strain on the force.
Increased support for both equipment readiness and force structure
levels remain critical requirements to improve our readiness. Time is
equally as vital as funding to generate required readiness levels. Our
sustainable deployment to dwell (D2D) ratio is 1:3, which means a
deployment of six months is followed by a period of 18 months at home
station. Units require adequate home station time to conduct personnel
turnover; equipment reset and maintenance; and complete a comprehensive
individual, collective, and cohesive unit training program. Units need
this period to ensure they are ready to meet all core and assigned
Mission Essential Tasks (METs) prior to re-deploying.
These challenges are compounded by the requirements on today's
force. Those requirements place a 1:2 D2D ratio on many of our units
and capabilities. The current ratio equates to a home station training
period one third less than what our best military judgment and
experience tells us is necessary and sustainable. Some units and
personnel that possess critical high demand, low density capabilities
and skill sets currently operate below a 1:2 D2D ratio. Portions of
marine aviation experience operational tempo below a 1:2 D2D ratio. Our
tiltrotor MV-22 Ospreys, deployed in conjunction with KC-130J aerial
refueling aircraft, provide previously unthinkable reach and
flexibility to the Joint Force. Deployment requirements have also
brought both communities to unsustainable D2D ratios. We recently
reduced the number of those aircraft assigned to our SPMAGTFs in order
to move these communities closer to a sustainable path. The
capabilities provided to the Joint Force will not change; however,
capacity will decrease. With increasing demand, resource limitations
will further reduce Joint Force capacity and/or incur risk for home
station units required for major combat operations. Some of our
formations lack the requisite days of supply to sustain a major
conflict beyond the initial weeks. The Marine Corps continues to
support existing operational requirements, but we may not have the
required capacity--the ``ready bench''--to respond to larger crises at
the readiness levels and timelines required.
high quality people
The success of our Marine Corps relies upon the high quality,
character, and capabilities of our individual marines and civilians;
they are the cornerstone of our readiness. Since the establishment of
the All-Volunteer Force over 40 years ago through the millennial
generation of today, we have successfully recruited and retained the
high caliber men and women we need to operate effectively in the global
security environment. Nearly 70 percent of our marines are serving in
their first enlistment, and approximately 35,000 marines leave the
Marine Corps each year. They must be replaced with the same high
quality men and women. Our recruiting efforts continue to succeed in
providing highly talented, patriotic men and women to replace those
marines who loyally served before. 99.89 percent of our newest marines
and recruits are high school graduates. This speaks to the quality of
the marines that make up our force. Despite our continued successes, we
must continue to seek ways to maintain the high quality people who will
comprise tomorrow's Marine Corps. We must closely track our ability to
recruit and retain our most highly qualified and skilled marines. In
order to retain marines on our team, we require the resources to offer
incentives to marines with experience, critical skills and valuable
specialties.
Marine Corps Force 2025, a year-long, comprehensive, bottom-up
review of the force identified various end-strengths and the associated
capabilities and modernization required to operate in the future
security environment. Through this process, we determined that we need
to increase Active component end strength to at least 194,000, to build
new capabilities that will deter, defeat and deny adversaries and meet
future Joint Force requirements. An increase of 3,000 marines per year
maintains a rate of growth consistent with effective recruiting and
accession while maintaining our high standards and ensuring a balanced
force. We thank you for passing the 2017 NDAA that authorizes 185,000
Active component marines. Your authorization, combined with the
appropriations we still require, puts your Marine Corps on the right
path to realize necessary growth that will enhance readiness.
installation capability
Marine Corps installations are the power projection platforms that
generate our readiness; they build, train and launch combat-ready
forces. Our installations provide the capability and capacity we need
to support the force. This includes our two depot maintenance
facilities, which provide responsive and scalable depot maintenance
support. While prioritizing deployed readiness, we defer infrastructure
and facility investments and modernization necessary to sustain and
train our Marine Corps for the 21st Century. The continued deferment of
Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) requires
increased infrastructure investment now to ensure that future FSRM
requirements costs do not increase. We ask for your continued support
to restore and modernize our facilities.
In addition to facilities sustainment and recapitalization, we
require investment in military construction (MILCON). Those investments
will support the fielding of new equipment and simulation systems that
facilitate improved training standards and operational readiness
enhancements. Improvements in training areas, to include aerial and
ground ranges, require your support for special use airspace and
additional land to replace inadequate facilities.
modernization
Modernization is the foundation of our future readiness to deter
and counter growing threats. Investing in and accelerating our
modernization programs directly correlate to improved overall
readiness. Previous decrements to our modernization efforts deferred
and delayed our critical future programs and forced us to continue
investment in aged legacy systems that lack the capabilities required
for the 21st Century. Over time, legacy systems continue to cost more
to repair and sustain. Simultaneously, we incur the opportunity costs
associated with the delayed fielding of replacement systems and the
increased capabilities they will provide. When we accelerate
modernization, we reduce unit costs, achieve efficiencies and save
taxpayer money.
Our Aviation Modernization Plan requires acceleration after
suffering recent delays, many attributed to funding deficiencies. This
modernization plan has proven its worth. Our MV-22 Ospreys expand the
operational reach of marines supporting Joint Force requirements.
Increasing the procurement of the F-35 and CH-53K will result in
similar and greater marine aviation capability improvements. Our first
operational F-35 squadron relocated to Iwakuni, Japan last month. The
squadron will deploy the F-35B as part of a MEU for the first time in
2018. We look forward to the stand-up of our first F-35C squadron,
further enhancing the 5th generation capabilities of our Navy-Marine
Corps Team. The CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement remains critical to
maintaining the battlefield mobility our force requires. It will nearly
triple the lift capacity of the aircraft it is replacing. The
acceleration of these key modernization programs will directly improve
our readiness and allow us to retire aircraft that have reached or
exceeded their intended life.
To modernize our ground combat element and ensure success against
increasingly capable 21st Century threats, we need to accelerate
investments in our ground systems. We need to replace our 40-year old
AAV fleet soonest. The procurement of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles as
planned will incrementally replace our High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles that we began operating over 30 years ago and that are
still in use today. This needs to be accelerated. There is currently no
replacement program for our legacy LAV fleet. We need to develop and
invest in a next generation replacement for this system. Additionally,
we need to establish programs that develop, procure and deliver active
protection systems, counter-UAS and increased long-range precision
fires capabilities. The Marine Corps will need your support to
recapitalize and modernize these key ground capabilities required for
the future operating environment.
Amphibious platforms provide the sovereignty, strategic mobility,
unmatched logistical support, operational reach, and forcible entry
capability required to deter and, when necessary, defeat our Nation's
adversaries. Our amphibious capability is a centerpiece to the
operational success of the Navy-Marine Corps Team. Our amphibious
concepts--our Naval character and expeditionary mindset--have been
validated by history, and we will remain agents of change in the
future. As the operating environment changes, the Marine Corps will
continue to innovate as we implement our new Marine Corps Operating
Concept (MOC). The availability of amphibious shipping remains
paramount to our readiness, responsiveness and the MOC. The Nation's
amphibious warship requirement remains at 38. The current inventory of
31 vessels falls well short of this requirement. Recurrent maintenance
challenges in the aging amphibious fleet significantly exacerbate that
shortfall. The current and enduring gap of amphibious warships to
requirements inhibits our Navy-Marine Corps Team from training to our
full capabilities, impedes our shared ability to respond to an emergent
crisis, and increases the strain on our current readiness. We will
explore procurement strategies including the possibility of block buys
and accelerating schedules that offer the best value for the taxpayer
and allow us to retain skilled artisans in our shipyards. Along with
increased amphibious ship capacity and modernization, we require the
funding for the associated surface connectors that transport our
marines from ship-to-shore, including the programmed replacement of the
Landing Craft Air Cushioned and Landing Craft Utility platforms. These
investments will improve our overall amphibious capability and
capacity.
The 5th generation Marine Corps for the 21st Century must dominate
the information domain. We must both enable and protect our ability to
command and control (C2) marines distributed across an area of
operations. This requires transforming MAGTF C2 capabilities through a
unified network environment that is ready, responsive and resilient.
Recently fielded C2 systems provide a significantly increased
capability associated with maneuver across the battlespace. We require
support from the Congress to fully field these capabilities to the
tactical edge, both in our ground and aviation platforms. These are
examples of modern capabilities that will facilitate improved
battlefield awareness to and from small, dispersed tactical units. As
warfare evolves into a battle of signatures and detection, improvements
such as these are vital to maximize our marines' protection and
effectiveness.
For too long, we have balanced the cost of our modernization
efforts against our current readiness by extending and refreshing many
of our legacy systems. While we judge these risks to be at manageable
levels today, those risks are increasing and they are yet more examples
of the trade-offs we are required to make due to fiscal reductions that
accompany operational demand increases. The continued support of this
Congress can mitigate and reverse these risks.
conclusion
On behalf of all of our marines, sailors--many deployed and in
harm's way today--and their families and the civilians that support
their service, we thank the Congress and this subcommittee for this
opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Marine Corps faces. I
thank you for your support as articulated in the recent 2017 NDAA.
While much work needs to be done, the authorizations within, coupled
with sufficient funding and the repeal of the BCA, will begin to put us
on a path to rebuild and sustain your Marine Corps for the 21st
Century. Our fiscal year 2018 plan will require adjustment for
decisions in fiscal year 2017 NDAA authorizations. We need to carry
over decisions for fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 into our FYDP
planning. Along with your authorization, we ask for the continued
support of this Congress to appropriate the funds required to rebuild
your Marine Corps. Additional end strength authorized by the Congress
will help put us on the path to generate both the capabilities and
capacity required in the complex operating environment our Nation
faces. Additional funds will provide the ``ready bench'' our Nation
requires and the infrastructure the force needs to train and sustain
itself. Our future readiness relies upon increased procurement and
modernization funding that will facilitate amphibious ship capacity and
allow us to off ramp the continued funding for sustaining legacy
systems. We have a plan to reset, recapitalize and modernize your
Marine Corps into a 5th generation force for the 21st Century. With
fiscal stability and predictability and increased resources, we will
provide the Expeditionary Force in Readiness our Nation requires to
protect its interests and security. With the support of the 115th
Congress, we will move forward with our plan and vision to ensure your
Marine Corps is organized, manned, trained and equipped to assure our
allies, deter and, when necessary, defeat our adversaries.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
General Wilson?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF

General Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member
Kaine, distinguished members of the subcommittee. On behalf of
the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, it's a pleasure to be here with you today, and with my
fellow Vice Chiefs. I request the written statement be
submitted for the record.
American airmen are professional, innovative, dedicated
and, frankly, the envy of the world. They are proud to be part
of the most powerful joint fighting team in our history. We
provide our leaders with a broad range of options, from
protecting our country and its interests both at home and
abroad. For the past 70 years responsive, flexible, and agile
American air power has been our nation's first and often most
sustainable solution in conflict and in crisis, underwriting
every other instrument of power.
We provide the nation with unrelenting global vigilance,
global reach, and global power. In short, your Air Force is
always in demand and always there. Look no further than two
weeks ago when your Air Force executed a precision strike in
Sirte, Libya, killing over 100 violent extremists. This was a
textbook trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-function
mission. Air Force space, cyber, and ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] warriors provided precision
navigation and timing while monitoring enemy communication and
movement.
Simultaneously, 2 B-2 bombers took off from Whiteman Air
Force Base in Missouri, flew a 34-hour non-stop mission,
refueled with 18 tankers from U.S., European, and Middle East
bases, and teamed with two MQ-9s to employ 108 precision
munitions, meeting their time on target within 10 seconds.
Meanwhile, every day your American airmen operate 60
remotely-piloted [RP] aircraft patrols 24/7/365, as an
unblinking eye for combatant commanders. They remotely fly
these missions from the continental United States. They team
with nearly 20,000 forward-deployed airmen to support the
missions, like the recent Raqqa and Mosul offensives, where our
fighter bomber and RP airmen also conduct 92 percent of U.S.
strikes against ISIS.
We do all of this while fulfilling two of our nation's most
critical missions at home. We insert two-thirds of the nuclear
triad and 75 percent of the nuclear command control
communications remain to ensure robust, reliable, flexible and
survivable options for the nation, while our fighters and
tankers remain on alert, as they have for the past 15-plus
years, ready to launch to defend the homeland.
The capabilities our airmen provide to our nation and our
allies have never been more vital, and our global demand for
American air power will only grow in the future. However, this
steadfast watch comes at a price, and the demand for our
mission and our people exceeds the supply. We are out of
balance.
Twenty-six years of continuous combat has limited our
ability to prepare for future advanced threat scenarios,
scenarios with the lowest margin of error and the highest risk
to national security. Non-stop combat, paired with budget
instability and lower-than-planned toplines, have made the
United States Air Force one of the smallest, oldest-equipped,
and least ready in our history. We have attempted to balance
the risk across our force to maintain readiness but have been
forced to make unacceptable tradeoffs between readiness, force
structure, and modernization. Today's global challenges require
an Air Force not only ready to defeat today's violent extremism
but prepared and modernized for any threat the nation may face.
Mr. Chairman, I'll close by quoting General Douglas
MacArthur. He sent a cable as he escaped the Philippines in
1942. He said, ``The history of failure in war can be summed up
in two words: Too late. Too late to comprehend the deadly
purpose of the potential enemy, too late in realizing the moral
danger, too late in preparedness.''
Distinguished members of the subcommittee, preparedness or
readiness cannot be overlooked. Your Air Force needs
congressional support for fiscal year 2017 to pass an
appropriation, and support for a budget amendment that
accelerates readiness recovery. In fiscal year 2018 we must
repeal the Budget Control Act and provide predictable funding
for the future. These are critical to rebuilding full-spectrum
military readiness, which is the number-one priority of the
Secretary of Defense. We need to act now, before it's too late.
On behalf of the Secretary and the Chief of Staff and the
660,000 airmen, Active, Guard, Reserve, and civilians who serve
our nation, thank you for your tireless support. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wilson follows:]

Prepared Statement by General Stephen W. Wilson
introduction
Since our establishment 70 years ago, the United States Air Force
has secured peace throughout the full spectrum of hostilities with a
decisive warfighting advantage in, through, and from air, space, and
cyberspace. Without pause, we deliver global combat power by deterring
and defeating our nation's enemies, while supporting joint and
coalition forces at the beginning, the middle, and end of every
operation. Though the intrinsic nature of warfare remains unchanged,
the character of war--and the approach joint forces must take to
address new and changing threats--must continually evolve.
As the nation plans to counter the national security challenges
posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Violent Extremist
Organizations, controlling and exploiting air, space, and cyberspace
remains foundational to joint and coalition success. Today's 660,000
Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen meet these challenges
by deterring threats to the U.S., assuring our allies, and defeating
our adversaries 24/7/365. We provide unwavering homeland defense and
operate a robust, reliable, flexible, and survivable nuclear
enterprise, as the bedrock of our national security.
This steadfast watch, however, comes at a price. Conducting
continuous, worldwide combat operations since 1991 has placed a
dangerous toll on our airmen, equipment, and infrastructure. Sustained
global commitments and funding reductions have eroded our Air Force to
be one of the smallest, oldest-equipped, and least ready forces across
the full-spectrum of operations, in our service history. The
uncertainty and reduction in military funding resulting from Budget
Control Act of 2011 (BCA) further degraded our readiness. Such fiscal
uncertainty critically challenges our ability to sustain warfighting
capacity, improve readiness, modernize our force, and invest in
research and development to maintain our advantages over near-peer
competitors.
While the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 provided some space
to improve readiness and continue modernization efforts, your Air Force
needs further Congressional support to ensure we continue to strengthen
America's military to win today's fight, while building the Air Force
our nation needs to meet tomorrow's challenges.
always there
Your Air Force has been globally engaged for the last 26 years of
combat operations. We relentlessly provide Global Vigilance, Global
Reach, and Global Power for the nation . . . we're always in demand . .
. and we're always there. Though our end strength has decreased by 38
percent since 1991, we have experienced significant growth across
several mission areas.
Our airmen provide joint forces with Global Vigilance using real-
time multi-domain platforms and sensors integrated across our global
intelligence and command and control networks to find, fix, and finish
a range of hostile targets simultaneously across the globe. Without
fail, the Air Force flies 60 combat lines of persistent attack remotely
piloted aircraft (RPA) per day . . . the unblinking eye that supports
combatant commander around the globe. Through our Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, we provided
warfighters over 6,000 intelligence products per day used to identify
enemy targets and trigger 70 percent of Special Operations Forces
assaults on terrorists.
Additionally, the Air Force conducted 4,000 cyber missions against
more than 100,000 targets, disrupting adversaries and enabling over 200
High Value Individual kill/capture missions. In securing our networks
and digital infrastructure, 2016 saw Air Force cyber operators block
more than 1.3 billion malicious connections--an average of more than 40
per second. Meanwhile, our space operators provide relentless and
reliable interconnectedness, global positional awareness, global
missile warning, and battlefield situational awareness for our joint
forces.
Nearly every three minutes a mobility aircraft departs on a
mission, providing Global Reach and access, projecting power through a
network of airfields in 23 countries and 77 locations, while providing
critical aerial refueling capability. In 2016, our aeromedical
professionals evacuated over 5,700 patients and provided emergency
medical care resulting in a 98 percent survival rate. Your Air Force
provides unrelenting ability to maneuver, sustain, and recover
personnel and assets . . . at home, abroad, and with our allies and
partners.
With American fighters, bombers, RPAs, and Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), the Air Force provides conventional and
nuclear Global Power that can strike an enemy on short notice anywhere
in the world. In Iraq and Syria, the Air Force has led 65 percent of
the more than 17,000 coalition airstrikes since 2014, to deliver
decisive firepower supporting joint, special operations, and coalition
ground forces to defeat and degrade ISIS and regain critical territory.
All while our airmen continue to provide two legs of the nuclear triad,
resource 75 percent of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
framework, deter our adversaries, and connect the President to
strategic options.
Stitched together, the fabric of our Air Force weaves multi-domain
effects and provides U.S. service men and women the strongest blanket
of protection and the ability to power project American's full range of
combat capabilities. Make no mistake, your Air Force is always there.
readiness in a changing world
However, being ``always there'' comes at a cost to our airmen,
equipment, and infrastructure, and we are now at a tipping point.
Sustained global commitments and recent funding cuts eroded Air Force
readiness, capacity, and capability for a full-spectrum fight against a
near-peer adversary. Our force structure and our platforms now
represent one of the smallest, oldest-equipped, and least ready forces
in our service history. In 2013, sequestration abruptly delayed
modernization and reduced both readiness and the size of the Total
Force.
Our readiness decline began as we entered fiscal year 2014
expecting a corresponding decrease in both operations and overall
funding. Instead, fiscal year 2014 began with a government shutdown and
fiscal planning focused on a second year of sequestration. Compounding
the fiscal austerity, 2014 presented enormous geopolitical challenges
to America. Challenges included Russia's annexing of Crimea, Chinese
island-building in the South China Seas, the rapid rise of ISIS, and
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, instead of
reducing commitments, we entered into a new era of great power
competition coupled with persistent war against violent extremism. The
combination of decreased funding and increased military operations
required the Air Force to make tradeoffs that adversely affected
readiness. In short, our force is stressed to meet ever-growing mission
demands.
In fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 budgets, we made necessary
adjustments to balance near-term readiness with future modernization,
but our readiness remains at a near all-time low due to continuous
combat operations, reduced manpower, an aging fleet, and inconsistent
funding. Instead of rebuilding readiness for near-peer conflicts, your
Air Force is globally engaged in operations against lesser-equipped,
but still highly lethal, enemies. This requires airmen to serve at home
and abroad to underpin joint force success, but at the expense of full-
spectrum readiness. In contrast to our joint teammates, your airmen do
not reset or regroup . . . they are either deployed abroad, deployed in
place, or training for their next deployment.
Your Air Force needs permanent relief from the BCA caps, increased
funding, flexible execution authority, and manpower to recover full-
spectrum readiness. We will continue to do all we can to innovate,
transform, and improve how we maximize our resources. However, we still
need your help in providing funding stability with the ability to
modernize our capabilities, at the pace required to fight and win
against any emerging threat.
state of air force readiness
During WWII, General MacArthur's Airman, General George Kenney,
said it best, ``Airpower is like poker. A second-best hand is like none
at all--it will cost you dough and win you nothing.'' Today's Air Force
is at risk of becoming a second-best hand with readiness hovering near
50 percent.
We remain America's first and most agile responder to crisis and
conflict, underwriting every joint operation . . . however, the demand
for your Air Force, exceeds the supply.
To meet the full requirements of our Defense Strategic Guidance and
current operation plans, we require 80 percent of our combat squadrons
to be full-spectrum ready. We define full-spectrum readiness as the
right number of airmen, properly led, trained and equipped, to
accomplish our Air Force mission in support of joint forces in both
contested and uncontested environments.
We measure full-spectrum readiness through our five levers of
readiness: critical skills availability, weapons system sustainment,
training resource availability, flying hour program, and operational
tempo. If airmen are not ready for all possible scenarios, especially a
high-end fight against a near-peer adversary, it will take longer to
get to the fight; it will take longer to win; and it will cost more
lives. The following sections highlight key areas where Congressional
support is needed in order to balance our five levers of readiness.
people
Airmen are our greatest resource and our Air Force need to increase
end strength to meet national security requirements. Manpower
shortfalls in key areas remain the number one issue limiting readiness
and is our top priority. At the start of 2016, our end strength stood
at 311,000 Active Duty airmen, down from more than 500,000 during
Desert Storm--a 38 percent decrease. Though we appreciate your support
to build the force up to about 321,000 in 2017, we will still be
stretched to meet national security requirements. To quote Senator
McCain, we need to ``dig out'' more than ``build up.''
To improve readiness and attain manning levels matching our mission
requirements, we are considering an increase to our Active Duty, Guard,
and Reserve end strength and will work with the Secretary of Defense to
develop the fiscal year 2018 President's Budget to address personnel
shortages. Our Total Force model (incorporating our Active Duty, Guard,
Reserve, civilians, and our contracted capabilities), not only
recognizes the value of an integrated team, but helps guarantee today's
and tomorrow's capability. We will develop plans to address shortfalls
in a number of key areas, including critical career fields such as
aircraft maintenance, pilots, NC3, intelligence, cyber, and battlefield
airmen.
As we drew down Active Duty manpower in recent years, we have
relied more heavily on our civilian airmen. Our civilians make up 26
percent of our Total Force--of which, 94 percent are in the field,
providing vital mission support through weapons system maintenance,
sustainment, engineering, logistics, security, intelligence, and
medical functions. Currently, our civilian workforce is 96 percent
manned. At the historical attrition rate, the civilian workforce will
shrink to a 93 percent manning level over the next four months.
In the aircraft maintenance field, we were short approximately
3,400 aircraft maintainers at the close of 2016. Because of this
shortage, we cannot generate the training sorties needed for our
aircrews. The same pool of maintainers that keep our existing aircraft
flying at home and in combat, must simultaneously support fielding new
platforms. Due to an ongoing shortage of Active Duty aircraft
maintainers, we will continue to fund contractors to fill the gap at
select non-combat A-10, F-16, and C-130 units as our Active Duty
maintainers transition to the F-35. This allows us to strike a balance
between meeting today's demand while modernizing for the future, but
masks the insufficient size of the force.
We also face a pilot shortage crisis across all disciplines, most
acutely in the fighter community. The Air Force has the world's finest
pilots who enable an incomparable duality of global mobility and combat
lethality. As airlines continue hiring at unprecedented rates, they
draw away experienced pilots. Without a healthy pool of pilots, we risk
the ability to provide airpower to the nation.
Pilots are strategic national assets and the pilot crisis extends
beyond the Air Force and military. It is a national problem which
requires senior-level attention in Congress, the Commercial Industry,
and the DOD. To address this national challenge, since 2014 the 'Air
Force-Airline Collaboration', formally known as the National Pilot
Sourcing Forum has increased efforts to effectively utilize and train
an adequate number of pilots to meet our nation's pilot demand signal.
However, pilot retention has declined for five straight years. We
ended fiscal year 2016 at 723 fighter pilots below requirement and
1,555 total pilots short across all mission areas. Pilot training and
retention are priorities. The increased end-strength provided in the
fiscal year 2017 NDAA will allow us to maximize the training pipeline
and fill out under-manned units, which are vital to our recovery. We
are grateful for your support to increase the pilot bonus, and we will
continue to ensure our retention programs are appropriately sized and
utilized.
nuclear deterrence operations
We require additional resources to invest in our nuclear
capabilities and infrastructure that are the bedrock of our national
security. While our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective,
we require significant investment to ensure robust, reliable, flexible,
and survivable nuclear readiness and deterrence well into the future.
On average, our B-52 bombers are 55 years old and our nuclear
facilities are now over 50 years old, with many facility systems
operating well past their 20-year designed life span. Currently, all of
our weapons storage areas are operating with waivers and deviations
from our high standards. Although these storage areas are
uncompromised--they remain safe and secure--we must recapitalize this
infrastructure to address the recommendations identified in our Nuclear
Enterprise Reviews for facility and weapons sustainment.
Meanwhile, we must continue to invest in modernization of our air-
and ground-based nuclear weapons systems. The B-2 and B-52 require
upgrades, and we must ensure one of our main acquisitions priorities,
the B-21 bomber, proceeds on schedule. In addition, our ICBMs, which
provide the U.S. with a stabilizing and responsive strategic deterrent
capability, are being maintained and operated well beyond their planned
operational life-cycles and face significant sustainment challenges.
The Ground-based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) recapitalization program,
which will replace the ICBM fleet, must proceed as planned in order to
ensure the ground leg of the nuclear triad remains credible and
effective in the decades ahead. Connecting the nuclear triad is our
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system. Accordingly,
NC3 must be modernized to support accompanying nuclear capabilities.
Finally, we must modernize our nuclear stockpile, by continuing to
support the B-61 modernization program, while investing in the
development of the Long-Range Standoff weapon as a survivable air-
launched weapon capable of destroying otherwise inaccessible targets in
any conflict zone. Though we are grateful for modest relief of spending
limitations that allowed us to address a scrutinized priority list of
nuclear modernization efforts, we require additional resources to
invest in foundational nuclear capabilities and infrastructure.
space
Underwriting every joint operation across the globe is our ability
to use the space domain at the time and place of our choosing. Our
freedom of action in, through and from space can no longer be taken for
granted. Our potential adversaries have had a front row seat to the
many successes achieved by space integration into joint warfighting
and, unfortunately, they are rapidly developing capabilities to deny us
space superiority. In the not too distant future, our potential
adversaries will have the capability to hold all of our military space
capabilities at risk.
Space is a warfighting domain. The paradigm for space operations
has shifted from a force enabler/enhancer to an integrated warfighting
capability. As the Nation's lead service for space, we require
additional support to build Air Force space systems, that are more
resilient and agile. This means investment in capabilities to defend
our space assets, while maintaining a cycle of continuous upgrades in
each generation of spacecraft to ensure that systems are fully ready
when called upon by the joint warfighter and can continue to operate in
an increasingly contested environment.
Maintaining assured access to space remains one of our top
priorities. We are working to mature and advance our Launch Service
Agreement strategy to develop affordable, sustainable launch
capabilities that will eliminate dependence on foreign rocket
propulsion systems. Second, we are developing Space Situational
Awareness and Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2)
capabilities, which underpin our efforts to integrate space into full
spectrum joint operations. Investments in space situational awareness
capabilities, such as Space Fence, ground-based radar and optical
systems and on-orbit surveillance capabilities, like the Geosynchronous
Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) [our geosynchronous orbit
``neighborhood watch''], enables critical battlespace awareness in
space and the unprecedented ability to characterize the space
operational environment.
Similarly, investments in the Joint Interagency Coalition Space
Operations Center (JICSpOC) and the Joint Space Operation Center
(JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) provide the decision superiority and data
we need to deter attack, and, if necessary, defend our capabilities and
freedom to operate in space. Lastly, space systems provide mission-
critical services and capabilities to support our Joint Forces in
theater and around the globe, every day. Continuing to modernize and
replenish our missile warning, nuclear command and control, satellite
communication and Global Positioning System constellations ensures we
will have resilient, mission-assured capability to support daily joint
operations.
Finally, we need to continue integrating our organizations and
capabilities across both the DOD and the Intelligence Community, while
improving training for our space force and cultivating an enduring
cadre of space operators and acquirers. We must normalize and
operationalize the space domain by maturing our tactics, techniques and
procedures and ``train like we fight,'' in space, just as we would in
any other domain to ensure we are fully prepared to deal with today's
adversaries and emerging technology.
cyberspace
Cyberspace capabilities are essential to joint operations. The Air
Force remains committed to providing 39 fully operational Cyber Mission
teams by the end of fiscal year 2018. Today's cyber teams are
conducting ongoing offensive and defensive cyber operations in support
of combatant commanders daily, therefore we must commit to a robust and
resilient cyber enterprise.
Today, the Air Force cyber enterprise lacks sufficient numbers of
trained cyber forces to meet the ever-increasing demands. Additionally,
the increasing numbers of attacks on our cyber infrastructure and
weapon systems, from state and non-state actors, continue to tax the
limited personnel and tools to effectively defend critical assets and
preserve freedom of movement in a domain where actions happen at the
speed of light. Adequate and consistent resourcing over time will
enable us to obtain and maintain cyber superiority in this highly
dynamic warfighting domain.
Additional investments in cyberspace capabilities are required. We
need to continue modernizing and developing offensive and defensive
tools and measures to harden current infrastructures while baking cyber
security into every new capability to counter cyberspace adversaries.
This will ensure Air Force and joint force mission assurance--command
and control, weapon system cyberspace defense, information dominance,
and integrating offensive cyberspace effects into multi-domain
operations.
combat air forces
The average age of Air Force aircraft is 27 years. This is the
oldest in our 70-year history. If aircraft required license plates, 54
percent of our platforms would qualify for antique designation in the
state of Virginia. The ability to fly, fight, and win with aging
aircraft is made possible by remarkable airmen in an all-volunteer
force. Modernization can no longer be delayed . . . it is the
capability and capacity for a high-end fight. Today's modernization is
tomorrow's readiness.
To continue to provide unrelenting air superiority and global
precision strike, we cannot accept a less than ready force. With
current combat readiness falling below 50 percent and an ever-growing
demand signal, our Air Force requires an increase in combat air forces
capacity. The more diminished our combat-coded fighter squadrons, the
more degraded our ability to posture and project global power for
America. At our current fighter procurement rate, it will take 45 years
to recapitalize our full fighter force. We must also continue to
procure the F-35 to counter rapidly advancing near-peer threats.
To ensure our airmen are ready to face any emerging or future
threat, we need to provide our airmen with advanced threat testing,
training, and associated technology. Our forces must have access to
realistic test and training ranges and investment in computer-aided
live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) infrastructure. LVC capability
provides opportunities to test and train against the world's most
capable threats, reduces costs, and supports full-spectrum readiness.
Finally, we must have sufficient munitions to counter current threats,
while developing advanced munitions to counter future threats.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr)
The Air Force ISR enterprise is often the first in the fight and
the last to leave . . . providing continuous coverage of global threats
and targets . . . from the earliest surveillance of the battlespace, to
after weapon impact. However, the demand for continuous ISR presence is
insatiable and ever growing, and our ISR enterprise is strained.
Over the past 15 years we grew the RPA enterprise 1,200 percent . .
. and today we support 60 continual combat lines of persistent attack
RPAs. Within current constraints, we are committed to improving quality
of life and work for our airmen, and are prioritizing investments to
create a dedicated launch and recovery MQ-1/9 squadron, increase
training, and restore two MQ-9 operations squadrons. Additionally, we
are training enlisted operators to fly the RQ-4 Global Hawk and funding
a strategic basing initiative to eventually fly RPAs at new locations
on schedule.
However, our ISR enterprise still needs help. More than 7,000
airmen working in our Distributed Common Ground System are over-
stressed and undermanned. These airmen supported over 29,000 ISR
missions, analyzed more than 380,000 hours of full motion video and
disseminated 2.6 million images to our warfighters in the last year
alone, attempting to quench the insatiable demand for ISR. They have
operated at these surge levels for over a decade.
To meet the needs of combatant commanders, the RPA force may
require additional airmen to achieve a healthy and sustainable force.
Moreover, we continue to pursue emerging ISR Cyber and Space
capabilities. We must also recapitalize our C2ISR platforms, such as
our E-8C JSTARS aircraft, which provides a unique combination of
airborne C2, communications, and high-fidelity moving-target
surveillance capability. These capabilities are essential to finding
and tracking our adversaries, conducting non-kinetic targeting, and
ensuring Air Force weapon systems cyber mission assurance.
infrastructure
We project airpower from a network of globally positioned bases,
and we must focus on maintaining these bases as part of our strategic
force posture. However, our infrastructure, particularly our
installations in the continental U.S., are in excess of our operational
needs. This is an inefficient arrangement with aging and underused
facilities consuming funds that should be prioritized for readiness and
modernization.
Budget pressures have repeatedly delayed investments in aging
infrastructure such as test and training ranges, airfields, facilities,
and even basic infrastructure like power and drainage systems. Our
infrastructure problem has only been exacerbated by the funding caps
imposed under the BCA. Every year that we delay infrastructure repairs
affects operations and substantially increases improvement costs. It is
time for another round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) to allow
us to reinvest funds in higher priority areas across the Air Force.
conclusion
Since 1947, the Air Force has relentlessly provided America with
credible deterrence and decisive combat power in times of peace,
crisis, contingency, and conflict. However, our relative advantage over
potential adversaries is shrinking and we must be prepared to win
decisively against any adversary. We owe this to our nation, our joint
teammates, and our allies. The nation requires full-spectrum ready air,
space, and cyber power, now more than ever. America expects it;
combatant commanders require it; and with your support, airmen will
deliver it.

Senator Inhofe. I thank all of you for your opening
statements.
I see this as I did 22 years ago in this committee, not
just to get our state of readiness where it should be, but also
to tell the truth about how unready we are. I think you did a
good job of that, General Wilson.
Admiral Moran, the thing that probably came out that
shocked most people from yesterday was your statement about
more than half the F-18s are not running. I mean, people need
to hear that, and they need to hear it from you guys who are at
the top and who are in a position to say it with more
credibility certainly than I can say it.
We know where we are right now. We know there are problems
we have. Senator Kaine and I are in very much agreement. In
fact, we have a mutual friend who put us together several years
ago, and we have a friendship. There's a little bit of
difference in how we see what has happened during the last
administration, the idea of finding ourselves where we have to
do something about sequestration, we have to do something about
the deterioration in the funding and the capabilities of our
military.
As we do that, we don't want to be in a position that for
every dollar we do that, we have to do it for the non-defense.
I mean, that philosophy tells me that the priority is not what
I interpret the Constitution, and I told you all of this when
you were in my offices. I think it's important that we
recognize that we're going to have to do a lot of rebuilding
here, and we have to tell the truth. When you talk about we're
pretty good forward but we have nearly an empty bench behind,
that's a serious thing.
You've heard a lot of the talks recently. You've heard the
figures, as some of you have referred to, the Army going to
540,000 ships, 355 marines to 36 battalions, and 1,200 fighter
aircraft there for General Wilson. These are figures that it's
going to be hard to actually come out for exact figures. We
talked to [Secretary of Defense] Mattis about these same
figures, and they recognize they do represent an enhancement
that has to be there.
I want to start off by asking each one of you how realistic
you think these figures are, not as if they're going to be
exact but are they in the ball park of the threat that's facing
us now.
We'll start with you, General.
General Allyn. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe. I'll start by--
--
Senator Inhofe. I neglected to say if there's no objection,
we'll use 7-minute rounds because we're going to have to do
this in one round.
Go ahead.
General Allyn. I'll ignore this 4-minute ticker on my
screen here.
Senator Inhofe. Just ignore that.
General Allyn. Yes, Chairman Inhofe, the Secretary of
Defense has directed a strategic review that we expect to
result in an adjusted force sizing construct. As the Chief of
Staff of the Army has highlighted in prior testimony, the
estimate that 540,000 in the Active force reflects is a subset
of what would it take to get the military risk level to respond
to the contingencies that we face and the operational plans of
our combatant commands down to a moderate level.
Senator Inhofe. You're talking about moderate risk.
General Allyn. A moderate risk level. That would require a
1.2 million total force. Now, if we get adjusted guidance,
obviously we will do our internal due diligence to determine
exactly what the right number is. You asked is it in the
ballpark; it's in the ballpark.
Senator Inhofe. All right, and I appreciate that. You know,
when you talk about risk, I would hope you would always make
sure people understand. You talk about risk, which talks about
readiness, which talks about lives. We're talking about lives
now, that's how serious that is.
Admiral Moran?
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir, Chairman. The number you quoted
was based on our force structure assessment, which was done
over the past year. I would tell you that that's a good target
to start ramping towards. As you know, in shipbuilding, it
takes years just to get to one ship. We're going to have many
years to assess where new technology takes us, new war-fighting
constructs.
As I said in my opening, we know we're too small for what
we're being asked to do today, so we have to get on a ramp to
not only arrest the decline, which I think we're on in
President's Budget 2017 [President budget for fiscal year
2017], unsequestered, and with an appropriations bill. It's a
target that's worth shooting for, at least in the beginning
ramp of the next four or five years.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's understandable. Would you
repeat your characterization of our capability of our F-18s?
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. The facts are that for our entire
Hornet fleet, it's the Hornets and Super Hornet fleet, we have
62 percent on a given day. Yesterday was 62 percent. I doubt
it's changed much since yesterday. We're in about 62 percent
that are not flyable.
Senator Inhofe. More than half.
Admiral Moran. More than half. On a typical day it's about
30 percent if everything's going well, about 30 percent that's
either in depot or on a flight line that's not flyable. We're
double where we should be in non-flyable aircraft.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
General Walters?
General Walters. Yes, sir. The figure of 36 battalions for
us, that's a reasonable target to shoot at if it's a total
force number. More importantly I think is if we grow end
strength. I mentioned that we have done 18 months' worth of
analysis on what capabilities we need. They're everywhere from
ISR, IO [information operations], counter-UAS [unmanned
aircraft system], which is nascent but required and I think a
need right now, long-range fires.
Before we build another capacity, we need to fix the holes
that are in our current organizations. That's a smaller number,
194,000 is about that, before you start buying any additional
capability. That's a strategic choice that needs to be made,
and a strategic review will look at that.
I think the 36 battalions comes from a 2-thing strategy,
doing 2 things simultaneously. I can tell you today we cannot
do two things simultaneously, and one of the stressing ones for
us is Korea. We couldn't do that at all if we still had
commitments elsewhere in the world--Europe, Africa, or the
Middle East.
Senator Inhofe. You know, they don't use that anymore like
they used to, two worldwide conflicts almost simultaneously.
General Walters. Yes, sir, and I think our enemies know
that.
Senator Inhofe. Because it's a recognition we're not there.
General Walters. Yes, sir, and I think our enemies know
that, too.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I think they do too.
General Wilson?
General Wilson. Chairman, I told you yesterday that we're
at about 50 percent readiness today across the Air Force. We're
at the smallest Air Force ever in 2016, when we bottomed out at
310,000. Just last year we finished the year at 317,000. We
want to grow our force to 321,000 this next year. We think the
target we're shooting for is 350,000 airmen in the United
States Air Force. That number fills 100 percent of our current
manning documents. That's a current mission. That's no new
mission. As mentioned by General Allyn, it's a strategic
defense review that looks at where we need to be. That number
can be adjusted even up. We think 350,000 is the number for our
airmen.
We think we need 60 fighter squadrons, in addition to
modernizing our nuclear force and our space forces.
Senator Inhofe. I want to get to one other area before we
go around, and that is when you're going through a starvation
period, you have two problems. One is it's at the expense of
modernization and maintenance. First of all, do you agree with
that?
What I'd like to have is just for each one of you the area
of modernization that needs to be enhanced now because you've
had to let that go, starting with you, General Allyn.
General Allyn. As we testified last year, Chairman Inhofe,
we've had most of our modernization programs on life support
for the last several years. We are currently--our modernization
program is 50 percent of what it was in 2009. In 2009, it was
$48.5 billion. It's $24.8 billion this year, and it's
inadequate to modernize for the near term, let alone the long-
range future force that we know we're going to require on a
multi-domain battlefield.
We would prioritize against our near-peer competitors to
ensure our current platforms are the best that we can possibly
field, and then begin to work on the new equipment that we
would need.
The good news about modernizing current equipment is it's
shovel-ready today if the resources are provided.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Admiral?
Admiral Moran. Senator, as you know, modernization for us
also comes in the form of maintenance. We modernize our ships
while they're in maintenance, just upgrading radars, weapon
systems, those sorts of things. In terms of platform
modernization, our top priority is the Columbia-class to
replace the Ohio-class of submarines. We're at the end of
service life in Ohio if we don't start this year. We appreciate
the anomaly in the current CR [continuing resolution]
environment for Columbia.
Second would be a close call between building to the 12th
nuclear aircraft carrier Ford-class to get us to a total of 12.
Then DDGs and SSNs, probably SSNs over DDGs if we had to
prioritize them, simply because we're already very low on our
SSN numbers, and are going lower over time. That's a key
capability for us.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Generals Wilson and Walters, you
answer for the record since we're out of time here. Keep one
thing in mind, and that is when you're looking at the future,
you don't know really what you have to--I always remember the
last year I was on the House Armed Services Committee, we had a
witness. This was in 1994. They said that in 10 more years we
will no longer need ground troops. You don't know. You're
predicting in the future; it's very difficult to do.
If you want to meet the expectations of the American
people, you have to be superior in all areas, which we're not.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the witnesses.
First a general question for all four of you based on your
verbal testimony. Would you agree that a comprehensive national
security strategy would require a repeal of sequestration not
only for defense but also for the non-defense accounts that
directly bear upon national security?
General Allyn. Senator Kaine, absolutely. We require a new
national security strategy to guide both the military
capability that's required and the other elements of national
power that would be integrated to whatever solution we would
need to deliver around the world.
Admiral Moran. I would agree with General Allyn, sir.
General Walters. I agree, sir. The entire nation's power
needs to be brought to bear.
General Wilson. I agree.
Senator Kaine. Thanks, General Wilson.
General Allyn, in your verbal testimony, in talking about
readiness, you talked about the link between readiness and our
ability to recruit and retain our best talent, and I'd like you
to elaborate on that a little bit. What's the connection
between these readiness discussions we're having and the
ability to recruit and retain?
General Allyn. Thank you, Senator Kaine. As I talked in the
intro of the conversation, the Army is people. At its core, our
primary weapon system is our soldier. Unless we can continue to
assess the great champions that continue to join the United
States Army every day and retain the best, we cannot sustain
the tempo that we are executing each and every day around the
globe.
We have really endured the last several years of the
drawdown on the backs of our soldiers who have been willing to
extend the time deployed, reduce the time at home, and carry
that load. We cannot continue to bear that burden into the
future without severe readiness impacts. If we don't have
soldiers manning our forces and carrying our weapons, we don't
have anything. That is job 1 for us.
Now, the good news is we are successfully recruiting the
force that we need, and we are seeing very positive signs in
retention. In response to the NDAA 2017 authorization, our
first step was to try to retain more of the current force, and
within the first 30 days of this effort 2,500 have said I want
to extend on this great team. We are encouraged by that, but we
know that this is a long-term effort, and we have to stay after
it.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Admiral Moran, you and I talked in my office about the
maintenance of ships, and as you point out, maintenance is
modernization for a lot of what you do. If we're down from the
300 and teens down to 275, doesn't that make the maintenance of
the remaining 275 even more important?
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir, it absolutely does.
Senator Kaine. Talk to me a little bit about the shipyards,
and I'll stay with Admiral Moran because there was an
implementation guideline on the civilian workforce hiring
freeze that was last week issued by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Secretary Work, and he authorized certain exemptions
for positions in shipyards and depots that perform direct
management of inventory and direct maintenance of equipment.
Nevertheless, that hiring freeze still is affecting your
shipyard and depot workers, and many of them are nearing
retirement. If this hiring freeze were to continue without
adjustment, talk a little bit about the effect that that would
have on shipyards in particular.
Admiral Moran. Yes, Senator. I'm mindful of the fact that
we've got several members here that have shipyards that are
very concerned.
Senator Kaine. Yes, I'm trying to beat the question----
[Laughter.]
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. We have some pretty good
assurances that the hiring freeze, the temporary hiring freeze
that's been put into place, that we will be able to get
exemptions for our depots and our yards. We are still working
through the mechanics of that, though. The Secretary of the
Navy, who has been delegated authority to allow for these
exemptions, has to sign each person's exemption, or can we do
these in groups based on the lower echelon input? We're working
through those details, but I think you'll be pleased to know
that we're going to get through this in the very near term.
To your point, if it were to endure, we're back to
sequestration, furlough levels of 2013, that was devastating to
our force, and we don't want to go there.
Senator Kaine. Could I have the other members of the panel
talk a little bit about what the hiring freeze would mean if it
continued?
General Walters. Sir, I'll just give you a short example.
We're doing a lot of planning to increase readiness and grow
the force and do these things. I'm short contracting officers
50 percent. If I can't hire contracting officers, we can put
any plan we want in place, we can put the money in place, but I
can't execute it, it's not going to come to fruition. That's
one of our challenges.
Senator Kaine. General Wilson?
General Wilson. You mentioned shipyards; depots are the
same way. We need to be able to--today, 96 percent of our
civilian workforce works outside of Washington, D.C. They work
in places like our depots or on our flight lines. If we can't
hire, that has a direct impact to readiness. We're confident
that we can get the procedures in place to move through this,
but we can't have it slow down the hiring.
General Allyn. For the Army, we've begun to triage our
depots based on those temp and term hires that were about to
expire. We've worked through February. We're just about through
March, and we find that the waiver is meeting the need that we
have for our commanders, and we have a direct link between our
commanders and the Secretary to ensure that bureaucracy does
not get in the way of taking care of our people.
Senator Kaine. I'm going to use the remainder to allow
General Walters and General Wilson to answer the question that
Senator Inhofe asked, because I was really interested in the
prioritization, if there were restoration of funds, what are
some of the highest priority items that you've not been able to
do that you would want to do, and I think this is really
important testimony to get on the record today.
General Walters. Yes, sir. We are like all the other
services that have taken hits in modernization. We're at about
50 percent of where we were even 5 years ago. It caused us to
make decisions. Our ground combat vehicle program, our 40-year-
old amphibious vehicles, our Humvees need to be replaced, and
we have programs for that but they're a very, very minimal
amount, minimum sustaining rate, and it caused us to do things
like an obsolescence program on our light armored vehicles
instead of buying new ones. We're putting--I don't like the
term ``band-aid,'' but we're putting that program on a light
armored vehicle when we really should be buying a new one.
Senator Kaine. General Wilson?
General Wilson. Senator Kaine, just like Admiral Moran
talked about, our first priority would be nuclear
modernization. We delayed investment in that for far too long.
Today we have 75 less F-35s than we had planned on in 2012. The
F-35 program is a significant modernization program going
forward.
Additionally, the KC-46 and the B-21 are significant
programs going forward. Today's modernization is tomorrow's
readiness, and right now our average fleet is over 27 years
old. We've got 21 of 39 fleets of our aircraft that exceed the
27-year average. Building this new capability will help the
modernization going forward.
Admiral Moran. Senator, if I could add, if you don't mind,
General Wilson reminded me that for Navy I was focused on the
shipbuilding part, but aviation is clearly a priority, either
in the near term buying Super Hornets to replace the Hornet
fleet, the legacy Hornet fleet, but also we're in the same
position. We are well behind where we wanted to be when it
comes to the F-35. Those are two very important modernization--
--
Senator Inhofe. I know that's true, along with the pilot
problem, which I'm hoping members will get into.
Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Lieutenant Colonel Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. I told
a friend earlier today that I think what I'm going to hear from
you gentlemen today is very similar to what we heard from last
year, and that's extremely disappointing I think for all of us.
Thank you for working under such tight constraints.
General Wilson, I'll start with you. The Iowa Army
Ammunition Plant produces components for some of America's most
advanced ammunition. Since 1941 it has played a role in
ensuring America's forces are ready, and I noted in your
written statement that you say we must have sufficient
munitions to counter threats. You're stating in your opinion
that your munition supply is low; is that correct?
General Wilson. Yes, Senator. Today we're expending about--
well, in the ISIS fight we expended 43,000 munitions. We're
spending about 1,500 a month. Replenishing that stock we think
will take about a billion dollars a year of added investments
over a significant period of time, just to replenish those
stocks. Our preferred munitions to meet all the combatant
commanders needs, we have a deficit across all of them that we
need to dig our way out of.
Senator Ernst. As far as Congress is concerned, simply by
providing the dollars necessary, you would be able to secure
those munitions?
General Wilson. Yes, ma'am. We've put investments not only
into the munitions but into what you described, the
infrastructure that makes those munitions. All the plants that
produce the fill for the munitions are part of the investment
going forward. It's a significant investment we believe of
about a billion dollars a year for about a decade, just on
munitions.
Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate that. Thank you very
much, General.
General Allyn, thank you. I appreciate you leading the way
in everything that you do in your travels around the globe to
visit our soldiers. That has been very important, and it has
been noted in many conversations that I've had. Thank you so
much.
You stated that our greatest asset is our soldiers, and I
firmly believe that. I believe that we have some of the finest
young men and women out there. As you know, I've been a long-
time proponent of upgrading small arms capabilities within the
Army, and I know, I know that readiness begins with the
individual soldier. If they are not ready, none of our higher
echelons can be ready.
I do commend the Army's recent action on upgrading its
handgun. I did receive a call from the chief, and I was glad to
hear about that. The fact remains that it took far too long for
that to happen, but we are on our way.
Russia continues to upgrade its rifles, and this really
needs to be a priority as well for the Army.
Again to you, besides more money, what can we do to upgrade
other small arms, and how can we do it faster?
General Allyn. I know that you're aware we have a soldier
enhancement program that is part of our program executive
officer soldier, and we are focused on a number of initiatives
to ensure that our soldiers have the best possible equipment as
they go into combat in the future, as we have been able to do
in the past.
We have many of those programs, just like every other
modernization program that we have. For instance, our multi-
year programs for our aviation fleet are all on the floor,
right? They're absolutely at the minimum level to keep those
contracts alive. We cannot operate that way. The unit cost for
every aircraft is increased each time we do that, and yet year
over year we're put into this dilemma.
In our soldier portfolio I can provide for the record
specifics, but having reviewed that in detail and visited PEO
[Program Executive Office] soldier at Ft. Belvoir, we have a
number of lighter, better human dynamic and next-generation
FLIR [Forward Looking Infrared] capability that we need to get
to the force. We've got to have money to enable that to happen,
so I appreciate your continued support as we move forward.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Army is actively taking steps to accelerate development,
procurement, and fielding of improved U.S. Army small arms capabilities
across the board. Small arms continue to provide a critical capability
in the overall effort to ensure the U.S. Army is and will be the
dominant power on any current or future battlefield. A new Maneuver
Force Modernization Strategy, which addresses soldier weapons to the
platoon level is currently under development at the Maneuver Center of
Excellence, and should be completed in third quarter, fiscal year 2017
(FY17). The Army also leverages the Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP).
The SEP is designed to evaluate existing prototypes or commercially-
available items that can enhance soldiers' capability. Specifically,
the following initiatives are in progress: The Army completes the pure-
fleeting of the Force with the M4A1 Carbine NLT FY23; Fielding of the
Squad Designated Marksman Rifle begins in fiscal year 2019; Fielding of
the Precision Sniper Rifle begins in fiscal year 2020; the M3 Carl
Gustaf 84 millimeter Recoilless Rifle is in fielding to Infantry Rifle
platoons now and the lightweight Carl Gustaf begins fielding in fiscal
year 2020; and, ammunition improvements are synchronized with weapon
system enhancements to enhance range and lethality. Further, when the
Small Arms Ammunition Caliber Study concludes in March 2017, the
requirements for a Next Generation Soldier Weapons (NGSW) will be
finalized. The NGSW family of small arms will replace current squad
(rifle/carbine, squad automatic weapon, and sub-compact) weapons with
production slated for fiscal year 2023.

Senator Ernst. Outstanding. Thank you, General.
Admiral Moran, thank you. I enjoyed our conversation the
other day. We agreed that readiness is really a mutual
obligation, something that we have to commit to in the
Congress. You committed to continue to look for ways to make
major acquisitions like the Ford-class carrier and the F-35C
more efficient. That's imperative. I recognize Congress'
responsibility to provide better budget planning and execution.
Can you commit to me here again that you're going to hold
programs like the Ford-class carrier accountable?
Admiral Moran. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. In our meeting you painted a very
grim picture of our Navy's current state of readiness, and I
think ensuring that we are being fiscally conservative with
major programs like that is key to establishing that readiness.
A question for you and something that we just briefly
touched on. If our Navy had to answer to two or more of the so-
called four-plus-one threats today, could we do that?
Admiral Moran. I hate to use the lawyer answer here and say
it depends, because it does depend on which two of the four
we're talking about. To answer it more specifically than that,
I think we probably need to go into a closed hearing to really
fully flesh that out for you. We are at a point right now, as I
said in my opening and in my written statement, that our
ability to surge beyond our current force that's forward is
very limited, which should give you a pretty good indication
that it would be challenging to meet the current guidance to
defeat and deny in two conflicts.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Finally, just very briefly, General Walters, you listed the
growing concern for the end strength as one of your top
priorities. Right now it looks like you're going to have to
pull in 3,000 marines a year to meet those recruiting goals. Is
that accurate?
General Walters. To be quite accurate, Senator, we think we
should not grow any faster to ensure our standards are met.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Given that----
General Walters. We'll buy their----
Senator Ernst. Very good. The legal answer.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ernst. Given that women make up about 50 percent of
our population, actually a little bit more, that's a good place
to start. Do you have a plan for utilizing women? What role
will they play as you try and increase your readiness and reach
your desired end strength?
General Walters. As you well know, the policy now is that
all MOS's [Military Occupational Specialties] are open to women
in the Marine Corps. We have a battalion that's starting a
great woman right now. I can't report to you on any results of
that. We have three female infantry down there and three in the
staff, and that was out of 380 that were trained and three
volunteered. We've turned the recruiters to start recruiting
for that MOS, and we have 13 in the pipeline right now. It's
going to be the law of small numbers for a while, I believe.
Senator Ernst. Great. Well, I appreciate it very much,
General. P.S., the marines need more amphibs.
Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today and for your service to
the country.
I just want to pick up on Senator Ernst's comments about
handguns for the Army and point out that I was very pleased to
see that get done and very proud to report that those handguns
are going to be made in New Hampshire by Sig Sauer, which is an
excellent company. You're going to get the best.
Admiral Moran, as we discussed when we met, one of the
things that I found very concerning was when the first meeting
of the Navy caucus met last fall, that Admiral Richardson said
to us that the Navy no longer plans any spending in the first
quarter of the new fiscal year because of the ongoing
continuous resolutions that you all have had to deal with and
the uncertainty that that means.
I think we are probably looking at another CR for the
remainder of this year, and I wonder if each of you could
identify what you think will be the most challenging impact of
that CR as you look at what you're facing in this current
budget situation.
General Allyn. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. I'll start, and
I know they'll be ready to pile on here.
Our fiscal year 2017 NDAA authorized an increase in our
operations maintenance account of over $4 billion. None of that
will be executable under a continuing resolution. That will
have severe implications to not only planned operations here in
the homeland but OCO missions as well, contingency operations
overseas. That will be a significant problem.
We also have 50 new starts that are part of our President's
Budget for 2017. None of those will get started.
To the point that Senator Ernst made about ammunition, we
also have a severe backlog in our war reserves which we were
trying to get after by increasing production at our plants and
facilitizing those plants. None of that will be possible under
a year-long continuing resolution.
That's just the top couple for the United States Army.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Admiral Moran. Senator, thanks for the question. The top
for us would be deferral of 14 ship avails, to include one
submarine that would add to the current bow wave for backlog
that we have, which is rather enormous. We would probably--we
will begin to shut down two air wings completely. That means no
flying for two air wings, and we'd go to what we refer to as
tactical hard deck for two additional air wings, which is 11
hours a month per pilot, just to keep them safe. Then we
would--well, it would definitely impact the other flight hour
accounts which do pilot production, so where we train pilots to
become pilots. I'm about to go over to the Naval Academy
tonight to welcome the newest selectees for naval aviation. I'd
hate to tell them that they're not going to be able to train to
be pilots for a while. That's what we're being faced with if we
go to a year-long CR without trading, moving accounts around
where something else has to give.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Walters?
General Walters. Yes, Senator, I'm with the Navy on this
one. The definition of a CR is spending at [fiscal year] 2016
levels. Our flying hour accounts are nowhere near. I think I
testified yesterday that if we don't get a supplemental, we'll
probably stop flying in July. It could be more. We could burn
through our 2016 levels because we have more RBA [ready basic
aircraft] aircraft in 2017 than we had in 2016, and that's how
it works. That would be the effect on us.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Wilson. Senator, we would have a $1.5 billion math
problem to make up. It would impact 60 new starts. To meet that
math problem, we'd have to directly--the only place we can go
for money is our readiness accounts. It would be flying hours,
WSS [weapon systems sustainment], or facilities, FSRM accounts.
Much like the rest of the service, we'd stop flying in the
summer, we'd backlog the depots, we'd have to delay, further
delay any modernization of our infrastructure on our bases. The
thing we're trying to stop or dig our way out of, readiness,
would impact the most.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all.
General Allyn. If I could, Senator----
Senator Shaheen. Please.
General Allyn.--just to add for all of us, you authorized
an end strength increase. That would not be funded. We would be
starting that hollow force revisit. At least when I joined the
United States Army, we were coming out of that, and we would be
starting back down that precipice.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I think I've heard everyone on this
subcommittee and everyone on the Armed Services Committee say
that we can't let that happen. Shame on us if we don't take
action to address it.
General Wilson, I was distressed to read in your testimony
that pilot retention has declined for five straight years. To
what do you attribute that? Is it the uncertainty that people
are facing, the lack of readiness to be able to train? Or is
there something else going on?
General Wilson. Senator, there are a lot of factors at play
here, but let me try to give you a snapshot of a couple of
them.
It is lack of flying, because pilots join the Air Force to
fly. There are different categories, but today's fighter pilots
are flying about 75 to 80 sorties a year, and they're flying
about 140 to 150 hours a year, total. That's significantly down
from before. They come into the Air Force to fly.
We've got lots of efforts underway to improve the culture
of the squadron, to see what a 21st Century squadron looks
like, and how do we remove the impediments that keep pilots
from doing what they want to do. Whether it be reducing
additional duties or their ancillary training, improving their
quality of life, we're working on those efforts.
The other part of it is there's an ops tempo that goes on.
Again, if I take a fighter squadron, for example, the Shaw
fighter squadron that flies F-16s, when they're in the bucket
to deploy, that year they average 260 days a year gone from
their families. On the year that they're back home, not
deployed, they're averaging 110 days TDY [temporary duty] to do
other things, red flags, other exercises, so they're gone a
lot.
At about that 11-year point, the family makes a decision do
we continue doing this, and the airlines are hiring and they're
paying a lot of money, and is this a better stability for us.
We're trying to get after this problem, and I can talk more on
the pilots because I don't think it's an Air Force problem or a
Navy problem or a Marine problem; it's a national problem that
we're going to have to get our arms around to get after.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
One of the issues that we've been following very closely in
New Hampshire is what's happening with the KC-46 new air
refueling tankers. I just learned that the delivery, that first
delivery of aircraft has slid by about six months. Will that
have an impact on our readiness? How will that affect what's
happening?
General Wilson. Senator, we all think it won't impact
readiness per say because we're going to keep the number of KC-
135s and KC-10s, and as we bring on the KC-46, once we get to
the 479 tankers, then we'll start one-for-one replacing KC-10s
and taking them out of the fleet. It's not ideal, we wanted to
be on time, but we slid a little bit. After the initial batch
of 3 per month, then we're going to go to 1.5, 1.25. That slide
in adjustment has made about a 6-month delay.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain?
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses, and I only wish that
all members of Congress could hear the testimony today as we
again fight the battle of sequestration.
I only have one question, and I don't want to take the time
of my colleagues. In late 1970s, some of you may recall or know
that the Chief of Staff of the United States Army came before
Congress and said that we had a hollow Army, and that caused
significant repercussions throughout the Congress and the
nation.
I'll begin with you, General Allyn. Do we face the prospect
of a hollow Army?
General Allyn. Thank you, Chairman McCain. My belief is if
we continue with a continuing resolution, and if we do not
eliminate sequestration this year, then we will be faced with
the likelihood of beginning that dive toward a hollow force.
Admiral Moran. Senator, I believe that the sign of a hollow
force is when no one wants to stay in the force, and I think
the longer we go, to General Allyn's point, with reduced
funding and an inability to allow our young men and women to do
what they joined to do, to serve their country, they'll walk,
and that will lead to a hollow force. We're under threat here
in the next few years if we don't get our fiscal house in
order.
General Walters. Chairman, same for us. If we don't give
them the new equipment, they won't stay around; and that, by
definition, at least in my mind, is a hollow force.
General Wilson. Chairman, I would agree with everything
that's been said. As we look at the time period you talked
about, the late 1970s, at the depth of the hollow force, we're
flying less sorties and less hours today than we were then.
The good news is we saw how we got there and we saw how we
get out of that, so we know what's required to do that. We know
that it takes, first of all, manpower. Once we fix the
manpower, then we get the right training. With the right
training, we get the weapon systems support, we get the flying
hours that we need, we fix the infrastructure, and we can dig
out of this, but we have to start now.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this
hearing.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country.
Sometimes we don't say that enough. We appreciate what you do.
I want to just work through some anecdotes that we've
learned about, and I'd like your thoughts on them, and perhaps
this brings some focus to the day-to-day operations and some of
the challenges that you have and your team has. If you don't
feel comfortable discussing it in this category, please let me
know.
Admiral Moran, I'd like to start with you. Can you talk
about the submarines that you've got right now, their
capabilities right now and whether or not, specifically with
the USS Boise, what the challenges are and the current
position?
Admiral Moran. Senator, thanks for the question. First of
all, our submarine force is the finest in the world,
unquestioned. We are lacking capacity in the long haul. If we
don't turn around our procurement of Virginia-class submarines,
we're going to be down in the low 40s by the middle of next
decade. That's the lowest point I can recall. We ask an awful
lot of that force.
To give you an indication of where we are with this smaller
Navy running harder than it has in a very long time, we are out
in our public yards, the priority to fix ships in our public
yards are our nukes, starting with our boomers because of the
national strategic deterrence, followed by our aircraft
carriers, and then we get down to the SSN world. Because of the
capacity limitations and the workforce limitations that we've
had, and our inability to get some of our submarines or some of
our work assigned to the private yards, we've had to delay
submarines like Boise for an extended period of time.
Boise was scheduled for a 24-month availability. They are
now on 47 month. In that time, the CO [commanding officer] has
come----
Senator Rounds. May I just make this point?
Admiral Moran. Yes, go ahead.
Senator Rounds. What you're telling me is that you've got a
nuclear submarine that, because it doesn't meet readiness
standards, you can't take it out and utilize it today.
Admiral Moran. Even while it's waiting for maintenance, it
is not certified to dive because of the length of time it's
been parked. Yes, sir, that's true.
The last piece of that that's important is that, much like
Albany, another SSN, which also was extended for 48 months,
that CO started the avail and finished the avail having never
left the yard to operate that submarine. The XO [executive
officer] and the chief engineer, I believe, neither one of them
promoted, and the entire crew never deployed. We're on path to
do that with Boise if we don't get her going. We're looking
hard at the private yards to fix that problem.
We have four additional, upwards of five additional
submarines this year who are going to have to go for an
extension to their dive certification. They're in a similar
situation. We think we get most of those extensions by NR
[naval reactor], but if they don't, then we have a similar
problem with some of them as we have with Boise today.
Senator Rounds. It's one thing to build to buy new. It's
another thing to take care of the stuff you've got, which is
suggesting that while we're talking about buying new, we're not
giving the resources to even take care of the equipment that
we've got today necessary for your operations.
Admiral Moran. We often trade readiness dollars to pay for
current operations and making sure our kids who are overseas on
deployment have everything they need.
Senator Rounds. I understand right now it's not just the
ships themselves, it's not just the boats themselves. When you
talk about manning them and equipping them, is it true that
right now there have been cases in which you've had carriers
moving back out of the areas of forward operations into the
back areas and trading them off and literally having to stop
midway and trading munitions from one ship to another because
you don't have the resources right now to maintain two?
Admiral Moran. All of the services are struggling with
munitions stocks, and we're no different. When our carriers
swap places, one coming home and one going on deployment, they
often have to offload some of their munitions to fill the
stocks of the one that's going on deployment. That is true.
Senator Rounds. Not necessarily the best way to run an
operation.
Admiral Moran. Not if you're going to turn that carrier
back around if something happens in the world like has happened
in the last 5 years, that's true. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me just ask with regards to
the tankers right now that we've got, I don't think we can go
anyplace in the world right now without having any one of our
aircraft having the availability of a tanker. What's your
current status on tankers, and what are their capabilities
today, and what would you expect them to be in order to meet
the ongoing needs of the Air Force?
General Wilson. Senator, we certainly are flying KC-135s
today. We're bringing on the KC-46, which is brand new. We'll
start delivery this year. We're flying KC-10s to keep 479 booms
in the air. You're absolutely correct, we've become a global
Air Force because of our tanker force that can move us around
the world. As I highlighted in my opening testimony, the strike
in Libya would have never happened without 18 different tankers
taking off from bases in the United States, Europe, and the
Middle East to make that mission happen.
Our tankers are getting old. That's why the KC-46 is so
important going forward and why it improves everything. It
improves MC [mission capable] rates to have more of them to
fly, aircraft availability. It improves capacity. The KC-46
modernization program is the first step to modernize the tanker
force. Largely it was built in the 1950s, modernized along the
way. We find tankers, KC-135s, with tail numbers of 56, older
than I am, and I'm an old guy, out there on the ramp. As we've
talked about, the maintainers who maintain those do Herculean
efforts to keep all those airplanes ready.
Senator Rounds. Let me ask you about your pilots right now.
How long does it take you right now to train a pilot, and how
long under optimum conditions should it take you based upon the
availability of aircraft that are air worthy today?
General Wilson. Senator, today, to produce a basic pilot
takes a little over a year. From that time, then they'll go on
to their training school. Depending on what they're doing, it
takes anywhere from four to eight months to a year to get what
we call mission ready. Then after that they'll go off to their
units.
Our training path is pretty much at capacity. We're
producing about 1,200 pilots a year. We think we can grow that
to about 1,400, and then we'll max out the current capacity to
produce pilots. Our problem isn't getting pilots on the front
end. It's basically retaining them on the back end, and then in
the middle of that being able to absorb them, getting them all
the flight time and training that they need. The hours of
sorties have been coming down across the force in the last
decade.
Senator Rounds. I had a chance to visit the F-35 base, the
training base in South Carolina yesterday. I noted that you've
got up-to-date models that are flying right now. They've got
good operational capabilities, Admiral, and that basically that
B model right now is operational and ready to go. The one thing
that I discovered is that you guys could use more of those in
an expedited manner to make up the difference. That aircraft
where for a while there were program problems, right now you're
using some updated software in it, and they're flying, and
they've got a good operational capability.
The aircraft in its current condition, we can use those in
combat today, can't we?
General Walters. Yes, sir, we can. The software upgrades
need to continue to give us full capability. It needs to
deliver on time.
Senator Rounds. I was very impressed with what you're doing
down there, and I appreciate it, and thanks for the
opportunity.
General Walters. Thanks for visiting the marines down
there, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service and leadership.
Admiral Moran, thank you very much for your commitment to
making sure that we move ahead with a waiver of the hiring
freeze at our shipyards. Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard is very
important to our national security, as well as to Hawaii.
General Wilson, in your prepared testimony you state that
today's Air Force is at risk of becoming a second-best hand,
with readiness hovering near 50 percent. Can you explain for
the American public what this means in terms of what the Air
Force can and can't accomplish in terms of its mission? In your
opinion, how much additional budget relative to recent budgets
would the Air Force need, and how much time would it take to
get readiness levels to much more acceptable levels?
General Wilson. Let me start with--I used an example,
Senator, of how long does it take to grow an 8-year tech
sergeant. It takes 8 years, and that's the type of experience
we need and I think it's going to take to get to the readiness
levels that we need. It's not going to happen in one year or
two years. We're looking at 6 to 8 years to bring the readiness
level back up to 80 percent.
When I talk about the United States Air Force being 50
percent ready, there are pockets of the Air Force that are
significantly below that. Let me give you a snapshot again. To
go back to the Desert Storm timeframe, in 1991, our Air Force
stood at about 500,000 active airmen, 134 fighter squadrons.
Today we have 55 fighter squadrons, and that's Active, Guard
and Reserve. Of that, 71 percent are deployed today or are
doing COCOM-assigned [combatant command] missions, homeland
defense of the nation or doing theater support in both Europe
and the Pacific. Said another way, there's 29 percent left in
the United States not fully engaged today.
In those different units, in a case against violent
extremists, I've got very ready crews. They're going to win in
the Middle East. Against a high-end adversary, they're not
training the way they should. They're not doing all the muscle
movement, all the skills that they need to practice on a
routine basis to be ready against any adversary anywhere.
Senator Hirono. When you talk about a high-end adversary,
you're talking about Russia or China?
General Wilson. Russia or China, for example.
Senator Hirono. Again, General Wilson, the Air Force COS
[Chief of Staff] has stated that 50,000 airmen have left the
Air Force while missions have grown, so there's a math problem,
and that the Air Force is too big for the resources available
but far too small for what the Nation demands of it.
Can you explain the implications of reduced readiness and
the impacts on morale and retention? I think one of you said
it's getting them on the front end that's okay, but keeping
them is a major problem.
Can you talk about the Air Force's plan to increase
readiness in future years? Also, what steps are being taken by
the Air Force to meet the requirements for more technically
capable recruits for areas like space, cyber, ISR, and nuclear?
General Wilson. Senator, those are all fantastic questions.
I'll maybe start with the last one.
We are in competition. We want the best talent that America
has to offer, and the good news is we're getting great talent.
It's going to continue to be a challenge as we go forward, as
we grow our force, because we've got to be able to attract
America's best and brightest. They've got to see what we do is
different, and I think we can connect to the American public
about the value of our mission. When they see what we're doing,
they want to serve, they want to join our team.
To be part of that, to be part of a world-class team, we
need to get them the right education, training, and equipment,
and then make sure they're both personally and professionally
fulfilled. That's what keeps them in the service. Across those
areas we've got lots of work to do to make sure that they're
not coming into the Air Force and working on old, outdated
equipment, that they're working on state-of-the-art equipment.
The training and education they get is world class. They remain
committed, passionate, and proud about serving our nation and
are personally and professionally fulfilled.
Senator Hirono. For our other services, are you basically
having retention problems also, and what are you doing to make
sure that the troops stay in?
General Walters. Retention should never be taken for
granted, Senator. It's something we look at every day. When it
comes to pilots, I think probably the Air Force is the
bellwether for that, and we're watching very closely what
they're doing, and we're looking for the partnerships to try to
keep more pilots in place.
The biggest thing we can do to retain service men and women
is to give them the equipment they need and the training they
need and the quality of service. The quality of life will come.
Give them the things they need to do the job they came in for.
If they sign up, let's get them the stuff they need.
Admiral Moran. Senator, I agree with everything that's been
said. I would just add that retention problems are always
looking in the rearview mirror. It's very difficult to project
when it's going to come without some of the canaries in the
coal mine.
On the pilot side, we certainly look to the Air Force to be
the leading indicator of that. We're concerned, deeply
concerned that they're having issues.
When it comes to recruiting, I often look to the Army
because they recruit more young men and women into the Army
than any of us do. If they're having troubles, then we should
be looking next.
Those are the bellwethers and the canaries in the coal mine
for us.
We currently are doing fine when it comes to recruiting. A
lot of young men and women want to come join the service for
their country. It's keeping them for the long haul, especially
those we have invested a lot of money in for their technical
training that we really have to pay attention to.
General Wilson. Senator, can I pile on just for a second,
just to give you another example? If each of us were to lose--
again, I'll use fighter pilots just for an example. If I say
I've lost 10 fighter pilots, what I really said, what I should
be saying, that's a $100 million capital investment, because
they're about $10 million each to train, and it takes 11 years.
When they get out at the 11-year point, that's the loss. I've
got to make up that capital investment, plus time, and that
experience. We're focused hard on how to retain quality pilots
in the Air Force, and what they've all said, let them do their
job with the right equipment.
Senator Hirono. Did you want to add something, General?
General Allyn. Thank you, Senator Hirono. I would echo the
comments that have been made. I will tell you that we are
assessing the finest talent that we have seen in our history.
We're getting high-quality soldiers that are joining. We are
watching very carefully our mid-grade non-commissioned officers
and mid-grade captains and majors who have been on this
relentless tempo. The reason why the end strength increase is
so important is that a smaller force cannot continue to carry
the same load without a retention impact. We need to grow the
force. We need to sustain the quality that we have, and we will
not have a retention problem as we move forward if we do that.
Senator Hirono. It's pretty hard to enable our people to do
the jobs that they signed up for if we continue to rely on
short-term CRs and we do not get rid of sequester, because
those all impact readiness and modernization, all of those
connected areas.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this
hearing. I just want to say for the record, I'm shocked. When I
read the testimony--and I want to thank you guys and your teams
for everything you're doing, but I want to comment on where we
are. I mean, this is shocking to me, that the Federal
Government has only a few things it's supposed to do. One of 6
reasons 13 colonies got together to start with was to defend
and provide for the national defense. No leader would ever let
that responsibility dwindle to this sort of capability. It's
not the fault of these guys. God bless them. I think they're
getting as much out of what we've given them over the last 25
years than anybody in the world, but here's where we are.
This is not the first time we've been there. General
Wilson, you mentioned the late 1970s. I mean, in the 1970s,
post-Vietnam, we defunded the military. We recapped it in the
1980s. We defunded it again in the 1990s. We sort of recapped
it in the 2000s. Behind 15 years at war, we burned it up, and a
lot of that money went to operations, not equipment.
We hear across all these services, we've got 20 years of
catch-up here, and I don't know how you do that. General Mattis
2 weeks ago actually said that the greatest threat to national
security is our own Federal debt, and here's why. I mean, we
can't fund what these guys need, and what we need for them to
have. There's a moment in history here today--I just want to
say it, though--that I heard both sides today say that we have
something in agreement, and I want to document that today in
the United States Senate. We both know that sequestration, CRs,
and the BC caps are just devastating to what we're trying to do
here, but it's much bigger than that, Mr. Chairman and leaders.
I just want to tell you how much I appreciate your brave
face today, but I'm very concerned that in the last 8 years,
and in the next 10 years based on the baseline budget today,
the Federal Government is borrowing over 35 percent of what it
spends as the Federal Government. That means that we're
borrowing the other 35 percent, the 35 percent. The problem
with that is that our discretionary spending is about 30
percent of our total spending. That means all of the tax money
we get in pays for our mandatory. That means that every dollar
we spend on your services, on the defense of the country, every
dollar we spend on our veterans and our VA [Veteran's
Administration], every dollar we spend on the domestic programs
which have been holding our military spending hostage, is
borrowed. We have to go to China to help fund what you're
talking about doing today.
Mr. Chairman, I don't know how to say this any clearer. We
are in the throws, I think, of the worst military crisis we've
had in our history, short only of the 1800s when we had to fund
our first five frigates and we didn't have any income to do it.
I don't care how we do this, but we've got to get serious as a
Congress and as an administration to figure out how to do this.
I just have a couple of questions. I read your testimony.
It speaks for itself. General Allyn, I'd like for you to
emphasize for the record some really telling--we had a question
on the hollow force. I'd like to quantify that a little bit.
You mention in here that your forces, you have about 31 BCTs
[brigade combat teams]. Is that right?
General Allyn. In the active force, 58 in the total force.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. Of that 58, or of the 31, you
have about 3 that could go to war tonight, that could fight
tonight. Is that what you said?
General Allyn. That's correct. They're fully manned, fully
equipped, and trained for immediate deployment.
Senator Perdue. That 3 compares to the 58. Is that correct?
General Allyn. That's across the 58. They happen to be from
the active force.
Senator Perdue. Agreed.
General Allyn. However you do the math, it's not good
enough.
Senator Perdue. I'm trying to find out how severe this
really is relative to putting it in perspective. It's amazing
to me how Congress and past administrations have allowed this
to happen.
Talk about consuming readiness. As we sort of build that
back, there's a danger, and I've heard this before, and I've
seen it in business. You can consume what you're adding back.
By the time you get to the end of that adding back, you really
haven't added much. I know you each have that going. Could you
explain that to us more?
General Allyn. Well, I think to my distinguished colleague
from the Navy, he used the term 'supply and demand.'' It's
really a very simple math problem. If your commitments remain
steady or increase, as the United States Army's have during
this drawdown, and your force is smaller, you are doing as much
or more with less. As a result, something gives. For us, we
would never send a soldier or a force to do a mission that
wasn't trained and ready and fully equipped with the best that
we can provide.
What that means is the force that's back here is less ready
than it needs to be, less well equipped, and for the United
States Army we've had to implement many restrictions so that
the forces going forward are fully manned.
Senator Perdue. We see that. I've been on Foreign Relations
now for just 2 years, but traveling around, meeting with your
troops around the world--and by the way, the best American, and
I mean the very best, is in uniform. It makes me proud to be
sitting here, and we want to fight to help do what you're
trying to do. They're getting what they need at the tip of the
spear. It's everything, the mojo back here, is what you're
saying is our problem.
General Walters, just to be specific about one example of
what General Allyn is talking about, in Moron, Spain, you've
got a great contingent of marines over there. Their mission, as
I understand it, is to protect, on a front-line basis, the
embassies in Africa. That's one of their missions, their
primary mission.
General Walters. Yes, sir.
Senator Perdue. We just had to bring half of our B-22
squadron back. Could you explain to us why we brought that back
and----
General Walters. Because we couldn't sustain it, sir. We
had to reduce the commitment to Moron and----
Senator Perdue. What does that do to your mission
capability?
General Walters. Well, it puts them in a little bit riskier
position if they--we had 12 over there because we had to send 4
to South Sudan, a no-fail mission. Four had to take off. Doing
that with 6 aircraft, 4 out of 6 on a 24/7 basis, is a little
bit more risky.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
General Walters. Now, if we had the squadron, if we had the
airplanes, if we had the readiness, then we would keep 12 over
there. It's the same with our--we didn't only reduce that one.
Our CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] commitment in Al Jaber went
from 12 to 6 aircraft.
Senator Perdue. Basically cut that----
General Walters. We cut those commitments. The requirement
was still there. We just couldn't sustain it, so we had to
reduce the commitment to a sustainable level, and that happened
to be six.
Senator Perdue. General Wilson, you mentioned that your
average pilot today, Active Duty, averages about 150 hours a
year. Is that correct?
General Wilson. Yes, Senator, across the fighter fleet.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. It would shock you, I know, but
it certainly shocks me to realize, Mr. Chairman, that I'm
flying four times--a sitting United States Senator, I put four
times the number of airplane hours as our average Air Force
pilot. That's shocking to me, and it's not your fault, but I
recognize how severe that puts us.
If we're looking at your priorities--there's no way we can
fund all this in the very short term--can you prioritize
between your list of the B-21, KC-46, F-35? Talk about that
just a little bit. The nuclear capability. You said nuclear was
priority one, right?
General Wilson. We have to modernize our nuclear force.
When you look at the nuclear force today, our Minuteman IIIs
were built in the 1960s, Minuteman I in the 1960s, modernized
to Minuteman IIIs in the early 1970s. We still have components
on the Minuteman III from the Minuteman I. We have to modernize
those.
Our cruise missiles were designed in the 1970s, built in
the 1980s, to last 10 years. They're on their fifth service
life extension for those missiles. They have to be modernized.
We have to have missiles that can get to the target and do
what's asked of it, and we have a plan to do that with what's
called the LRSO [Long Range Standoff Cruise Missile].
The B-21 bomber. Again, we're flying all of our bombers.
Our newest bomber is 25 years old, the B-2. That's the newest
bomber. All of our bombers are old. The B-21 will be a huge
improvement to our combat capability.
Nuclear first, KC-46 to follow--or, excuse me, F-35, KC-46,
and then the B-21. Those are the programs going forward, the
modernization programs.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
I think we also need to recognize--and this will surprise a
lot of people. I want to distribute these out. This shows what
has happened to our military in terms of priorities. In 1964,
52 percent of all revenues that came into the United States
went into defending America. That figure is now 15 percent.
It's a much more volatile world out there.
The only place we're going to come up with the resources is
going to be to re-prioritize where our military is. I was a
little bit critical of President Obama's position, that he
didn't want to do anything with the military unless you do an
equal amount. That's not what the Constitution tells us we're
supposed to be doing.
I have three things to put in, without objection, into the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chairman, I could make just a response
to your comment about the doing it equally for defense and non-
defense, because I think, just to explain how we look at it
from our side of the aisle----
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
Senator Kaine.--because maybe this will help us figure a
way forward.
There was no necessary linkage between spending on defense
and non-defense prior to the sequestration and the budget caps.
You'd make your argument for non-defense; you'd make your
argument for defense. You'd hopefully convince your colleagues.
When the caps were voted in place, the sequester in August
of 2011, it was, ``let's try to find a good budget deal, but if
we don't, we will impose budget caps equally on defense and
non-defense.'' The equality was as a result of the budget caps
going into place in the sequester, and so we have always
insisted on our side of the aisle that as long as the caps are
in place, there should be equal relief.
If sequester was repealed like that, we would be back in
the previous state where there wouldn't be a 50-50 argument.
Each side would make its case on the priorities that it wanted
and may or may not succeed, but we insist on the 50-50, and
another president did as well, because we are in a BCA [Budget
Control Act] cap environment, and as long as the sequester is
the law and we're not repealing the whole thing, we insist on
50-50.
Now that the GOP controls both houses, it would seem like a
good time to go ahead and get rid of the caps, and then we'll
just go back to making our case about the priorities. Living
under the caps under this scenario, I think we all agree it
really doesn't make any sense, and there's no 50-50 argument
once the sequester goes away.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Yes, Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. I know that we have a time deadline, but I
just thought it might be remiss of us to close this hearing
without asking our panel to testify on the comments yesterday
before the House panel on the BRAC [base realignment and
closure] process and whether they support that, because there
was testimony yesterday that some of you would like to see
another round of base closing, and I just wanted to see if we
could get insight into that.
Senator Inhofe. Let's do this, and I would afford the same
opportunity for the other senators here. Quite frankly, I
didn't bring that up, and I didn't bring that up because I
disagree with these guys.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Here's the problem, and tell me if you
disagree with this. I've been through every BRAC round, five of
them now. Without exception, every BRAC round for the first 3
years costs money. If there's ever a time in the history of our
military that we can't afford to dilute those dollars that we
need to try to resolve the problems that have been talked about
today, it's now.
The second reason is this. We've allowed in this starvation
period our function to go down. I've always been hesitant, and
I felt the same way back in the 1990s after we said the Cold
War is over and we no longer need this site, we lived through
that. The problem with that is, if you allow the mission, the
infrastructure to go down and the resources to go down to match
what is already artificially low, then once you rebuild you
don't know for sure what you're going to need.
Now, you didn't ask me; you asked them. If you would like
to make any comments about your position on a very significant
issue, it would be BRAC.
General Allyn. I'll step into the breach first, Chairman,
recognizing that I'm going to say something that you disagree
with, but I respect your opinion. I also recognize that I've
been up here now for the third year pleading for additional
funding, pleading for the elimination of sequestration, and
pleading for the stoppage of continuing resolutions.
Given that those have not gone away, we are forced to look
internally on where else can we save, and a BRAC is an area we
know we can save. Yes, we do have to put money up front, but
right now we are saving $1 billion per year from the 2005 BRAC,
and $2 billion per year from all the BRACs in prior years.
That's real money that we need if we don't get rid of
sequestration and we don't get rid of continuing resolutions.
That's the environment that we're operating in, and to us a
billion dollars would make a huge difference. It costs us $30
million to run an installation, whether there's a soldier on it
or not. This is real money when you have 154 installations to
run around the world.
Senator Inhofe. I would say if we can afford to reach the
point where that yield is achieved and realized, I would agree
with you.
Any other comments on the BRAC?
Admiral Moran. Senator, I would just tell you I learned a
long time ago that waterfront property is something you should
never give away.
[Laughter.]
General Allyn. The Army doesn't have much of that.
Admiral Moran. I know, and that's why I respectfully
disagree with you.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Moran. We feel we're in pretty good shape in the
Navy. The 6 percent or so of overhead that we're carrying
really is internal to the bases. If we could do a micro-BRAC
inside our own bases just to demolish buildings we'd like to
demolish and not have to go through the bureaucracy of that,
that would be far more helpful than going through another round
of BRAC to the Navy.
Senator Inhofe. Appreciate it.
Any other comments?
General Walters. Sir, we're small either coast. We're fine
right where we are.
Senator Inhofe. You're still using retreads, too.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. I apologize, but I cannot resist this
moment. I came into the Senate as a debt hawk and also a
defense hawk. We've lost the luxury of choosing sides on this.
We have to be both. I'm very concerned that in the last 42
years, since the 1974 Budget Act, we talk about CRs and we talk
about sequestration and all this, but we've used 175 CRs since
1974. That's not going to stop.
The budget process is broken. It's one of the problems
that----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, it is.
Senator Perdue. It's not a partisan comment. It's one of
the few things Senator Kaine and I--we agree that this is
something, if we could get to a politically neutral platform,
you could eliminate CRs, you could eliminate debt ceiling
conversations. This is something that we can do. I think we
have to use the military as the platform and the reason why it
is absolutely necessary we do it right now.
I would implore this subcommittee to start looking at that
as a way to put pressure back on the people who do have an
opportunity to change that process. One-hundred-seventy-five
continuing resolutions under all kinds of presidents over the
last 42 years. This has nothing to do with partisan politics.
It's something that we've got to fix. We will never solve this
problem until we solve that problem.
Senator Inhofe. We might start by passing appropriations
bills.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, I just want to be clear for
the record that I agree with your position, not with General
Allyn's, much as I understand it.
Senator Inhofe. Oh. Thank you.
General Allyn. I wasn't coming after Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, ma'am. My stepfather worked there for 30 years, okay?
I got to go to school because of it.
Senator Perdue. In 42 years, we've averaged two-and-a-half
appropriations bills passed per year. That's the problem.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. It's disgraceful.
General Wilson, last shot.
General Wilson. Senator, I think we carry about 25 percent
extra capacity on our bases. I think there's an opportunity to
do some smart investment going forward. Right now, we're
carrying a backlog of stuff that we have to pay for in this
budget environment. I think we need to look at opportunities to
save.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, appreciate very much the excellent
testimony and the attendance. Thank you so much for being here.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
force structure
1. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, based on each of your services analysis, how big does
each service need to be in order to carry out its current missions and
potential contingencies in the future?
General Allyn. As CSA General Mark Milley testified in 2016, the
Army would need to grow to about 1.2 million in order to ensure we have
the capacity necessary to carry out current operations and be ready to
execute required contingency plans at moderate risk. Assuming the Army
is authorized and funded for end strength increases, the Army will need
a proportional increase in funding for training and equipping. Without
this funding we cannot reduce risk or increase readiness.
Admiral Moran. Today's strategic environment is increasingly
demanding and the evidence is undeniable that we are engaged in a sea
control competition with major powers that we have not faced in over 20
years. Achieving national tasking and goals in this security
environment requires a larger Navy, as validated by the 2016 Force
Structure Assessment (FSA) which set a requirement for 355 ships. This
larger force will also require additional manpower, readiness, aircraft
and weapons. While the FSA sets a target to begin building toward the
future force, Navy continues to investigate advanced technologies and
innovative operating concepts to allow us to be more competitive,
efficient and effective in the future. When these evolutionary and
revolutionary technologies and capabilities deliver, Navy will revisit
the FSA to ensure we deliver the Navy the nation needs.
General Walters. The Marine Corps recently completed a year-long,
comprehensive review of our force to determine the capabilities
necessary to persist in the future operating environment and fight and
win against a peer adversary. That review revealed that the Marine
Corps needs to be at an end strength of at least 194,000 marines to
possess these capabilities. However, due to current steady state
demands, the Marine Corps would require end strength above 194,000 to
provide the deployment-to-dwell ratio that would afford adequate
training time between deployments to maintain a ready, full-spectrum
force. Importantly, an end strength increase without an associated
increase in modernization, training, and sustainment funding will not
set the conditions for success against a peer adversary.
The recent authorized end strength increase of 3,000 marines to a
force of 185,000 is a move in the right direction. However, the most
recently projected POM-18 controls limit the ability to modernize that
force in a timely manner. We continue to do analysis to determine those
risks which may be inherent with this authorized end strength and
associated funding.
General Wilson. To improve readiness and attain manning levels
matching our mission requirements, we must increase our Active Duty,
Guard and Reserve end strength. Growing to at least 350,000 Active Duty
and commensurate growth in the Guard, Reserve and stabilizing civilian
strength would allow us to address shortfalls in a number of key areas,
including critical career fields such as aircraft maintenance, pilots,
NC3, intelligence, cyber, space, and battlefield airmen.

2. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, will this force structure be large enough to fight two
Major Theater Conflicts near-simultaneously?
General Allyn. This 1.2 million force structure is designed around
the existing defense strategy and classified guidance to ensure the
Army is capable of defeating one adversary while denying another. Even
at a total force size of 1.2 million, the Army will face moderate to
significant levels of risk when faced with defeating one adversary
while denying another simultaneously.
Admiral Moran. Defense planning guidance directed that the capacity
and capability of the Joint Force must be sufficient to defeat one
adversary while denying the objectives of a second adversary. The
Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment identified 355 ships as the
force size required to achieve national tasking and goals based on
Navy's current platforms.
General Walters. There are a number of variables that must be taken
into account to answer this question. Force structure demands (force
flow timelines and overall peak requirements) for two near-simultaneous
Major Theater Conflicts vary widely dependent on the specific
combinations considered, the level of acceptable risk articulated by
the National Command Authority, and if OPLANS or Support for Strategic
Analysis (SSA) scenarios are utilized as the baseline.
General Wilson. While growing to 350,000 will make the force we
have healthier, the Air Force still faces capacity and capability
shortfalls to be able to meet the Defense Planning Guidance (Defeat
plus Deny and Homeland Defense).

3. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what are each of the services plans for increasing end
strength over time? How fast can each service grow?
General Allyn. The fiscal year 2017 NDAA passed by the Congress and
signed by the President directed the Army to increase end strength to
1,018K (476K-AC/343K-ARNG/199K-USAR) by the end of 2017. The Army plans
to use this increase in end strength to fully man units and grow
certain select areas such as cyber. The Secretary of Defense has
directed a strategic review that will determine the required end
strength of each Service. Our current analysis states that given
availability of funds and authorization, the Army could sustain a
responsible end strength increase of 10,000 soldiers per year while
sustaining the high quality and readiness of our force.
Admiral Moran. Navy combat power is predominantly delivered through
platforms--ships and aircraft. To effectively deliver this combat
capability, these platforms must be properly manned with appropriately
trained people. The Navy end strength profile is largely dependent on
the composition and manpower needs of the platforms that force is
supporting. Navy is developing specific accession and workforce
management plans to support anticipated force structure scenarios,
within established fiscal and infrastructure constraints. These plans
consider: general population propensity for service, recruiting and
training capacity, Sailor retention behavior, and the skills, training
and experience required, based on the demand signal of the anticipated
force structure. The speed at which manpower growth occurs will vary
depending on the rate at which new platforms are procured and
constructed, the manning needs of specific platforms as they come
online, required skill-sets of Sailors assigned to those platforms, and
the seniority/experience mix needed to operate at peak readiness,
efficiency and capability. Ship construction rates will be the limiting
factor to the rate of increase in end strength. The Navy's capacity to
recruit and train additional personnel may require adjustments, but
should not limit the pace of required manpower adjustments.
General Walters. At current funding levels, the Marine Corps cannot
grow beyond 185,000 marines without creating a hollow force. However,
with additional funding for modernization, training and sustainment,
the Marine Corps could grow responsibly at a rate of up to 3,000 per
year. The current limiting factors for growth are the throughput
capacity of some of our highly technical schools, joint school
capacities, and the need to recruit and retain high quality people for
the modern force.
General Wilson. The Air Force has articulated a need for 350,000
Active Duty airmen based upon the current Air Force mission set and
force structure. In general, if approved, while we could grow faster,
we believe that an increase of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 airmen per
year (reaching 350,000 by the fiscal year 2023/2024 timeframe) would
provide for a sustainable growth path, would meet the long-term needs
of the force by providing stability and experience, and would allow us
to properly balance our Air Force specialty codes.

4. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, will each of the services be able to recruit and retain
qualified personnel to fill the ranks of a larger force?
General Allyn. The Army expects to recruit and retain enough
quality soldiers to achieve the fiscal year 2017 NDAA authorized end
strength increases to 1.018 million. Army recruiting and retention
programs will continue to focus on maintaining quality, in particular
retaining only high-caliber soldiers and by accessing almost all high
school diploma graduates and bringing in no applicants with histories
of adult major misconduct. The Army has achieved year to date fiscal
year 2017 accession missions and projects to achieve the original
fiscal year 2017 accession missions in all components while maintaining
the current high quality of the All-Volunteer Force. Sustaining a
larger, high quality force will require increased recruiting manpower
and incentives for recruiting and retention.
Admiral Moran. Depending on the size and pace of the expansion of
the force, I am relatively confident that Navy is postured to
accommodate potential growth. We would expect to experience challenges
in meeting an increased demand signal for high quality enlisted
recruits in the Nuclear Field, Information Warfare, Special Warfare,
and Advanced Electronics ratings, and among medical, dental and
chaplain corps officers. An increasingly competitive recruiting market
and quality standards may require application of additional resources.
As we plan for future growth we must also remain mindful of training
infrastructure capacity--in terms of military construction, numbers of
instructors, and available course offerings--which may also need to
grow at a rate commensurate with planned force structure growth.
Similarly, we continue to experience retention challenges and inventory
shortfalls among critically-manned communities. Continued judicious
application of targeted special and incentive pays will be critical in
our efforts to continue meeting aggregate enlisted retention goals in
the foreseeable future. We are closely monitoring economic indicators
that could impact our ability to meet recruiting and retention goals as
we grow the force. Current indicators suggest increasing demand from
the civilian sector for our top talent over the next few years. As we
track retention behavior, we remain laser-focused on retaining Sailors
in the right mix of ratings and pay grades to position us to meet
future mission requirements, while monitoring the health of the force.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The growth is achievable based upon our recruiting,
accession, training, and retention projections, but would require
additional fiscal resources and personnel within our training
enterprise to grow and sustain a larger force. As part of any budget
submission, we would program for the requisite resources and personnel
to support this effort. We will need Congressional support for the
increased resource requests associated with recruiting, training, and
retaining airmen. This would include increases in our reenlistment and
retention bonuses as well as other special pays. Retention is critical
to our growth plan and we must preserve and maximize the experience we
have in the force as we access increasing numbers of young airmen.
Additionally, to support high retention we must continue to inspire our
airmen and ensure we maintain a high Quality of Life for our airmen and
their families.
readiness goals
5. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what actions or resources are being applied to near-
term readiness recovery efforts?
General Allyn. Actions being taken to improve near-term readiness
include using increased end strength to offset personnel shortages and
targeted increases in training dollars, flying hours, ground OPTEMPO
hours to support higher readiness levels at home station and the Combat
Training Centers (CTCs). A substantial portion of the Regular Army end
strength growth to 476,000 will be used to increase manning levels in
existing units. This increase will help offset personnel shortfalls,
non-availability, and non-deployablity that currently have units
training and deploying at 75 to 85 percent of their authorized
strength. CTCs facilitate commanders' readiness assessment through
live-fire, force-on-force, and computer-simulated exercises integrating
all aspects of lethal and nonlethal effects tailored to the operational
environment from platoon- to corps-level. In fiscal year 2018, we will
execute 20 maneuver CTC rotations for our BCTs including an increase to
Army National Guard BCTs from two to four per year. Combat Training
Centers (CTCs) play a critical role in building decisive action
readiness because home stations cannot fully replicate the realism and
lethality of operations against a near-peer nation. Combat Training
Centers are now routinely challenging units with hybrid threats and
have increased exposure to electronic warfare, enemy unmanned aerial
systems, cyber-attacks, indirect fire, and increased enemy use of
precision guided munitions. Adequate preparation at home station is
essential for a unit to benefit from CTC training. The Army continues
to invest in training readiness at home station by sustaining training
support services and implementing more Emergency Deployment Readiness
Exercises. Select Reserve Component forces designated as early
deployers for contingency operations will receive increased manpower,
equipping, and training resource priority.
Admiral Moran. Over the past several years, and in a very
challenging budgetary environment, we have had to make tough choices
between current readiness and future readiness, and have experienced
readiness degradation caused by underfunding of our operating and
maintenance accounts. To reverse this course in the near term, we will
be submitting an addendum to the President's Budget 2017 budget request
that addresses some of our most immediate and serious readiness
shortfalls. This request for resources will add funds to the Ship Depot
Maintenance, Flying Hours, Aviation Depot Maintenance, Aviation Spares,
and Ship Operations accounts. These critical investments are a down
payment on a recovery plan as we dig out from years of underfunding
these programs and contending with funding uncertainty. If approved by
Congress, we are confident that we will be able to begin to turn the
corner on some of our most critical readiness challenges. Moving
forward, funding stability at these elevated levels will be key to
maintaining required fleet readiness.
General Walters. Rebuilding the Marine Corps requires both near
term actions implemented in fiscal years 2017 (FY17) and 2018 (FY18)
and longer term efforts across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
These changes can be viewed through the lens of manpower, modernization
and readiness. It requires growth in service funding with a
commensurate increase in Navy funding that supports Marine Aviation and
amphibious ship and surface connectors. The Marine Corps for the 21st
Century requires an end strength increase and seeks funding in fiscal
year 2017 for the NDAA authorized endstrength of 185,000 marines in
fiscal year 2017.
Due to the near-term emphasis on improving the readiness of Marine
Corps aviation and ground combat equipment to meet warfighting
requirements, Service actions seek to sustain--and, where possible,
accelerate--the ongoing transition to new platforms while also
increasing depot and unit maintenance capacity. Each of these efforts
is critical to achieving established goals for ready basic aircraft and
ground combat equipment that support training and operational
requirements.
Readiness funding remains the linchpin of our ability to meet
operational demands and provide for a ``ready bench'' prepared to
rapidly respond to major crises. Addressing current readiness
shortfalls requires additional operation and maintenance funding to
enable exercises and training. Our bases, stations and installations
are the platforms where we train and sustain our marines. They require
increased sustainment, restoration and modernization funding. Support
by the Congress for these initiatives facilitates the recovery of
immediate shortfalls in manpower, modernization and readiness.
General Wilson. The Air Force's Fiscal Year 2017 Amended Budget
Submission (ABS) request totals $8.5 billion . . . builds on our
readiness recovery, fills gaps, and improves lethality. It funds the #1
readiness priority of growing Active duty end-strength from 317,000 to
321,000, as well as essential support functions, and Military
Construction requirements for future growth to fill critical capability
gaps. For example, it addresses significant shortfalls in pilot
production. It funds F-16 Flight Training Unit bed-down at Holloman Air
Force Base, New Mexico, flight training support and maintenance
training contracts, adversary training, and administrative support
functions at fighter squadrons. The ABS arrests the decline of full
spectrum readiness, continues key modernization efforts (F-35, KC-46,
B-21), and meets a combination of forward presence and deployed
commitments

6. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, are there particular service areas that are more at
risk than others, in terms of their readiness recovery efforts?
General Allyn. The Army meets current combatant command (COCOM)
demand for forces, but we cannot meet COCOM contingency requirements
with ready forces in all warfighting capabilities. In support of
current operations, the Army continues to source roughly 50 percent of
base combatant command demand (pre-planned) and 70 percent of emergent
demand for the Joint Force. To sustain this demand, the Army is forced
to accept risk in end strength, capacity, readiness, and modernization.
Armored and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), Patriot battalions,
and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units are experiencing
the most stress, as combatant commanders increase demand to assure
partners, provide support to Counter Terrorism operations, and set the
theater. The cost of this high operational tempo is that units cannot
build the core Decisive Action readiness required for future
contingency demands.
Admiral Moran. Because of the readiness debt accrued from years of
high operational demand, reduced budgets, and persistent uncertainty,
the Navy's overall readiness recovery path for both afloat units and
shore infrastructure is now more fragile. Disruptions, deviations and
delays to readiness funding levels and maintenance schedules can
undermine future recovery progress. Although proper funding for all
readiness accounts is vital, ship and aviation depot maintenance along
with aviation spare parts remain our most critical elements in the
recovery of afloat readiness. fiscal year 2018 planned maintenance for
our ships and aircraft is at an all-time high level, therefore, any
deferral or cancellation of fiscal year 2017 maintenance would further
exacerbate fiscal year 2018 planned efforts.
General Walters. Aviation readiness, amphibious ship availability,
and ground combat equipment readiness are three areas that present a
greater element of risk to current readiness. The most acute readiness
concerns are found in our aviation units. A large percentage of our
aviation units lack the minimum number of ready basic aircraft (RBA)
for training and we are significantly short ready aircraft for wartime
requirements.''e Marine Corps has implemented extensive plans to
recover readiness across every type/model/series of aircraft in the
current inventory, while recapitalizing new aircraft to ensure future
readiness. The key to reducing risk in aviation is recovering readiness
by transitioning to new aircraft as quickly as possible. The Marine
Corps is only a third of the way through its transition from legacy
platforms. Delays in funding and fiscal constraints undermine recovery
efforts and increase the institutional challenge of balancing current
readiness with modernization.
The limited inventory of operationally available amphibious
warships results in significant operational risk for Marine Corps
forces--and strategic risk for the nation--in the event of a major
combat operation requiring forcible entry operations. The limited
availability is the product of fiscally-constrained ship inventories,
ship maintenance challenges, and combatant commander demand. The result
has been restricted opportunities for Marine Corps units at every level
to properly train for amphibious operations outside of dedicated Marine
Expeditionary Unit cycles. The Marine Corps fully supports the Navy's
2016 Force Structure Assessment, which articulates the requirement for
a 355 ship Navy (including 38 amphibious ships) and recommends
accelerated procurement to support this objective. Maintaining and
modernizing our current fleet is just as important as building new
ships. Funding maintenance and modernization enables the ships to reach
their 40 year estimated service life, increases operational
availability and readiness, and ensures warfighting relevance in the
future operating environment.
We also continue to closely monitor ground combat equipment
readiness. Older platforms that were utilized at an accelerated rate
due to operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan now require
increased maintenance. These increased costs are just being accurately
realized and captured, but the aviation challenges associated with
aging platforms outlined above are being replicated in the ground
combat equipment portfolio.
General Wilson. Twenty-six years of constant demand has eroded Air
Force readiness, especially for our low density, high demand core
functions, like Personnel Recovery (PR). Today, our PR units are
operating at an unsustainable surge operations tempo driven by high
deploy-to-dwell between 1:1 and 1:2. As a result, the opportunity to
train across all mission areas is limited at home station. The Air
Force is focusing investment in training enterprise modernization and
maximizing training opportunities with available home station equipment
to address readiness shortfalls in this mission area. Additionally, the
Air Force is focused on growing the force to address other high demand
critical skills: maintenance, fighter pilot, intelligence, and
battlefield airmen.

7. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how has DOD leadership helped guide service efforts and
what, if anything, else could be done at the department level to aid
service readiness rebuilding efforts?
General Allyn. The Department of Defense manages global force
requirements, including missions assigned to Army forces. Continued
deployments are having both a positive and negative effect on building
Army readiness. Rotations of Armored and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
to Europe and Korea are building readiness. These rotational units are
conducting training aligned with their decisive action mission and are
building proficiency across the whole unit. The Army makes more
progress towards rebuilding unit readiness when assigned missions
require complete units, rather than ad hoc formations. When combatant
commands request ad hoc formations, unit readiness drops as units are
disaggregated or assigned to perform missions that do not require the
unit's core design capabilities. Units deployed in support of non-
decisive action operations are not increasing readiness. These units
experience degraded readiness for contingencies against peer
competitors when conducting missions not requiring decisive action
proficiency. DOD leadership is helping Army readiness through guidance
that emphasizes deployment of whole units and reducing artificial
prescriptive policy limitations (force manning levels) that prevent
unit-based mission assignments.
Admiral Moran. DOD leadership has been instrumental in its support
of regulating the number and length of deployments Navy has been
required to provide in support of our combatant commanders. This has
helped preserve needed maintenance time and has added the required
schedule predictability that is essential in planning and executing
ship and aviation maintenance. DOD leadership has also been
instrumental in prioritizing readiness recovery and advocating for
additional appropriations in fiscal year 2017 to support readiness.
Though DOD's budget has been severely constrained by limited toplines
under the Budget Control Act and Bipartisan Budget Acts, fully funding
the readiness accounts is essential to current and future readiness
recovery efforts.
General Walters. There are two on-going DOD efforts to guide
Service readiness recovery efforts. The DOD Enterprise-level Readiness
Framework was established to develop readiness models to track enter-
rise readiness recovery, using common assumptions, annual milestones,
and demand signal derived from the Guidance for Employment of the Force
or the Defense Planning Guidance. The second effort is based on the
Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces, which
directed the Secretary of Defense to:

Conduct a 30 day readiness review and submit actions that
can be implemented within this fiscal year to improve readiness,

Submit a plan of action within 60 days that addresses
areas for improvement that include readiness,

Build a larger, more capable, and more lethal joint
force.

The results of these ongoing DOD efforts are expected to provide
the Services with sufficient guidance for readiness recovery that
acknowledges the unique contributions that each Service provides to the
Joint Force.
General Wilson. The #1 Air Force readiness priority is people. To
ensure we remain ready to defeat terrorists as well as sophisticated,
well-equipped militaries, we must continue to grow the force. We need
Congress' support to grow from 321,000 in fiscal year 2017 and to
350,000 in the 2023/24 timeframe. Growth will be appropriately
evaluated across all components as well as our officer, enlisted, and
civilian workforces. Furthermore, we are targeting growth in critical
career fields to help improve readiness. We are stabilizing and
bolstering our remotely piloted aircraft community while continuing to
meet combatant commander requirements. We are increasing pilot training
capacity and adjusting our incentive pay structure to help address our
growing pilot shortage.

8. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how are DOD and the services tracking progress in
recovering readiness?
General Allyn.The Army measures readiness at the strategic,
operational, and tactical level against the ability of units to
complete their core-designated missions to meet the requirements of the
National Military Strategy (NMS). At each level there are standard
metrics that are assessed monthly or quarterly to measure trends in
readiness recovery and enable the Army Senior leadership to assess and
where possible mitigate risk over time. Based on current assessments
and trends, and assuming sustained, predictable funding and elimination
of BCA impacts, the Army is making progress towards attaining our
readiness goal of having the Total Force ready to meet NMS requirements
by fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2023.
Admiral Moran. Navy closely tracks the status of issues impacting
readiness through a series of Shore, Aviation and Ship enterprises.
Senior leadership within each of those communities routinely meet to
discuss mitigation plans for any readiness issues and to track progress
being made on improving overall health of the force. The Navy's four-
star led Fleet Commanders Readiness Council (FCRC) convenes monthly to
review recovery efforts and to provide guidance on any issues impacting
afloat and shore readiness. Issues identified during FCRCs are often
provided to the Joint Staff for situational awareness and also support
OSD Readiness Deputy's Management Action Groups.
General Walters. To manage and track the progress of readiness
recovery, the Marine Corps uses an integrated process that brings key
elements of the Service Headquarters and the Operating Forces together
in the Institutional Readiness Working Group (IRWG). The IRWG meets
routinely at multiple echelons from action officer to General Officer
to identify obstacles to readiness recovery and to propose solutions to
those impediments. On a quarterly basis, the IRWG prepares and presents
a brief to the Service leadership, including the Commandant of the
Marine Corps (CMC), during the Quarterly Readiness Board (QRB). The QRB
reviews critical actions and the progress toward readiness recovery.
The outputs of the IRWG and the QRB support OSD and Joint Staff
tracking of readiness. The Office of the Secretary of Defense uses the
Readiness Management Group and the Deputy's Management Action Group
(DMAG), Strategic Portfolio Reviews, and Program Budget Reviews. The
Joint Staff's Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) operates on a quarterly
basis, the principal outputs of which are: the Joint Force Readiness
Review, Operational Plans Assessments, the annual Readiness Deficiency
Assessment, and an input to the Quarterly Readiness Report to the
Congress. The results of the CRS are reported by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense in the Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress.
In addition to participation in these events, the Marine Corps also
conveys its readiness to Congress through briefs and hearings.
General Wilson. The Air Force's readiness recovery strategy focuses
on disciplined, synchronized investment in readiness accounts in
sequential order. The first priority is our longest-lead process,
Active Duty end strength--up to 321,000 by the end of 2017--and
eventually 350,000 over the next five to seven years. To that end, we
must ensure the Office of the Secretary of Defense supports funding
321,500 end-strength in fiscal year 2017. Next, investment in the
training and sustainment enterprises, both of which require three to
five years of lead time due to industrial and human processes. Finally,
as global rotational demands permit, we will be ready to increase
flying hour funding to facilitate more robust home-station training
activities. In short, each readiness 'lever' must be engaged at the
proper time and in coordination with the other levers.

9. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what interim benchmarks and timelines have been
established to ensure progress stays on track?
General Allyn. Last December, the Army published 2018 readiness
objectives for all Army components for roughly half of our operating
forces. The Army will publish 2019 readiness objectives for all
operating forces this spring, and analysis is already supporting 2020
readiness objectives. The Army refined its force generation processes
to manage Army force readiness around expectations of Sustainable
Readiness. The Army will optimize the force readiness posture with
readiness objectives meeting combatant commanders' requirements, while
simultaneously mitigating our risk of supporting contingency
requirements specified in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The Army
standardized its Mission Essential Task Lists by unit type and
developed objective measures of training readiness so our Commanders
can more clearly assess readiness. Standards are based on decisive
action combat tasks. These objective measures will enable a consistent
view of readiness across the Total Army and simplify assumptions for
force generation. The Army has clear readiness goals to improve overall
readiness posture, and the details for a specific year can be provided
in a classified venue, as needed. These goals are unattainable without
sustained, predictable funding and elimination of the return of BCA
impacts.
Admiral Moran. Navy is developing specific interim benchmarks and
timelines for recovery goals with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to best capture readiness metrics. Recovery goals and timelines
remain closely tied to the Navy's Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP).
For OFRP to work as designed in providing maximum employability of
units, one of its key lines of efforts, ship & aviation maintenance,
must be funded to required levels in a stable manner over time to
ensure any benchmarks or timelines that do get established are
achievable.
General Walters. The Marine Corps has established interim
deadlines, but these deadlines could be impacted by budget uncertainty
and evolving operational commitments:

All OEF ground equipment was retrograded as of December
2014. The initial target for completion of the reset of this equipment
was two to three years after the last equipment item retrograded from
Afghanistan. That target date, however, was extended to May 2019 in
order to allow for the reset of additional MRAPS.

The key to an aviation ``Ready bench'' is fixing and
flying aircraft. The Marine Corps is fixing aircraft in two ways: by
executing a Readiness Recovery Plan (current readiness), and buying new
aircraft as fast as possible (future readiness). By aggressively
adhering to and funding the Readiness Recovery Plans, and by making the
necessary manpower, training and policy changes of the recovery plan,
the Corps achieves an across the board T-2.0 readiness by June 2019,
and no later than fiscal year 2022 have the Ready Bench capable of
responding as the Nation's Crisis Response Force.

Marine Corps Force 2025 identifies the critical
capabilities and organizations required to ensure future readiness and
to meet the requirements of the future operating environment, as
described in the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC).

The Marine Corps is working with DOD to establish service goals to
reconstitute readiness to execute the 2016 National Military Strategy,
but a stable fiscal planning horizon is necessary for success. With the
resources available, the Marine Corps is not anticipated to
reconstitute a ``ready bench'' within this Fiscal Year Defense Program.
General Wilson. The Air Force uses the term ``full-spectrum
readiness'' to describe Air Force units achieving operational
capability in advanced warfighting skills. Given the time required to
recruit and train airmen, the Air Force projects no substantial
readiness improvement until fiscal year 2020-21, when conditions are
expected to be set for readiness recovery. Unit readiness assessments
are constantly monitored against the requirements of the National
Military Strategy for major force elements.
maintenance and sustainment costs
10. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, the increase in operational tempo has resulted in an
increase in utilization rates for all our equipment and weapons
platforms. How does that impact life expectancy and maintenance costs
of those systems?
General Allyn. Increased operational tempo reduces life expectancy
and increases costs to sustain equipment and weapon system platforms
significantly. We have sought to mitigate these impacts through
programs such as Reset, Recapitalization (RECAP), and Service Life
Extension Programs (SLEP). Sustaining resources for these critical
programs is essential.
Admiral Moran. For naval aircraft, service life and maintenance
periodicity is largely defined by flying hours with additional
considerations for fatigue from how the aircraft is flown during those
hours. Higher operational tempo results in reaching these flying hour
and fatigue milestones sooner than planned. This results in more
frequent maintenance, and therefore, higher cost, as well as requiring
extensive and expensive service life assessment and extension programs
to meet aircraft inventory requirements. For ships, both operation and
time-dependent factors impact service life. Major preventative
maintenance actions are bundled into regularly scheduled depot
availabilities, to maximize preparedness for deployments and inter-
deployment cycle readiness while also ensuring ships reach their
expected service life. Both the bundling and periodicity of these
availabilities are determined by design and engineering analysis based
on assumed operational tempo and schedule compliance. During the Navy's
period of highest operational tempo from 2001-2009, surface ships
frequently delayed, skipped, or received shorter depot maintenance
availabilities than planned in order to meet presence requirements.
This practice, as cited in the Balisle Report, put our surface forces
at risk of falling far short of their expected service life, and
contributed to the early decommissioning of the Oliver Hazard Perry-
class frigates and the extensive modernization periods required for the
Ticonderoga-class cruisers and some amphibious ships. Even when depot
availabilities are executed per plan, operational tempo drives some
maintenance costs. Since 2001, as force structure has shrunk, underway
days per ship, both deployed and non-deployed, have steadily risen in
response to the increasingly dynamic international security
environment. This results in more wear-and-tear on the ships, with less
time to conduct repairs in port outside of major availabilities, both
of which contribute to growing corrective maintenance costs.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The increase in operational tempo and utilization
rates causes our equipment and weapons systems to reach the end of
their planned service life more rapidly. This also causes maintenance
costs to be accrued earlier than the Air Force originally planned. When
our systems must be used beyond their planned service life, additional
and potentially costly maintenance actions, inspections, and testing
are required in order to ensure our systems continue to be operated
safely.

11. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what does that do to each of your service's procurement
and modernization plans?
General Allyn. The Army must balance maintaining current fleet
readiness by incrementally upgrading capability on legacy platforms
with the cost and opportunity of developing next-generation equipment
to prepare for future conflicts. The challenge we face is providing the
best equipment for current combat operations today, while preparing for
conflict with a near-peer in the near future. The Army has been
challenged to modernize for the last 15 years because funding
constraints mandated the prioritization of readiness for current
operations while accepting risk through decreased investments in next
generation capabilities. To achieve immediate readiness goals we
prioritize getting the best equipment available into units with modest
upgrades. Going forward, the Army must focus equipment modernization on
re-establishing overmatch and simultaneously developing new military
capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat emerging regional and
global peer adversaries. This balance is evaluated in the Army's new
Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review process. Due to funding
constraints, the Army has cut investments for modernization and
equipment by one-half compared to just eight years ago. The Army is
investing in new development of prioritized programs to help close
extremely high risk gaps against peer competitors. Today's fiscal
environment impedes the Army's ability to achieve both a high state of
current readiness and modernize the force to a level that would allow a
technological over-match against potential near peer adversaries and
meet war plan demands. To meet the demands of today's unstable global
security environment and maintain the trust of the American people, the
Army requires adequate, sustained long-term and predictable funding.
Admiral Moran. Increased utilization rates magnify the historic
tension between maintaining the fleet we have and building the fleet we
need for the future fight. Increased rates burn through programmed and
projected service life of our equipment faster than planned, increase
deployment demands on our personnel, and provide additional near-term
requirements for training to meet a higher-than-expected operational
tempo, negatively impacting our ability to sustain our force today and
what we can afford tomorrow. In recent years, fiscal constraints from
the Budget Control Act (BCA) and Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) have
further exasperated this issue. Representative examples of mitigation
decisions follow: Within Aviation, the challenge of end of life
planning and inventory for legacy F/A-18A-D aircraft has required the
Department to procure additional F/A-18E/F aircraft. In the mid-term,
the Department is focusing on F/A-18E/F service life extension. In the
far-term, the Department is focused on sustaining inventory capacity
with new aircraft procurement (F/A-18E/F and F-35), and incorporating
capability improvements to maintain combat relevancy. Within Surface,
ships such as the Ticonderoga-class (CG-47) cruisers will be inducted
into an emergent phased modernization program that align with ship
retirements to prevent unacceptable reductions in available force
structure. This innovative plan permits Navy to reapply manpower from
ships in phased modernization to address other manning shortfalls while
simultaneously avoiding the operating costs for these ships while they
undergo maintenance and modernization.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. These conditions have jeopardized future Air Force
modernization and recapitalization efforts at a time when demand for
Air Force capability is increasing and our advantage over competitors
is shrinking. We have attempted to balance the risk across our force to
maintain readiness but have been forced to make unacceptable tradeoffs
between readiness, force structure, and modernization.

12. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how do you plan to reverse this trend?
General Allyn. Reversing the trend requires increased base funding
for the Army's modernization program. In the interim, we will sustain
prioritized upgrades of our current weapon systems and tightly focused
new developments to close immediate capability gaps. Simultaneously,
we'll do our best to keep our aging fleets ready through reset and
recap programs. Reset reverses the effects of combat stress on
equipment. Reset, Recapitalization (RECAP) or Service Life Extension
Programs (SLEP) can improve weapon system platform performance
capabilities and return select weapon systems to a ``zero mile/zero
hour'' condition with original performance specifications. For example,
the Army is enhancing reliability of UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters, M1A2
Abrams Tanks, and Patriot Missile systems through the RECAP program.
Admiral Moran. The current funding levels do not support the
readiness levels that the Navy needs to maintain in order to support
the Defense Strategic Guidance. Underfunded accounts force hard choices
between current and future readiness and will negatively affect force
structure levels, degrading Navy's ability to meet scheduled and
unscheduled operational requirements. Navy will apply additional
resources granted by Congress to the highest priorities laid out in the
Defense Strategic Guidance, but will take risk in our ability to fill
lower-priority mission areas, such as presence missions outside of
areas of conflict.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. If our weapon systems must be operated beyond
planned service lives, additional life extension programs must be
considered and upgrades to key components may be necessary. The Air
Force will need to make difficult trades between modernization, force
structure investment and readiness to ensure our aging weapon systems
remain operationally effective, while we bring newer systems online.
modernization
13. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what are each of your service's priorities over the
next five years for modernizing its key combat capabilities?
General Allyn. The Army's top ten modernization priorities for the
next five years are:

1. Air and Missile Defense (Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD));
2. Long-Range Fires;
3. Munition Shortfalls;
4. Mobility, Lethality and Protection of Brigade Combat Teams;
5. Active Protection Systems--Air and Ground;
6. Assured Position, Navigation, and Timing;
7. Electronic Warfare;
8. Offensive and Defensive Cyber Capabilities;
9. Assured Communications;
10. Vertical Lift.

Admiral Moran. We are committed to modernization through
investments in critical programs such as CG, DDG, and LSD-class
modernization and upgrades to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets. Aircraft
carrier modernization will support current and future carrier air wings
(to include JSF and future unmanned aircraft) in evolving operational
and threat environments while ensuring ships reach their 50-year
expected service life. We are building the Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarine, and adding new capabilities to the Virginia-class
submarine, F-35 Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon, and the development of
unmanned systems. Through sound investment decisions, we will build
Navy future force capability and capacity designed to overmatch the
threat.
General Walters. The F-35B and F-35C Joint Strike Fighter remains
the Marine Corps' top aviation acquisition priority as we continue our
transition from legacy F/A-18A-D, AV-8B and EA-6B platforms to the 5th
generation strike/fighter. Additionally, the transition of our heavy
lift rotary-wing aircraft from the CH-53E to the CH-53K remains a top
priority. Over the next five years Marine Aviation will enter the
heaviest years of aircraft transition and modernization in its history.
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
(JLTV), and the Ground / Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) are the
Marine Corps' top ground acquisition priorities although G/ATOR will
support the entire MAGTF in ground and aviation mission sets. While
these programs will be in full rate production over the next five
years, the Marine Corps will also be taking every opportunity to
address other modernization priorities wherever possible to ensure we
remain a Lethal Force with a 21st Century approach to combined arms
that integrates information warfare, long-range precision fires, and
air defense and seeks to destroy and defeat our enemies across five
domains- air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.
General Wilson. The Air Force's priorities over the next five years
include funding our Top 3 modernization programs: F-35, KC-46, and B-
21. We are also committed to investing in our key mission areas, to
include Nuclear, Space, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance; and modernizing legacy fighter capabilities.

14. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, to what extent has each of your services prepared a
long-term funding plan for your modernization efforts?
General Allyn. This year, the Army initiated an extensive Strategic
Portfolio Analysis Review (SPAR) which will occur annually to inform
future resource decisions. The SPAR reviewed Army capabilities over a
30-year period, evaluated each program's relative worth, assessed our
strategic priorities, and identified investment and divestment
opportunities. By prioritizing the needs of the Army, the leadership
can more accurately identify where available modernization funding will
be invested.
Admiral Moran. Years of sustained deployments and constrained and
uncertain funding have taxed the readiness of the fighting force
requiring tradeoffs in capability, capacity, and readiness. Under
current fiscal constraints, we have prioritized near-term readiness,
but the fiscal realities facing the Navy make it imperative that we
modernize and extend the service lives of our in-service ships,
aircraft and weapons to meet warfighting requirements. The nation faces
an increasing array of diverse threats, thus Navy must fund
modernization programs that provide the capability necessary to defeat
current and future threats. Absent sufficient funding for readiness,
modernization and force structure, the Navy cannot return to full
health, where it can continue to meet its mission on a sustainable
basis. The Navy intends to ensure that the ships and aircraft in
inventory are maintained and modernized so they provide the full
measure of combat power to the combatant commanders. Navy continues to
modernize its Ticonderoga-class (CG-47) guided missile cruisers and
amphibious dock landing ship and lay them up for a phased modernization
plan. Cruiser modernization ensures long-term capability and capacity
for purpose-built Air Defense Commander (ADC) platforms. Additionally,
an important facet of the Navy's plan is to modernize the Arleigh Burke
class destroyers which includes Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E)
upgrades as well as combat systems improvements with upgraded AEGIS
weapons systems, BMD capability, installation of the Evolved Sea
Sparrow Missile (ESSM), integration of the SM-6 missile, and improved
air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air capability. This renovation reduces total ownership
costs and expands mission capability for current and future combat
capabilities. The Navy continues aviation recapitalization of all major
platforms, has increased procurement of F/A-18E/F and F-35 aircraft,
and made key modernization investments. The fiscal year 2017 budget
request increases both the F/A-18E/F and F-35 strike fighter aircraft
procurement in order to mitigate near-term and far-term risks to our
strike fighter inventory and invests in priority aircraft
modernization. Important modernization efforts include Joint Strike
Fighter Follow-on Modernization, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, F/A-18E/F
service life extension, and incremental improvements to P-8s. Critical
to power projection from the sea, our new and upgraded airborne early-
warning aircraft, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, completed Fleet
integration and deployed with USS Roosevelt (CVN 71) Carrier Strike
Group. Finally, the Navy's modernization strategy invests in the
modernization of current weapons to support them through their service
lives including obsolescence upgrades to the Block IV Tomahawk during a
mid-life recertification program which adds 15-years of additional
missile service life; fields the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)
as the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1 solution to
meet near to mid-term threats; and develops follow-on Next Generation
Strike Capability (NGSC) weapons to address future threats and to
replace or update legacy weapons. This plan brings next generation
technologies into the Navy's standoff conventional strike capabilities.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. Each year the Air Force Planning process produces a
30-year resource allocation plan that builds the best Air Force
possible to meet the current National Strategy, given projected Total
Obligation Authority. The plan addresses Air Force fighter/bomber
needs; Space, Cyber, and Nuclear modernization; and overall Air Force
readiness, among other priorities.

15. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what will it cost each of your services to modernize,
where will the resources come from, and how will the modernization plan
be sequenced?
General Allyn. The Army requires stable and predictable funding to
achieve our most pressing modernization objectives. The level of
modernization we plan for is governed by our near-term readiness needs,
the size of the force, and the fiscal limits established by the
administration and Congress. The Army conducted a Strategic Portfolio
Analysis Review to establish our priorities for Army capabilities over
a 30-year period and evaluated each program's relative worth in a
fiscally informed manner. Air and missile defense; long-range fires;
munitions shortfalls; and the mobility, lethality, and protection of
our Brigade Combat Teams are the immediate focus of our modernization
efforts. The challenge we face is providing the best possible equipment
for combat units to fight tonight, while simultaneously preparing for
conflict with a near-peer in the future. Given the current situation in
the world coupled, with fiscal constraints, we are prioritizing
equipment upgrades that will have the greatest impact against near-peer
threats and can be in the hands of soldiers in the next 10 years. We
are taking advantage of limited opportunities to pursue prototyping to
fill pressing capability gaps faster by leveraging existing systems or
technologies. Our greatest challenge is that investment in new
development is fiscally constrained, and we are focused on extremely
high risk capability gaps. Absent increased funding, in the near future
we face the very real possibility of losing our qualitative overmatch.
Admiral Moran. The President's Budget 2017 Alternate Budget
Submission includes the Navy's best approach to addressing this complex
challenge. Each budget cycle presents competing requirements between
maintaining the force that we have (readiness), modernizing the force
we have, and buying the future force we need. In our readiness analysis
we recognize that near-term readiness-focused plus-ups must be enduring
in order to ensure the sustainment of appropriate readiness levels.
This sustained readiness funding will apply pressure on those resources
available for modernization and recapitalization. As a result, under
current funding levels, Navy will struggle to recapitalize its current
force, and be unable to grow without additional funding. Navy is
pursuing innovative solutions that accelerate the fielding of new
capability. First, we are finalizing the implementation of the Navy's
Acceleration Acquisition strategy which seeks to streamline acquisition
for key programs of record, and accelerate the prototyping,
experimentation, and demonstration of critical technologies that make
have the potential to change the way we fight in the future. Next, we
are experimenting with different analytic tools to more precisely
define total lifecycle costs, and the impacts of individual force
structure decisions on the elements that generate force readiness:
Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Networks, and
Installations. We believe these two efforts will target the key areas
for investment and cost reduction to support building the modern naval
force.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. To fund the Air Force that will dominate against a
peer adversary requires predictable and sustained investment above
current levels. The Air Force will build the best force possible within
the Total Obligation Authority (TOA) level received, and resources will
come from efficiency efforts, divestitures, and increased TOA.
Sequencing is challenging as the Air Force must carefully consider
trades between capability, capacity and readiness and make hard choices
within available funds to reach our 30-year plan goals.

16. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how are each of your services balancing the short-term
requirement to repair or rebuild old equipment with longer-term efforts
to replace that same equipment with next-generation equipment?
General Allyn. The Army must balance maintaining current fleet
readiness by incrementally upgrading capability on legacy platforms
with the cost and opportunity of developing next-generation equipment
to prepare for future conflicts. The challenge we face is providing the
best equipment for current combat operations today, while preparing for
conflict with a near-peer adversary in the near future. The Army has
responsively provided the critical equipment to succeed in
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations over the past 15
years, but has not modernized for the higher-end of warfare. To achieve
immediate readiness goals we prioritize getting the best equipment
available into units with modest upgrades. The Army must focus
equipment modernization on re-establishing overmatch and simultaneously
developing new military capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat
emerging regional and global peer adversaries. This balance is
evaluated in the Army's new Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review
process. The Army has half the funding for modernization and equipping
our force compared to just eight years ago. The Army is investing in
new development, in prioritized programs to address extremely high risk
capability gaps. Today's fiscal environment constrains the Army's
ability to achieve both a high state of current readiness and
sufficient investment to modernize the force to a level that would
allow a technological over-match against potential near-peer
adversaries and meet war plan demands. To meet the demands of today's
unstable global security environment and maintain the trust of the
American people, the Army requires adequate, sustained long-term and
predictable funding.
Admiral Moran. The Navy has funded near term maintenance
requirements to ensure a high level of operational readiness for
deploying units by accepting risk in the modernization and maintenance
of our shore infrastructure, including shipyards, aviation depots,
ordnance storage and handling facilities, piers, runways, hangars,
utility systems, and other support facilities. Long term
underinvestment in these facilities is taking a toll on our ability to
support deploying forces and require significant recapitalization
efforts which are currently unaffordable within the existing budget.
General Walters. Modernization, the key to future readiness, is
essential to evolve the Marine Corps to out-pace future threats and
establish a ``5th Generation MAGTF'' capable across all warfighting
functions in all domains. The Marine Corps of today is largely
optimized for the past and continues to sacrifice modernization to
sustain current readiness for deploying units. In the current austere
funding environment, the Marine Corps has been forced to make decisions
that accept near-term risk by emphasizing incremental capability
modernization over warfighter fielded capacity.
Currently, Marine Aviation is a little over one-third complete with
the transition of every tactical platform in its inventory. Our
transition plan recapitalizes current squadrons with transformational
technologies--5th generation STOVL strike/fighters, tilt-rotor
technology, advanced heavy lift helicopters, and modernized amphibious
based Group 3 and Group 5 Unmanned Aircraft Systems. As this transition
is ongoing, we have completed a series of independent readiness reviews
(IRRs) with the goals of increasing the number of Ready Basic Aircraft
(RBA), building comprehensive strategies to recover our readiness, and
meet flight line entitlement warfighting requirements. These reviews
are intensive and dispassionate, and give us an in-depth look at the
issues and concerns in each community. To date we have completed IRRs
for the AV-8B, CH-53E, and the MV-22B while the H-1 IRR is in progress
this year.

CH-53 IRR: We are executing our CH-53E Super Stallion
readiness recovery reset. Per the planned reset induction schedule
there are currently 16 aircraft in reset between the East Coast, West
Coast, and Hawaii. Three CH-53Es are complete with the reset now, and
they are the finest performing aircraft across the entire heavy lift
fleet; we anticipate the entire CH-53E fleet to be reset in the next
three to four years. This reset process is breathing new life and
reliability into the CH-53E fleet, extending the viability of our heavy
lift fleet until CH-53K arrives.

MV-22 IRR: From the outcome of the V-22 IRR we found that
we need to have one configuration of the Osprey; right now we have
about 77. The answer to why we have so many variants lies within how
the acquisition and fielding of the MV-22 occurred. Always needing the
latest and greatest forward capability, we chose to deploy the aircraft
as soon as the first combat capability existed. Since the start of
fielding, the aircraft has advanced in areas such as reliability,
performance and capability. The Independent Readiness Review identified
many factors, to include the transfer and cannibalization of these
aircraft which can also contribute to different configurations, and
which identified the solution as a common configuration. Common
Configuration Readiness and Modification (CC-RAM) is a disciplined
approach to put some of those pieces in place and reduce the complexity
of the environment from 77 configurations to 3. One example is the use
of a standard and more improved aircraft nacelle.

AV-8B IRR: This review identified a cost-effective
strategy through the remainder of the Harrier's service life to produce
the required squadron T 2.0 standard. To date we have seen a 26 percent
increase in pilot hours per month, and a 23 percent increase in
squadron RBA throughout the AV-8B community.

The real key to attaining next generation capabilities and
recovering readiness is through transition. Due to our aging aircraft
fleet, we have to focus on both current readiness while we
simultaneously recapitalize TACAIR with the F-35B/C, complete the H-1
transition, and soon initiate the transition to the CH-53K.
Like Aviation, our Marine Corps ground programs which we choose to
emphasize, at the risk to other programs, includes:

The AAV survivability upgrade which will continue to
provide a ship to shore self-deploying capability bridge until we have
replacement for our 40 year old AAVs.

The ACV 1.1 is our first step in an incremental approach
to replacing those AAVs.

The JLTV is a joint USMC/U.S. Army program to procure the
next generation replacement for the venerable HMMWV.

CAC2S and G/ATOR provide an ability to control our
airspace enabling freedom of action to employ our organic weapons with
the speed and tempo that makes the Marine Air Ground Task Forces
successful.

CESAS II, Intrepid Tiger II, NOTM, and MQ-21 are some of
the new capabilities that we must buy to support the IW enablers.

The Marine Corps is in a regular evaluation cycle centered on the
Combat Development and Integration Campaign of Learning that seeks to
identify near term efficiencies that will allow us to invest in the
modernization that will eventually realize the capabilities of the
``5th Generation MAGTF''. However, in today's funding environment,
capability modernization can only be realized by accepting risk in
warfighting capacity.
General Wilson. The fiscal year (FY) 2018 President's Budget is
currently under development. Looking back, the fiscal year 2017 budget
request balanced short-term modernization with long-term
recapitalization to maintain capability, capacity and readiness while
living within fiscal constraints.
flight training
17. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, are each of the service's flying hour programs properly
sized to support full spectrum readiness requirements?
General Allyn. Army Aviation is currently funded to train to
platoon- and company-level collective training, which is insufficient
to achieve decisive action, or full spectrum, readiness requirements
against a near-peer enemy. Although sufficient to meet readiness
requirements for current contingency operations, failure to train to
decisive action readiness at the battalion level increases the risk to
our aircrews, and it risks degrading mission effectiveness in a higher
threat environment. The Army is currently facing challenges in
achieving higher levels of collective readiness due to shortages in
pilots and aircraft. Additionally, Army Aviation is nearing the end of
major force structure reorganization (Aviation Restructure Initiative)
and taking deliberate steps to address training, manning, and equipping
constraints. In order to address our manning shortages, the Army is
increasing flight school training throughput, increasing warrant
officer accessions and pursuing incentives to adequately man the force.
In order to address our aircraft shortages, the Army is leveraging
multi-year procurement programs and requesting increased levels of
resourcing beginning in fiscal year 2017 to fill holes across the
Aviation structure. The Army will require sustained and predictable
funding to achieve full spectrum aviation readiness. Funding at Budget
Control Act (BCA) levels or extended periods operating under Continuing
Resolutions (CR) will inhibit the Army's mitigation measures and delay
our ability to achieve the readiness levels required against a near-
peer enemy. Additional flight hours and the capacity of trained pilots
and mission capable aircraft to execute our combined arms training
strategy will increase proficiency in decisive action readiness and
reduce risk.
Admiral Moran. The appropriate level of sustained readiness for the
``full spectrum requirement'' in peacetime is 80 percent of that
requirement. The flying hour program supports the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan, a force generation construct that provides naval
aviation forces of the ``right readiness, right cost, at the right
time.'' Specifically, aviator and aircrew flight hour requirements are
established to support platform specific mission proficiency through
training flights and real world operations. Reductions in available
funding have necessitated reduced readiness for forces early in the
training cycle. The Navy mitigates risk through the use of a tiered
readiness approach that limits flight hours for aviators during
squadron maintenance and work up periods, and increases proficiency as
units prepare to deploy. The impact of this reduced level of funding is
the dearth of forces able to surge from homeport to support the
deployed forces on the line in case of conflict. Increased flying hour
funding will improve the readiness of the surge forces.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The U.S. Air Force fiscal year 2017 flying hour
accounts were programmed to the levels we could execute, though still 8
percent below the minimum requirement for ready aircrew due to manpower
and aircraft availability issues. Higher execution rates are limited by
shortfalls in appropriately trained critical personnel (primarily
maintenance manpower), reduced availability of older legacy aircraft
systems, and ongoing support to the current fight. As a result, we do
not recommend additional unexecutable funding for the flying hour
program at this time. However, we will require plus ups to the flying
hour program across the Future Years Defense Program as existing
shortfalls are improved.
The top investment priority to begin restoring full spectrum
readiness is increasing end strength manpower. Additionally, deliberate
increases in funding levels for weapon system sustainment, training
resources and infrastructure are all necessary for full-spectrum
readiness recovery.

18. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how does the hours our combat flight crews are getting
today compare to the hours they were flying in the 1980s and 1990s?
General Allyn. Due to advances in technology and training, it is
difficult to compare flying hours from the 1980s and 1990s to the
present. The introduction of high-fidelity simulation devices enable
more efficient and effective live training. The Army estimates that
aircrews flew approximately 20 hours per month during the 1980s, and 14
hours during the 1990s. In 2016, Army aviators flew an average of
approximately 10 hours per month, down from approximately 12.5 hours in
2014. Over the last 15 years, Army aviation has relied heavily on
deployed flight time to establish a foundational base of experience.
However, deployed flight time has decreased significantly since
operations transitioned more toward an advise and assist mission
profile. From 2006-2014, Army aviators flew an average of 31 hours per
month while deployed. Since 2014, aircrews have flown an average of 10
hours per month while deployed. These reduced flight hours have
permitted the Army to maintain sufficient rotary-wing aviation
readiness to meet current operational requirements in the
counterinsurgency operational environment, but they are inadequate for
the lethality and complexity of operations against a near-peer
adversary.
Admiral Moran. Modern Navy aircrew are better trained and more
ready for advanced air combat than at any time in the past; however,
the standards required to achieve this level of proficiency are not
supported by current funding levels. In 2016, Naval Aviation flew less
than half the number of flight hours when compared to the highest
flight hour execution point in 1989; 1.07 million versus 2.23 million
flight hours. The Navy's newer planning factors for the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan (OFRP) have reduced required training flight hours.
Training requirements are now based on where the aircrews are in the
training cycle, and high fidelity simulators have reduced the required
time to train, making comparison difficult.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. USAF pilots fly less annual training hours today
than in past decades. In the 1980s fighter pilots flew an average of
213 hours; in the 1990s-205 hours; in the 2000s-183 hours; and previous
12-months (Apr 16-Mar 17) 149 hours. In the 1980s bomber pilots flew an
average of 233 hours; in the 1990s-190 hours; in the 2000s-223 hours;
and previous 12-months (Apr 16-Mar 17) 156 hours.

19. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how do the hours our combat flight crews are getting
today compare to other nations?
General Allyn. Currently, U.S. Army aviators are flying
approximately 10 flight hours per month. However, to achieve collective
training proficiency for decisive action readiness against a near-peer
adversary, we estimate a need to fly between 14 and 15 hours per month.
NATO published standards that pilots should achieve a minimum of 140
hours per year, or approximately 11.6 hours per month to meet basic
individual proficiency requirements. A recent query of other nations
(France, Germany, Italy, Australia, Netherlands, and the UK) revealed
standards similar to those set forth by NATO. These nations would also
require additional hours to achieve the collective level proficiency
necessary for decisive action readiness against a near-peer enemy.
Admiral Moran. U.S. Naval Aviators maintain an advantage over
Russian/PLAN aviator counterparts when it comes to sheer quantity of
flight hours (approximately 200 per year versus roughly 120 per year),
and we are consistently upgrading and providing state of the art
training for our aviators. However, our competitors have watched how we
train and they are becoming more proficient, reducing the competitive
advantage the U.S. Navy enjoys.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. Current USAF flight hours approximate the NATO
Standard and exceeds the flight hours of potential adversaries.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

20. Senator Inhofe. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what impact does reduced flight hours have on
readiness, experience, proficiency, and safety?
General Allyn. Reduced flight hours inhibit the Army's ability to
develop the experience and proficiency necessary to achieve the
readiness levels required to defeat a near-peer enemy at an acceptable
risk. Due to budget constraints, Army Aviation is currently funded to
train to platoon and company-level collective training, which is
insufficient to achieve decisive action, or full spectrum, readiness
requirements against a near-peer enemy. The Army also faces manning and
equipping shortages which impact achieving higher levels of collective
readiness. Over the last 15 years, Army aviation has relied heavily on
deployed flight time to establish a foundational base of experience.
However, deployed flight time has decreased significantly since
operations transitioned to an advise and assist role. From 2006-2014,
Army aviators flew an average of 31 hours per month while deployed.
Since 2014, aircrews have flown an average of 10 hours per month while
deployed. Despite the reduced flight hours, however, the accident rate
of 1.33 accidents per 100,000 flight hours from 2010 to present
represents an all-time low. Additional flight hours and the capacity of
trained pilots and mission capable aircraft are necessary to enable our
aircrews to execute combined arms training, which will increase their
proficiency in decisive action readiness and reduce risk in a conflict
with a near-peer enemy.
Admiral Moran. Reduced flight hour execution, as a result of fewer
Ready Basic Aircraft on flight-lines has a direct, negative impact on
readiness, experience, proficiency and safety. These negative impacts
were validated in a 2015 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study which
found extended periods at very low flight hours resulted in extremely
low readiness, decreased flying experience, decreased warfighting
proficiency and higher risk of experiencing a pilot causal factor (PCF)
mishap. The Navy refers to this as the Tactical Hard Deck (THD). The
same study discovered pilots are 50 percent more likely to have a PCF
mishap when flying at THD; the risk increases even more when flying
below THD. Hours flown below Optimized Fleet Response Plan standards
reduce the number of tasks aircrew (Naval Aviators, Naval Flight
Officers and Naval Aircrewmen) perform towards primary mission areas.
Specifically, CNA found aircrews fly 25 percent fewer tactical training
flights per month when the units are operated at THD. This reduces
their readiness levels, as well as their experience and proficiency at
those tasks, preventing full spectrum readiness. Naval aviation strives
to maintain readiness levels through prioritization of units preparing
to deploy and deployed; however, this leaves non-deployed units at home
with fewer hours to execute and fewer aircraft to fly. These lower
readiness levels for non-deployed units also leads to slower
progression and attainment of aircrew milestones and directly affects
retention within Naval Aviation. Where aviation safety is concerned,
readiness gaps are considered to be situations in which: A. There were
insufficient numbers of Sailors to perform maintenance functions, or;
B. Sailors were insufficiently trained to perform maintenance
functions, or; C. Insufficient parts or equipment were available to
produce an adequate number of Mission Capable aircraft in order to
provide sufficient flying time to maintain aircrew proficiency, or; D.
Known aircraft deficiencies were not corrected in a timely manner due
to insufficient resources. Aviation mishaps are typically caused by a
number of causal factors and it is often difficult, if not impossible
to say with certainty a single factor, such as a readiness gap, was the
primary causal factor. The Naval Safety Center carefully reviewed
Aviation Class-A Flight Mishaps (damage of $2 million or more and/or
aircraft destroyed, and/or loss of life) for the period between fiscal
year 2012 and fiscal year 2016 to see if there was a readiness
component. The Naval Safety Center believes of 44 Class-A Flight
Mishaps for the period fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, three
of 44 mishaps (6.8 percent) had a readiness component.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. Fewer flight hours generally reduces repetition
that build the habit patterns required to gain proficiency in flying
tasks which prepare aircrews for combat. It also equates to a longer
time period for inexperienced pilots to become experienced in their
platform. Less proficient pilots that take longer to gain expertise
will also have a more difficult time maintaining that expertise. In
addition to being fiscally inefficient, reduced flight hours decrease
overall Air Force readiness and increase risk to combat operations.
nuclear readiness
21. Senator Inhofe. General Wilson, the Air Force is responsible
for two legs of the strategic nuclear triad as well as tactical fighter
aircraft assigned to regional nuclear missions. What is your assessment
of the readiness of those nuclear forces to conduct strategic
deterrence missions as well as to provide support to regional combatant
commanders in the event of a regional crisis or on-going conventional
conflict?
General Wilson. Air Force nuclear deterrence forces, including both
dual-capable and nuclear-only platforms, are ready to perform their
full range of assigned missions. However, many of these systems were
last recapitalized in the 1980s and are operating decades beyond their
intended service lives. Should planned modernization programs be
delayed or deferred, the Air Force's ability to provide the Nation with
credible and effective nuclear deterrence in the future could be at
risk.

22. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Moran, what is your assessment of the
readiness of the nuclear ballistic missile submarine force to carry out
strategic deterrence patrols?
Admiral Moran. The Navy's SSBN force and supporting facilities are
safe, secure, and effective at meeting the requirements identified by
the Strategic Command (STRATCOM). The SSBN force is sized and
maintained to keep the required number of platforms properly
positioned, postured and survivable at all times.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
foreign language proficiency
23. Senator Ernst. General Allyn, the fiscal year 2017 NDAA
conference report highlights the importance of foreign language
proficiency in maintaining military readiness. Accordingly, the Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) has had a
requirement for copyright-covered, authentic-content foreign language
training material in two successive years. That requirement was fully
funded, but under-executed by $5 million, in fiscal year 2016. DLIFLC's
budget request and requirements for fiscal year 2017 remain unchanged.
What is the status of the approved Performance of Work Statement in the
contracting process?
General Allyn. DLIFLC is always required to provide authentic
foreign language training materials. Current information technology
provides access to authentic foreign language materials. Therefore,
DLIFLC no longer requires a contract for this general capability.
DLIFLC would, however, benefit from assistance with copyright
permissions. A previous contract included both assistance with access
to authentic foreign language materials and copyright permissions. The
scope and cost of this contract was in excess of Army requirements.
Because the contractor declined to tailor its contract to meet actual
requirements, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) chose not to renew the
contract. DLIFLC has developed a performance work statement for
submission in late fiscal year 2017 to contract for the capability to
gain copyright permissions for authentic foreign language materials in
certain targeted languages at higher levels of proficiency. We expect
this contract to go out for competition in fiscal year 2018.

24. Senator Ernst. General Allyn, how can Congress be assured
DLIFLC will meet this requirement through a competition this calendar
year?
General Allyn. As the Executive Agent for DLIFLC, the Army remains
committed to generating readiness among linguists from all Services
supporting Department of Defense missions. U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Headquarters, Department of the Army
closely monitor all contracting actions. DLIFLC developed a performance
work statement for submission in late fiscal year 2017. We anticipate
the contract will be awarded in calendar year 2018.

25. Senator Ernst. General Allyn, how will a delay in meeting
DLIFLC's own stated requirements impact military readiness?
General Allyn. Because DLIFLC already has access to authentic-
content foreign language materials, delays in this contracting action
will have minimal impact on military readiness. Assistance with
copyright permissions allows DLIFLC to incorporate authentic materials
into its own organizational texts and teaching materials.
army improved turbine engine program
26. Senator Ernst. General Allyn, during operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Army combined arms efforts were heavily integrated
with assault, scout, and attack rotary wing aviation assets. In
particular, due to the high-hot challenges in both theaters of
operation, rotary wing aircraft were often required to limit payloads
due to inadequate engine power for the mission or for the environmental
conditions. The Army is pursuing the Improved Turbine Engine Program,
or ITEP, to provide increased power, improved fuel efficiency, and
reduced maintenance costs for the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache.
Army leadership has previously pronounced ITEP as their #1 Army
Aviation modernization program. Is ITEP still the Army's top aviation
modernization priority?
General Allyn. Yes, the Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) is a
top modernization priority for Army Aviation. Scheduled to enter Low-
Rate Production in 2024, the Army is programmed to start bridging its
rotary wing high/hot capability gap in 2026. In 2018, the Army will
select a preliminary design and award the ITEP development to a single
vendor. Once completed, this materiel solution will reduce cumulative
sustainment costs and offer commanders the ability to deliver an
unrestrained aviation maneuver capability, at less than high/hot
conditions, increased engine power and fuel efficiency can be traded
for helicopter range, speed, or lift capacity. Enhanced helicopter
performance bridges the high/hot capability gap, assuring that the ITEP
remains a top modernization priority.

27. Senator Ernst. General Allyn, do you anticipate continued
support for this Army program for the Black Hawk and Apache fleets?
General Allyn. Yes, the Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) is
balanced and fully funded in the Future Years Defense Program.
Additionally, the Capabilities Development Document is scheduled for
approval in the third quarter of fiscal year 2017. The ITEP extends the
life of the current Black Hawk and Apache fleets and, contingent on
funding, continues to be important to the Army.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Purdue
new joint military net assessment (jmna) process
28. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, I understand that the joint staff is working on a new
assessment, to be called the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) that
will include an assessment of what's needed to meet the threats and
challenges we face, exclusive of budget limitations. What is being done
by you and the joint staff to better assess readiness and our ability
to meet the Mission Essential Task List (``metals'') as well as our
operation plans (``o-plans'') at the combatant command level?
General Allyn. The Army has adopted analytical processes to
quantify the requirement for forces to meet Combatant Commander
Contingency Plans, as focused by Defense Planning Guidance, in order to
optimize a ``sustainable'' readiness force posture for contingencies.
To enhance unit preparation for contingencies, we have adopted
objective measures of training readiness for decisive action in unified
land operations that will quantify unit training readiness levels. The
Army's role will be to provide input to the new Joint Military Net
Assessment process.
Admiral Moran. Navy actively participates in the Joint Combat
Capability Assessment Group, whose purpose is to identify combatant
command top concerns with respect to supporting combatant commander
(CCDR) O-Plans, and provides input to JMNA. Working collaboratively
with the Joint Staff, the group not only addresses O-Plan-related
issues, but explores potential mitigation strategies and solutions that
can be performed at the Joint and Service-level. Navy's assessment of
readiness to support CCDR's O-Plan METLs is a continuous refinement
process. Assessments of capabilities supported by the status of
resources (personnel, equipment, supply, training, and ordnance) are
reviewed and refined as required. This ensures the information provided
to the CCDRs, via the Defense Readiness Reporting System Enterprise, is
meaningful and accurate.
General Walters. The JMNA is a classified document. In general,
HQMC continually assesses Combatant Commanders' (CCDRs) OPLANs to
ensure the Service is properly prioritizing its organize, train, and
equip responsibilities. OPLAN assessment and evaluation incorporates
Joint Staff, CCDRs, and Service planner analysis with Service training,
capability development and readiness issues. The JMNA will highlight
Marine Corps readiness concerns and assist Services in their efforts to
identify combat and Service support necessary to mold a force that can
deter, respond, and defeat adversaries in crisis and contingency
situations. Coordination with the Joint Staff will enable the Joint
Staff to identify total force areas of duplication, mitigate
underfunded programs of record, and provide guidance to improve
capability and capacity development in the future. Most significantly,
the JMNA will allow Services coordinate a holistic course to improve
national security and Defense Department readiness across the spectrum
of conflict.
General Wilson. JMNA synthesizes disparate staff estimates into an
overall assessment. Today, Air Force commanders assess their unit's
ability to meet their designed capability and any assigned Operations
Plans on a monthly basis in accordance with the Chairman's readiness
system. The Joint Staff is working with the Services on recommendations
to better assess readiness.

29. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, can you explain more about the new JMNA process, and
why the joint staff has decided to take this on?
General Allyn. I would have to defer to the Joint Staff to comment
on their specific JMNA efforts which are in accordance with the
Chairman's title 10 responsibilities. NOTE: JS provided this proposed
response. JS reached out through LA channels to Sen Perdue's staff to
ensure they have the information needed for JMNA and they understand it
is a Joint Staff product should they have additional questions or
concerns.
Admiral Moran. JMNA addresses the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS)'s strategic planning responsibility under title 10 U.S.
Code Sec. 153(a)(2)(c) to ``[perform] net assessments to determine the
capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as
compared with those of their potential adversaries.'' The assessment
aims to inform CJCS recommendations about strategic, programmatic,
budgetary, and force development choices by synthesizing ongoing
assessment efforts to integrate an overarching view of Comprehensive
Joint Readiness. The Joint Staff can provide additional information
about their specific JMNA efforts if needed.
General Walters. The purpose of the JMNA is to assess the
comprehensive readiness of the Joint Force to execute the National
Military Strategy today and through the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The JMNA synthesizes ongoing assessment efforts to integrate an
overarching view of comprehensive joint readiness. In particular, the
JMNA assesses U.S. military capabilities, capacity and readiness
against potential adversaries through the lens of the 4+1 problem sets
and develops options for addressing gaps in key competitive areas.
These options are intended to inform CJCS recommendations about
strategic, programmatic, budgetary, and force development choices. The
JMNA is a classified document. However, 2016 version is being finalized
as the Joint Staff begins work on the 2017 version with OSD, the
Services and Defense Department supporting establishment.
General Wilson. Under title X, the ``CJCS is responsible for . . .
performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed
forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of
their potential adversaries.'' The purpose of the JMNA is to develop an
integrated assessment of the comprehensive readiness of the Joint Force
to execute the National Military Strategy currently and through the
Future Years Defense Program. It draws upon inputs from multiple
existing Joint Staff processes in which the combatant commands and
Services participate. For more detailed information, recommend
contacting the Director, Joint Staff.

30. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what do you expect this new assessment will find in
terms of the difference between needs and resources?
General Allyn. I would have to defer to the Joint Staff to comment
on their expectations for JMNA conclusions. NOTE: JS provided this
proposed response. JS reached out through LA channels to Sen Perdue's
staff to ensure they have the information needed for JMNA and they
understand it is a Joint Staff product should they have additional
questions or concerns. Impact of Continuing Resolutions on Readiness
Admiral Moran. The JMNA informs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff with strategic, programmatic, budgetary, and force development
recommendations. The current JMNA assessment is ongoing and classified.
I would have to defer to the Joint Staff to comment on any expectations
for JMNA findings.
General Walters. The 2016 JMNA is classified. Generally, the
assessment synthesizes existing assessments and compares U.S. military
capabilities, capacities and operational approaches to those of our
adversaries.
General Wilson. The Air Force expects the JMNA will highlight
previously identified gaps between needs and resources consistent with
Air Force analyses. The document is still in coordination, and while
the Air Force and other Services participated in some of the processes
that informed the JMNA, the Services did not participate in drafting
the document itself. As such, for more detailed information, recommend
contacting the Director, Joint Staff.
impact of continuing resolutions on readiness
31. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, when I visit bases in Georgia or talk to combatant
commanders, one of the first things I hear is that continuing
resolutions are hurting our military's ability to plan and spend
wisely. Do Continuing Resolutions (CR's) make readiness more expensive?
General Allyn. Absolutely yes. Under a CR, the Army's funding is
limited, by appropriation, to the rate spent in the prior year (fiscal
year 2016) through the CR period. This forces prioritization decisions
within available funding. Contract funding is limited to the duration
of the CR period (fiscal year 2017 CR #2 - 270 days) as opposed to the
full period of performance (generally one year), requiring multiple,
less cost effective contracts. Contract administration is more
expensive (in time and money) and contract prices increase as companies
absorb the risk of uncertain funding and unpredictable periods of
performance. Tradeoffs are required when CR funding levels are less
than the President's Budget Request. Programmed readiness / training is
often deferred, scaled back, or cancelled. Uncertainty for contractors
and higher commodity prices contribute to elevated readiness costs. The
CR prevents new starts and production rate increases; low production
rates often increase commodity prices and overall per unit costs.
Admiral Moran. Yes, continuing resolutions (CR) drive
inefficiencies into the execution of our budgets, creating redundant
work and additional time and cost. For example, CR rules restrict
funding obligations to only the CR period, driving the breakup of
contract actions into multiple transactions that we otherwise would do
once. CRs perpetuate labor intensive and cost prohibitive processes by
increasing administrative workload throughout the Department,
exacerbating our efforts to reduce headquarters workforce and adding
stress/overload in contracting where we already have a critical skills
shortfall. Two specific examples of CR impacts to cost are articulated
below: Depending on the length of time, a CR can result in the deferral
or cancelation of some planned execution due to a lack of time left to
plan and execute the funding, which ultimately increases (bow waves)
the requirements to subsequent fiscal years and often results in higher
costs. Given the two-year planning, programming, budget and execution
cycle, it becomes increasingly difficult to manage these shortfalls in
the subsequent budget cycle. Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) rates are
established to recoup expenses incurred by NWCF activities in carrying
out workload requested by our Fleets. Fluctuations and uncertainty in
the funds required to support demand for working capital funded
activities, as well as cash reductions in the CR calculation, impact
the net operating results (NOR) and planned cash balances in NWCF
accounts. For example, reduced shore command activity under a CR
impacts the cash flow at our Facilities Engineering Commands for
utilities. Protracted CRs not only impact the NWCF cash balance but
also drive NOR losses that will cause future rates to increase in order
to make up for the losses.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. A CR (especially long term) can make readiness more
expensive. CRs impact our ability to do long term planning, introduce
contractual limitations, and delay our readiness recovery leading to
lost productivity, manhours and potential contractual fees.

32. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what would be the impact of extending the Continuing
Resolution to the rest of the fiscal year on readiness? How would this
compare to a fiscal year 2017 appropriations bill at President Obama's
request levels?
General Allyn. An extended fiscal year 2017-long CR results in a
depleted readiness / training account for U.S. Army Forces Command
(responsible for training oversight for 750,000 soldiers) by mid-July
2017. A minimum of one combat training center rotation will be
canceled, degrading deployment readiness for one BCT and negating
critical developmental experience for hundreds of joint leaders. The
Army will make prioritization decisions, delay or cancel new starts,
delay or cancel contracts, and defer all collective training for non-
deploying units. Combat vehicles will no longer be maintained in
``ready to fight'' conditions and spare part stockages will be
depleted. Units will enter fiscal year 2018 with degraded equipment
readiness levels. Most egregiously, all the readiness gains Commanders
have fought to regain will begin a declining slope, immediately
impacting near term readiness levels, and creating distrust between
soldiers and their chain of command. An unready Army means high risk to
mission success if deployed into combat and will result in higher
casualties. Programmed Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding
increased in fiscal year 2017 ($1.4 billion in Base and $0.5 billion in
OCO) above fiscal year 2016 levels. A year-long CR will prevent
adequate funding for military pay, equipment, and readiness for the
NDAA end-strength increase. These limitations have a direct, negative
impact on the following:

- The CR also impacts funding for the POTUS directed OPTEMPO
increases for C-ISIS operations, and the recently directed deployment
of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to USKF.

- The extended CR will prevent critical equipping in support of
the Army's conversion of one Infantry Brigade Combat Team to an Armor
Brigade Combat Team, impacting mission risk to two theaters in fiscal
year 2018.

- Combatant Command Emergent/Urgent operational needs (ONS/JUONS):
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS); Offensive Cyber; Reactive Armor
Tiles

- Total Force Readiness initiatives--secure and sustainable
training and power projection platforms; cyber tools and platforms;
communication and collaboration technology tools.
- The expected funding level under a year-long CR would prevent
Army depots from rebuilding four Apache helicopters, two Blackhawk
helicopters, several Patriot Air Defense systems, and upgrades to
system software that is required and critical to ensure weapon systems
communicate on the battlefield. This equipment is needed to fill
critical gaps in our formations.

Admiral Moran. Due to reductions from the Bipartisan Budget Act of
2015, high operational demand for naval forces in fiscal year 2016 and
fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2016 execution/closeout, and changes in
operational plans since President's Budget 2017 submission, the Navy
currently has significant shortfalls in our readiness accounts even
from President's Budget 2017 levels. The Navy's fiscal year 2017
Request for Additional Appropriations (RAA) requests additional funding
to address these shortfalls and improve warfighting readiness. In
addition, the current conference report for the fiscal year 2017
Defense Appropriations Act, as passed by the House, includes an
increase in funding for Navy readiness. While the increase would not be
enough to fully address the readiness shortfall, every additional
investment into readiness helps. Extending the continuing resolution
(CR) for the entire fiscal year would continue to drive inefficiencies
into the system, for readiness and across the entire Navy portfolio.
The instability would force CR mitigating action that could impact
morale, recruitment and retention, and future year budgets.
Additionally, a CR prevents any type of reprogramming action,
therefore, where the Navy might have made choices in fiscal year 2017
to re-prioritize funding from other sources to address our readiness
shortfalls, this option has been unavailable.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. A year-long CR reverses the efforts made in our
readiness recovery . . . taking us back to ``just in time'' readiness
which increases the risk to the warfighter.
Under a year-long Continuing Resolution (CR), the Air Force must
absorb a $1.3 billion cut (fiscal year (FY) 2016 enacted is $1.3
billion less than the fiscal year 2017 President's Budget request) in
the remaining five months of the fiscal year. Impacts to people,
readiness and modernization are unavoidable as we would need to find
executable options to solve the shortfall.

Direct impact on our people and readiness recovery

o Halts efforts to grow Active Duty end-strength above 317,000

o Peacetime flying hours would be drastically reduced (i.e., 82
months = $1 billion)

o Depot maintenance inductions would be delayed, impacting
aircraft availability in fiscal year 2017 and beyond

o Facility projects would be limited to life/health/safety

o Civilian hiring freeze continues through end of year

Severely impacts our modernization efforts

o Acquisition new starts, including MQ-9 upgrades, Joint
Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, and C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program Increment 2, would require anomalies

o We also would not be able to keep up with the demand for
critical munitions such as Long Range Anti-Ship Missile and Joint Air-
to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range, further depleting our
inventories.

33. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what have been the impacts to readiness due to being on
a seven-month CR for fiscal year 2017?
General Allyn. Because the Army has fully funded training and
readiness efforts year to date, an extended CR will result in no
readiness funding for non-deploying, CONUS based unit training after
mid-July. Some units in the Total Army, particularly Reserve Component
units with Summer Annual Training events, will not reach programmed
proficiency levels. Additional funding for modernization and
maintenance is being deferred in order to provide full resources to
prioritized units. Under a continuing resolution, the Army has to
prioritize funding to deploying units, leaving soldiers and units with
reduced training opportunities and less proficiency. The CR constrains
the Army to fiscal year 2016 levels, which is $225 million below the
fiscal year 2017 Presidential Budget request. Some Commanders must
sacrifice critical field training exercises and restrict funding to
only individual and small unit training.
Admiral Moran. Because of the House's passage of the conference
report for the fiscal year 2017 Defense Appropriations Act, and the
President's submission of an fiscal year 2017 Request for Additional
Appropriations (RAA) to Congress, the Navy has delayed taking
continuing resolution (CR) mitigating action in hopes that Congress
will be able to pass a fiscal year 2017 Defense Appropriations Act with
some or part of our RAA request. At this point, the Navy has prudently
only taken minor mitigations that are reversible. This includes
deferring ship operations parts and supply requisitions, and reducing
support for training ranges and schoolhouses. However, if the CR is
extended for a full-year and additional appropriations are not
provided, then the Navy will be compelled to take more severe
mitigating action because of the inability to drawdown more gradually
at the end of the fiscal year. These actions will need to be executed
when it becomes clear that Congress will not provide the necessary
funding to support training, maintenance, and operations through the
end of the fiscal year, based on the funding and time available at that
point. Navy will make every effort to protect deployed forces, with
impacts primarily focused on our non-deployed forces. Eventually, this
will manifest in an inability to meet some future planned Global Force
Management commitment. The frequency and duration of these gaps will be
a direct function of the readiness shortfalls that remain uncovered by
a continuing CR and any reductions to the Navy's afloat readiness RAA
requests.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. We have been able to mitigate risks and major
impacts to readiness through Congressional approval of anomalies in the
investment appropriation for increased production levels for munitions
and the KC-46 contract to increase from 12 to 15 aircraft.

34. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how much has the CR decreased funding for readiness
programs for fiscal year 2017 compared to plans outlined in the budget
request?
General Allyn. Since the continuing resolution constrains the Army
to approximate fiscal year 2016 enacted levels, the Army's flexibility
to address readiness requirements is constrained compared to the fiscal
year 2017 President's Budget Request because the Army cannot access the
expected increased OPTEMPO funding of $225 million.
Admiral Moran. The CR has not decreased Operations & Maintenance,
Navy (OMN) funding because fiscal year 2016 OMN levels are slightly
higher than fiscal year 2017, so Navy activities are continuing to
operate and plan on the assumption that they will receive the
President's Budget 2017 requested amount. However, reductions from the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, high operational demand for naval forces
in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2016 execution/
closeout, and changes in operational plans since President's Budget
2017 submission have resulted in significant fiscal year 2017 readiness
shortfalls from our President's Budget 2017 levels. The Navy's fiscal
year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations (RAA) requests
additional funding to address these shortfalls and improve warfighting
readiness. Additionally, the Continuing Resolution prevents any type of
reprogramming action, therefore, where the Navy might have made choices
in fiscal year 2017 to re-prioritize funding to address our readiness
shortfalls, this option has been unavailable.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The Continuing Resolution funds the Air Force at
fiscal year (FY) 2016 enacted levels, which is $1.3 billion less than
the fiscal year 2017 President's Budget submission.

35. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, could you briefly, discuss the impact on your
respective services should the BCA caps go back into effect for fiscal
year 2018, as they are slated to do in current law?
General Allyn. At current strength and readiness levels today, the
Army remains at high military risk to simultaneously defeat and deny
significant adversaries, continue to support counterterrorism
operations and defend the homeland as called for by Defense Planning
Guidance. A return to BCA funding levels will negate the hard earned
readiness gains and prioritized modernization efforts achieved over the
past four years since sequestration in fiscal year 2013. The most
significant impact will be seen in the Army's inability to resource the
fiscal year 2017 NDAA end-strength increases. Returning to BCA funding
levels will once again force the Army to reduce its combat units in
capacity and capability and start an inevitable decline toward a hollow
force.
Admiral Moran. A return to sequestration levels in fiscal year 2018
and beyond would require changes to the defense strategy, which would
then dictate the specific priorities, impacts, and reductions.
Sequestration level funding would prevent our ability to significantly
recover readiness or grow force structure, despite the increasingly
complex and dynamic security environment. The Navy would likely
struggle to support ship and air operations and maintenance, training,
and shore infrastructure sustainment and modernization. The hard
choices required for cuts to readiness, capability and capacity would
result in a Navy that cannot support our current national strategies.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. Air Force readiness remains at historic lows,
driven by 26 years of continuous combat operations and the impacts of
sequestration. If sequestration returns in fiscal year (FY) 2018, it
would have many of the same devastating effects that occurred in fiscal
year 2013. Impacts to readiness and future modernization cannot be
avoided, because those are the accounts we can dial down quickly.
Actions required to pay the estimated sequestration bill include:

Reversing readiness recovery

o Flying hours reduced (e.g. $1 billion redux = 82 months of
flying)

o Depot Maintenance deferrals . . . increases bow-wave, reduces
aircraft availability/readiness for war effort and peacetime training

o Combat Air Forces training exercises minimized . . . fewer
pilots ready for full spectrum fight

o Take risk in munitions such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions,
Small Diameter Bombs, and Hellfire missiles (e.g. $1 billion = 850
percent reduction) . . . all used in current fight . . . current
production max'd to keep up with demand

o Infrastructure risks . . . mission bed-downs and training
delays, base operating support to minimum levels (e.g. example $1
billion = 843 percent of Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization and 870 percent of Military Construction budget)

Modernization Delays

o Adjust F-35 buy (e.g. $1 billion = 810 F-35s)

o Defer 4th/5th Gen Modifications . . . F-16s, F-15Cs, F-22s

o Defer B-21, Long Range Standoff Weapon, Ground-Based
Strategic Deterrent, MC-130s, Joint Surveillance And Target Attack
Radar System recap

o Defer Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization

o Reduce investment in Science & Technology

People

o Cap military end strength at current levels . . . maintenance,
nuclear, cyber shortfalls will remain, delaying readiness recovery

o Civilian hiring freezes . . . critical skills left unfilled

Potential force structure reductions

o A-10 , U-2, KC-10, RQ4s, C-130Hs, EC-130s

Living with less than planned budget levels has resulted in the Air
Force being the smallest, oldest, and least ready in history. BCA level
funding has devastating effects on our capability, capacity, and
readiness.
joint surveillance target attack radar system (jstars) as an example of
readiness capability
36. Senator Purdue. General Wilson, you stated in your written
testimony that JSTARS capabilities are, ``essential to finding and
tracking our adversaries, conducting non-kinetic targeting, and
ensuring Air Force weapons systems and cyber mission assurance.''
However, the current fleet of JSTARS has been suffering from some
serious delays in depot maintenance. Right now, there are seven
aircraft in the Northrup Grumman Lake Charles, Louisiana facility and
one aircraft in depot status in Warner Robins. That's half the fleet.
I'm also concerned that the ``service life extension plan'' (SLEP) will
increase the cost and complexity of maintaining the aging legacy fleet,
as opposed to bringing the recapped fleet online sooner. Can you speak
to the readiness issues caused by unforeseen delays in depot
maintenance at the Lake Charles facility?
General Wilson. The Air Force has no plans to SLEP the Legacy
JSTARS fleet. Although the Air Force is working with Northrop Grumman
to address delays at the Lake Charles Maintenance and Modification
Center, sustainment costs for the Legacy fleet continue to grow at an
unacceptable rate. This is one of the key reasons the Department chose
to recap the capability despite significant funding constraints. Given
the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act, the Department must
accept and work to mitigate a capacity gap as we continue to fully
support JSTARS Recap. The Air Force is working with our industry
partners to see if the Department can extend the service life of a
portion of the JSTARS fleet within the current programmed funding, to
reduce the gap between the divestiture of the Legacy platform and
Initial Operational Capability of Recap.

37. Senator Purdue. General Wilson, for the record, will there be a
capability gap between divestiture of the current fleet and acquisition
of the new JSTARS? What does that gap mean for Air Force capabilities
and combatant commander demands?
General Wilson. The Air Force is sensitive to the critical role
JSTARS fills for combatant commanders and recognizes the demand for
this capability will likely not decline. Unfortunately, there will
likely be a capability gap as we retire legacy E-8C JSTARS. However,
the solicitation for the JSTARS Recap contains incentives for
contractors to accelerate fielding of JSTARS Recap to minimize this
potential gap.
There is no single Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft that can
fuse Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2) with Ground Moving
Target Indicator (GMTI) capability like JSTARS, but there are DOD
assets that can act to partially mitigate the potential capability gap.
Therefore, this potential gap means that the Department and combatant
commanders will need to look across the DOD for a mix of assets to
partially mitigate shortfalls until the new JSTARS becomes available
for taskings.
marine avaiation and mv-22 ospreys
38. Senator Purdue. General Walters, you mentioned in your written
testimony that you recently reduced the number of MV-22 ospreys (and
their aerial refueling aircraft, the KC-130J) assigned to your special
purpose Marine air ground task forces (SPMAGTF) to improve the
operational tempo and allow time for training and maintenance. Last
April, I visited with one of your MAGTFs in Moron, Spain, and gained an
appreciation for the importance of this mission, especially as it
relates to crisis operations and embassy emergency response in Africa.
Can you speak to how this move has diminished Marine readiness in that
regard? What do you need to restore this readiness?
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
navy aviation readiness
39. Senator Purdue. Admiral Moran, an article recently published in
Defense News stated that nearly 2/3 of the Navy's strike fighters (F/A-
18 Hornets and Super Hornets) can't fly because they're either
undergoing maintenance or are waiting for parts or their turn in the
Navy aviation depot backlog. What mitigation efforts are in the works
to address your $1.7 billion readiness shortfall? When will those
efforts be put in place?
Admiral Moran. The Navy is attacking the readiness shortfall by
working to improve supply, engineering and maintenance planning.
Additionally, the Navy is leveraging lessons learned from legacy Hornet
as we modify our Super Hornet sustainment plans. As a result of the
high number of F/A-18 Hornets and Super Hornets in an Out-of-Reporting
(OOR) status, the Department of the Navy initiated broad measures to
pull together key stakeholders from across the Naval Aviation
Enterprise, including Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), to identify and mitigate constraints
and to manage readiness challenges. The focus remains on identifying
and removing constraints to the production, engineering and material
fronts at organic and commercial depots, as well as squadron flight
lines, which are each key to the ability to return OOR aircraft back to
in-reporting status. Additionally, the Navy has developed a new
comprehensive end-of-life management strategy for the F/A-18 A-D which
includes creating streamlined, consolidated depot events at major
flight-hour milestones, as well as Strategic Individual Aircraft
Reviews used to identify priority high-capability lot aircraft that are
candidates for retention until planned sundown. The Navy is proactively
implementing Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) modifications during
depot level maintenance. This involves replacing targeted structural
components within the aircraft, reducing the need for future periodic
inspections and unplanned structural In-Service-Repairs (ISR). In the
meantime, the Navy has engaged commercial Contractor Field Teams (CFT)
to help reduce completion time for one-of-a-kind repairs as they arise.
For legacy Hornets, in-reporting inventory is also impacted by
significant supply and squadron-level maintenance challenges. Much of
the squadron maintenance burden is associated with the demands of
operating aircraft well past their original design service life of
6,000 hours, with many aircraft currently beyond 8,000 hours and with
the intent to extend life up to 10,000 hours. The end-of-life
management strategy aims to reduce squadron level maintenance burden by
aligning and reducing flightline maintenance tasks for the last two
thousand hours of the aircraft's life. Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) Logistics is simultaneously conducting an in-depth analysis of
legacy Hornet squadrons to understand and remove additional constraints
to readiness. The F/A-18 contains many ``fly-to-failure'' components
and operates in highly corrosive salt-water environment. As a result,
maintenance requirements become increasingly complex and unpredictable
the further the aircraft extends beyond its original design life. The
NAVAIR analysis effort is intended to assess levels of manpower,
training effectiveness, support equipment availability, and adherence
to maintenance procedures. The Navy is applying the lessons learned
from the legacy Hornet while preparing to extend the service life of
the Super Hornet fleet. Like the Hornet, the Super Hornet was
originally designed with a service life of 6,000 hours. Compared to the
legacy Hornet, the need for a service life extension was funded earlier
in the program's life, providing greater opportunity to mitigate future
impact. As the areas of the aircraft requiring attention are finalized,
the program is developing full Service Life Extension kits to
proactively repair or replace life-limited components in every F/A-18E/
F retained past 6,000 hours. As with the legacy Hornet, the plan is to
replace key structural components during planned depot level
maintenance with new metal, greatly reducing the need for follow-on
inspections and the likelihood of future unpredictable, custom repairs.
Making the Super Hornet SLEP kits available significantly earlier in
the service life extension process will prevent many of the challenges
the Navy has experienced with the legacy Hornet Extension program.
Finally, there have been supply challenges in the Super Hornet and
Growler fleet with specific aircraft components. In the short term,
these issues are being addressed on a case-by-case basis with
coordination between the fleet, NAVSUP, DLA and program management. As
work to reduce component shortfalls continues, the Navy is
simultaneously optimizing the maintenance strategy to ensure parts are
repaired at the most efficient level via organic intermediate and depot
facilities, the original manufacturer, other commercial maintenance
facilities, or by the outright purchase of replacement parts. In the
long term, the Navy is increasing the forecasting capability to better
predict and compensate for component shortfalls before they become
critical.

40. Senator Purdue. Admiral Moran, would it be useful to open up
Air Force depots to Navy aircraft maintenance, to help relieve the
depot backlog?
Admiral Moran. There is no need to utilize Air Force Depots, as
they would face the same degraded aircraft material condition which
results in increased demand for parts, engineering analysis and
logistics support. In an effort to augment depot production, the
Department of the Navy has partnered with Boeing and L3 Corporation to
stand up additional maintenance facilities to target F/A-18 Legacy High
Flight Hour inspections and repairs outside current Navy Organic Depot
Facilities. Naval Aviation Depots have sufficient capacity to handle
the remainder of the F/A-18 A-D workload through the FYDP and will
continue to implement productivity and internal process improvements to
accelerate throughput. The Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) has also
invested in Material Readiness Teams and corrosion training at the
squadron level to improve material condition. Better fleet corrosion
control/preservation procedures will reduce the man-hours depot
artisans must allocate for corrosion related repairs and further
improve depot turn-around time.
readiness in space
41. Senator Purdue. General Wilson, you said in your testimony
that, ``In the not too distant future, our potential adversaries will
have the capability to hold all of our military space capabilities at
risk.'' Can you speak to what needs to be done to regain competitive
advantage in space? What are the current space readiness issues you're
dealing with?
General Wilson. Our priority is to ensure the Air Force continues
to provide resilient space effects to all warfighters and to ensure we
are fully prepared to fight and win a conflict that extends into space.
To do this, we are adjusting how we organize, train, and equip through
the Space Mission Force (SMF) and Space Enterprise Vision (SEV). The
SMF is emphasizing advanced training of our space operators while also
giving them time to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) to protect our assets and mitigate adversary actions. This
training and these TTPs will also drive the discussion of the rules of
engagement and authority structure required to operate in a contested
space environment. The SEV lays out a roadmap of future systems and
capabilities that will provide a space force that is resilient to
attack. We are also working to ensure that acquisition authorities are
held at the appropriate levels to ensure we can acquire appropriately
resilient systems while limiting unnecessary duplication of effort.
Finally, we have started national-level policy discussions to determine
the messages we want to send to our allies and adversaries and to
advance policies that allow tactical commanders the ability to operate
in a real-time ``battlefield'' environment.
army readiness
42. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, you stated that only one-third
of your Brigade Combat Teams, one fourth of your Combat Aviation
Brigades, and half of your Division Headquarters are deemed ready.
Further, you said that only three of your BCTs could be called upon to
``fight tonight.'' I find this very alarming, especially as we see
near-peer adversaries, like Russia and China, flexing their muscles. Is
three BCTs ready to ``fight tonight'' a historic low?
General Allyn. Although our Army is close to achieving its goals
for C1/C2 BCTs, the definition of ready forces used by the Joint Staff,
I feel strongly that to make readiness more robust and to be responsive
to combatant command crisis-response, we must have more BCTs that are
ready for immediate commitment. Therefore, the Army is taking actions
to increase the number of C1 (fully ready) BCTs from 3 today to 6 by
fiscal year 2018, if fiscal year 2017 requested funds are appropriated.

43. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, if you were to see a large
funding boost under this administration, what would it take for you to
buy back readiness of the current Army force structure?
General Allyn. The Army's top priority remains its warfighting
readiness. If provided additional funding, the Army would apply the
funds to accounts directly contributing to warfighting readiness:
starting with our new recruits arriving thanks to the NDAA authorized
increased end strength, ground and air operations, operations
supporting home station training, and maintenance funding. Training
readiness in home station and rotational forces remains a priority
concern for the Army. Should Congress authorize and appropriate
additional operations and maintenance funding, the Army would continue
to rebuild readiness levels by investing in training readiness for both
home station training and rotational forces supporting Korea, the
Middle-East, and Europe. The Army would continue to fund Combat
Training Center modernization, Emergency Deployment Readiness
Exercises, and facilitate our depots and ammunition plants to enable
increased equipment readiness and munition war stocks. If given more
funding for institutional training, the Army would use it for initial
military training, aviation training, and professional military
education.

44. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, you've also said that the Army
risks consuming readiness as soon as you build it. Can you elaborate on
the risk of immediately consuming readiness? How can we dig ourselves
out of this hole?
General Allyn. Units deployed in support of Non-Decisive Action
operations, such as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and Operation
Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), where we perform primarily train, advise, and
assist missions, are not increasing readiness while deployed.
Additionally, units disaggregated due to restricted force manning
levels or performing missions with ad hoc formations immediately
degrade unit readiness upon deployment. Additionally, when combatant
command force demands emerge unexpectedly, as they have already this
year in support of OFS and OIR, the Army deploys ready forces that were
expected to provide increased surge capacity for potential
contingencies. The Army must be prepared to fight existential
adversaries capable of high-end conventional warfare with trained and
ready forces. Currently, the Army can only accomplish the requirements
specified in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) at high military risk
due to insufficient ready forces to meet multiple contingencies
simultaneously. To improve readiness and lower risk based on the
current challenges of sourcing demands, the Army needs to grow force
structure, increase Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve
integration and readiness, and continue to build Decisive Action
proficiency. To do this, sustained, long-term, and predictable funding
is essential.
depots and civilian hiring freeze
45. Senator Purdue. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, in the state of Georgia, we have two bases doing
important maintenance and depot work--at Robins Air Force Base and also
at the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany. I've been hearing a lot
of concerns about how the civilian workforce freeze is impacting their
ability to hire and get the job done--something that will ultimately
impact military readiness if not resolved quickly. I'm concerned we'll
start to see PDM (programmed depot maintenance) timelines shift to the
right. I understand that Deputy Secretary Work issued guidance last
week on how DOD will implement the civilian hiring freeze. Can you let
us know when we can expect guidance from DOD for the base-level on the
workforce?
General Allyn. In accordance with guidance released by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on 1 February 2017, OSD allows for exemptions to
be granted that are deemed critical in certain areas. Positions in
depots in which incumbents perform direct management of inventory and
direct maintenance of equipment are specified as meeting this criteria.
Depots and arsenals are a critical part of the core industrial base of
the nation and essential to Army combat readiness and the Acting
Secretary of the Army has been very proactive in ensuring this remains
our number one priority.
Admiral Moran. In accordance with guidance released by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on 1 February 2017, OSD allows for exemptions to
be granted that are deemed critical in certain areas. Positions in
depots in which incumbents perform direct management of inventory and
direct maintenance of equipment are specified as meeting this criteria.
Depots and arsenals are a critical part of the core industrial base of
the nation and essential to Army combat readiness and the Acting
Secretary of the Army has been very proactive in ensuring this remains
our number one priority.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The DepSecDef ``Implementation of Civilian
Workforce Hiring Freeze'' (Feb 1, 2017) and OUSD ``Implementation of
Civilian Workforce Hiring Freeze--Change 1'' (Feb 17, 2017) Memorandums
provide implementation guidance for an across-the-board hiring freeze
directed by the President on January 23, 2017. The freeze impacts both
appropriated fund and non-appropriated fund positions across all Air
Force Major Commands and Installations. Except for certain actions
(e.g., internal career ladder promotions and Pathways intern
appointments), all functions, to include depot maintenance, require
exemption approval of the Secretary of the Air Force. Updated DOD
guidance (Change 2) is forthcoming, providing updated Section A
functions and further delegation of authority for Section C exemptions
required by law.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
restoring readiness
46. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what readiness-related accounts are you currently
executing at maximum capacity, and if you were given more funding
today, what would be the top near-term priorities in which you would
invest to restore full spectrum readiness as soon as possible?
General Allyn. The Army's top priority remains its warfighting
readiness. If provided additional funding, the Army would apply the
funds to accounts directly contributing to warfighting readiness:
starting with our new recruits arriving thanks to the NDAA authorized
increased end strength, Ground/Air OPTEMPO, Land Forces Operations
Support (supporting home station training), and Maintenance funding.
These accounts are also executing at maximum capacity under current
funding. The second priority is rebuilding Total Force capacity to make
the Army a decisive conventional force--with additional funding we will
buy back combat power in our Brigade Combat Teams. Should Congress
authorize and appropriate additional Operations and Maintenance
funding, the Army's top near term priorities are to continue rebuilding
readiness levels by investing in training readiness both in home
station training and through our rotational forces supporting Korea,
the Middle East, and Europe, through Combat Training Center
modernization, through Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises, and
through additional maintenance.
Admiral Moran. Due to the Bipartisan Budget Act, the Navy was
compelled to fund afloat and shore readiness accounts below requirement
and maximum capacity in our fiscal year 2017 President's Budget (PB-17)
submission. In addition, emergent needs and execution since President's
Budget 2017 submission has resulted in a critical fiscal year 2017
afloat readiness shortfall of $1.7 billion. If more funding were
available today, our top near-term priorities to restore readiness
would include ship maintenance, ship operations, air operations, and
information warfare and other operations. Funding these accounts would
address immediate operational and maintenance requirements and restore
near-term warfighting readiness. In addition, our shore infrastructure
has become severely degraded and is getting worse because it has been a
repeated bill payer for other readiness accounts in an effort to
maintain afloat readiness. Consequently, we continue to carry a
substantial backlog of facilities maintenance and replacement,
approaching $8 billion.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. Air Force readiness is currently handicapped in 5-
key readiness elements: the availability of trained and experienced
airmen in critical positions; predictable baseline funding which
currently utilizes leveraged overseas contingency operations funding to
meet enduring weapon system sustainment requirements; reliance on
outdated and limited training resources; training flying hours set at
executable level but below minimum requirements; and a sustained
operational tempo that consumes readiness at a rate faster than it can
be replaced. Congress can help now: 1) Support end-strength increase,
2) Support on-going recapitalization efforts to replace aging fleets
and right-size high-demand capabilities, 3) Permanent relief from
Budget Control Act funding levels. The erosion of our full-spectrum
combat readiness started well before sequestration, but has been
exacerbated by it.

47. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, please quantify what your current readiness backlogs
are for training, depot maintenance, FSRM, and MILCON, and if you
received more funding how much more could you execute within a fiscal
year?
General Allyn.The Army estimates existing readiness backlogs in the
following categories: Training--$589 million Training readiness in home
station and rotational forces remains a priority concern for the Army.
The Army continues to assess its training needs to support both
enduring and emerging missions, and recognizes the potential for
unforeseen shortfalls throughout the remainder of the fiscal year.
Depot Maintenance--The Army's deferred depot maintenance for fiscal
year 2017 is: $1,026 million. If we were to receive additional funding
by mid-April 2017, the Army could execute $143.7 million of that
workload by the end of fiscal year 2017 and arrest the degradation of
Army readiness. Specifically, we could overhaul missiles and missile
test kits in support of an Air Defense Artillery battalion, we could
affect post-production software updates across a wide range of systems
and networks to improve cybersecurity and interoperability of the
systems, we could overhaul nearly 6,000 pieces of support equipment and
the M109A6 howitzers and M992 ammunition carriers to support nearly
three armored brigade combat teams. Facilities Sustainment--the Army
has a $10.8 billion restoration and maintenance backlog and has
identified $335.9 million in projects ready to execute in fiscal year
2017. The Army continues to address and document the state of
facilities and evaluate restoration and modernization requirements.
Should the Army receive funding appropriated for FSRM in excess of the
amount cited above, the Army is prepared to identify and accelerate
additional shovel-ready projects through September. MILCON--the MILCON
deficit is $38 billion. The Army estimates an annual funding
requirement of $3.3 billion to recapitalize, restore, modernize, and
support Army readiness.
Admiral Moran. The Department of Defense has just released the
fiscal year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations (RAA), which
requests funding in addition to our fiscal year 2017 President's Budget
(PB-17) to address current year readiness shortfalls. The RAA includes
items that are executable in fiscal year 2017 that would address
immediate operational and maintenance requirements and improve
warfighting readiness, including depot maintenance, training, FSRM and
MILCON. Quantifying backlogs in training and depot maintenance is
challenging because in addition to quantifying the deferred maintenance
needs through condition inspections, the backlog is impacted by Fleet
requirements that change based on warfighting needs, operational tempo,
and rotations in personnel. Over time, some backlogs cannot be
recovered as maintenance or training is not received when needed.
Emergent needs and larger-than-projected work packages for our
shipyards and air depots also create fluctuations in the total backlog.
This then has forced us to remove ships and aircraft from service for
extended periods, which in turn increases the tempo for the rest of the
fleet, which causes the fleets to utilize their ships and airframes at
higher-than-projected rates, which increases the maintenance work,
which adds to the backlog, and so on. The cyclical nature of the
backlogs makes it difficult to quantify. Currently, the Navy estimates
our FSRM backlog as approaching $8 billion based on our identified
requirements. However, that backlog grows to over $40 billion under the
assumption of improving restoration of all facilities to a condition
index of 100 (the maximum), as indicated in the fiscal year 2015
Financial Report. In developing the fiscal year 2017 RAA, the
Department focused primarily on addressing near-term warfighting needs
and on those efforts that could be responsibly executed within this
fiscal year. The Navy's fiscal year 2017 RAA includes $171 million for
FSRM projects focused on warfighting readiness support, $50 million in
MILCON for planning and design, and $21 million to offset cost growth
and complete previously authorized MILCON projects. Although the Navy
has additional FSRM projects that are executable in fiscal year 2017,
they do not represent the Secretary of Defense's highest priorities for
fiscal year 2017. The Navy plans to consider these projects in our
future budget submissions. The Navy is currently working with the new
Administration to determine defense priorities and requirements for
fiscal year 2018 and the Future Years Defense Program, and is also
currently working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on an in-
depth readiness review. fiscal year 2018 funding requirements and
executability are partially dependent on the final disposition of the
fiscal year 2017 budget. The details of the fiscal year 2018
President's Budget will be released to Congress in the next few months.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.

General Wilson.

Training Backlog:

$10.1 million in essential requirements necessary to
support Air Force end-strength growth from 317,000 to 321,000:

o Funds tech training requirements including: Basic Military
Training (BMT) supplies and equipment necessary to support an increase
in accessions (031B - 84711F); technical training requirements,
Advanced Distributed Learning Service (ADLS), and temporary duty to
school to ensure technical courses have the required materials for
course completion and expansion to handle additional trainees as the
Air Force grows.

$112 million in requirements to bridge the gap in both
fighter and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) pilot shortfalls:

o +$3.0 million funds F-35 contract maintenance training
instructors required to train F-35 crew chief, avionics, and armament
initial accessions training requirements. This is necessary to train
340 airmen to maintain the F-35 Fleet. (032D-89731F).

o +$17.9 million funds Introductory Flight Training support
contract (IFT), required for all new pilot candidates to enter
Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) or (RPA) training. Impacts 986
undergraduate pilots and 154 RPA pilots training necessary to reach
critical pilot production levels to achieve readiness levels. (032B-
84748F).

o +$65.0 million funds F-16C/D Fighter Training Unit (FTU)
squadron beddown for additional 31 F-16s at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico. Includes 1-year maintenance contract plus costs necessary
to run the unit. Additional fighters increase the ability for the FTUs
to generate more warfighters. (011D-27597F).

o +$20.25 million for fighter squadron contract admin support.
Provides ability to increase mission and readiness focus as fighter
pilot manning in operational squadrons drops below 95 percent. Total
Requirement: $4 million to United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)
PE 27603F; $6.25 million to Pacific Air Forces (PACAF); $8 million to
test/weapons instructor course/Air Education and Training Command
(AETC).

o +$6.0 million for adversary air funding. Provides adversary
training for 4th/5th gen forces. Contract adversary air allows fighter
pilots to return to the line and focus on full spectrum readiness
training and allows an increase in pilot production/upgrades.

Depot Maintenance Backlog: Depot maintenance backlog is defined as
those aircraft deferred from entering depot maintenance for either a
Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) or a planned major modification.
Currently, only three weapon systems reflecting 40 PDM or programmed
major modifications inputs are considered backlogged: A-10, F-22 and
TH-1H.
A-10: The cost to complete A-10 backlog is approximately $70
million. This is an unfunded requirement and should depot capacity
become available, the program office would use out-of-cycle requests to
fund inductions falling in or near the year of execution. Estimated
time for total backlog to be completed is at least four to five years,
likely longer based on depot capacity.
F-22: F-22 currently has 13 aircraft backlogged (4 Structural
Repair Program II & 9 Inlet Coating Repair (ICR)) for fiscal year 2017.
This backlog is expected to grow to 17 aircraft by the end of fiscal
year 2018. Cost to complete F-22 backlog is 8$40 million (touch labor +
Contract Logistics Support (CLS) support costs). Estimated time for
total F-22 backlog to be completed is by the third quarter of fiscal
year 2019, if the user, Air Combat Command (ACC), continues funding the
ICR speedline service through fiscal year 2019.
TH-1H: Seven of 28 PDM aircraft are backlogged. All are at home
station. No additional funding required to complete backlog. Backlog
will be complete by fiscal year 2019 with an estimated three to four
backlogged aircraft completed per year.
Infrastructure Backlog FSRM and MILCON: The backlog in FSRM and
recap MILCON has grown beyond $25 billion, which includes facilities
and infrastructure maintenance, repair, and recapitalization
requirements. An additional $1 billion per year investment in
infrastructure will arrest the current decline.
Increasing FSRM funds would have a direct tangible impact on
readiness, ensuring the Air Force's network of globally positioned
bases are fully capable of projecting airpower and maintaining our
trans-regional access.
Based on where we are today in the fiscal year, the Air Force can
execute over $800 million in FSRM and facility operations, as well as
$500 million in MILCON over and above what has already been requested
in the fiscal year 2017 President's base budget. This does not define
our overall annual execution capacity, but is primarily driven by the
timely receipt of funds with respect to the fiscal calendar and time
limits associated with individual appropriations.

48. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what specifically would a fully-funded whole ``ready''
force look like, and how much time would it take to achieve?
General Allyn. A fully-funded, whole and ready Army is organized,
manned, equipped, and trained to the levels necessary to fight as
prescribed in the National Military Strategy. In order to achieve a
ready force, the Army must improve home station training; add Combat
Training Center (CTC) rotations; increase manning levels; increase
professional military education; increase training support systems;
modernize ranges (including cyberspace ranges), simulation centers, and
virtual training centers; and increase constructive training. With the
right resources and force structure, the Army could achieve a fully-
funded and ready force by fiscal year 2023. This time frame allows unit
leaders to experience vital training and readiness repetitions during
multiple CTC rotations and joint deployment exercises at various levels
of command.
Admiral Moran. A fully-funded whole ready force would include
sufficient funding to meet Fleet requirements for today's Navy, in
addition to investing in the readiness, capability and capacity needed
for the future Navy. A whole force would have sufficient funding to
take care of our Navy Team, recover current readiness shortfalls,
maintain the ships and aircraft we have today, and build a larger and
more capable Navy the nation needs. Specifically, some key elements of
this force would include fully funding current fiscal year 2017
shortfalls in ship maintenance, ship operations, air operations, and
information warfare and other operations. Healthy ship and air depot
maintenance requires continued hiring and training of skilled
workforces to maintain our ships and aircraft. Healthy aviation
readiness would also require restoral of stocks of necessary parts and
spares, and procurement of additional F/A-18E/F aircraft to mitigate
the near-term strike fighter shortfalls and provide more aircraft to
allow our pilots to fly the hours they need to maintain proficiency.
Restoral of Permanent Change of Station moves would improve the
readiness of our people. Shore infrastructure, which is critical to our
ability to support deploying forces over the long term, has become
severely degraded and would require almost $8 billion to recover the
backlog in facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization. At
the same time, we cannot restore the fleet to full health without also
updating our platforms and weapons to better address current and future
threats, and evaluating the right size of the Navy so that it can
sustain the tempo of operations that has become the norm. The Navy is
actively working on plans for the future fleet with Secretary Mattis
and his team, and we look forward to discussing those plans with you
when they are approved. The time needed to achieve a whole ready force
is dependent upon not only sufficient funding, but also on stable and
predictable funding. The longer the Navy receives stable, predictable
full funding, the faster and more efficiently the Navy would be able to
achieve a whole ready force.
General Walters. The 2016 National Military Strategy describes
readiness as the ability of the Joint Force to respond to a contingency
while maintaining flexibility and resiliency. It further describes
comprehensive readiness as the assessed ability to meet the warfighting
requirements today and in the future against the five priority
challenges and unanticipated contingencies. With that context, a fully
``ready'' Marine Corps requires the ability to generate forces in
sufficient capacity and with operationally relevant capabilities
against a near-peer adversary in support of the national strategy of
Defeat/Deny. As an element of the Joint Force, the Marine Corps
provides forces that are naval, expeditionary, agile and lethal in
nature. The 21st Century MAGTF is capable of successfully competing
against an adversary in all warfighting functions and across all five
domains of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Institutional
readiness in the Marine Corps depends upon the proper balance between
the five readiness pillars: High Quality People, Unit Readiness,
Capability & Capacity to Meet Combatant Commander Requirements,
Modernization; and Infrastructure Sustainment. Readiness improvement is
constrained by inconsistent and insufficient funding to support the
five pillars. The Marine Corps is working with DOD to establish service
goals and timeframes to reconstitute readiness to execute the 2016
National Military Strategy, but a stable fiscal planning horizon is a
prerequisite for success. With sufficient resources, this level of
readiness could be achieved no earlier than the end of FY2022.
General Wilson. Today, we remain the finest Air Force in the world.
However, our relative advantage over potential adversaries is closing
rapidly and in some cases it has closed. We must be prepared to win
decisively, and that means we must ensure America's airmen are
resourced and trained to fight alongside the Army, Navy, Marines, and
Coast Guard--the joint military team--to meet national security
obligations.
The USAF readiness recovery strategy focuses on disciplined,
synchronized investment in readiness accounts in sequential order. The
first priority is our longest-lead process, Active Duty end strength--
up to 321,000 by the end of 2017--and eventually 350,000 over the next
five-seven years with commensurate growth in the Guard and Reserve.
Next, investment in the training and sustainment enterprises, both of
which require three to five years of lead time due to industrial and
human processes. Finally, as global rotational demands permit, we will
be ready to increase flying hour funding to facilitate more robust
home-station training activities. In short, each readiness `lever' must
be engaged at the proper time and in coordination with the other
levers.
federal hiring freeze
49. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, last week, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work issued
implementation guidance on the civilian workforce hiring freeze
directed by the president. The guidance authorized exemptions for
``positions in shipyards and depots'' that ``perform direct management
of inventory and direct maintenance of equipment.'' What types of
workers and mission functions are still excluded?
General Allyn. In accordance with guidance released by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on 1 February 2017, OSD allows for exemptions to
be granted that are deemed critical in certain areas. Section A of the
guidance specified 16 categories of personnel whose functions were
determined by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary to meet national
security or public safety responsibilities. Examples of these positions
are those directly supporting the execution of contingency missions and
operations, cybersecurity or cyberspace operations, space operations or
planning, medical positions, first responder firefighter and law
enforcement positions, child care workers, positions providing direct
support to the prevention of child abuse, sexual assault, domestic
violence, and suicide nuclear reactor and nuclear weapon safety
personnel, mortuary affairs, positions required to be filled by foreign
nationals, positions funded by foreign military sales and civilian
mariners. On 7 March 2017, a 17th category was added to this section
which covered essential military installation and base operating
services, infrastructure sustainment, and family readiness programs
including Morale, Welfare, and recreation activities and any other
positions paid with non-appropriated funds. If a Command determines
they have a position that is not specifically exempted from the hiring
freeze but it is deemed critical to mission readiness, they must submit
an exemption request with written justification detailing the
criticality of the requested position for approval by the Acting
Secretary of the Army.
Admiral Moran. Although there is a defined exemption for Shipyards
and Depots in the DOD Guidance on the Hiring Freeze, there is also a
strict requirement that positions be considered individually by the
Secretary of the Navy. Therefore, Budget Submitting Office Commanders
(BSO) (Flag Officer/General Officer or Senior Executive Service
members) are responsible for certifying compliance with the DOD
guidance and must exercise careful scrutiny to hold true to the
criteria in the guidance for all positions. Positions which support the
Shipyards and Depots can be filled if the BSO Commander certifies that
the position meets an exemption category and the SECNAV approves.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. In keeping in line with the President's memorandum
and Department of Defense guidance, the Air Force has identified
certain functions necessary to meet national security or public safety
responsibilities that cannot afford to be impacted by the temporary
hiring limitations. For all other exemption categories, the hiring
freeze extends to all civilian vacancies regardless of mission,
position type, or funding source to include non-appropriated fund
positions. This creates significant challenges to the Air Force, as
these positions directly deliver combat power for depot-level
maintenance, supply chain management, and the associated acquisition
management programs which are essential to our ability to support the
warfighter.

50. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, if every year you are losing depot workers to
retirement and attrition, how are you going to be able to increase
readiness if you need more funding and end strength, yet are unable to
hire more civilians to work?
General Allyn. The Army plans to use the exemption authority for
depot positions performing direct management of inventory and direct
maintenance of equipment. In accordance with guidance released by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense on 1 February 2017, OSD allows for
exemptions to be granted that are deemed critical in certain areas.
Positions in depots in which incumbents perform direct management of
inventory and direct maintenance of equipment are specified as meeting
this criteria. Depots and arsenals are a critical part of the core
industrial base of the nation and essential to Army combat readiness
and the Acting Secretary of the Army has been very proactive in
ensuring this remains our number one priority. Any worker at these
types of installations deemed critical to the mission function by its
commander are recommended for exemption to the Acting Secretary of the
Army.
Admiral Moran. As functions necessary to meet National Security or
Public Safety responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense has delegated
authority to the Secretary of the Navy, and other service secretaries,
to exempt positions that perform direct labor/maintenance and inventory
management functions in shipyards and depots from the hiring freeze.
Furthermore, the Secretary has established a framework for Service
Secretaries to provide individual exemptions for those positions that
are critical to defense operations. Therefore, the Department of the
Navy (DON) has executed a rapid response plan to enable Commands to
seek exemptions in accordance with the Department of Defense guidance.
The DON plan ensures integrity of decisions and streamlines processes
to the maximum extent practicable in support of the priority work of
our Department and its missions. Navy is aggressively pursuing
exemptions to minimize long term readiness impacts, while evaluating
the size and makeup of the Service's civilian workforce, including
those at the shipyards and depots, pursuant to the Presidential
Memorandum.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. Our civilian airmen play a critical role in our
ability to supply warfighters with the weapon systems needed for
today's and tomorrow's fights. As you mention, it is instructive to
consider the Air Force Sustainment Center and our depots, where
approximately 88 percent of their workforce are civilians who directly
deliver combat power for America through depot-level maintenance,
supply chain management, and power projection for legacy and 5th
generation weapon systems. It is also worth noting our depots'
attrition rate results in over 200 civilians departing on a monthly
basis.
The depots have a mature and deliberate strategic workforce
planning process that takes into consideration programmed dollars,
training curves, forecasting of recruiting needs and analysis of the
current workforce. Through this methodology, the depots plan and target
graduating students and other skilled workers to replenish the
workforce, as well as identify the need to offer incentives and/or
other forms of marketing strategies.
Fortunately, OSD's guidance provides a means to approve exemptions
to the hiring freeze, based on impact to national defense and public
safety. Along those lines, we've worked hard to establish a process to
conduct a thorough, yet expedient, review of potential hiring freeze
exemptions, while meeting the spirit and intent of the Presidential
Memo. We've streamlined our exemption review process as any associated
hiring delays for critical positions at the depots will hamper our
ability to execute this vital mission.

51. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, which readiness-related functions are at the most risk
because of this hiring freeze?
General Allyn. There are vacancies for civilian personnel who
support training readiness at the installation and command level,
including at ranges and live-fire facilities. These vacancies require
approximately 300 soldiers to perform these tasks and functions daily
as borrowed military manpower. As a result, these soldiers are unable
to train with their units, reducing unit and individual readiness for
combat. Commands are not able to hire against legitimate needs. If the
hiring freeze continues, there is a high potential for reduced training
participation throughout the remainder of the year.
Admiral Moran. The Navy's readiness-related functions most at risk
because of the hiring freeze are those not covered by Section A of the
Secretary of Defense's implementation memorandum, but still critical to
the production process at our shipyards, aviation depots, and
intermediate level maintenance activities. These functions include
human resources and training personnel required to bring on board new
production workers exempted from the hiring freeze, and production
support functions including contract management, engineering, finance,
quality assurance, and project management. The hiring freeze could also
make it more difficult to attract and retain the future workforce
across all skill sets, and slow replacement for losses through normal
attrition. Recurring hiring freezes further reduce morale across the
federal workforce and hinder our ability to recruit and retain highly-
skilled employees as an employer of choice as we try to recover from
previous years of budget uncertainty. The Department of the Navy has
executed a rapid response plan which ensures the integrity of decisions
and streamlines processes to the maximum extent in support of the
priority work of our Department and its mission. The full impacts to
readiness will depend on the ultimate length of the hiring freeze.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The civilian hiring freeze will negatively impact
Air Force in sortie generation, cyber operations, Nuclear Command,
Control, and Communications, depot operations, and space operations.
Men and women in uniform depend on the unwavering elite support and
innovative contributions of dedicated and skilled civilian airmen--most
civilians work as key enablers to operations across mission areas. They
sustain critical infrastructure, manage major acquisition programs and
emergency services, and deploy to support combatant commanders. Our
civilian workforce is a major component of the best Air Force in the
world.
From 2006 to 2011 the Air Force identified manpower reductions and
recapitalized, modernized, and rebalanced the ``total force'' into a
smaller, more lethal and agile force. In the past few years, Air Force
Headquarters also reduced their manpower by 20 percent. Currently,
there are 180,000 Air Force civilian positions world-wide, with 12,000
personnel actions in abeyance pending exemption.
energy resiliency
52. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, last month, the Air Force described an incident in the
past (via open source media) in which a RPA mission based in the U.S.
was flying a targeting mission overseas. Because of a routine
maintenance power outage stateside, the RPA feed temporarily lost power
and the target was able to get ``away and is able to continue plotting
against the U.S. and our allies.''
Improving energy resiliency on military installations and forward
operating bases is a priority, which is why section 2805 of the fiscal
year 2017 NDAA gave DOD new authority to program and purchase assets
like secure microgrids and other technologies to improve energy
resiliency against outages that are either weather-related or man-made
like cyber-attacks. Understanding you can't disclose fiscal year 2018
budget details yet, but to what extent, if any, have you used section
2805 to plan or program to improve energy resiliency in the fiscal year
2018 budget request? If not, why not?
General Allyn. The Army's approach to installation energy and water
resilience is holistic. It includes reducing risk to critical missions,
assured access to resource supply, improving infrastructure reliability
and effectively operating utility systems. Identifying and addressing
gaps in energy resilience is embedded across all of our energy
programs. Army has two energy resilence projects planned, due to the
change in the language in Section 2805 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA.
Admiral Moran. Section 2805 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA amended
section 2914(a) of title 10 to state: ``The Secretary of Defense may
carry out a military construction project for energy resiliency, energy
security, or energy conservation, not previously authorized, using
funds appropriated or otherwise made available for that purpose.'' This
amendment widened the aperture for considering energy conservation
improvement program (ECIP) projects on the merits of energy resiliency
and energy security in addition to energy conservation.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. While the Air Force has not utilized the authority
provided under Section 2805 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA yet, the Air
Force is planning to incorporate this new military construction
authority into future projects to address the Air Force's more critical
energy construction needs. That said, the Air Force is taking a
holistic, enterprise-wide approach to ensuring critical missions and
capabilities remain functional during long-term or widespread energy
disruptions. This includes leveraging existing tools and using all the
authorities provided by Congress to develop resilient energy
demonstration projects, with a sustained focus on missions and
installations. In fact, recent actions, such as the creation of the
Office of Energy Assurance and its Resilient Energy Demonstration
Initiative, demonstrate the Air Force's desire to use all the
authorities provided to it by Congress to enhance its energy assurance.

53. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, given Secretary Mattis' quote ``unleash us from the
tether of fuel'' and his recent statements to SASC that combat units
``face unacceptable limitations because of their dependence on fuel''
and his desire to ``push those limits further'' because ``our efforts
to resupply the force with fuel made us vulnerable in ways that were
exploited by the enemy'', what specific steps are you taking to improve
combat capabilities for the warfighter through operational energy
improvements and to increase energy resiliency on installations and
forward operating bases?
General Allyn. The Army is delivering enhanced energy resilency on
select Army installations. Examples include micrgrids, redundant
transmission lines, hardened sub-stations, advanced switching gear,
battery storage, and one-site power generation, including renewable and
alternative energy sources.
Admiral Moran. The Navy has undertaken deliberate initiatives
intended to increase combat capability through improved energy
efficiency: Maritime: In order to achieve greater reach and longer time
on station for the operational fleet, the Navy has implemented several
improvements to reduce energy and maintenance costs including
technologies such as: solid state lighting; stern flaps and hybrid
electric drives for amphibious ships; combustion trim loop modification
for steam ships; and automated cleaning of gas turbines while on line.
Additionally, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is developing new
energy efficient power conversion technology; advanced high power
control architectures; energy and power dense energy storage
technologies; advanced energy efficient hull forms; and lightweight
high strength materials for more fuel efficient and capable naval
platforms. Aviation: In order to achieve enhanced combat capability
through energy efficiency initiatives, Naval Aviation is expanding the
use and enhancing the fidelity of flight simulators where appropriate
(to reduce fuel use), promulgating best practices of SMART tanking and
minimizing use of auxiliary power units (APUs) when appropriate, and
developing efficiency modifications for the F-35 and F-18 engines to
increase combat radius and reduce tanking requirements. ONR is
separately conducting research into variable cycle advanced technology
(VCAT), which would enable additional aircraft engine efficiencies for
further increased combat radius and reduced tanking requirements.
Expeditionary: ONR is supporting research to increase energy resiliency
and decrease energy demands for forward-deployed and distributed
forces. This effort includes recently completed research into advanced
solid oxide fuel cells with increased efficiency to reduce
expeditionary fuel demands. ONR is also leading important research into
higher power, lightweight, and flexible solar cells, while optimizing
our ability to utilize solar energy in expeditionary power systems.
Additionally, ONR is researching advanced grid technologies to add
efficiency, stability, and resilience to expeditionary power by
integrating a variety of power generation sources (solar, military
generators, or even locally scavenged equipment) available on the
future battlefield. Future research will explore more efficient, ultra-
compact, ultra-lightweight, and near maintenance free power generation
sources in support of warfighters at the tactical edge. Installation
Energy Resiliency: In order to increase energy resiliency on
installations, Navy is reducing energy consumption in our facilities
while improving our utility infrastructure. Navy is using utility
condition assessments and mission analyses to prioritize funding for
our most critical facilities. Navy is also building partnerships with
the private sector, allowing the Navy to leverage third party financing
to further improve installation energy resiliency. ONR is also
conducting research to enhance the cyber-security and efficiency of
power grids.
General Walters. The Marine Corps is improving combat capabilities
by increasing efficiency of systems, improving the understanding of
energy on the battlefield, and changing the energy related behavior of
individual marines. For example, we recently transitioned fuel
efficiency technologies developed by the Office of Naval Research's
Fuel Efficient Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement program to the
Program Executive Office (Land Systems). This technology has the
promise of improving the fuel mileage of the Marine Corps' most
ubiquitous vehicle by 8-10 percent. The Marine Corps is also working
with the Army to develop an energy metering and monitoring capability
that will provide actionable information to commanders that will enable
more efficient movement and usage of energy on the battlefield. In
addition, we are inserting energy into the training and education
programs ranging from driver training of Lance Corporals up through
post graduate education for our officers. This holistic training and
education plan will incorporate an energy ethos across the entire
Marine Corps.
Marine Corps Installations have adopted a proactive approach
towards improving their energy security posture by reducing dependence
on external suppliers of vital energy resources through conservation,
efficiency, and on-site generation. Assessments have been performed
across all Installations to identify remedial actions to mitigate
unacceptable energy security risks. Micro-grid capabilities which
provide the ability to control and distribute power are currently
deployed aboard multiple installations (Miramar, Yuma, and 29 Palms)
and will continue to be utilized when determined to be lifecycle cost
effective or to provide flexibility and security to mitigate
unacceptable risk.
General Wilson. The Air Force is working to unleash us from the
tether of fuel and improve combat capabilities by emphasizing energy
initiatives associated with flying operations and building installation
energy resiliency at U.S., overseas, and forward operating bases. These
include: long-term investments in advanced engines and aircraft
designs; emphasizing flying operations fuel savings through more
efficient mission planning (i.e., reducing ``fuel carry'' weight) and
upgraded aircraft; upgrading range equipment; reducing engine idle
times; optimizing demand; assuring supply; and improving resiliency of
the installation energy that powers bases. This is accomplished through
an improved understanding of mission-thread vulnerabilities. The Air
Force is hardening critical nodes and diversifying energy sources which
will provide sufficient and resilient, dedicated power and agile
transmission systems capable of mitigating the risk of long-term damage
to the electric power grid.

54. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how, if at all, do you consider the maneuver and
operational forces' energy needs and vulnerabilities during training
exercises, operational plans, and wargames (for energy needs and
vulnerabilities, and risks at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels)?
General Allyn. Army units are designed, equipped, and trained to
rely on their own sources of power and are not dependent on external
power sources. Army units deploy with power generation capabilities to
training exercises, where they operate in a degraded environment.
Energy needs and vulnerabilities, and realistic logistics challenges
for maneuver and operational forces are a part of all operational
planning and are fully exposed in all war games and training exercises.
Admiral Moran. The Navy works with the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) and the respective combatant commander to forecast necessary fuel
requirements and distribution to support operational forces.
Additionally, Navy is continuously working with DLA to review the
strategic positioning of fuel and the infrastructure needed to support
training, surge force and operationally deployed ships and aircraft.
General Walters. The Marine Corps conducts modeling and simulation
to analyze energy supportability in operational plans and at lower
levels in order to identify vulnerabilities and risk. Measures to
mitigate those risks are generated and inserted into wargames in order
to ascertain the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation measures.
Those measures found to be impactful are then inserted into live force
experimentation for validation and follow on requirements development.
This process systematically and deliberately ensures that the Marine
Corps is investing wisely to develop the critical capabilities
required.
General Wilson. Overall, the Air Force is developing better tools
and processes to analyze energy vulnerabilities at all levels: base,
mission, campaign, and operations. On the installation side, the Air
Force is participating in service and national level wargames, such as
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC) GridEx, to
look at how long-term disruptions to the nation's electrical grid would
impact the Air Force's critical infrastructure and potentially
jeopardize its ability to conduct its mission. On the operational side,
service and combatant command war games and studies have concluded that
while U.S. forces are considerably more lethal than in the mid-1990s,
they consume more fuel. The aggregate impact of increased consumption
by the joint force is significant and needs to be fully accounted for.
Additionally, ``red'' attacks on fuel storage and resupply systems
should be factored into training exercises, operational plans, and
wargames. Assumptions used in operational planning and wargames about
the availability and capabilities of key joint energy enablers
supporting the near- and long-term fight need to be validated. The
entire battlefield energy ecosystem needs to be looked at as a system
of systems in order to fully recognize the energy-related risks on
operational plans.

55. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how can our acquisition systems better incorporate the
use of energy in military platforms, and how, if at all, are
assessments of future requirements for the maneuver and operational
forces taking into account energy needs as a key performance parameter?
General Allyn. Army Science and Technology in collaboration with
our partners in industry, is developing and demonstrating more
efficient power plants and drive trains for Army air and ground
platforms that provide the technology options for future acquisition
efforts. The Energy Key Performance Parameter (KPP) is required for all
new programs and addresses risks to operating and sustaining these new
systems in combat. KPP includes both fuel and electric power demand
considerations in systems, including those for operating ``off grid''
for extended periods when necessary, consistent with strategic analysis
products.
Admiral Moran. The Department of the Navy's (DON's) energy strategy
emphasizes energy security and force capability enhancement for
platform and weapons systems, as well as for non-tactical shore
operations. Mandatory calculation of Fully-burdened Cost of Energy
(FBCE), establishment of an energy component of the affordability
target, energy consideration in acquisition plans, energy consideration
in the acquisition governance gate review process and energy review of
legacy systems have been implemented as energy considerations by using
a uniform measure of calculation by all DON System Commands. The energy
needs of future weapons systems are analyzed on the system level and as
we see their role in strike groups. At the systems engineering level,
the energy Key Performance Parameter is integrated with the other
performance parameters to optimize and balance range, endurance, speed,
and payload. The Navy then uses the Operational Energy Supportability
Analyses to examine the energy supportability of the weapons system in
the context of a larger warfighting capability, like a Strike Group, to
ensure that we have the energy supplies and sustainment necessary. The
development of the evolutionary MQ-25 Stingray is a very effective
example. It is a system we are developing that helps address future
tanking requirements for F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-35 squadrons.
General Walters. All new acquisition programs have energy Key
Performance Parameters and Key System Attributes built into their
requirements. The inclusion of theses energy measures in the
requirements process ensure that these attributes are built into the
systems we acquire. In addition, the execution of Energy Supportability
Analyses provides identification of the energy related impact of a
system on warfighting capability at the higher level. We are also
integrating energy needs into assessments as part of service level and
Title 10 wargames to better identify energy induced risk areas and
future requirements.
General Wilson. In developing future requirements, the Air Force
supports and embraces the Joint Capabilities Integration Development
System (JCIDS) Manual mandatory Energy Key Performance Parameter (KPP)
requirement, which will enable enhanced combat capability by balancing
energy requirements and performance for relevant threats. Furthermore,
the Air Force will ensure our capability planners incorporate energy as
a design criteria as described in Air Force strategy, instructions,
policy directives, and guidebooks which reinforce the JCIDS mandate.

56. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, as you acquire new systems and modernize existing ones,
how, if at all, is the fully burdened cost of energy factored into
related acquisition decisions?
General Allyn. The fully burdened cost of energy (FBCE) is factored
into acquisition decisions. Army Regulation 70-1, ``Army Acquisition
Policy,'' states: ``All new Army acquisition programs (including new
program starts and increments) with end items that consume energy shall
include the FBCE needed to operate the system in their total ownership
cost analysis.'' To follow this policy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Cost and Economics (DASA-CE) estimates the FBCE through
detailed scenarios and apportionment to provide the analysis and
evaluation of alternatives for each program. Program managers use these
results to determine system of-systems energy requirements to support
acquisition program design trades.
Admiral Moran. On June 20, 2011, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)) issued a
memorandum that provided guidance for platforms and weapon systems
concerning the use of energy-related factors in acquisition planning,
analyses, development and competitive source selections. This
memorandum also mandated the use of fully-burdened cost of energy
(FBCE) calculations in program planning and specifically in the
Analysis of Alternatives phase to inform system trade-off decisions and
differentiate between competing systems. The memorandum specified that
the Navy systems commands would develop a uniform method for
calculating FBCE to support their respective acquisition programs.
These methods have since been finalized and approved by the Office of
ASN(RD&A), and are based on methodology and guidance previously
developed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The inclusion of energy
evaluation factors in the acquisition process enables the Department of
the Navy to make progress towards leadership goals for energy
efficiency and alternative energy and meet legal mandates (e.g. Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, National Defense Authorization
Act of 2010).
General Walters. Fully burdened cost of energy analysis is
conducted as part of the analysis of alternatives for major acquisition
programs as directed by Department of Navy acquisition policy. In
addition a Marine Corps Order directs the Marine Corps to consider
energy performance tradeoffs with other performance factors when
conducting modernization and upgrades to legacy programs.
General Wilson. The Air Force supports and utilizes the DOD-wide
procedures, frameworks, and analytic tools that enable a better
understanding and management of the effect of energy demand on force
capability, vulnerability, and the enterprise's Total Ownership Costs.
We also will ensure the acquisition workforce carefully considers
energy procurement, delivery, logistics, infrastructure, and
sustainment, as well as the force protection necessary to achieve these
missions throughout the acquisition lifecycle.
climate change
57. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, since the 2010 QDR, DOD has identified climate change
as a threat to both its operations and installations. Just last month,
the National Intelligence Council stated that climate change and global
health issues pose imminent and long-term threats through 2035. The GAO
found that the Military Services have experienced limitations on access
to training ranges due to thawing permafrost in Alaska, extreme weather
events in Southern California, and reduced live-fire activities due to
unusually dry conditions at ranges. Secretary Mattis recently stated to
SASC that ``the Department should be prepared to mitigate any
consequences of a changing climate.'' Would you agree that climate
change poses a threat and makes it more difficult for DOD to train and
execute its missions?
General Allyn. Extreme weather events remain a concern for Army
installations and all Senior Commanders plan for these potential
conditions, mitigate the risk where possible, and rehearse response
plans to potential crises.
Admiral Moran. DOD Directive 4715.21, Climate Change Adaptation and
Resilience of January 14, 2016 provides DOD with the resources
necessary to assess and manage risks associated with the impacts of
climate change. To date, training range operators and users have not
documented any difficulty in range use attributable to climate change.
There has also been no impact to Navy missions, considerations for
climate change impacts are however being incorporated with strategies
and plans.
General Walters. As indicated within our submission to the 2017
Congressional Sustainable Ranges Report (SRR) and previous SRR reports,
we recognize ``climate change has potentially wide-ranging effects,
especially in the coastal areas where the Marine Corps trains and
operates. The Marine Corps is concerned that such effects could alter
the capabilities of installations over time; therefore, these risks
must be analyzed, monitored, and addressed in installation planning''.
The Marine Corps utilizes a comprehensive approach to integrate
climate change adaptation and resilience considerations for
installation ranges and training areas. Climate change factors are
incorporated into our existing assessments and planning processes for
ensuring continued access to ranges and training areas and supporting
infrastructure. Encroachment management policies include potential
climate change impacts and related trends in natural hazards as a
potential threat to the viability of, and access to, ranges and
training areas. In addition, potential climate change impacts and other
potential natural hazards to critical infrastructure are included in
the threat hazard and vulnerability assessments supporting Marine Corps
mission assurance policies.
We realize climate vulnerabilities is not a one-time occurrence. It
is an iterative, recurring process involving periodic review of
experienced weather and other climate-related events and trends, and
evaluates potential mission impacts, while our understanding of climate
science also continues to improve over time. Risk management decisions
for each installation rely upon an assessment of local conditions and
regionally-specific current/expected conditions.
The Marine Corps will continue to address all areas of
encroachment. Our ranges and training areas will be required to support
training of marines and Marine Corps units in an expanding array of
mission-essential tasks that require ever-increasing amounts of
training space and increasingly sophisticated range resources.
General Wilson. Bottom Line: Weather and climate conditions affect
the operational environment in which the Department of Defense must
train and operate. Anticipating how climate conditions will affect the
future operations can inform the way we prepare, plan and posture our
force structure. The Air Force already experiences impacts from
changing climate conditions, such as coastal erosion, which threatens
numerous strategic radar sites in Northern Alaska to recurring flood
concerns at littoral bases like Joint Base Langley-Eustis.
Additionally, changes in climate conditions have the potential to
impact military test, training, operations, and readiness; for example:
Resource competition could create geopolitical
instability which would increase response demands;
Increased humanitarian aid requirements could result from
more intense and frequent extreme weather events;
Infrastructure is more likely to be impacted when ice
caps recede, sea levels rise, permafrost thaws, and increased floods
and droughts.

58. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what steps have you taken, if any, to plan and mitigate
the threat and effects of climate change, particularly given the
significant investment this country has made in our military
installations, shipyards, and depots?
General Allyn. We are assessing the vulnerability of Army built and
natural infrastructure to the effects of a changing climate. For
example, the Army is evaluating the water needs, usage, and capacity
required to support mission execution on our installations.
Admiral Moran. Coastal installations and the communities in which
our sailors, marines, civilians and their families live are vulnerable
to sea levels and storm surge. The resilience of these installations
and communities is essential to future readiness associated with all
naval mission areas. The Navy is incorporating various sea level change
studies and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
Digital Coast SLR and Coastal Flooding tool into its existing processes
and policies for managing the shore. For both current military
construction projects and restoration and modernization projects >$7.5
million that are located within a 100-year floodplain, the Navy
requires an assessment of the vulnerability of mechanical and
electrical subsystems to flood hazards and the implementation of
necessary mitigation efforts to address these vulnerabilities. The Navy
is also reviewing the Unified Facilities Criteria to identify needed
updates to ensure that the direct and indirect physical effects of
changes to sea level are incorporated into design and planning
documents across the entire project lifecycle.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The Air Force continues to integrate climate
considerations more broadly into our policies, plans, and operations to
better manage risks and effects of altered operating environments.
Specific to ensuring sustainability and resilience of our
installations, we incorporate consideration for the effects of changing
climate conditions in our installation planning processes. This
includes facility and infrastructure planning as well as emergency
management planning. As our understanding of the range of future
climate conditions improves, our planning will improve to better inform
our investments from basing decisions to force structure to
acquisitions.

59. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, how are you incorporating the risks from climate change
and related shocks and other shifts in water, food and weather
disasters into your strategies and plans?
General Allyn. The Army will continue to work with Geographic
Combatant Commanders (GCCs) on planning that ensures DOD is prepared to
conduct operations today and in the future as well as address the
effects of a changing climate on our readiness.
Admiral Moran. Considerations for climate change impacts are being
incorporated with strategies and plans in accordance with DOD Directive
4715.21, ``Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience,'' January 14,
2016. For example, the Department of Navy and Coast Guard's maritime
strategy, ``A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,''
addresses risks from climate change, such as enhanced storms, rising
sea levels, and coastal flooding. In addition, the ``U.S. Navy Arctic
Roadmap 2014-2030,'' outlines a deliberate Implementation Plan for
anticipating, and preparing for, the impacts of climate change in the
Arctic as that region becomes more accessible. The Navy may be called
upon more often to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), both
domestically and overseas, in the face of more frequent and more
intense natural disasters. The Navy is prepared and able to conduct
pre-planned and emergent DSCA and HA/DR missions within the resource
constraints and priorities of fleet operations. However, there is an
opportunity cost in training, presence, and security cooperation
activities when assets are diverted from current missions to respond to
other contingencies.
General Walters. As outlined in DOD Directive 4715.21, ``Climate
Change Adaption and Resilience,'' the Marine Corps takes a holistic
view of climate change into consideration. We do this when we review
our installations' infrastructure; identify requirements associated
with Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) plans and Defense
Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA); consider the impact of the life
cycle of our weapons systems, platforms, and equipment; consider the
impact to our training ranges and the subsequent impact to the
effectiveness of the training; work with local authorities on
developing plans for response to weather emergencies; identify
requirements for personal protection equipment and medical protection
measures necessary for operating in various climates and geographic
locales; actively pursue measures to reduce our ecological and energy
footprint; etc.
For a geo-specific O-Plan response, I defer to the Geographic
Component Commanders.
General Wilson. The Air Force 30-year plan methodically integrates
the best available estimates of future threats, and forecasts of
economic, scientific, and environmental factors based on current
strategy and future forecasts. As developments occur and risks from
man-made or other environmental shocks can be quantified and included
in the forecast, the Air Force will incorporate them in our long range
plan.

60. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, are your component commands identifying water and food
shortages, humanitarian and weather disasters, as challenges or events
in their input to the UFR/IPLs and other requirements generation
process? Are they incorporating these risks and opportunities into
theater engagement and partner development?
General Allyn. Our Army Service Component Commands support the
efforts of the combatant commanders, who plan and execute their Theater
Campaign Plans, Theater Security Cooperation Plans and contingency
plans such as those for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Admiral Moran. Conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HA/DR) is one of the missions of the Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG). As such, component commands identify, plan and budget for
requirements to support HA/DR as part of the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. Expanding and strengthening
partnerships is a priority of CNO's Design for Maintaining Maritime
Superiority in order to execute all DSG missions. For HA/DR
specifically, the Navy does include HA/DR planning and exercises into
theater engagement and partner development with our Joint Services,
interagency partners, and international partners. The U.S. Navy-led
Pacific Partnership exercise is the largest annual multilateral HA/DR
preparedness mission conducted in the Indo-Pacific region.
General Walters. Yes, in our planning processes, we consider
requirements for combating the effects of climate change, as well as
requirements for operating in regions impacted by climate change. This
includes our annual budget development processes, the IPL, and the
unfunded priority list.
More specifically, when we identify and develop requirements to
support Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions, we want the MAGTF to be self-
sustaining. While we are there to provide stability and address the
immediate concerns of an impacted populace, oftentimes the engineering
equipment and various utility capabilities we bring for MAGTF
sustainment is instrumental in providing relief. This can range from
drilling new wells, building brides, or containing infectious disease
outbreaks. For example, Tactical Water Production Systems (TWPS),
material handling equipment (MHE), and medical equipment and supplies
can be essential in providing relief.
For theater engagement and partner development, I defer to the
Geographic Component Commanders.
General Wilson. Each year, the Air Force major commands review
combatant command contingency and operation plans for their area of
responsibilities to identify and elevate gaps and risks for funding
considerations. In addition, the Air Force organizes, trains, and
equips its personnel to respond to variety of contingency operations
including natural disasters and humanitarian assistance. The Air Force
applies this training during humanitarian missions and theater
engagements throughout the year, which enables airmen to train partner
nations on the risks and challenges associated with climate change and
natural disasters. The Air Force applied this concept during the
humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the aftermath of Typhoon
Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013.

61. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what additional support do you need, if any, from
Congress to fully identify and respond to the impacts of climate
change?
General Allyn. As a global force, we must be ready to respond and
deliver mission success in all environments and conditions. We continue
to assess, incorporate and manage the effects of altered operating
environments on our capabilities and capacity. This includes force
structure, basing, military operations, capacity building, stability
operations and the demand for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
and Defense Support to Civil Authorities in short and long-term plans.
To be able to meet the demands of today's unstable global security
environment, we require sustained, long term, and predictable funding.
The most important steps that will have both positive and lasting
impact is the repeal of the 2011 Budget Control Act, ensuring
sufficient funding to train, man and equip the authorized force.
Admiral Moran. The Navy appreciates Congress' support of our
current efforts. The Navy has been evaluating the effects a changing
climate may have on our built infrastructure, people, systems, and
missions. For example, Navy coastal installations are especially
vulnerable to changing sea levels and storm surge. The Navy is managing
risk by incorporating tools and vulnerability assessments into our
processes and policies, and updating design and planning documents for
facilities projects. The Navy will engage Congress as appropriate to
sustain mission capability.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. The Air Force welcomes Congressional support in
addressing gaps and risks associated with the climate change should the
need arise in the future. We will work with the appropriate bodies to
identify areas for additional support.
brac
62. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters,
General Wilson, what is your position on BRAC?
General Allyn. The Army has indicated its need for BRAC repeatedly
in testimony. Should the Department receive BRAC authority we will use
it effectively to eliminate excess and reinvest funds on higher
priorities.
Admiral Moran. The Navy's readiness-related functions most at risk
because of the hiring freeze are those not covered by Section A of the
Secretary of Defense's implementation memorandum, but still critical to
the production process at our shipyards, aviation depots, and
intermediate level maintenance activities. These functions include
human resources and training personnel required to bring on board new
production workers exempted from the hiring freeze, and production
support functions including contract management, engineering, finance,
quality assurance, and project management. The hiring freeze could also
make it more difficult to attract and retain the future workforce
across all skill sets, and slow replacement for losses through normal
attrition. Recurring hiring freezes further reduce morale across the
federal workforce and hinder our ability to recruit and retain highly-
skilled employees as an employer of choice as we try to recover from
previous years of budget uncertainty. The Department of the Navy has
executed a rapid response plan which ensures the integrity of decisions
and streamlines processes to the maximum extent in support of the
priority work of our Department and its mission. The full impacts to
readiness will depend on the ultimate length of the hiring freeze.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General Wilson. I strongly support the Department of Defense
requests for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) authority. Even with
growth to a 350,000 Active Duty force, the Air Force projects it will
have 24 percent excess infrastructure capacity, so we've got ample
margin to reduce infrastructure, grow our force and be capable of
surging should the need arise. Without BRAC authority, the Air Force
will continue to spend our limited budget on infrastructure we don't
need, rather than mission-critical readiness, modernization, and
infrastructure we do need.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
advanced combat helmet generation ii
63. Senator Shaheen. General Allyn and General Walters, I
understand there are several contracts currently under consideration or
soon to be released, including combat helmets--notably the Advanced
Combat Helmet Generation II (ACH Gen II) for the Army. These contracts
are designed to provide next generation, advanced protective equipment
for our men and women in uniform and are critical to the readiness of
the service branches.
It has come to my attention that a helmet manufacturer with a
questionable past performance record has submitted a proposal to
compete for this contract. This company was subject to a Department of
Justice Inspector General report (attached) highlighting ``findings of
fraud and other irregularities related to the manufacture and sale of
combat helmets,'' which found that over 126,000 Advanced Combat Helmets
(ACH) were not manufactured to contract specifications by Federal
Prison Industries (FPI), defective and recalled from circulation. This
action resulted in over $19 million in unnecessary costs to the Federal
government and severely endangered our warfighters in the field.
General Allyn and General Walters, what steps are being taken by
the Army and Marines to ensure that current and upcoming Request for
Proposal responses for personal protective equipment (PPE),
specifically helmets, are evaluated on a ``best value'' basis and not
on Lowest Price/Technically Acceptable (LPTA) guidelines and that past
performance is accounted for in these evaluations?
General Allyn. The Army's strategy for acquiring personal
protective equipment, to include helmets, is to promote competition and
award contracts based on well defined, validated and tested
requirements. Past performance is one of several evaluation factors
that the Army thoroughly assesses to determine confidence in an
offeror's ability to perform. There are two approved Best Value
contracting methods: LPTA and Trade-Off. LPTA is not being used for the
ACH Generation II contract you mentioned. Instead, the Army will award
using a Trade-Off contract between technical and price evaluation
factors. Regardless of contract type, products must always meet the
highest standards for soldier safety, proven by formal testing to Army
validated requirements. I assure you the Army will continue to ensure
soldiers have the best protection available.
General Walters did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
refueling capability in the pacific
64. Senator Hirono. General Wilson, you testified to the importance
of refueling tanker capabilities to support the global reach of Air
Force missions. The current tankers the Air Force has are old and the
new KC-46 tankers are not scheduled to arrive in the fleet until 2019.
What is the Air Force's plan for refueling capabilities in the Pacific
until the new KC-46 tankers arrive?
General Wilson. With the acquisition of the KC-46, the Air Force
plans to grow the tanker fleet from 455 to 479 aircraft as the KC-46
comes online. Until the new KC-46 tankers arrive, the Air Force will
follow the current process to provide refueling capabilities in the
Pacific and all theaters. If theater assigned assets are insufficient
to meet requirements, the theater geographic combatant commander will
submit a request for forces (RFF) to the Joint Staff, and the Joint
Staff will follow the global force management allocation plan (GFMAP)
process to provide forces based on availability and prioritization.
Multiple analyses confirm tanker requirements during times of
contingency, including contingencies in the Pacific, can be met with a
tanker fleet of 479 aircraft. By growing the tanker fleet from 455 to
479 aircraft with the addition of the highly capable KC-46 aircraft
included in that mix, the Air Force will be able to maintain sufficient
air refueling capacity in the Pacific.
diversity
65. Senator Hirono. General Allyn, while the graduation of the
first females from Ranger School and the opening of all MOSs to all
soldiers is a great step for diversity in our armed forces, what is the
Army doing to mentor junior officers and enlisted personnel from these
and other diverse groups to ensure that they have the opportunity and
guidance to someday become senior leaders in the Army?
General Allyn. The soldier 2020 formal education plan provides
leaders with? the opportunity and knowledge to mentor leaders and
soldiers assigned to previously closed units. As one example, the
Infantry School brought recent Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course
(IBOLC) graduates, both male and female, to the United States Military
Academy's SMA Branch Week. This opportunity provided recent
perspectives by both genders as it relates to combat arms training.
During Branch Night, IBOLC graduates interacted with recently branched
Infantry cadets to share personal experience and mentorship.
retention rate
66. Senator Hirono. General Walters, you testified that retention
should not be taken for granted and that you need to provide marines
and sailors the tools required to do their jobs. If the Marine Corps
are authorized to increase its end strength numbers, what steps will
you take to ensure that the quality of marines recruited and the
training they receive will maintain the Marine Corps standard when you
grow the force to meet requirements?
General Walters. We have no intention of changing our minimum
standards for the recruitment of potential marines. The current Marine
Corps recruiting force is designed to access up to 38,000 total force
(regular and reserve) with 63 percent scoring in the top three tiers of
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (DOD standard is 60 percent) and 95
percent graduating from high school (DOD standard is 90 percent). The
Marine Corps has accessed its annual mission at or above the USMC
standards consistently through years of both increasing and decreasing
end strength.
As we look to increase our end strength we are paying close
attention to the training this force will need to meet the challenges
of future operating environments. The complexity that we expect to
characterize these operating environments will require adaptive and
innovative marines that are able to out think their foes and overcome
the chaos found in combat. As such, we are conducting detailed analysis
to ensure our training and education establishment is prepared to make
the necessary adjustments to grow the force responsibly. We will need
to change the way we approach training and education, increase our use
of technology and simulation to give our marines an immersive
experience that replicates the demands of combat, provide better live
fire ranges, and develop methods that will improve their decision
making ability. All of this speaks to the need to ensure that we
provide the resources necessary to transform our training and education
so that we will not only be able to train increased numbers of marines,
but also provide them with demanding training that ensures they are
ready to answer the Nation's call.
eagle vision
67. Senator Hirono. General Wilson, as you know, Eagle Vision is a
deployable ground station for collecting and disseminating unclassified
commercial satellite imagery. It can provide imagery products to
warfighters and first responders in a timely fashion. The products can
also be released quickly to allies due to the commercial nature of the
imagery.
I have been an advocate of this system and have discussed the
importance of this program with past and present Air Force and National
Guard Bureau leadership.
One concern I have had is that over the years the Air Force has not
funded this program to a level necessary to maintain the capabilities
which made it so valuable in the first place. As a result of the
reduced funding levels, important system capabilities such as electro-
optical imagery, and synthetic aperture radar have either been
diminished or completely eliminated. Maintenance, training and system
upgrades have also been impacted.
While the Air Force continues to face a challenging fiscal
environment, it is my hope that key decision makers keep in mind the
tremendous capabilities and flexibility that this system provides. The
Eagle Vision system provides a significant return on investment
especially if it is fully funded to reduce maintenance risks and other
capabilities are restored.
It has been alleged that the demand signal for the Eagle Vision
products are diminishing. I would caution that we have to be aware of a
potential self-fulfilling prophecy. Underfunding the program leads to
maintenance and sustainment risks, reductions in training, and reduced
variety of imagery available leading to a diminished overall system
capability. If is the system becomes less capable no matter the reason,
the demand will likely decrease.
I hope that the Air Force will continue to recognize the value of
this capability and will continue to support this system which provides
invaluable support in domestic disaster relief operations as well as
for international efforts with our friends and allies.
Can you provide an update on where you are in terms of fiscal year
2017 funding for the program? Also, while I understand that you can't
discuss the actual fiscal year 2018 budget, can you keep me informed of
any changes you are considering for the Eagle Vision program?
General Wilson. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President's Budget (PB)
requested $14.6 million in programmed funds for Eagle Vision. This
budget provides $8.8 million of operations and maintenance (O&M)
funding and $5.8 million of procurement funding. An additional $4.96
million in O&M is required to minimally fund Eagle Vision Electro
Optical (EO) operations in fiscal year 2017 and the Air Force will
internally fund the shortfall with execution year funds. The programmed
$5.8 million in Procurement provides funding for the System Program
Office and equipment upgrades to include hardware and software for the
ground sites. The programmed $8.8 million in fiscal year 2017 O&M funds
Air National Guard technician payroll, training, travel, imagery
production equipment, licensing and supplies for the Air National Guard
and Active Duty to keep the Eagle Vision sites operational. It also
funds the EO imagery contract through 31 July 2017 and one contractor
support position.
Programmed fiscal year 2017 O&M funds a portion of the maintenance
and sustainment (M&S) contract. Funded parts of the M&S contract are
ground site architecture, software support, data acquisition, antenna
maintenance and limited notice support for ground sites. Contractor
travel, system engineering and information assurance requirements of
the M&S contract are partially funded. The Air Force plans to use $4.96
million of internal execution year funds to fully fund the EO and M&S
contracts through all of fiscal year 2017. In the future, Eagle Vision
will continue to compete for funding in a constrained fiscal
environment and will seek to maximize capability within resource
constraints.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2017

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

THE HEALTH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL BASE AND ITS ROLE IN PROVIDING READINESS TO THE WARFIGHTER

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in
Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James
Inhofe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee members present: Senators Inhofe, Rounds,
Ernst, Perdue, Kaine, and Hirono.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Senator Kaine and I have a policy where we
start on time. If everybody does that, then everybody shows up.
If they do not, they will not show up. So we are going to go
ahead and do that.
I will have an opening statement, and you will have an
opening statement, and then we will get ready to hear the
presentations. This is going to be very, very significant, this
hearing.
Today, we are joined this afternoon by Lieutenant General
Larry Wyche--I am sure that you been around to see most of
these members; Vice Admiral Grosklags; Vice Admiral Thomas
Moore; Lieutenant General Michael Dana, the Deputy Commandant
of the Marine Corps; Lieutenant General Lee Levy, who is out in
my State of Oklahoma at Tinker Air Force Base.
I thank the witnesses for agreeing to testify today, and I
also thank Ranking Member Senator Kaine for his leadership and
partnership on this issue. We work very well together. We are
old friends.
Just last month, the subcommittee received testimony from
the service Vice Chiefs on the current readiness of Armed
Forces. Now that is what we heard the last time in the first
committee hearing that we had, and I remember one of the
witnesses was reflecting back in the 1970s when we had a hollow
force.
I think, even though it is not all that well-defined, I
think we have a hollow force today. I am very much concerned
about it.
I think this is a very significant hearing to hear from you
folks, and I look forward to your testimony.
Senator Kaine?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all the witnesses. I do appreciate your service
and appreciate you being here today as we take testimony that
will help us as we start to work on the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act]. We want to do it in such
a way that we can restore full spectrum readiness as soon as we
can.
As my chair mentioned, we do work well. We had a hearing
last month, and the Vice Chiefs laid out how the DOD
[Department of Defense] continues to suffer from unacceptable
levels of full spectrum readiness, and we heard a mantra worth
repeating today, that DOD needs more predictable and stable
funding. Readiness is a function of many things. Predictability
is one of the key ingredients.
The five witnesses today are going to help us understand
the direct correlation between the readiness of maintenance
facilities and the degraded operational readiness measured in
terms of decreased training, flying, and steaming days.
Specifically, I am hoping to hear from witnesses about the
impact that unpredictable funding has on workload planning and
how the condition of a degraded shipyard or depot impacts the
ability to retain skilled employees, engineers, and workers.
We have recruiting and retention bonuses for men and women
in uniform, and for good reason. We need to make sure that we
find ways to better retain and reward those serving at home and
abroad.
We often hear about how military platforms need
modernization, and yet so does the infrastructure that
maintains those platforms. So the deferred maintenance backlogs
at shipyards, ammunition plants, air logistics centers,
arsenals, and depots continues to grow and has been left
unaddressed for a very long time.
We have technology challenges as we hope to modernize our
organic industrial base. I think we should pay more attention
to key enablers, this important set of institutions, workforce,
and technology.
This subcommittee and the DOD should work together to
explore news ways for the shipyards and depots to recruit and
retain the highly skilled workforce they need now and in the
future.
Some of the models that we are using to support
cybersecurity and laboratory R&D [research and development]
workforce can be used here as well. For example,
apprenticeships, internships, the scholarship for service
program for civilian service in the DOD, and exchanges with
private industry all have a place to play in getting us that
workforce.
We need to make better use of our innovative partners like
DOD labs, universities, industry, and even places like DARPA
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] to develop the new
technologies to improve efficiency.
I had a great meeting, Mr. Chair, with General Dana
yesterday. We talked about the growth of 3D printing as
something that is really changing some of our functions in a
good way.
One of the first directives that the new administration put
out that has concerned me was the Federal hiring freeze, making
a difficult problem worse, and I will ask about that today.
There were some exemptions, yet even with exemptions, the
hiring freeze impacts and even flies in the face of common
sense, whether it is a child care worker in Germany, or a
commissary worker stocking shelves in Virginia, or an engineer
who does not have direct touch with platforms but nevertheless
is critical to the development of platforms, some of this
impact has been felt.
The hiring freeze, in my view, is an unnecessary layer of
red tape at a time when we should be encouraging the next
generation of Americans to weld holes at shipyards, manufacture
gun tubes at an arsenal, write software code for the most
advanced fighter aircraft on the planet.
So we have to put ourselves in the shoes of high school
grads and college undergrads. The hiring freeze that was
announced was 90 days with TBD to follow, but if you are a
youngster with a lot of talent and you are thinking about what
you want to do, when you look at a Federal workforce that is
going to be dramatically affected by hiring freezes, you would
probably be smart to think about other lines of work.
The bottom line is that the civilian workforce is just as
dedicated to men and women in uniform. Many of them wore combat
helmets before they were part of the civilian workforce, and we
rely on them, as many in the defense industrial and production
facilities, to help us succeed.
Finally, I would just suggest again what I have been
suggesting since I came to the Senate in January 2013. One of
the first votes I cast in February was to turn off the
sequester. It was originally a deal to force us to find a
budget deal, and it was sort of an interesting philosophy. In
order to force ourselves to do something smart, we will agree,
if we do not, to do something stupid.
I never really thought that was a good management
technique, and when I came into the Senate, I said, let's turn
it off and let's just make our budgets about advocating for
priorities. When we decide upon priorities, we will do budgets
based on priorities rather than priorities based on budgets or,
worse, priorities based on budgetary uncertainty.
I think especially it is kind of an interesting time, a new
administration, all levers of power, executive and both Houses,
in the control of one party. We could get rid of the sequester
caps on both defense and nondefense and then just make our case
about what we think the Nation should spend in these areas. I
would hope that we might have that discussion in the full
committee.
But for purposes of today, we are going to hear good
testimony that will go into the record and help us as we get
into the NDAA process.
I am glad my chair has called this committee, and I look
forward to your testimony.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Thank you, Senator Kaine, just so it
will be in the record, when we first heard about the hiring
freeze, of course, the exception being the military, we
immediately got that corrected.
Just take our depot in Oklahoma that General Levy is very
familiar with. They only have one uniformed officer in the
whole place. They have a couple thousand employees. You cannot
make ordnance. You cannot fight a war if you are not making
ordnance.
So those areas had to be corrected immediately and were
corrected immediately.
Now, we are going to hear from each one of you guys, and we
will ask you to try to confine your statements to 5 minutes,
and your entire statements will be made a part of the record.
So we will start with Lieutenant General Larry Wyche, a
Deputy Commanding General of the United States Army Materiel
Command.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LARRY D. WYCHE, USA, DEPUTY
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

LTG Wyche. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the readiness of the Army's organic
industrial base. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the
Honorable Robert Speer, and our Chief of Staff, General Mark
Milley, thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment
to our soldiers, our Army civilians, families, and veterans.
It is an honor for me to appear today along with my
distinguished colleagues from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force.
Since the War of 1812, our Nation has reaped the rewards of
the unique capabilities that reside in our organic industrial
base. Today, 23 ammunition plants, depots, and arsenals produce
combat readiness by manufacturing, repairing, and resetting our
military's equipment.
Our organic industrial base directly employs a skilled
workforce of more than 22,000 people. Many of them are highly
skilled artisans and craftsmen who deliver readiness while
supporting operations impacting all 50 States.
The organic industrial base is often referred to as
America's national security insurance policy. As with all
insurance policies, there must be sufficient coverage in
advance of crises and the confidence that the policy will be
delivered and honored.
The organic industrial base represents the very best
protection, paying dividends in the form of readiness now while
providing the capabilities to regenerate equipment and unit
readiness at the offset of future crises.
The Army's organic industrial base serves to mitigate risks
by providing strategic depth and scalable response during times
of crises by producing materiel, which include ammunition,
explosives, trucks, artillery tubes, tanks, helicopters, and
much more. Our manufacturing base has always delivered state-
of-the-art technology and equipment to our globally engaged
forces.
The two greatest challenges that we face today in our
organic industrial base are budget caps mandated by the Budget
Control Act of 2011 and the lack of consistent and predictable
funding, as evident by repeated continuing resolutions. The
longer the Army operates under the budget cap in an
unpredictable fiscal environment, the more difficult it is to
sustain production and retain a skilled workforce.
We recognize the commitment and steadfast support by the
committee over the last 16 years. Without your support, the
organic industrial base could not have surged when called upon
in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
I would like to thank each distinguished member of this
committee for allowing me to offer this testimony today. Your
continued steadfast support enables us to maintain and
modernize our organic industrial base while simultaneously
preserving and developing the workforce required to provide
value to our Nation in the form of readiness.
General Milley states it so succinctly. The number one
priority for the Army is readiness. The foundation of Army
readiness is a responsive industrial base.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Wyche follows:]

Prepared Statement by LTG Larry Wyche
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
readiness of the Army's Organic Industrial Base. On behalf of our
Acting Secretary, the Honorable Robert Speer, and our Chief of Staff,
General Mark Milley, thank you for your support and demonstrated
commitment to our soldiers, Army civilians, families and veterans.
Since the War of 1812, our great Nation has reaped the rewards of
the unique capabilities resident in our Organic Industrial Base (OIB)
to manufacture and repair the equipment and materiel needed to equip
and sustain our Armed Forces. Today, 23 ammunition plants, depots and
manufacturing arsenals produce combat readiness by manufacturing,
repairing and resetting our military's equipment. These depots, plants
and arsenals possess specialized core competencies and are operated by
a workforce of highly-skilled artisans, some of whom are the 2nd and
3rd generation of a family dedicated to the defense of our nation.
These patriots and the facilities in which they work provide a unique
set of capabilities that enable readiness and the projection of
national power.
The OIB is often referred to as America's National Security
Insurance Policy. As with all insurance policies, there must be
adequate coverage in advance of a crisis and confidence that the policy
will be honored. The OIB represents the very best protection--paying
dividends, in the form of readiness now, while providing the capability
to regenerate equipment and unit readiness at the outset of the future
crises. The OIB directly employs more than 22,000 people in operations
that span all 50 states. The annual economic impact of the OIB on local
economies is in excess of $3.696 billion. As an example, McAlester,
Radford and Iowa Ammunition Plants, as well as the Anniston Army Depot,
collectively introduce $205.1 million into their communities each year.
The Army's Organic Industrial Base serves to mitigate risk by
providing strategic depth and scalable response during times of crisis.
Whenever called upon, the OIB delivers equipment to the tactical point
of need that is maintainable and affordable within the tactical
commander's available resources (soldiers, time and dollars). From
small arms, ammunition and explosives, to trucks, radars, optics and
main battle tanks, our manufacturing base has always delivered state-
of-the-art technology and equipment to our globally engaged forces.
challenges
The two greatest challenges we face today with our OIB are budget
caps mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and a lack of
consistent and predictable funding as evidenced by repeated continuing
resolutions. Sequestration's legacy of imposing cuts without
consideration of national security requirements must be brought to an
end. Our military's readiness is held hostage to it. Also, continuing
resolutions have fostered an era of unpredictable funding that
adversely affects the OIB. A year-long continuing resolution will
preclude the Army from funding Depot Maintenance at the level needed to
rebuild 4 Apache helicopters, 2 Black Hawk helicopters, several Patriot
Air Defense systems, as well as upgrades to weapon system required to
ensure interoperability on the battlefield.
Additionally, the longer the Army operates under the budget caps
and in an unpredictable fiscal environment, the more difficult it is to
sustain production at levels that maintain workforce skill sets.
Exploiting best business practices in our industrial operations
requires consistent levels of funding that facilitate long term
planning.
Furthermore, parts of our manufacturing and facilities
infrastructure are near the end of their life cycles. We need your
continued assistance with modernization and replacement. Since fiscal
year 2005, more than $2 billion has been invested in automation and
robotics to enhance production and ammunition out-load capabilities, as
well as attain energy self-sufficiency. Given the value of the OIB's
infrastructure, keeping it in good order offers a good return on
investment.
maintaining readiness
We recognize and are extremely appreciative of this committee's
steadfast support through the past 16 years of war. Without your
support, the OIB could not have surged when called upon in support of
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, to reset nearly four
million items of equipment--a workload three times that of the workload
during the Vietnam War. To put this in operational terms, that equates
to resetting 105 Brigade Combat Teams.
The capabilities of our adversaries continue to evolve.
General Milley states it most succinctly; ``The Army's number one
priority is readiness.'' A foundation of Army readiness is a vibrant
and responsive industrial base. We cannot afford to let our warfighting
capabilities fall into decay because within the OIB reside one-of-a-
kind resources that cannot be easily revived or replicated, and
certainly not in time to respond to a national crisis. Now more than
ever, we must enhance our readiness through continued investment in our
organic capabilities in order to ensure our force can conduct and
sustain a combined arms fight in unified operations. In that way we can
deter our adversaries and, importantly, win decisively without undue
risk to the force.
For example, Nitrocellulose is a key compound used in making
explosives. The Radford Army Ammunition Plant is the only known
manufacturer of nitrocellulose in North America. McAlester Army
Ammunition Plant is so proficient at manufacturing certain munitions
that the Navy and the Air Force ask them to produce ordinance to meet
both their wartime and training requirements. Watervliet Arsenal is the
only manufacturer of large caliber cannon tubes in this hemisphere.
Every howitzer at Ft. Sill has a gun tube produced at Watervliet. In
fact, in 2013 as the Army was preparing to upgrade the M109A6 self-
propelled howitzers to the A7 configuration, corrosion was discovered
in the bore evacuators on the cannon barrels. The Army determined that
nearly 75 percent of these Paladin howitzers in the inventory were non-
mission capable due to bore evacuator corrosion. In nine months' time,
Watervliet repaired 157 of the 171 barrels that were repairable and
replaced 73 of the 88 that were not. The skilled and determined
workforce, combined with the unique capabilities resident in the
arsenal, averted a crisis.
Since 2003, Army equipment reset requirements have generated $29.5
billion in work for the OIB. Orders from the U.S. Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps have generated another $5.7 billion in revenue. In 2015
alone, the Army's Organic Industrial Base provided $698 million in
joint depot work and $504 million in joint parts, demonstrating its
impact on not only Army readiness but the readiness of all our Armed
Forces. The output of our depots, plants and arsenals not only provides
strategic depth but produces direct economic impact on a supply chain
of over 11 thousand vendors--many of which are small businesses.
While we are asking for your support, it is important to note that
we are working feverishly to maximize the impact of the resources you
have provided. In the past four years, the Army has reduced its
inventory of secondary items by 9.2 billion. The OIB has realized $4.5
billion in financial benefits like cost avoidance through continuous
process improvement projects since 2011.
As retrograde and reset operations slow, the Army must find
innovative ways to reshape itself and leverage its investments with
partners from other parts of DOD, government and the private sector
when missions, goals, and requirements align. Preserving the workforce,
optimizing processes and aligning workload to unit readiness and
sustainment needs must be prioritized as we divest obsolete systems and
equipment. Simultaneously, we must continue to develop the capabilities
required to meet future requirements.
closing
This committee, more than anyone else, knows that the world is more
dangerous and unpredictable than it has ever been. While our nation's
greatest minds work hard to predict the future we are continually
surprised by the unpredictable. In every instance of crisis, the OIB
has responded by providing solutions to meet unanticipated demands. If
the OIB is to continue to deliver when our nation needs it most, we
must invest now. Consistent and predictable funding to preserve,
maintain and modernize our critical capabilities provides the last line
of defense against the unknown, while we continue to produce readiness
that guarantees that we will win wherever and whenever our nation
calls.
I would like to thank each distinguished member of the Committee
for allowing me to offer this testimony today. Your continued steadfast
support enables us to maintain and modernize the OIB, and
simultaneously preserve and develop the workforce required to provide
value to our nation in the form of future readiness and deterrence.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Wyche.
We will now hear from Vice Admiral Grosklags, Commander,
United States Naval Air Systems Command.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL PAUL A. GROSKLAGS, USN, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND

VADM Grosklags. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Kaine, distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today to
discuss specifically, in my case, naval aviation and some of
the readiness challenges that we face. I know those challenges,
as you mentioned in your opening statement, are no surprise to
this subcommittee, as both the Vice Chief and the Assistant
Commandant testified to that effect about a month ago.
About our aviation depots specifically--and we call them
Fleet Readiness Centers, so I might use those terms
interchangeably. They are a critical element in our overall
readiness recovery plan. They are continuing a steady recovery
from fiscal year 2013 primarily and the impacts of furloughs
and hiring freezes associated with sequestration, to your
point, Senator Kaine. But also, they are recovering from years
of limited and uncertain funding.
Today, they are also increasing their workload. The demand
on them actually has never been higher. Sixteen years of
wartime activity, the challenging material condition of the
aircraft that are coming in the front door as well as the
extension of our aircraft service lives well beyond what we had
originally planned to utilize them to. A case in point that I
think most of you are familiar with are our F-18 A through D
models.
While we will always remain challenged as long as we are
flying with our F-18 A through D models in terms of keeping
them ready, we have stabilized that particular depot production
line. We have become predictable in our delivery of those
assets back to the fleet. By the end of this Year, beginning of
next calendar year, we will have met the fleet's requirement
for in-service or in-reporting
F-18s.
So while we are turning the corner there on F-18s, as I
mentioned earlier, the overall workload continues to increase,
as we see increasing demand signals for V-22s, H-1s, other type
model series, as well as component repair VR [virtual reality]
supply system.
But it is also important that we all recognize that getting
our depots back up on step really only addresses one piece of
the readiness equation. We have to be equally focused on our
supply support, our maintenance planning, our maintenance
publications, our support equipment, the training and
qualifications of our sailors and marines who maintain these
aircraft, and I could go on.
But those things are just as important as our depot
capability. The funding for those efforts is through a variety
of individual line items. We collectively tend to call those
our enabler accounts. As the Department has struggled to
balance our competing requirements and limited resources for
the last number of years, funding in these accounts has been
severely constrained, and I can tell you that readiness has
suffered as a direct result of that lack of funding.
In our fiscal year 2017 request, the Department has taken a
major step forward toward addressing the required funding for
these enabler accounts. The request for additional
appropriations further augments that request and our recovery
efforts. Because of that, if we end up operating under a full-
year continuing resolution, there will be a significant
negative impact to our ability to continue our overall naval
aviation readiness recovery efforts.
As you said, Senator Kaine, in your opening, stable,
predictable, and sufficient funding is absolutely critical to
our readiness recovery efforts. I look forward to working with
the subcommittee to that end, and I look forward to your
questions.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Grosklags.
We will now hear from Vice Admiral Thomas Moore, United
States Navy, Commander United States Naval Sea Systems Command.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS J. MOORE, USN, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND

VADM Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, ranking
member, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of
the 73,000 men and women in the Naval Sea Systems Command, I
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the health of the
industrial base and its critical role in maintaining the
readiness of our fleet.
The Naval Sea System Command's number one priority is the
on-time delivery of ships and submarines to the fleet. At any
given time, about one-third of the Navy's fleet is undergoing
either a major depot maintenance availability in one of our
four naval shipyards and private sector surface ship repair
shipyards or conducting pier-side intermediate maintenance.
Our naval shipyards and our private sector partners are the
cornerstone of that effort to deliver our ships and submarines
on time. The 33,850 men and women who work in our naval
shipyards and the workers in our private sector partners today
are true national assets.
The high operational tempo in the post-9/11 era combined
with reduced readiness funding and consistent uncertainty about
when these reduced budgets would be approved have created a
large mismatch between the capacity of our public shipyards
today and their required work. This mismatch has resulted in a
large maintenance backlog which has grown from 4.7 million man
days to 5.3 million man days between 2011 and 2017.
Today, despite hiring 16,500 new workers since 2012, the
naval shipyards are more than 2,000 people short of the
capacity required to execute the projected workload, stabilize
the growth and the maintenance backlog, and eventually
eliminate that backlog.
[The information referred to follows:]

``The high operational tempo in the post 9/11 era combined with
reduced readiness funding and consistent uncertainty about when these
reduced budgets will be approved have created a large maintenance
mismatch between the capacity in our public shipyards and the required
work. This has resulted in a large maintenance workload, which has
grown from 4.7 million man-days in 2011 to a planned 5.3 million man-
days in 2017. Today, despite hiring 16,500 new workers since 2012,
Naval Shipyards are more than 2,000 people short of the capacity
required to execute the projected workload, stabilize the growth in the
maintenance backlog and eventually eliminate that backlog.''

This man day shortfall coupled with reduced workforce
experience levels--and today, half of my workforce has been in
naval shipyards for less than 5 years--and shipyard
productivity issues have all impacted fleet readiness through
the late delivery of ships and submarines.
However, although we face many challenges, the challenges
are not insurmountable. Years of sustained deployments and
uncertain funding have created a readiness debt that we must
begin to address today.
In our naval shipyards and private sector, that begins with
defining the full maintenance requirement, matching the budget
to that requirement, ensuring the capacity to perform work
matches that workload, and improving the productivity of our
workforce through improved training and infrastructure
investments that must be made to modernize our naval shipyards.
We can and we must tackle each of these issues today and
sustain that focus into the future. Only then will our
industrial base be able to provide the readiness required of
our Navy today and into the future.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Moore.
[The combined prepared statement by Vice Admiral Paul A.
Grosklags and Vice Admiral Thomas J. Moore follows:]

Combined Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Paul A. Grosklags and Vice
Admiral Thomas J. Moore
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of
the Sub-Committee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify on the
current state of Navy readiness and the challenges we face today and in
the future.
Before we discuss Navy's readiness challenges and our plans to
address them, it is important to understand our present situation.
Globally present and modern, our Navy provides timely, agile, and
effective options to national leaders as they seek to advance American
security and prosperity. Today, however, the ongoing demand for naval
forces continues to grow, which will require the Navy to continue to
make tough choices. In the classic trade space for any service
(readiness, modernization and force structure), readiness has become
the bill payer in an increasingly complex and fast-paced security
environment. To address these realities, the Navy has identified
investments to restore the readiness of the fleet today to shore up
what we have. At the same time, we cannot restore the fleet to full
health without also updating our platforms and weapons to better
address current and future threats, and evaluating the right size of
the Navy so that it can sustain the tempo of operations that has become
the norm. The Navy is actively working on plans for the future fleet
with Secretary Mattis and his team, and we look forward to discussing
those plans with you when they are approved.
To characterize where we are today, we would say it's a tale of two
navies. As we travel to see our sailors in the United States and
overseas, it is clear to me that our deployed units are operationally
ready to respond to any challenge. They understand their role in our
nation's security and the security of our allies, and they have the
training and resources they need to win any fight that might arise.
Unfortunately, our visits to units and installations back home in the
United States paint a different picture. As our sailors and Navy
civilians, who are just as committed as their colleagues afloat,
prepare to ensure our next ships and aircraft squadrons deploy with all
that they need, the strain is significant and growing. For a variety of
reasons, our shipyards and aviation depots are struggling to get our
ships and airplanes through maintenance periods on time. In turn, these
delays directly impact the time Sailors have to train and hone their
skills prior to deployment. These challenges are further exacerbated by
low stocks of critical parts and fleet-wide shortfalls in ordnance, and
an aging shore infrastructure. So while our first team on deployment is
ready, our bench--the depth of our forces at home--is thin. It has
become clear to us that the Navy's overall readiness has reached its
lowest level in many years.
There are three main drivers of our readiness problems: 1)
persistent, high operational demand for naval forces; 2) funding
reductions; and 3) consistent uncertainty about when those reduced
budgets will be approved.
The operational demand for our Navy continues to be high, while the
fleet has gotten smaller. Between 2001 and 2015, the Navy was able to
keep an average of 100 ships at sea each day, despite a 14 percent
decrease in the size of the battle force. The Navy is smaller today
than it has been in the last 99 years. Maintaining these deployment
levels as ships have been retired has taken a significant toll on our
Sailors and their families, as well as on our equipment.
The second factor degrading Navy readiness is the result of several
years of constrained funding levels for our major readiness accounts,
largely due to fiscal pressures imposed by the Budget Control Act of
2011. Although the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 provided temporary
relief, in fiscal year 2017 the Navy budget was $5 billion lower than
in fiscal year 2016. This major reduction drove very hard choices,
including the difficult decision to reduce readiness accounts by over
$2 billion this year.
The third primary driver of reduced readiness is the inefficiency
imposed by the uncertainty around when budgets will actually be
approved. The inability to adjust funding levels as planned, or to
commit to longer-term contracts, creates additional work and drives up
costs. This results in even less capability for any given dollar we
invest, and represents yet another tax on our readiness. We are paying
more money and spending more time to maintain a less capable Navy.
We have testified before about the maintenance and training
backlogs that result from high operational tempo, and how addressing
those backlogs has been further set back by budget cuts and fiscal
uncertainty. Our attempts to restore stability and predictability to
our deployment cycles have been challenged both by constrained funding
levels and by operational demands that remain unabated.
Although we remain committed to return to a seven month deployment
cycle as the norm, the need to support the fight against ISIS in 2016
led us to extend the deployments of the Harry S Truman and Theodore
Roosevelt Carrier Strike Groups to eight and eight and a half months,
respectively. Similar extensions apply to the Amphibious Ready Groups
which support Marine Expeditionary Units. This collective pace of
operations has increased wear and tear on ships, aircraft and crews
and, adding to the downward readiness spiral, has decreased the time
available for maintenance and modernization. Deferred maintenance has
led to equipment failures, and to larger-than-projected work packages
for our shipyards and aviation depots. This has forced us to remove
ships and aircraft from service for extended periods, which in turn
increases the tempo for the rest of the fleet, which causes the fleets
to utilize their ships and airframes at higher-than-projected rates,
which increases the maintenance work, which adds to the backlogs, and
so on.
Reversing this vicious cycle and restoring the short-term readiness
of the fleet will require sufficient and predictable funding. This
funding would allow our pilots to fly the hours they need to remain
proficient, and ensure that we can conduct the required maintenance on
our ships. It would also enable the Navy to restore stocks of necessary
parts, getting more ships to sea and better preparing them to stay
deployed as required.
naval shipyards
One of the key components of Navy readiness for our public and
private repair shipyards is our ability to effectively plan and execute
maintenance on ships and submarines. This is reflected in the Navy's
Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), which places maintenance at the
beginning of the OFRP cycle in recognition of the fact that our
deployed readiness is dependent on our ability to complete the required
maintenance on time and on schedule before ships enter their training
and deployment cycle. As the Vice Chief of Naval Operations testified
last month, our shipyards are struggling to deliver ships out of
availabilities on time and back to the Fleet. When we do not get it
right it strains our ability to train and deploy our forces
Naval Sea Systems Command's number one priority is the on-time
delivery of ships and submarines to the Fleet. At any given time, about
one-third of the Navy's Fleet is undergoing either a major depot
maintenance availability in one of our four Naval Shipyards and private
sector surface ship repair shipyards or conducting pier side
intermediate maintenance. Regardless of where the work is taking place,
NAVSEA is working every day to improve maintenance throughput so that
our warfighters have the platforms and weapon systems they need to
defend our nation.
Our long term success in delivering ships and submarines out of
maintenance on time depends on three important elements: determining
the full maintenance requirement, aligning the maintenance budget to
this requirement so we can match the capacity in our shipyards to the
workload, and improving the overall productivity of our maintenance
workforce through improved training, processes, tools and
infrastructure.
Long-term continuing resolutions, as we have seen over the past
eight years, coupled with a constrained budget environment have
exacerbated our ability to effectively plan and execute ship
maintenance. Receiving the complete budget mid-way through the year
leads to significant inefficiencies, such as delays in material and
parts procurement for future availabilities, and results in significant
missed opportunities in the year of execution. A stable, predictive
funding environment is imperative to support the effective planning and
preparations for both current and future maintenance requirements.
The high operational tempo in the post 9/11 era combined with
reduced readiness funding and consistent uncertainty about when these
reduced budgets will be approved have created a large maintenance
mismatch between the capacity in our public shipyards and the required
work. This has resulted in a large maintenance backlog which has grown
from 4.7 million man-days to a planned 5.3 million man-days between
2011 and 2017. Today, despite hiring 16,500 new workers since 2012,
Naval Shipyards are more than 2,000 people short of the capacity
required to execute the projected workload, stabilize the growth in the
maintenance backlog and eventually eliminate that backlog. This
shortfall, coupled with reduced workforce experience levels (about 50
percent of the workforce has less than five years of experience) and
shipyard productivity issues have impacted Fleet readiness through the
late delivery of ships and submarines. The capacity limitations and the
overall priority of work toward our Ballistic Missile Submarines
(SSBNs) and Aircraft Carriers (CVN) have resulted in our Attack
Submarines (SSNs) absorbing much of the burden, causing several
submarine availabilities that were originally scheduled to last between
22 and 25 months to require 45 months or more to complete. These delays
not only remove the submarines from the Fleet for extended periods of
time, but also have an impact on the crews' training and morale. This
situation reached a boiling point this past summer when in order to
balance the workload, the Navy decided to defer a scheduled maintenance
availability on the USS Boise (SSN 764) that will effectively take her
off line until 2020 or later. Although the Navy has not made a final
decision on Boise, she will likely be contracted to the private sector
at additional cost to the Navy in 2019.
The Naval Shipyards have seen a large influx of new hires over the
past five years. As of today, half of my public shipyard workers have
less than five years' experience. With further growth anticipated in
the coming years, we are taking steps to accelerate the training
process. For example, all Naval Shipyards have implemented, and are
expanding the use of, Learning Centers with realistic mockups in a
``safe-to-learn'' environment. New employees are now able to support
shipyard-unique work within one to four months of being hired, rather
than one to two years under traditional training methods.
In addition to hiring enough people to execute the workload, we
must also invest in our Naval Shipyard infrastructure. Many of our
Naval Shipyards have buildings and equipment that are degraded or
obsolete. With today's exceptionally complicated ships and systems, we
are finding that our infrastructure does not meet the needs of a modern
day repair facility. NAVSEA has identified future facility
modernization and improvements required to support newer classes of
ships, including the Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines and Gerald
R. Ford-class aircraft carriers. The Naval Shipyards' outdated
Information Technology and Cybersecurity departments are also a
critical component of this effort.
The challenges faced by the private sector yards that perform
maintenance on our surface ships are very similar to our Naval
Shipyards. They, even more than the Naval Shipyards, are impacted by
the uncertainty around when budgets will actually be approved. Despite
these challenges, we have seen improvements in private sector
maintenance. We are driving stability into our processes by working
with third-party planners to increase our ability to conduct advanced
planning, and the shift to competitively awarded fixed-price contracts
has reduced cost and added discipline to the process that has limited
growth and improved on-time performance by 40 percent since 2014.
Although we face many challenges, they are not insurmountable.
Years of sustained deployments and uncertain funding have created a
readiness debt that we must begin to address today. In our Naval
Shipyards and private sector, that begins with defining the full
maintenance requirement, matching the budget to that requirement,
ensuring the capacity to perform work matches the workload, and
improving the productivity of our workforce. We can and we must tackle
each of these issues today and sustain that focus into the future. Only
then will we provide the readiness required of our Navy today and into
the future.
naval aviation fleet readiness centers
The Navy and Marine Corps are addressing Naval Aviation readiness
through seven inter-related Lines of Effort (LOE)--(1) Fleet Readiness
Center (FRC) Capability and Capacity, (2) Depot-level In Service Repair
of aircraft, (3) FRC Supply and Component Repair, (4) Aircraft
Utilization, (5) Aircraft Material Condition, (6) Flight Line Supply,
and (7) Flight Line Maintenance.
Sustained improvement in the readiness of our Naval Aviation forces
requires successful execution of multiple ongoing activities across
each of these LOEs.
Full and predictable resourcing of these readiness improvement LOEs
is essential to re-building Naval Aviation readiness to the level
required to support COCOM mission execution objectives.
Specifically, we must maintain a focus on (1) investment in the
facilities and workforce at our FRCs, (2) achieving full funding of our
``enabler'' sustainment accounts (listed at end of this statement), and
(3) maximizing funding for supply support.
Naval Aviation's FRCs execute Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul
(MRO) activities for a broad range of Aircraft, Engines, Components and
Support Equipment (SE)--providing these products directly to our
sailors and marines in support of mission readiness. The capability and
capacity of our FRCs are still recovering from prior years of limited
sustainment account funding, and effects of fiscal year 2013
sequestration driven furloughs and associated hiring freeze. While
working to regain previous levels of output on all product lines,
meeting production throughput requirements remains challenged by an
increased workload demand driven by the degraded material condition of
inducted aircraft and components resulting from 16 years of war-time
activity combined with the effects of extending aircraft service lives.
To increase production output by reducing turn-around-time, our
FRCs are implementing continuous process improvement initiatives,
including best commercial practices such as Critical Chain Project
Management, across all of our aircraft and component production lines.
In fiscal year 2017 our FRCs are increasing their workforce size as
a continuation of recovery from fiscal year 2013 reductions and in
direct response to increased aircraft and component workload. Approved
exemptions to the current hiring freeze for depot artisan and
production support personnel is enabling us to continue hiring;
however, normal workforce attrition, regional competition with
industry, and regional economic conditions combine to challenge our
hiring plans in some locations.
Two issues that will continue to negatively impact our ability to
meet current and future FRC workload demand are (1) aging facilities
and support equipment, and (2) predictability of funding. Accurate
planning of FRC workload requirements 12-24 months in advance is
critical to ensuring we have the right people, facilities, and tooling
in place when an aircraft or component enters the MRO process. The long
term continuing resolutions we have faced in recent years, particularly
when already operating in a very constrained funding environment,
directly impact our ability to effectively plan, and then efficiently
execute, aircraft and component repair schedules.
Creating a path to full resourcing of those accounts which support
FRC production and overall aircraft readiness on the flight line is
critical. These accounts support activities ranging from procurement of
new and repaired spare parts to maintaining the currency of technical
and repair manuals used in the FRCs and on the flight line. As we have
painfully experienced over the last 5-7 years, being underfunded and
``unbalanced'' in these accounts has resulted in significantly
decreased flight line readiness.
The maintenance, engineering, and logistics professionals working
at our FRCs and supporting sustainment efforts across Naval Aviation,
including our sailors and marines on the flight line, continue to do an
amazing job of optimizing readiness within the constraints of aging
equipment, increasing demand, and constrained / uncertain resources. We
look forward to working with Congress to remove barriers to their
success.
Naval Aviation Sustainment Accounts
Flying Hour Program (1A1A/1A2A)--Aviation Depot Level Repairables,
consumables, fuel Air Systems Support (1A4N)--Engineering
Investigations, tech pub updates, maintenance planning, Reliability
Centered Maintenance, Bill of Material updates, etc
Aircraft Depot Maintenance (1A5A)--Scheduled aircraft, engine,
component repairs; In-Service Repairs
Aircraft Depot Operations (1A6A)--Cost Reduction Initiatives,
Preservation
Aviation Logistics (1A9A)--Performance Based Logistics / Contractor
Logistics Services for F-35, V-22, E-6, KC-130
Technical Data and Engineering Services (1A3A)--Field tech reps,
Maintenance Readiness Teams
Equipment Maintenance (1C7C)--Support equipment rework, calibration
of test equipment
Aviation Spares (APN-6)--Procurement of interim and outfitting
spares

We will now hear from Lieutenant General Michael Dana, U.S.
Marine Corps and Deputy Commandant Installations and Logistics
for the Marine Corps.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL G. DANA, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS, UNITED STATES MARINE
CORPS

LtGen Dana. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member
Kaine, distinguished Senators.
The first thing I would like to start off with is a thank
you. I have Master Gunnery Sergeant Baughman here. That is 25
years of Marine Corps experience. I have 36 years.
What I want to pass to you is, in this entire time I have
been in the Marine Corps, the American people and Congress have
taken care of us. Everything from Desert Storm to Somalia, to
Iraq and Afghanistan, we have gotten everything we need, and we
greatly appreciate the support.
I wanted to preface my comments by saying that, because we
do have a few asks. We are combat ready to go. We are the fight
tonight force. But there are four things I would like to cover
quickly.
First, the accelerated aging of our equipment set. I said
to Senator Kaine yesterday, normally vehicles, MTVRs [Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacements], trucks that would go 1,200 to
1,500 miles in a peacetime environment, we were racking up
15,000 to 18,000 miles per vehicle, so that accelerated aging
induces a cost.
Good news for the depot. Senator Perdue, sir, thanks for
the great support there. But it generates work.
Second is the complexity of today's systems. If you look at
when I came in, in 1982, an M151 jeep, very simple, four
cylinders, 16 to 18 miles a gallon. The problem was it was not
very survivable, so we came up with the MRAP [Mine-Resistant
Ambush Protected].
But the MRAP is a system of systems, and many of the combat
platforms we have today are systems of systems, so you need
more maintenance, more technicians, more money to keep those
systems moving.
Next is the gradual decline in depot funding. We
appreciate, we greatly appreciate, the 80 percent that we get,
in some cases 84 or 88. But we are very confident in our
requirements. So when we generate 100 percent requirement for
our equipment set, anything less than that leads to a gradual
decline in readiness for that year.
Last is the decline of our facilities. We have 29,000
facilities in the Marine Corps; 4,300 of those are in poor or
fair condition.
Like the Commandant, because he is the Commandant, he has a
plan, and we are executing that plan. It is an installation
reset strategy, which I talk to you more in detail more later,
sir. But the bottom line is, he wants us to help ourselves
before we ask you for help. So when we come to you for
requirements, sir, it is a hard and fast, fact-based
requirement.
I look forward to the questions. Thanks for having us here
today.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Dana
follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Michael G. Dana
Lieutenant General Dana was promoted to his current rank and
assumed his duties as Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics
in September 2015.
Lieutenant General Dana was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in
June of 1982 following graduation from Union College in Schenectady,
New York.
From 1983-1986, Lieutenant General Dana was assigned to 2nd Tank
Battalion, deploying with Battalion Landing Team 1/8 to the
Mediterranean. In 1986 he was assigned as the Combat Cargo Officer
aboard USS Duluth (LPD-6), deploying to the Western Pacific with
Battalion Landing Team 1/9 embarked.
From 1988-1991, Lieutenant General Dana served as the Logistics
Officer for Battalion Landing Team 3/1 and as a company commander and
S-3 with 1st Landing Support Battalion from 1992-1994 (Desert Storm/
Operation Restore Hope). From 1996-1999 he served with the Standing
Joint Task Force at Camp Lejeune, as an ISAF Plans Officer in the
Former Republic of Yugoslavia and as the II MEF G-4 Operations Officer.
After a tour with MAWTS-1, Lieutenant General Dana commanded MWSS-371
from 2000-2002.
From 2003-2005 he was assigned to III MEF, serving as the G-7/3D
MEB Chief of Staff, III MEF Deputy G-3, and OIC of the MARCENT
Coordination Element at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.
From 2005-2007, Lieutenant General Dana commanded MWSG-37,
including a deployment to Iraq from 2006-2007. From 2010-2012
Lieutenant General Dana served as the Commanding General, 2d Marine
Logistics Group, including a deployment to Afghanistan from 2011-2012.
He was then assigned as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Logistics
(LP) until October 2012.
Joint assignments include service with EUCOM, NORTHCOM and, most
recently, PACOM. Lieutenant General Dana is a graduate of Amphibious
Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of
Advanced Warfighting and the Naval War College.
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine and distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today and to report on the readiness of your
United States Marine Corps.
I have the privilege to lead an Installations & Logistics (I&L)
team that delivers the installations, logistics, and ground equipment
readiness that ensures the Marine Corps remains capable of ``Making
Marines and Winning our Nation's Battles''. We are grateful for the
continued support of Congress and of this subcommittee for your
appreciation of this pivotal role to our nation's defense and in
ensuring we remain ready when the nation is least ready.
your marine corps today
Today, your Marine Corps continues to operate at the same tempo as
it has over the past 15 years. With a dynamic and complex operating
environment, the Joint Force requires and actively employs our
expeditionary capabilities. During the past year, your marines executed
approximately 185 operations, 140 security cooperation events with our
partners and allies, and participated in 65 major exercises. Nearly
23,000 marines remain stationed or deployed west of the International
Date Line to maintain regional stability and deterrence in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific region. Our Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) support the
joint force by executing counterterrorism (CT) operations in Iraq and
North Africa, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) support in Japan and Haiti, and remain forward deployed to
respond to crises and emerging threats.
marine corps risk
As we operate around the globe today, fiscal constraints and
instability have impacted our readiness. As resources have diminished,
the Marine Corps has protected the near-term readiness of its deployed
and next-to-deploy units in order to meet its operational commitments.
Since the conclusion of OIF and OEF, the Marine Corps has not had the
benefit of an ``inter-war'' period to reconstitute and modernize our
force. Fifteen years of continuous combat has placed tremendous stress
on the force, our Installations, our equipment, and our readiness.
installation and logistics overview
In support of Marine Corps operations, our bases and stations are
collectively the ``launching pad'' that produces and deploys ready,
trained forces. Further, our enterprise ground equipment management
efforts provide an end-to-end, total life cycle process to account for
and maintain-sustain our gear to ensure a high state of readiness.
In terms of total Marine Corps Force serviced on our Installations,
there are over 180,000 marines, 176,000 dependents, 29,000 civilians,
and 140,000 retirees. The support ranges from 23,000 housing units, 600
barracks, 56 fitness centers, 43 child development centers, 5,284 miles
of road, 146 hangars, 58 runways and close to 15,000 buildings. We are
responsible for the management of a $3.8 Billion annual portfolio of
programs, systems, and projects in support of marines and their
military equipment and supplies valued at over $30 billion and real
property valued at over $70 billion.
installation risk and condition
The state of facilities is the single most important investment to
support training, operations, and quality of life. The Marine Corps has
24 bases and stations valued at over $52 billion. We greatly appreciate
the approximately $1.5 billion a year we received from 2007-2014; this
investment supported new barracks, new aviation platforms, and
improvements to our infrastructure. However, since 2015 our MILCON
budget has averaged approximately $570 million per year, well below our
requirements. Based on the current fiscal landscape, we foresee $5.4
billion in requirements with only $1.1 billion in available funding
over the next 6 years. At the current level of investment, it would
take over 204 years to recapitalize our infrastructure.
In addition to MILCON funding, our installations require the
requisite amount of Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization (FSRM) money. Due to historic funding challenges, we have
seen our FSRM backlog grow to $9 billion. The effect of this shortfall
is that of 29,000 facilities in the Marine Corps, 15 percent or 4,300
facilities are in poor or failing condition. Overall Facilities
Condition Index (FCI) across the Marine Corps is 82 percent (Fair).
At current funding levels, we are able to complete new construction
projects supporting the ``Rebalance to the Pacific'', the fielding of
new aviation platforms such as the F-35 and V-22, and renovating some
of our worst barracks; however, without additional investments there
will be long term impacts on support to training, operations,
logistics, and ultimately readiness. Many projects to replace existing
inadequate and obsolete facilities that directly support operational
forces are unaffordable. We are deferring critical infrastructure
required to support training, operations, and logistics.
To offset these challenges, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
signed an Infrastructure Reset Strategy in November 2016 to reverse the
ongoing decline in Marine Corps Facilities
condition and close the growing gap between facilities requirements
and available resources. The Commandant's vision is to sustain
infrastructure and installations as capable, resilient, right-sized
platforms to generate force readiness and project combat power.
Although we have a comprehensive strategy, we will continue to
prioritize investment of limited resources based on mission and
condition. Further, current levels of investment will cause the
condition of our facilities to degrade as we defer sustainment and it
will lead to more costly repairs and restoration costs. We do
appreciate the additional $154 million provided this year for hangars
at Miramar. We would appreciate Congress' continued support of our
optimization and modernization efforts.
ground equipment risk and condition
The prioritization of current readiness also comes at the expense
of equipment modernization, which equates to future readiness. Further,
the high op-tempo of the last 15 years of operations has strained our
equipment set and has caused accelerated aging. While our equipment has
performed well, the dual challenges of equipment age and continued
wear-and-tear has led to ground equipment readiness challenges.
Adequate maintenance funding is stretched to maintain readiness across
the depth of the force.
Due to the tremendous support of Congress, the reset of our
equipment is 92 percent complete. While this is a significant
accomplishment, the constrained fiscal environment has prevented us
from reconstituting and modernizing the force. Our most important
ground legacy capabilities continue to age as modernization efforts are
not moving quickly enough.
We have extended the service life of older platforms such as the
Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) and Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) well
beyond expected retirement dates; both platforms remain operational due
to the extraordinary sustainment efforts of our marines and civilians,
as well as continued investment in service-life extension programs. Our
AAVs are now more than four decades old. Our AAV Survivability Upgrade
(SU) Program will sustain and marginally enhance the capability of the
legacy AAV, but this does not remove the need to modernize this nearly
obsolete platform. Additionally, the average age of LAV's within our
inventory is 26 years; the oldest vehicle is 34 years old. As of today,
there is no program identified to replace this capable, but outdated
platform and we continue to incur increasing costs to extend its life.
Although resourcing of depot and field level maintenance has kept
pace with requirements over the last decade with both baseline and OCO
funding, sufficient funding is required in the future to maintain
ground equipment readiness due to the aging of our equipment . Four
critical weapon systems (AAV, LAV, Tank, and M777 Howitzer) account for
approximately 70 percent of the Marine Corps' depot maintenance budget
and these costs are steadily rising. For instance, the AAV depot
sustainment plan cost $49 million in fiscal year 2011 and now costs $82
million.
Our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) is another
example of the ground equipment readiness challenges we face today.
Thirty years ago, the HMMWV was not developed through the prism of
asymmetric warfare and improvised explosive devices (IED). Increased
weight on the chassis with the armored variant and a challenging
operating environment has led to higher sustainment costs. Continued
support for our procurement requests to purchase the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) to replace our HMMWVs is appreciated. Another
challenging subset of equipment is high demand/low density (HD/LD)
items, primarily communication assets and specialized tool sets, which
support the ability of units to operate in dispersed locations.
Our Depot Production Plants at Albany and Barstow are an essential
component to our ground equipment readiness strategy and have been
instrumental in maintaining the readiness of our equipment. However, we
can only fund our depot maintenance account to 80 percent of the
identified requirement which has led to a backlog. To offset this, we
are instituting a refined conditions based methodology to better inform
future maintenance actions.
Our constrained maintenance funding has made it difficult to keep
up with the level of maintenance required. Critical, aging weapons
systems, such as tanks, AAVs, and artillery, are increasingly costly to
maintain resulting in readiness levels near 70 percent. To maintain
readiness levels across our entire equipment set, available readiness
funding is stretched. Your support of our readiness funding requests
will improve combat equipment availability in support of operations and
training. As we look to the future, our enterprise ground equipment
management efforts will align USMC material requirements with available
resources to ensure the Marine Corps is the most cost effective and
cost efficient steward of the US taxpayer dollar.
The Marine Corps has a plan to regain and sustain unit readiness;
and with your continued support, we can achieve our organizational
readiness requirements leading to a balanced Marine Corps that is
healthy and is able to train and operate with needed equipment for all
assigned missions.
innovation
While we are focused on readiness for today, we are innovating to
achieve readiness in the future. We are implementing unmanned
platforms, 3D printing and predictive supply/maintenance capabilities
to optimize tactical distribution, modernize the supply chain, and
increase equipment readiness. Within our Installations, we are moving
towards ``smart cities'' and advanced transportation technologies to
reduce operating costs. Across the Installations and Logistics
portfolio, we are leveraging the rapid advancements in technology
available today. Most importantly, we are committed to delivering these
future capabilities to ensure sustainable readiness.
conclusion
On behalf of all of our marines, sailors--many deployed and in
harm's way today--and their families and the civilians that support
their service, we thank the Congress and this committee for this
opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Marine Corps faces. Your
support of our funding requests will provide the ``ready bench'' our
Nation requires and the infrastructure the force needs to train and
sustain itself. Our future readiness relies upon sufficient procurement
and modernization funding. With the support of the 115th Congress, we
will move forward with our plan and vision to ensure your Marine Corps
is organized, manned, trained and equipped to make marines and win our
Nation's battles.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Dana.
Now Lieutenant General Lee Levy II, United States Air
Force, Commander of the Air Force Sustainment Center, United
States Air Force Materiel Command, and very busy at Tinker Air
Force Base.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE K. LEVY II, USAF,
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SUSTAINMENT CENTER, UNITED STATES AIR
FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND

Lt. Gen. Levy. Good afternoon, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
Member Kaine, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Like
General Dana and my colleagues to the right, thank you for
allowing us this opportunity to testify before you on the
readiness of our United States Air Force.
On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the Honorable Lisa
Disbrow, and our Chief of Staff, Dave Goldfein, thanks for your
support and demonstrated commitment to our airmen, our Air
Force civilian families and veterans.
Without apology, your United States Air Force has delivered
global vigilance, global reach, and global power for the
Nation. We are always in demand, and we are always there. We
supported joint and coalition forces throughout every
operation, and we have secured the homeland through continuous
surveillance and air defense.
We have done all this with a force that is now 30 percent
smaller than at the outset of Desert Storm and aircraft and
infrastructure that continues to age and present new
challenges. Literally, we are finding ways to do more with
less.
Your total force airmen, Active Duty, National Guard, Air
Force Reserve, and our dedicated civil servants, are amazing,
and they continue to seek new and innovative ways to get the
job done.
Make no mistake, your United States Air Force is ready to
fight tonight. But I am concerned about our ability to sustain
our Air Force to fight tomorrow.
Threats to the Nation and our vital national interests
continue to evolve and adapt present formidable challenges that
threaten us and our allies. As we develop advanced airspace and
cyber capability for tomorrow, we must continue to adapt our
readiness, sustainment, and logistics enterprise as well.
As General Wyche said, the organic industrial base is the
Nation's insurance policy. It underpins our readiness to fight
not only tonight but be prepared to fight and sustain into the
future. The Air Force Sustainment Center underwrites this for
our Air Force joint partners and allies.
Our command has responsibility for nuclear sustainment and
supply chain management for two-thirds of the Nation's nuclear
triad. Nuclear deterrent operations are the bedrock of our
national security.
Our command also has responsibility to set, open, and
sustain theaters in times of peace and conflict, and we are
doing this with weapons systems across our Air Force that are
on average age 27 years old.
The defense industrial base is brittle. We find an ever-
diminishing vendor base for sustaining our platforms and
increasing challenges recruiting the kind of talent our Air
Force simply must have for the future. A fifth-generation Air
Force must have a fifth-generation workforce.
From the logistics sustainment portfolio perspective, all
of the service destinies are interconnected. This is not a
zero-sum game. Our Nation's warfighting capabilities rise and
fall together. We all must be fully functioning teammates. When
we enter the battlespace, we rely on one another.
For example, at Tinker Air Force Base, headquarters of the
Air Force Sustainment Center, we are home for and sustain the
Navy E-6B Mercury fleet. We are a critical link in our Nation's
nuclear command-and-control architecture. We ship munitions
from McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, from Tinker Air Force
Base.
You may be familiar with the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air
Force Base in Arizona. While some call it that, I prefer to
think of it as a national reservoir of aerospace capability.
To that end, they are regenerating their F-18s from long-
term desert storage to help with the Department of Navy's
TACAIR [Tactical Air Support] challenges that you heard about a
moment ago, while our team at Warner Robins Air Logistics
Complex just outside of Macon, Georgia, are working hard making
wing spars for that hard-to-replace-part for the F-18 in a
public-private partnership to help the Department of Navy
readiness.
I could offer dozens more examples. While logistics and
sustainment by itself will not win a war, it will absolutely
lose you a war.
The airmen of the Air Force Sustainment Center are
predominantly civilian. Our ability to hire takes months due to
an antiquated hiring system. In an era when software engineers
are becoming as essential to weapons systems sustainment as jet
engine technicians, we simply must have a better system for
recruiting and hiring our total force airmen for tomorrow.
We compete with industry for a scarce commodity, STEM
[science, technology, engineering, and mathematics] graduates
that the Nation already does not produce enough of. This
competition for talent has readiness implications for today and
for tomorrow.
Our Nation needs to increase its investment in force
structure, readiness, and modernization. We find when we do
that, we have a full-spectrum ready airspace and cyber force to
meet today's challenges and tomorrow's.
Our citizens expect this from us. Our combatant commanders
require it of us. With your continued support, our airmen and
your United States Air Force will continue to deliver it.
Thank you for having us today, and I very much look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Levy follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Lee K. Levy, II
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the readiness
of your United States Air Force. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the
Honorable Lisa Disbrow, and our Chief of Staff, General David Goldfein,
thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment to our airmen,
Air Force civilians, families, and veterans.
This year the United States Air Force celebrates its 70th birthday.
Since established as a separate service in 1947, our Air Force has
secured peace through the full spectrum of conflict with a decisive
warfighting advantage in, through, and from air, space, and cyberspace.
Since Desert Storm in 1991, for the past 26 years, we have been
operating in a continuous state of combat and combat support.
Essentially, we have been in a steady state of war for the last 37
percent of the history of our service. Without pause, the United States
Air Force has delivered global combat power to deter and defeat our
nation's adversaries; we supported joint and coalition forces at the
beginning, middle, and end of every operation; and we have secured our
homeland through continuous surveillance and air defense. We have done
all of this with a force that is shrinking in size, with a fleet that
is now an average age of 27 years old, and infrastructure that
continues to age and present new challenges. But our Total Force
Airmen--Active Duty, National Guard, Air Force Reserve and our
dedicated civil servants--are amazing and they will continue to seek
new and innovative ways to get the job done. Make no mistake, the
United States Air Force is ready to fight tonight, but I am concerned
about our ability to sustain our Air Force to fight tomorrow. Threats
to this nation and our interests continue to evolve, adapt, and present
formidable challenges that threaten our nation and our allies. As we
develop advanced air, space, and cyber capabilities for tomorrow, we
must continue to adapt our readiness, sustainment, and logistics
enterprise as well.
As the Commander of the Air Force Sustainment Center, I am
extremely proud to represent the nearly 43,000 Total Force Airman
across 23 locations in 18 states and several overseas locations that
are laser focused on providing the best sustainment and logistics
capabilities for the available funding to meet the challenges of
tomorrow. Literally, we are finding ways to do more with less.
Since its creation as part of Air Force Materiel Command's
reorganization in 2012, the Air Force Sustainment Center has delivered
combat power for America through a globally integrated, agile logistics
and sustainment machine spanning from factory to flight line and back,
representing and supporting all aspects of Logistics. We directly
support every combatant commander, service, and many interagency
partners as well as 63 allied countries with depot-level maintenance,
supply chain management, and power projection for legacy and 5th
generation weapons systems. By achieving the right results the right
way through our disciplined ``Art of the Possible'' leadership and
constraints-based management methodology, we continue to yield
significant results. Since 2013, we significantly reduced by an average
of 70 days each the time it takes to inspect, repair, and return
bomber, fighter, mobility, and special mission aircraft to operational
units. Across the entire Air Force Sustainment Center, we delivered
back to the operational commands 69 more aircraft in fiscal year (FY)
2016 than fiscal year 2012 and we reduced critical parts shortages by
28 percent from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016. Since 2013,
through cost savings or cost avoidance, the Air Force Sustainment
Center has returned $2.4 billion to the Air Force to invest in other
areas of readiness or modernization. But we cannot continue to rely on
savings within our current budgets to fund our future modernization and
sustainment requirements.
The Air Force Sustainment Center is more than the three ``depots''
in Georgia, Utah, and Oklahoma. Our world-class Air Logistics Complexes
at Robins, Tinker, and Hill Air Force Bases are interconnected
``engines of readiness'' for the Air Force as well as joint partners
and allies, and they work as one team to deliver combat effects. The
Active Duty, Reserve, Guard, civilian, and contractor airmen that make
up the Air Force Sustainment Center deliver combat power to warfighters
by adding service life to weapons systems and creating additional
capabilities through modernizations and upgrades.
Additionally, the Air Force Sustainment Center is the Air Force
global supply chain manager for planning, sourcing, managing, and
delivering over $8 billion of parts annually to the combatant commands.
As both the wholesale and retail provider of supplies and parts, the
supply chain is the shock absorber for Air Force readiness.
The Air Force Sustainment Center is critically involved in, and
essential to, sustaining our nation's nuclear enterprise--not just for
the United States Air Force but for the United States Navy as well.
This mission area is our number one responsibility and our sustainment
of components for each leg of the nuclear triad is vital to our nation
maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. We directly enable bombers,
inter-continental ballistic missiles, dual capable fighters, air
launched cruise missiles, and Navy command and control aircraft that
communicate with submerged nuclear assets.
To continue to provide Air, Space, and Cyber supremacy in today's
evolving global security environment, our Air Force requires sustained,
long-term, and predictable funding. If Budget Control Act-level funding
returns in fiscal year 2018, it will have severe impacts on our airmen
and readiness. The most important actions this Congress can take to
ensure the world's most powerful Air Force will continue to dominate
the skies tomorrow will be to repeal the 2011 Budget Control Act and
ensure sufficient funding to modernize our weapons systems and
infrastructure. We appreciate your support to build the force up to
about 321,000 in 2017, yet we will remain stretched to meet national
security requirements. We are currently working with the Secretary of
Defense to develop the fiscal year 2018 Presidential Budget to address
manning shortfalls in key areas. We must increase our Active Duty,
Guard and Reserve manning levels in key skill areas to meet the
emerging mission requirements while continuing to support enduring
combat operations.
challenges to readiness
The Air Force Sustainment Center--with its organic industrial
base--is the nation's readiness and war sustaining insurance policy. We
are proud to sustain America's first and most agile response to crisis
and conflict, underwriting every joint operation. We provide critical
enablers in the air, space, and cyber domains and those demand signals
are going to continue to increase over time. But we continue to
experience significant readiness challenges in funding, workforce
hiring, and aging infrastructure and weapon system sustainment.
Recently, the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force,
General Wilson, testified to this committee and stated: `` . . . being
`always there' comes at a cost to our airmen, equipment, and
infrastructure; we are now at a tipping point. Sustained global
commitments combined with continuous fiscal turmoil continue to have a
lasting impact on readiness, capacity, and capability for a full-
spectrum fight against a near-peer adversary.'' Those costs have unique
implications within the Air Force Sustainment Center.
civilian workforce hiring initiatives
The Air Force Sustainment Center depends on a 79 percent civilian
workforce. Our civilian airmen bleed equally blue as those that wear
our uniforms and they serve and sacrifice for our nation as well. As we
evolve and adapt our weapons systems and concepts of operations, we
must evolve and adapt our workforce. A 5th Generation Air Force
requires a 5th Generation workforce. Requirements for a Science-
Technology-Engineering-Math (STEM) educated workforce and advanced
manufacturing and technical skills are ever increasing. We no longer
just buy airplanes; we buy highly integrated, sophisticated software
packages that come in sophisticated airframes. Each weapon system we
procure brings with it an increasing requirement for software
development and maintenance to perform almost every function on the
aircraft, from controlling flight controls, interfacing with weapons,
navigation and communication, recording system health and status, etc.
All of this ``cyber'' capability must be designed so it is resilient to
sophisticated cyber warfare. Our requirements for scientists and
engineers to sustain these software-intensive weapons systems are
increasing dramatically. In addition to developing and sustaining new
weapons systems, our engineers must also find ways to sustain our aging
legacy systems. From understanding airframe stress, metallurgy, non-
destructive inspection techniques, and reverse engineering parts, it
takes a talented pool of engineers to help us sustain our legacy Air
Force. As we bring new weapons systems on line and continue to sustain
our legacy fleet, our civilian engineers are a pivotal component of
readiness. As we project a steady increase in the technical workforce
needed to support critical warfighting systems, any government actions
that make it more difficult to recruit and retain a skilled workforce
are detrimental to our readiness.
An antiquated civilian hiring system also constrains our ability to
effectively compete with industry for a qualified workforce. The
ability to hire engineers to sustain our Air Force is a strategic issue
for our nation. We are experiencing a sustained annual growth in our
requirements for the number of software engineers by 10-15 percent.
While we aggressively try to hire qualified engineers, we simply cannot
get enough qualified applicants to meet our demand. Most recently, to
hire 465 new scientists and engineers, we expanded our recruiting
efforts across 85 universities in 24 states. This year, our hiring
target is 528 new scientists and engineers. To meet this growing
demand, we continue to devote significant resources to our recruiting
efforts. However, over the past two years, we did not meet our hiring
goals, resulting in being short 569 hires at the end of fiscal year
2017. Without these engineers, our ability to sustain our Air Force
today and into tomorrow is in jeopardy. Our nation's Air Force is
rapidly transitioning into an information-age fighting force and our
ability to sustain and rapidly modify key software in our weapons
systems will prove to be a decisive capability in the conflicts of
tomorrow.
Two key programs have yielded great benefits in hiring and
retaining our scientist and engineer workforce. First, the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Development Funds have been a valuable resource
supporting our efforts to recruit, hire, retain, train, and develop our
scientist and engineer workforce. Second, last year, the Air Force
Materiel Command implemented the DOD Civilian Acquisition Workforce
Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo) for the acquisition
workforce, including scientists and engineers. Although we are just
getting started, AcqDemo provides vital flexibilities that enable us to
offer competitive salaries and compensate our technical workforce
according to performance. The Air Force Sustainment Center appreciates
your continued support of these programs.
Manning shortfalls impact our ability to keep pace with our current
workloads as well as prepare for future workloads like the KC-46A. Our
scientist and engineer hiring efforts presume a healthy supply of
graduates with the right degrees. Especially in the area of software
developers and cyber experts (electrical engineers, computer engineers,
and computer scientists) we must continue to expand this pipeline. As a
nation, we must continue the full-court press to attract, excite, and
educate the next generation of STEM patriots. Last year, volunteers
from the Air Force Sustainment Center donated over 6,000 hours to STEM
outreach initiatives. Through funding in the Department of Defense for
STEM outreach programs, such as STARBASE, we provided $700,000 in
fiscal year 2016 to support competition teams, sponsor events, and do
classroom enhancements. Continued fiscal support for K-12 STEM
outreach, scholarships, and internships like the DOD SMART scholarship
program, will help expand the supply for STEM graduates that will
enable the Air Force Sustainment Center to hire the technical workforce
we need in the future.
Our workforce challenges are not just with engineers and
scientists. We also rely on a very large labor force of highly skilled
technicians and mechanics. The populations of trained mechanics is
simply not available in the same quantities as in the past. While we
work very closely with vocational training centers around our Air
Logistics Complexes, we must still rely heavily on former military
technicians that separate or retire from Military Service and seek a
government civilian position. The 180-day waiting period to hire
military retirees also reduces our ability to hire required personnel.
other challenges
In addition to workforce challenges, the unpredictable state of
defense appropriations over the past few years significantly impacts
our ability to hire personnel and work with industry partners. Many
companies are not eager to invest in advanced technology or sustain
existing sustainment capacity when the future of defense funding is
volatile and uncertain. Many talented personnel are deterred from
working for the government when they hear about furloughs and other
uncertainties. Industry partners are disincentivized to bid on
contracts when budgets are unpredictable or it is not cost-effective
for them to manufacture small quantities of parts. As a result, we
receive fewer bids or ``no-bids'', which translates into less
competition, increased costs, and operational impacts to our
warfighters. A smaller industrial base is also creating diminishing
manufacturing and repair sources for many of our aging weapon systems.
The Air Force Sustainment Center works closely with industry
leaders to leverage technology and advanced manufacturing and repair
capabilities to help us sustain our Air Force. We must lean on industry
partners to develop engine test capabilities for the future. We watch
major Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) and Supply Chain companies
adapt and evolve to meet the demands of their customers, and we learn
what we can from their experiences, while they continue to learn from
us. We must continue to reduce barriers to collective innovation that
will benefit commercial business as well as government systems.
Currently, there are barriers to collective innovation because of
statutes that prevent collaboration with industry and academia to
utilize depot resources for collaborative problem solving.
shaping future logistics capabilities
The future of warfare is hybrid and multi-domain. Air dominance is
not a national birthright. Our adversary's increased capabilities in
advanced air defense systems and 5th generation aircraft compel us to
find more ways to sustain our Air Force through agility and global
integration. Additionally, we currently do not have the ability inside
Air Force logistics to deconflict and prioritize competing requirements
and then articulate those risks back to the
combatant commanders. This gap presents risk because the
responsible combatant commanders must absolutely understand realistic
and risk-based options and alternatives to be mission effective. Having
multi-domain logistics command and control will help shape operational
schemes of maneuver and determine whether or not we have the agility to
adapt across multiple domains in multiple geographic locations
simultaneously. The necessary processes, decision support tools and
visibility are necessary for us to be successful. Our adversaries do
not limit their thinking by lines on a map or combatant commander
boundaries. Their perspective is hybrid, global, and multi-domain. Our
ability to command and control logistics capabilities from opening and
sustaining theaters across the globe and resetting the forces will be
paramount. Global Logistics agility and the management of scarce assets
can only be achieved via a robust global logistics command and control
architecture and supporting networks.
The current state of logistics has a theater-centric focus. It is
reactive with no common operating picture for logistics, leading to
ineffective global asset utilization. The multi-domain logistics
command and control is an enterprise-level view of Air Force logistics
to optimize warfighter support. By implementing multi-domain logistics
command and control, we will no longer think about one combatant
command area at a time. It will create complete global asset visibility
and decision support tools to best assign and allocate limited global
resources to meet immediate theater needs. This new way of operating
will allow us to integrate with global and theater planning, articulate
risk to the combatant commanders, provide intelligent logistics command
and control in anti-access and area denial environments, prioritize and
synchronize resources, set and re-set the theaters, and interact with a
global distribution network.
We do not currently have a command and control system that allows
us to have resilience and mission assurance. This will be essential to
the combatant commanders in future warfighting.
closing
The Air Force Sustainment Center continues to deliver combat power
to our combatant commanders. We can fight and win tonight. But we must
continue to adapt and rely on additional investments and resources to
ensure we are ready to deter and defeat potential adversaries tomorrow.
As the logistics enterprise evolves and adapts, we must have a multi-
domain logistics command and control capability that will be able to
utilize limited resources across multiple theaters in multi-domain
conflict. High velocity combat support to the warfighter through pre-
positioned resources and the ability to swing logistics forces from one
point of need to another point of need will be essential. General Eric
Shinseki once said, ``If you don't like change, you'll like irrelevance
even less.'' We, as the Air Force Sustainment Center, simply cannot
afford to be irrelevant because the risks are just too great . . . the
Air Force and the nation rely on us.
Since 1947, the Air Force has relentlessly provided America with
credible deterrence and decisive combat power in times of peace,
crisis, contingency, and conflict. However, our relative advantage over
potential adversaries is shrinking and we must be prepared to win
decisively against any adversary. We owe this to our nation, our joint
teammates, and our allies. The nation requires full-spectrum ready air,
space, and cyber power, now more than ever. America expects it;
combatant commanders require it; and with your support, airmen will
deliver it.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Levy.
Let's start with you because I can remember, 30 years ago,
we were talking about the core competencies and organic
capability. At that time, I thought it was rather arbitrary to
come up with a 50/50. Well, that was 30 years ago, and we still
are 50/50, but it seems to have worked. A lot of people have
not stopped to think about why it is necessary to keep this
core capability.
So, just briefly, anyone who wants to answer the question
as to why it is significant that we have that core capability,
feel free to respond.
LTG Wyche. Senator, I will start with talking about several
one-of-a-kind capabilities within the organic industrial base
that is unique to our organic industrial base, and that is
Watervliet. Watervliet produces large caliber cannon tubes for
the Navy, for the Marines. At Fort Sill, Oklahoma, all of the
houses there have these gun tubes. Those gun tubes are only
made in this hemisphere.
So that is a very unique capability that you just cannot go
and get out in industry, and that is why we need to reserve
those unique core capabilities within the organic industrial
base, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
General Levy?
Lt. Gen. Levy. Yes, sir. So we find 50/50 to be
extraordinarily useful, particularly when coupled with the core
statute, because we think about what General Wyche said in his
opening comments. The organic industrial base is the Nation's
insurance policy.
That logistics and sustainment infrastructure exists to
provide for the Nation in times of war, to behave as that
buffer and ability to surge. When we find there is a healthy
relationship between industry and the organic industrial base,
what we find is that both sides improve their performance,
drive down overall sustainment costs, and deliver best-value
capabilities for the warfighter while at the same time
preserving that critical insurance policy, if you will, that
ability to surge for the Nation.
It also drives--and I mentioned in my remarks the
brittleness of the defense industrial base. It also drives a
certain level of what I like to sometimes refer to as
coopetition, the healthy relationship between commercial firms
and the government activities in parts of the marketplace where
there might only be one vendor.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. That is a huge point there, because we
went through a period of time when we experienced such things.
This has been a moving target.
I do appreciate that. It is an insurance policy, I think we
will all agree.
For clarification, Admiral, when you were talking about
your
F-18 program, you were talking about just the Navy and not the
Marines. Is that correct?
VADM Grosklags. Sir, actually, speaking of both.
Senator Inhofe. You were? Because our testimony that we
heard when we had the other hearing, that I referred to in my
opening statement, the Marines, 62 percent of their F-18s were
down. What kind of percentage do you have, if you exclude
those, out of the rest of the Navy?
VADM Grosklags. I can tell you that I agree with that
number for the Marine Corps. For the Navy, it is comparable.
What I was referring to specific on the comment I made
about the depots and kind of reaching the peak of our depots
throughput requirement was a difference between outer reporting
aircraft, which are in our depots or long-term storage, versus
those on the flight line, which is the number that you are
referring to.
Of the flight-line aircraft, there are approximately 60
percent of those today that are not----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I think that is right.
You know, General Levy, Congress was skeptical about the
creation of the Air Force Sustainment Center. I think the
concerns that were expressed at that time are pretty much
answered by this time, but you are the one who was in a good
position to respond as to why it is necessary and its success.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to
address that.
I will tell you that, from our view, the Air Force
Sustainment Center creation has been a tremendous success.
Let's just talk money, for example. In the 4 years since
the Air Force Sustainment Center was created and we have begun
to operate Air Force logistics as one common enterprise, we
been able to return $2.4 billion back to our United States Air
Force. That is validated by the Air Force audit agency. That is
money that goes back to addressing readiness and critical
modernization challenges that our Air Force has.
From a performance perspective, we have managed to cut flow
days and improve safety and quality on all of our platforms. We
now have B-1s at the shortest amount of flow days ever. We have
now taken over the ability to do things, for example, when
businesses go out of existence at Robins. There was a vendor
that went out of business that makes critical parts for the C-
5. The Air Force Sustainment Center team at the Warner Robins
Air Logistics Complex was able to rapidly internalize that and
keep the C-5 readiness at the level we need it to be at.
We were able to, for example, with the KC-135, the KC-135
MRO [maintenance, repair and overhaul], go from three sources
of repair, two commercial and one organic, to one source of
repair, organic. Now every KC-135 in the United States Air
Force, about 76 a year, receive their program depot maintenance
at the Air Force Sustainment Center at Tinker Air Force Base.
All three of those locations, at Hill Air Force Base,
Tinker Air Force Base, and Robins Air Force Base, operate as an
enterprise. So if an F-15 comes into Robins for repair, the
engine comes to Tinker and the landing gear goes Hill.
By operating as an enterprise, we find efficiencies. We
find synergies. We drive our performance. As importantly, we
drive down costs to our Air Force.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. It was different. I remember back when
they had five ALCs [Air Logistics Centers] and then we made the
step down to three, so I think that is very significant. That
is an excellent answer.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
A question for Admiral Moore about shipyard challenges.
Shipyards are critical to maintaining fleet readiness and also
supporting forward presence. While there have been a number of
success stories at our shipyards, there are also a lot of
challenges that we have heard about: loss of experienced
workers, lengthy periods required to rebuild, lost experience,
aging infrastructure, and IT systems. I have two questions.
First, what actions is the Navy taking to address long-term
challenges at the shipyards that could affect our ability to
complete maintenance on schedule? Second, how do we determine
and measure the health of shipyard infrastructure? I have heard
some of you guys use the term fester factor when describing how
a ship is doing, but how do you measure how a shipyard is
doing, in terms of being able to perform its maintenance tasks?
VADM Moore. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
So to the first question, I think following the sequester
in 2013, we have had a significant challenge, as you discussed,
in getting our ships and submarines out on time.
It is a combination of things. We certainly have run the
ships hard since 9/11. We have had an inexperienced workforce.
To your second question, which I will get to, the
infrastructure is really not a 21st Century shipyard
infrastructure.
Then, frankly, we just did not have enough people in the
shipyards to do the work that was required to get done.
We have taken some significant action over the course of
last year. There is more work to be done, and I think we are
starting to see the loss days go down a little bit. So, first
and foremost, we have to understand what work has to be
accomplished on our ships and submarines, so we really have
worked hard to go back and look at our class maintenance plans,
look at the work that is required, and define what that
requirement is, and then go back to the Pentagon and explain to
them what work needs to get done.
Then we have to be able to recognize that we just do not
have enough workforce in the naval shipyards. So it is not
necessarily--it is not just a matter of them working harder.
They are great national assets to us, but if you do not have
enough workers to get the work done, you are inevitably going
to get the ships late.
So we have started to hire. We have hired 16,500 new
workers over the last 5 years. We are still about 2,000 people
short, and I am working very hard with the CNO to get to that
number, and we need to get there.
Along with that is a recognition, as you hire all these
people, a young workforce, that you have to get them trained.
In the past, it would typically take 4 to 5 years to take a new
shipyard worker and get them to kind of a journeyman level
where you could trust them to go work on a nuclear submarine or
carrier. Today, we have invested a lot of money in our training
system so that a young worker coming in today, it takes them
about 1 to 2 years, to the point that they can actually provide
real wrench-turning on the ship. I think that is something that
is really, really important to us. So improved training and the
hiring processes we have.
To your second question on the health of the
infrastructure, across-the-board, we have a long list of things
that need to get accomplished in the shipyards today. I have to
be able to figure out how to go make the case to make the
investments in the naval shipyards.
If I am at Newport News Shipbuilding, I incentivize them
and they can incentivize themselves to go buy new welding
equipment, new cranes, et cetera, because it helps them on the
bottom line. It improves their cost performance.
In the naval shipyards, we do not have the same mechanisms.
So if you were to go look at the shops and things, you know, I
need new welding equipment. I need workflow processes that are
better. I need improvements to the dry docks across-the-board.
Those investments in the naval shipyards are going to be an
important component to our ability to get the workforce to be
more productive. It is pretty hard to demand a worker to get
more productive when he is working with tooling that is 15 to
20 years old where his counterpart in the private sector is
using something that is a lot more state-of-the-art.
So it is a holistic plan that we have to work across-the-
board on. You have raised an important issue with the
infrastructure piece. It is something that we have tended to
ignore and just focus on getting the right number of people in
naval shipyards. But I would argue just getting the right
number of people in naval shipyards by itself is not enough.
You have to give the workers the tools necessary to get the
work done.
Senator Kaine. I just have a minute left. But others, could
you weigh in on the workforce challenge?
In other subcommittee hearings, we have heard about losing
pilots to commercial aviation. In terms of hiring your own
maintenance workers across your various portfolios, do you face
increased competition from the private sector? Talk a little
bit about the workforce challenges that Admiral Morris just
described.
LtGen Dana. Sir, I would say for the Marine Corps, in our
depots, we are blessed with a great workforce.
You mentioned this in your opening statement. To keep them,
what we are trying to do, and we are actually working on it, is
in terms of giving them additional skillsets--we talked a
little bit about innovation in the workplace and at the depots
with added manufacturing and 3D printing, being able to do CAD
[computer-aided design] diagrams. We are partnering with local
colleges in the Albany, Georgia, area--we are going to do the
same in Southern California, also at some of our bases on
coastal Carolina--to provide these workers skillsets that they
can use elsewhere.
I know that sounds somewhat counterintuitive, but we feel
that if we are showing that we are taking care of that
workforce, giving them those additional skillsets to excel in
the 21st Century environment, then they will stay with us out
of loyalty.
VADM Grosklags. Sir, if I may really quickly, of our major
three fleet readiness centers in North Carolina, Florida, and
San Diego, San Diego is really the only one we have a challenge
with in terms of hiring people. We have underexecuted our
hiring plan there for several years in a row, and it is largely
due to competition for the workforce as well as the high cost-
of-living out there.
So we have turned to basically hiring bonuses, which has
had a significant impact, positive impact, over the last 6
months.
The NDAA language this year in 2017 that is going to give
us some direct hiring authority we believe will be very helpful
once we fully implemented that.
The other thing we are actually looking at trying to
implement with OPM [Office of Personnel Management] is some
increase in locality pay.
So we are making progress. But in that type of high-cost
environment where just up the road in the Los Angeles area you
have a very competitive aerospace industry, that is a challenge
for us.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Senator, I would also offer that it is the
entire team. So we tend to talk about the depot artisans, the
jet engine mechanics, or the shipyard workers. But, frankly, it
is the entire team. It is the engineers. It is the firemen. It
is the entire ecosystem. The quarterback without the rest of
his or her team is simply not going to be effective.
So the challenge is hiring across the variety of skillsets.
But I will tell you, while we talk about things such as pilot
shortages and other critical skillsets, I mentioned in my
opening remarks, we simply do not produce enough engineers in
the Nation. We have a challenge hiring them and keeping them.
I have 3,600 engineers in the Air Force Sustainment Center.
That is more than the Air Force Research Laboratory. We are in
a close-in battle with industry to recruit and retain that kind
of workforce, and they are absolutely essential.
So it is really about the entire ecosystem for us.
We also find that much like we talk about pilot shortages,
we see shortages in some of the aircraft skills--avionics,
electricians, jet engine mechanics--because many of those men
and women come to us from Military Service. With the Military
Services being smaller, producing fewer and fewer American
youth going into those lines of work to begin with when they
come out of high school or going through vo-tech [vocational-
technical], that presents some additional challenges for us.
But we partner very closely with all the colleges and
universities and the vo-techs in the neighborhood of our
primary installations. Actually, from an engineering
perspective, we recruit nationwide to try to find the very best
talent because in a software-driven Air Force, as we move to
that Information Age Air Force from that Iron Age Air Force, we
have to have that kind of talent.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chairman, I am over my time, but could
General Wyche just answer the question too?
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
LTG Wyche. Senator, in regards to the hiring freeze, it
does create some challenges for us.
Now we are able to meet our mission requirements. If that
hiring freeze is extended beyond 90 days, it will have an
impact on us recruiting a workforce, getting them in place, so
they can continue to deliver those weapons systems.
Senator, you can recall back in 2013 when I was at Fort Lee
when we went through sequestration. That was not a good time
for our employees at Fort Lee and our Army.
With regards to the industrial base, we lost 7,000
employees. At McAlester alone, they lost 167 employees that
never returned to McAlester because they went to other
industries such as the oil industry. We are at that point where
we are just beginning to recover from that.
So we are working through those, but the hiring freeze does
have some challenges that we are working through.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and testifying today
on our industrial base and the critical role that it plays in
our military readiness. I recently visited Iowa Army Ammunition
Plant, which is a government-owned, contractor-operated
facility in my home State, and their ability to rapidly
increase workload and provide a stable supply of ammunition is
a key part to our national security.
However, due to their dependence on the Army to modernize
the facility, their techniques, the manufacturing techniques,
are behind. This is not something I blame the contractor for.
They have put forth a proposal for the Iowa ammunition plant
that could save the Army and taxpayers $18 million per year,
paying for itself in less than 5 years.
The cost-saving decisions currently sit with the Army, so,
General Wyche, this is for you. What is the Army doing to
modernize its GOCOs [government-owned contractor-operated] in
order to help drive down production costs and cut overhead?
LTG Wyche. Senator, we are doing a couple things.
First, we have identified the requirements, and we know
that, to maintain the facilities, just to keep them from being
degraded, it would cost us approximately $100,000 a year and to
get them at an acceptable level with the modernized
capabilities, it would cost us another $300 million for the
next 10 years.
Senator Ernst. Okay.
LtGen Dana. Ma'am, if I could help out my Army brother on
this, because they help us with ammo.
Senator Ernst. Yes, sir.
LtGen Dana. I made a trip to Lake City, which is one of the
large ammunition plants in the Midwest. What is just
fascinating about that facility is half the facility had
equipment from 1942. I own a lot of weapons, not in DC, by the
way, but I blowup my own ammo.
Senator Ernst. Do not admit that now. Right.
LtGen Dana. But if you look at how they work in the plant,
it is just like they did in 1942 with the primers and the
primer powder. It is very dangerous work.
But then the other half, because the Army's great
initiative is they went to automated in the plant, so they
retrained that workforce to go for the guys and gals doing it
for 30 years one way to where they are doing automated
machinery, and they are doubling the output.
One of the questions was, how can the industrial base meet
that requirement for ammunition? Well, I think the Army is
doing a great job at that.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Hopefully we can modernize and get to
that point where we are not losing that workforce but we are
stabilizing the supply as well as growing that supply with
demand as necessary. I appreciate that.
In 2015, the GAO came forward with three recommendations to
ensure we sustain the critical capabilities found at our
arsenals. The first issue is implementing guidance for make-or-
buy analysis when it comes to DOD procurement. The second was
to identify fundamental elements of a strategic plan for the
arsenals. The third is to develop and implement a process for
identifying critical capabilities at arsenals and the workload
needed to sustain those capabilities.
The Department has concurred with all of those
recommendations, but as of this morning, they have not followed
through with any of those recommendations or produced the
reports necessary.
I have been through the Rock Island Arsenal, and I really
witnessed what the men and women are doing at that arsenal to
contribute to our national security. This is taking a long
time.
General Wyche, again, when will we see the reports that
have been required, specifically the critical capabilities
assessment and the guidance on make or buy?
LTG Wyche. Senator, that particular area of make or buy, I
would have to come back to you on the record with that
particular answer, because I am not prepared to answer that
question.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology, the Army Materiel Command, and the Department of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics are working together to update both
the GAO and Congress on these topics. The initial response to the GAO
report was submitted by the Army on 5 January 2016. The GAO submitted a
follow up inquiry on the Army's efforts/actions to implement GAO Report
16-086 recommendations. The Army Materiel Command is working with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology on the response for submission to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense in mid-May. Additionally, we are also
collaborating on the NDAA 2017, section 326 report to Congress. Section
326 requires the Secretary of the Army to submit to the congressional
defense committees a strategy to revitalize the Army organic industrial
base. This report includes several Arsenal-related requirements
including an assessment of OIB manufacturing sources, an assessment of
the processes used to identify OIB critical capabilities and sustaining
workloads, and a description of manufacturing skills needed to sustain
readiness.

Senator Ernst. Okay. I would appreciate that, because that
is very concerning, especially to the folks at the arsenals.
LTG Wyche. Yes.
Senator Ernst. They would like to see those reports as soon
as possible.
Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for testifying. I feel as though, with
the sequester and with the budget caps, et cetera, that we are
just doing a lot of catch-up, so I thank you for what you are
doing with what we have provided to you.
Many of you have mentioned how hard it is to recruit or
retain our workforce, that is a critical part of our industrial
base, and at the same time how important it is that the men and
women who do the work have modern equipment.
So, of course, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, I am always
concerned about whether or not they have the tools with which
to do the job. I am just thankful that you continue to
emphasize those aspects.
General Levy, you were one of the people who mentioned
about recruiting and retaining. I am just wondering, the people
with STEM backgrounds, are you doing anything special to
recruit women?
You can start, and then any of the rest of you, because
women drop out of the STEM fields at every point of the
continuum, and unless we do something very specific targeting
women and girls and minorities in these areas, it is just not
going to change very much.
So are you doing anything in particular recruiting women?
Lt. Gen. Levy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for asking that
question.
I often tell people, how long does it take to grow a STEM
worker for an air logistics complex? About 21 years, from about
here all the way until he or she graduates from university and
is ready to come be one of our civilian airmen.
So we have a variety of programs where we do outreach to
females and to minority or disadvantaged areas. In fact, last
year alone, my engineering community did 60,000 hours' worth of
community outreach to try to develop interest in STEM
curriculum throughout different parts of the communities where
our bases are located. Obviously, it tends to be in the area
where our facilities are located.
Senator Hirono. Did you say you are starting at an early
age as in middle school, elementary school?
Lt. Gen. Levy. No, ma'am, as in elementary school.
Senator Hirono. That is great.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Because if you do not imbue them with that
desire for STEM early, and if you do not give them the passion
for learning and the intellectual curiosity, and, also, if the
state educational systems do not have the ecosystem that
delivers things like high school physics and calculus and that
sort of thing, then they are certainly never going to go to
university and be an engineering graduate.
We also financially support as well as support with
volunteer time the STARBASE program at all three of our primary
installations, which is another science and technology--I would
sort of refer to it as a learning camp for young boys and
girls, to get them interested in STEM career fields and
hopefully spark that interest.
Senator Hirono. Are you doing similar kinds of outreach for
the Army and the Navy?
VADM Grosklags. Senator, if I could, our program with
NAVAIR [U.S. Navy Naval Air Systems Command] is very similar to
what General Levy just described. The other thing I would add
is, through our Executive Diversity Council at NAVAIR, we have
separate advisory groups, one for women, one for Hispanics, one
for African-Americans, one for Asian-Pacific islanders, and on.
Part of those advisory groups' major focus is exactly on
recruiting within either those ethnic or gender groups. We have
had very good success in doing that.
As somebody alluded to earlier, then we have to keep them.
One of our challenges is keeping them because it is a very
competitive marketplace.
Senator Hirono. Yes. I realize that.
Anybody else?
LTG Wyche. Yes, Senator. We have several outreach programs
at each one of our 23 arsenals where the commanders are
personally engaged. They are visiting colleges, identifying
those potential students who would like to come work at our
arsenal.
One program that we are really excited about is the AMC
[Army Materiel Command] 1,000 program. That is a program where
we set a goal to hire 1,000 summer interns, 1,000 per year for
the next 5 years. In the last 2 years, we have been able to
reach that goal, so we are very excited about that program.
Senator Hirono. So your summer intern program, are they
targeted to minorities and women?
LTG Wyche. Yes, they are. Yes, they are.
Senator Hirono. I congratulate you for your efforts.
Because I know this is such a needed area not just of course
for our military but across the country, we have a need for
hundreds of thousands of people with STEM backgrounds, so I do
have a couple of bills that I have introduced. I will send you
copies. The focus is on supporting more minority and women in
these fields.
In the few seconds that I have left, Mr. Chairman, the
President has called for a significant increase in the number
of ships, so I wanted to ask, this is for Admiral Moore, how
would a Navy of 355 ships impact the current capacity of our
public shipyards?
VADM Moore. Thank you, Senator, for the question. We have
already started to look at what that would take. The plan to
get to 355 that we have laid out in our force structure
assessment gets us there in the mid-2030s, and so we will need
to grow the size of our naval shipyards. We will have to grow
the size of our private sector that is building the equipment
today.
We are also going to have to remember, up at the
headquarters level, where we are providing technical support
and oversight and technical manuals, et cetera, we are going to
have to grow all those. So the time frame between now and 2035,
as long as there is a stable and predictable budget that goes
along with that, we can manage to grow the workforce.
The Navy has been at that size before, and we were able to
maintain the force back then. If it is done in a sustained way,
we can certainly grow the workforce to get there. We have
already taken the steps to make those plans as we start to grow
the force.
Senator Hirono. So if you already have these kinds of plans
and what it would take to get to this number, could you share
those with our committee?
VADM Moore. Sure. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Navy is growing our organic shipyard workforce to 36,100 full
time equivalents (FTE) across the four Naval Shipyards to meet our
existing workload projections which peak in fiscal year 2021. The 355-
ship Navy will add nine additional submarines and one carrier above
what is in the Navy today. To properly support a 355-ship Navy, we will
have to modernize our four naval shipyards and possibly increase the
size of our workforce beyond 36,100. The Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Plan lays out a two-decade investment plan required to
provide the Shipyards the Navy needs. Focused on three major areas--dry
dock recapitalization, facility layout and optimization, and capital
equipment modernization--the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan
is designed to improve shipyard performance to meet fleet requirements
based on the size of today's Navy. However, the process and
infrastructure efficiencies realized by executing the plan will allow
our shipyards to better support a 355-ship Navy. Going forward, the
Navy will continue to annually assess future workload requirements and
make adjustments to FTE numbers required to balance capacity in view of
any new maintenance requirements, changes in ship operations, or
changes to shipbuilding and/or ship inactivation plans. We are moving
ahead with the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan to address our
most pressing modernization requirement so we can deliver ships out of
maintenance, on-time.

Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. I
think sometimes we get in the middle of a discussion on
everything else and we forget that it is gentlemen like you
that make this whole thing work, and we appreciate what you do
and we appreciate what your teams do.
One of our challenges is that we need to be in a position
to supply you with the materials and equipment that you need.
When you make reports back to us indicating that there are
times in which you need equipment that you have right now that
you are not able to maintain appropriately because the funding
is not there, it is something that we have to highlight.
I would like to begin with talking about the USS Boise.
I know that in your opening statements for the record,
Admiral Moore, you had based the fact that you had to make a
determination as to whether or not a nuclear-powered submarine
would basically remain at dock because we did not have the
dollars available to get it in and to get it up to speed to
actually be able to dive again.
Can you share with us just exactly what is going on with
that, why would we have that kind of problem with a nuclear
submarine? How in the world would we ever justify having an
asset of that value sitting at dock and not having the
resources available to maintain it in a seaworthy condition?
VADM Moore. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question, Senator.
In the Boise situation, what happened is--and this issue is
with the naval shipyards. It is we did not have enough
workforce to go to get the work done. Our typical behavior in
the past--and there are a couple submarines in the yards right
now, USS Asheville, USS Hawaii, and USS Albany, who is also in
Norfolk.
An availability that would have typically taken 22 months,
we inducted them into the shipyards anyway knowing that we did
not really have the workforce to work on the availability. So
the net result was that the submarine would stay in the
shipyard for 48, 49 months.
If you are the crew of the Asheville or the Albany and you
have been told, hey, this is 22-month availability, and you are
in that naval shipyard for 4 years plus, you can imagine what
it does to morale and retention.
In the case of the USS Boise, we were faced with a similar
situation. We did not have the capacity at Norfolk Naval
Shipyard to do the work.
When I came in as the Naval Sea Systems Commander, one of
the things that I talked with Navy leadership about was, hey,
look, we have to be realistic that we do not have the capacity
to get the work done. When we face something like Boise, we
have to recognize that sticking it in and just letting it sit
there pier-side for 4 to 5 years is really not the way to do
it.
In the Boise case, we made a decision to not put it in the
shipyard because I did not want it to sit there for 4 to 5
years. The downside of that is nuclear submarines have very
specific maintenance that has to be done on them in order for
me to certify that the ship is safe to submerge.
You are exactly right. We have taken a submarine, even
though it is an Active Duty submarine, to essentially it is not
available for the Nation's use.
We have to be able to get out in front of this. We have to
be more predictive about the----
Senator Rounds. Admiral, I appreciate your comment, but
what I am curious about is why did we find ourselves in that
position? Is it a matter that we did not have the money to pay
the bills to get it done?
VADM Moore. Yes, it is----
Senator Rounds. Or is it a matter that we did not have the
capabilities, and we just did not see it far enough in advance?
VADM Moore. We did not have the capacities, so there are
two things.
One, we should have been more forward-looking and
anticipate--we know when these submarines are going to come
in--and be able to say, hey, I do not have the workforce
necessary to get that work done, because it takes me 2 years--
from the time you give me a dollar to go hire a worker, it
takes me 2 years to get that person----
Senator Rounds. So does that mean we did not get the money
to you in time?
VADM Moore. No, I think it is not a matter of you not
getting the money to us in time. It is a matter of competing
resources within the Navy and the Navy's decision on what was
going to be in the budget at the time.
In particular, when we submitted the budget for fiscal year
2014, that is probably when we would have needed the resources,
the money, in order for me to go hire up to where I needed to
be at Norfolk Naval Shipyard in 2016.
It is a terrible situation on Boise, and we need to make
sure that, going forward, we get the capacity in the shipyards
right and we work with our private sector partners at Electric
Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding in a one shipyard concept so
that if we know we are not going to have the capacity to get it
done, we work with them so that, in fact, if they have the
capacity, they can do the work.
In this particular case, Electric Boat is going to do the
work probably on the boat, but it is going to be in 2019. So we
are going to take a submarine and set it pier-side for about 3
years.
Senator Rounds. So that means then that the captain who was
perhaps on his way through a process in which he spends time
someplace besides at sea, it impacts not only his ability to
move forward with his career but everybody on that ship is now
delayed as well. Is that a fair assessment?
VADM Moore. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Going beyond just to the personnel level of the ship and
crew itself, we are going to take a submarine, if you are
assigned to that submarine for the next 3 years, you are not
going to go out to do what we have trained you and what you
love to go do. So that is something we have to go work on, and
we cannot let the Boise example happen again.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Perdue, you are now recognized.
Senator Kaine is now presiding.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to echo what Senator Rounds has said. A
lot of times we get to the problem without thanking you guys. I
would like, just as importantly, for you to take it back to
your teams as well, that it is not lost on us that we have
lived in utter peace here in the homeland for quite a number of
years, even though we have been deploying. We know what is
involved in that.
So we thank you all for that.
I have two concerns. I am an old supply chain guy, so I
have sat in your seat. I understand what you are up against.
This did not just start in the last couple years. I mean, we
have had three periods of disinvestment in the military in the
last 50 years, the 1970s, the 1990s, and the last decade. But
this time, it is really serious because it comes on the back of
the recaps that happened before then, each of those times. It
actually started from a higher point.
So the disinvestment in the military this time actually
started from a depleted point to start with. We burned up a lot
of our equipment. Deployments were longer. We ended up in a
weaker position before this disinvestment started.
I have two concerns. One is our organic workforce, what I
call your depot and your shipyard workforces. Two is the supply
chain.
The supply chain is two things, I think. One is your
ability and your shipyards and depots to turn around
maintenance. But the bigger one, in my mind, is, as our
platforms--and this is true across-the-board, whether it is
air, sea, or whatever. I mean, the assets that we have, the
major platforms are all maturing at very similar times. The
startups have been delayed such that, if I look at it honestly,
we do not talk about this much, but we have a gap in capacity
that is anywhere from 1 to 2 years in some platforms to as much
as 10 years in other platforms.
It is a major problem. The optempo that we were
experiencing in the last decade contributes to that.
I have two quick questions.
General Levy, I know you have talked about this last year
in committee and in private about your workforce. Because of
those conversations, I think in the NDAA last year, there was a
direct hire authority put in place.
How long does it take you to hire a systems engineer or
mechanic, a scientist, today?
Lt. Gen. Levy. That is a great question. Thank you,
Senator.
So, first, I would like to say thanks for the direct hire
authority that was signed into law in the NDAA.
Senator Perdue. Where are we in implementing that?
Lt. Gen. Levy. So the OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] draft policy or draft guidance was submitted to the
services on the 20th of March, required back to them on the 3rd
of April. Then once they approve that, then the services will
begin implementing the direct hire authority. As you recall,
there was a 2-year authorization.
We look forward to coming back to you all in the future,
telling you how the direct hire piece of this is working. So we
are not there yet, because that is recently enacted
legislation.
Senator Perdue. These are policies inside the service,
correct?
Lt. Gen. Levy. Yes, sir. So enacted in the NDAA, signed in
December.
Senator Perdue. Right.
Lt. Gen. Levy. That is a new authority for all of us.
Senator Perdue. Right.
Lt. Gen. Levy. So OPM had to write some guidance. They
distributed it to OSD, who then has now created some guidance.
They have asked the services to comment, with the comments
being due on the 3rd of April. I expect that we will be able to
have the guidance to do the direct hire in the weeks ahead.
Senator Perdue. So how long does it take you to hire those
guys today?
Lt. Gen. Levy. So, today, it takes, on average, 148 days to
hire somebody. In fact, I pulled the numbers this morning
because this is important to me, right? This is very much
central. The human beings that work on these platforms, whether
they are engineers or jet engine mechanics or firemen or
somebody who works at a daycare center, they are all equally--
--
Senator Perdue. When you identify retaining somebody, and
this is true in business as well as military, finding somebody
and retaining them are two different things. You find somebody.
If it takes 148 to onboard them, you lose a lot of candidates
during that process.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Yes, sir.
Senator Perdue. You have to. So you are perpetually finding
new candidates to start another clock of 148 days.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Yes, sir.
Senator Perdue. That is a disaster waiting to happen.
Lt. Gen. Levy. It is very difficult to close that circle.
Senator Perdue. I will tell you, in business, to hire these
people today is 30 to 45 days tops--tops--90 days for a CEO
[Chief Executive Officer]. Someone at your level in business
today, if I started a search as a board member, it would be 90
days. If I did not have an answer in 90 days, I would be after
somebody's job.
This is how far out we are in terms of being competitive.
So tell us what we need to do. As you onboard that procedure,
please keep us involved, because this is one where you have a
great standard to look at, because these are the very places
you are competing.
I am going to be out of time, but, Admiral Moore, I want to
get it to one other question, and that is the supply chain. As
these big platforms--the reason I want to ask you, you have the
aircraft carriers, you have the SSBNs, these are major, major
platforms over long periods of time.
The Federal Government does not have a capital budget. We
just do not. I do not know how we actually commit industries to
build these huge platforms without a long-term plan.
So the inconsistent start-stop of these budget
conversations that we have in Congress, tell us the impact that
that is having on this domestic supply chain for these major
platforms. You can talk about the air platforms too, the F-35,
the F-22, and the follow-on maintenance that is required to
keep those things going.
LtGen Dana. Yes, thanks, Senator, for the question.
A lot of times, we focus most of our effort on when we have
budget unpredictability at the tier 1 yards, the people who are
actually building the ships and the submarines or who are doing
the maintaining. I would tell you, if you are a Northrop
Grumman or an Electric Boat, then you have the cash reserves to
kind of absorb a little bit of that.
But where it has the bigger impact is at the tier 2, at the
supply chain, the people providing the cabling, the pumps, the
valves.
The unpredictability in the budgets absolutely has
significant challenges for us in terms of being able to
maintain somebody that is providing a pump or a valve or you
name it to a ship or a submarine. They do not wait around long.
If it is unpredictable, they will go do something else, because
they are running in a cash flow environment that does not allow
them to absorb losses for very long.
So it is certainly a major concern to us, and it is
something I would like to focus on when we talk about the
budget unpredictability, is that these are the people that
really get impacted.
When they drop out of the business, it just means less
competition, which it is kind of a vicious cycle. It drives our
costs up in the end.
Senator Rounds. I thank all of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. [Presiding.] I do have one second round
question.
Do you have any other questions you wanted to ask?
Senator Perdue. We would be here all day, sir.
Senator Kaine. If you want to keep going, you can. I have
one quick one that is kind of a wrap-up, but feel free, since I
have to stay here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Perdue. Senator Kaine and I have closed plenty of
these committee meetings together. He has a marine that is in
harm's way today, and I know how serious he takes this.
I grew up at Robins Air Force Base, and I have been to
Albany many times. I still have the mud from the Columbus area
under my nails. I know where you guys have had footprints.
I am very concerned about--we have now moved into, it looks
to me like, a military position posture where deployment is
going to be sort of the watchword of the day. We closed 15
bases in Europe in 2015. I think that number is correct. We
have not had a major BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] here,
in terms of our facilities matching the requirement.
In your opinions, and I would welcome anybody to onboard
this question, and that is, with regard to our footprint here
in physical plants, General Dana, you said, and you summed it
up best. You said, here are the problems: aging equipment,
complexity of today's systems, decline in depot funding, and
decline in our facilities.
So the question I have is, are our facilities in the United
States and abroad matching this 4-plus-1 mission requirement it
looks like you guys are geared up to try to deal with today
that is so different than the 1-1 mission requirement we had
over the last 50 years.
LtGen Dana. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. We have
33,000 marines forward-deployed right now, 22,500 west of the
dateline and----
Senator Perdue. He has one of them.
LtGen Dana. Yes, sir. We had that very discussion
yesterday.
As you look at our infrastructure, I cannot speak for the
other services, but in terms of the Marine Corps, we think we
are in a good place in terms of the number of facilities we
have, especially if we go to an above 185 force, to be
determined by funding, of course.
But in terms of the infrastructure itself, I mentioned that
we had many facilities that were in poor and failing condition.
I just quickly want to talk about this, as we are looking very
hard, sir, at the entire portfolio. We have one command, Marine
Installation Command, that looks at all of our facilities and
develops a consolidation, demolition, refurbishment, and new
build plan that the Commandant makes a decision on how that
goes.
So in the past, it was somewhat stovepiped. You talked
about your command and your command. Same thing with us on the
installation side. So we are making those dollars go the
furthest when we create literally a master plan for the entire
Marine Corps and how it beds down.
Senator Perdue. Do you guys outsource to each other?
LtGen Dana. Yes, sir, at Fort Leonard Wood, and other
places. Yes, sir.
Senator Perdue. What I am asking, if you have depot
limitations in certain places, certain depots, I mean, I look
at the F-18s, for example. We have a lot waiting on major depot
maintenance. But there are other depots that might have excess
capacity.
I know you look at this all the time in terms of the cost
of making that depot apply to another need, but is that
ongoing? Are those things you guys are always----
LtGen Dana. Yes, sir. We do our tanks at Anniston. They do
a great job.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Our helicopters are done at Corpus Christi
Army Depot. We do Marine F-35 and Navy F-35 work at Hill Air
Force Base in Utah.
We talked earlier about the F-18 work that we are doing for
the Navy not only at Davis-Monthan, at the boneyard, but also
asked Robins Air Logistics Complex.
We do the Navy E-6 work at Tinker Air Force Base. We do
Navy and Marine F-35 engines at Tinker Air Force Base.
So, yes, sir, there is a lot of crosspollination that
occurs.
LtGen Dana. Not only the physical part but we do a lot of
sharing ideas. Lee invited me out to Tinker, and that is an
absolutely 21st Century depot, great processes, reduction in
cycle time. We got a lot of lessons from that for Albany and
Barstow.
Senator Perdue. Well, General Wyche and General Levy owe
you two beers after today. You have been bragging on all these
guys today.
Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Just really one last question, and it is a good closer.
So in your current lane, what is it that most keeps you up
at night? In any particular order, we would love to hear from
you.
LTG Wyche. Senator Kaine, I will start with the lack of
predictable, consistent funding, because when we do not get
that, we not cannot plan our workload. We cannot plan our
production schedules. That is very important to us. Equally as
important, it creates concerns among our employees, because
they want stability in their lives.
Senator, back to your comment on the supply chain, there is
concern also in the supply chain. We monitor approximately
4,000 suppliers that we build with. In our analysis, we have
identified 1,000 of those suppliers at medium- to high-risk to
going bankrupt. That is a very important as we continue to
provide the readiness for our Army.
Senator Kaine. Admiral Grosklags?
VADM Grosklags. We will just go down the row here, sir. Two
things, if I might, one on-topic and one perhaps slightly off-
topic.
The readiness of the naval aviation forces is number one.
We alluded to some numbers earlier----
Senator Kaine. We had some powerful testimony about that at
the last hearing.
VADM Grosklags. Yes, sir. I will not go into a lot of
detail on that. You are well aware of it.
The challenge I mentioned in my opening statement and that
General Wyche just mentioned is about stable funding and
getting the funding up to the level we need. We have clear data
that shows, as funding started to decline back in the 2009-2010
time frame, our readiness on the flight line, mission-capable
aircraft, full mission-capable aircraft, dropped in exact
correlation with that reduction in funding for those NAVAIR
accounts that I mentioned earlier. So that is one.
The other one is also related to the other part of my
business, which is the buying of new stuff, the acquisition
piece. There, we are just too slow. It continues to bother me
that we cannot collectively accelerate that process. There are
a number of initiatives that we are working on that I would be
happy to share with you at another time.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
Admiral Moore?
VADM Moore. Yes, Senator. I think the thing that keeps me
up at night is not having another Boise. We have the smallest
fleet we have had in a long time. Getting these ships and
submarines back out to the fleet, out there in the operating
force, is critical to the Navy's readiness, to the Nation's
readiness.
When we have something like Boise or we deliver George W.
Bush late, 5 months late out of availability, the impact of
that is that the young men and women out there wearing the
uniform are having to deploy longer and stay on station longer.
So it is not lost on me that, at the end day, it is my job
to get these things out on time. It really impacts our ability
to keep these young men and women safe and get them back on
deployed turnaround times that make sense.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
General Dana?
LtGen Dana. Sir, two quick things.
First, we track 19 platforms in the Marine Corps, shoot,
move, and communicate. Only one of those, an assault amphibian
vehicle, is being replaced. Where I am going with this is
deferred modernization, because we need new systems in the
future because, as I talked about accelerated aging, these
systems are going to wear out at some point.
The second one, not exactly my lane, the gentlemen to my
right have this lane, but as you look at the capability
development system in the military, which is a Robert S.
McNamara, very Ford Motor Company type system, it is not
keeping up.
I went to Singularity for a week, to the executive course.
You look at those folks out there, they are turning product in
weeks and months and maybe 18 months. I mentioned yesterday
Local Motors, a company here locally that literally, from idea
to design to fielding of the equipment, they are doing it in
anywhere from 3 to 13 months.
That is the future, because the enemy in the future, we are
coming out of an Industrial Age where it is all big iron. Now
we are going into space and cyber five-dimension fight instead
of a three-dimension fight. We are going to need to be able to
manufacture capabilities a lot faster.
Thanks for the opportunity to comment.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
General Levy?
Lt. Gen. Levy. Thank you, Senator.
To General Dana's point, our adversaries also iterate that
fast, in terms modernization. Our adversaries can go from
concept to hardware on the ramp in 18 to 24 months. So from a
modernization perspective, we all have a pretty considerable
need for modernization, but it is not just the new platforms.
It is the speed at which we field them.
To your direct question, Senator, about what keeps me awake
at night, it is stable and predictable funding. Since I manage
the supply chain for the United States Air Force, when I do not
know when I am going to get my money, I cannot tell suppliers
when I am going to spend that money.
To General Wyche's point, we drive businesses out of
business. That is not what we are here for. But when the
average fleet age of the United States' platforms is 27 years
old, and 21 of 39 fleets could qualify for antique plates in
your State, sir, that tells me that the supply chain and the
ability to have that available to us to sustain those older
platforms is absolutely essential. The funding that drives the
human beings, the infrastructure, the MILCON, all of the
components that it takes to generate that readiness, that all
stems from a stable and predictable funding stream.
So that coupled with the modernization challenges for our
Air Force are the two things that really give me pause.
Senator Kaine. Senator Perdue has heard me give this
lecture in Budget, and he and I are kind of on the same page
about this. On budgets, I am a real certainty--having been a
mayor and governor, I learned that anybody can adjust to a
number more than they can adjust to a question mark. Even if
they do not like the number, they can adjust to a number. But a
question mark is tough, especially if the question mark is not
only a question mark about the amount but about when I may know
when the question mark is going to be filled in with an amount.
I continue to believe we made an enormous mistake at the
end of the last calendar year. We were very close to having an
omnibus bill done that would have been, essentially, a 10-year
full appropriation not only in the defense category but in
everything else.
The incoming administration--I can understand why they did
this, they are about to take the helm, and they want their
thumbprint on it rather than somebody else's. But they said do
not do it, go ahead and adjourn on the 10th of December even
though you have the time to do an omnibus, and do a CR through
April 27.
Well, what that did is it put them in a box where, when
they came in, they had to then turn around and do a budget for
the rest of fiscal year 2017 and work on a 2018 budget. A new
administration working on just a fiscal year 2018 budget is
plenty to take on their shoulders, but they complicated the
work by telling us to recess and go home on the 10th of
December when we could have gotten an omnibus bill done and
still had plenty of a fine Christmas vacation.
So we made a big mistake, and what we ended up doing was
not giving you certainty. So we have this CR that goes through
the 27th, and we are sitting here, Senator, I do not really
know exactly what is going to happen come the 27th of April. We
are in the middle of the discussion about the fiscal year 2018
budget too.
So we ought to be giving you and giving everybody more
certainty. Even if you do not like it, even if you wish the
number was different than the number we give you, at least we
can give you something that you can plan and adjust around.
That really has been on us. This is something that I know
Senator Perdue shares my views about this, being both on Budget
and Armed Services. We owe you better than what we are giving
you on the predictability score. Hearings like this kind of
have a way of reminding us that we have to step up our game a
little bit.
So thank you so much for what you do, for your testimony,
and we will look forward to taking this into account as we are
working on the NDAA.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
maintaining and sustaining aging weapons systems
1. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, what are the challenges of maintaining aging
weapon systems with regards to engineering, parts, supply chain, costs,
etc.?
LTG Wyche. Maintaining aging weapon systems leads to higher than
programmed costs for the Army. The Army is keeping systems longer than
they were initially designed, resulting in obsolescence. Fewer vendors
manufacture replacement parts requiring larger inventory/stock levels
and increased storage costs. Examples include the M-113 Armored
Personnel Carrier and the M109A6 Paladin, which still uses the Vietnam-
era chassis.
VADM Grosklags. Maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of aging
weapons systems and associated sub-systems presents a number of
challenges, including age/use based structural fatigue, parts
obsolescence, component reliability and inventory availability; each of
which has an impact on portions of DOD's maintenance and sustainment
system. For example, structural fatigue can lead to cracking or other
material degradation (corrosion) that must be mitigated. To do so can
require extensive engineering analysis and subsequent logistics
decisions regarding make, buy or repair of the analyzed item. With
aging systems, the make, buy or repair decision can be particularly
challenging depending on vendor availability, access to technical data
packages, materiel inventory levels, or access to commercial/organic
repair sources of repair and support equipment. In total referred to as
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMS/MS). If
any of these elements are immature, not available or must be
reconstituted to affect a make, buy or repair action, it adds
significant cycle-time to weapons system or sub-system sustainment with
commensurate increases in system down-time and cost.
VADM Moore. The maintenance, repair, and overhaul of aging weapon
systems and associated subsystems present a number of challenges. With
regard to parts support, age-based structural fatigue, parts
obsolescence, component reliability, and inventory availability impact
portions of the Navy's maintenance and sustainment schedules for each
ship, submarine, and aircraft carrier. For example, structural fatigue
to a component or system can lead to cracking, corrosion, or other
material degradation that creates risks which must be analyzed for
mitigation. This work requires engineering analysis and subsequent
logistics decisions regarding whether to make, buy, or repair the
component or system. Modernization of weapon systems presents similar
challenges. Engineering and other studies must be conducted to
determine if a system should be modernized, retired, or replaced. Until
these actions are taken, the Navy risks maintaining systems that may
have outlived their effectiveness. Such decisions can be particularly
challenging depending on vendor availability, access to technical data
packages, material inventory levels, or access to commercial and
organic sources of repair and support equipment. An additional
challenge is that the original equipment manufacturer often does not
support aging weapon systems. Companies that provided the original
weapon systems may have gone out of business or are now producing newer
weapon systems and no longer support the older systems. Any repairs
that require engineering for such systems adds significant costs to
sustainment and increases the overall down-time of that particular
weapon system or item. In total, this is referred to as diminishing
manufacturing sources and material shortages. If any of these elements
are immature, not available, or must be reconstituted, it adds
significant cycle time to the sustainment of a weapon component/system
or subsystem, with commensurate increases in system downtime and cost.
Compounding the parts support challenge is the diminishing workforce
expertise for older weapon systems. The life span of many naval ships
varies and numerous weapon upgrades or replacements occur during their
service lives. Due to turnover of personnel within the Naval Shipyard
workforce during such a time period, the experience and expertise level
required may not be available for the aging systems.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy.

1. Many of the AF's aging aircraft still utilize obsolete
technology or equipment that is extremely costly to upgrade/replace. In
many instances, the original manufacturer is no longer in business or
no longer wishes to manufacture these obsolete items. The 448th Supply
Chain Management Wing (448 SCMW) has a Diminishing Manufacturing
Sources and Material Shortages program for managing these issues.

2. Proprietary data is a major limiter. Having no or limited
data rights reduces our ability to source new suppliers and often
leaves us with reverse engineering as our only option.

3. Evolving market dynamics for some defense unique products may
lead to industry consolidation, restructuring, or exit strategies that
affect DOD's ability to sustain a supply chain for aging weapon
systems. The low demand for some unique military parts is not enough to
sustain competition. In some cases, the demand is so low that it's not
cost effective to manufacture parts or require Minimum Buy Quantities
above the actual requirement. The reality is that our aging systems are
less profitable than other prime businesses.

4. Effective global supply chain integration and management are
critical to DOD program success. While globalization brings many
benefits to both defense firms and the Department, this cross-border
collaboration has also increased the potential threat of global supply
chain disruption, counterfeit parts, sabotage, and theft of critical
American defense technology. This shifting landscape of defense
production may require new tools and authorities to address prospective
security threats and to safeguard the value and integrity of American
technology.

2. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, have each of the services been working
together and with DOD and industry on sharing best practices, revising
processes and readiness plans, cutting costs? If yes, please provide
examples.
LTG Wyche. The Army routinely shares and seeks methods to garner
efficiencies, control costs and provide a quality product in accordance
with the agreed upon schedule. A current example of coordination with
our Sister Services is the UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter Recapitalization
program at Corpus Christi Army Depot. This program is currently being
executed by employing the `Art of the Possible' Lean Six Sigma focused
process. The Army adopted this process from the United States Air Force
at Warner Robbins Air Force Base in Georgia. Corpus Christi Army Depot
is currently in the first year of utilizing this concept, but we
envision reducing Repair Cycle Time from over 500 days (currently) to
320 initially with a stretch goal of 280 Repair Cycle Time. The
Headquarters, Army Materiel Command and its LCMCs regularly conduct
Industry Forums with the private industry to discuss warfighter and
industry needs, areas of concern, and collaborate on future initiatives
important to sustaining the joint warfighter.
VADM Grosklags. Yes. The services do work together sharing best
practices with each other and with industry. Benchmarking repair
processes among organic depots is common. Recently, Fleet Readiness
Center Southwest in San Diego, CA visited the Air Force Logistics
Center (ALC) in Oklahoma City, OK to study the Air Force's use of
Critical Chain Project Management in aircraft production. With regard
to specific aircraft, while investigating challenges with CH-53
sustainment, USN/USMC reviewed the Army's CH-47 helicopter reset
program after years of operations in Iraq. This successful exchange led
the Navy to employ a similar Depot maintenance approach for its CH-53
helicopter program. At the component level, inter-service cooperation
involves the Navy and Marine Corps in cooperation with the U.S Air
Force to study and prototype the USAF consumable sparing model for use
in support of the MV-22 aircraft. At both a formal and informal level,
the services belong to organizations such as the National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
and others which are in place to promote ``best policies, practices,
products and technology for warfighters.'' This cooperation and sharing
can be seen in such forums such as the recent Sea, Air and Space
Symposium and at the DOD Maintenance Symposium held annually at
locations throughout the United States. Finally, Naval Air Systems
Command visits occur routinely with Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs) and other industry partners such as American Airlines, Sikorsky,
Boeing and others to gain an understanding of best and current
practices employed to maintain and sustain a global aircraft Fleet.
VADM Moore. The Navy has been working with DOD and Industry on
sharing best practices, revising processes and readiness plans, and
cutting costs in a variety of ways. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
has within its Acquisition and Commonality Directorate two critical
programs through which this occurs: the NAVSEA Enterprise Commonality
Office and the National Shipbuilding Research Program. The NAVSEA
Enterprise Commonality Office focuses on working across the NAVSEA
enterprise to advocate for cross-platform commonality and variation
reduction in order to reduce the fleet's total ownership cost while
maintaining capability. The office develops the necessary policies and
guidance to implement commonality initiatives, and institutionalize
commonality principles and practices across the Command. The National
Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP) provides a framework for shipyards
building and repairing naval vessels to share best commercial and naval
practices and execute research and development opportunities that will
reduce the total ownership cost of U.S. Navy ships, other national
security customers and the commercial sector. NSRP is a Navy-sponsored
collaboration of 11 U.S. private shipyards, five NAVSEA-affiliated
Program Executive Offices, the United States Coast Guard, and the
NAVSEA Enterprise Commonality Office. A key NSRP product is the
Strategic Investment Plan, developed jointly by Industry and Navy
leaders from the input of Industry experts and the results of
benchmarking studies conducted to identify technology gaps and the need
for process improvements. Research projects to close gaps and improve
processes have been carried out over the years by 11 shipyards, 24
universities, over 290 shipbuilding suppliers, and Navy subject matter
experts across 43 states.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) has been
working together with DOD and Industry through Depot Maintenance Inter-
service Support Agreements and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).
Working together with DOD and Industry: The AFSC negotiated its first
Enterprise Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Boeing in 2013, and has
since expanded its EPA portfolio to include 18 Industry partners. This
innovation in partnering strategy allows the three Air Logistics
Complexes to execute Implementation Agreements in an expeditious
manner, thereby reducing administrative cost and increasing efficiency.
The EPAs cover both products and services, including software,
commodities, new technology implementation, and other elements as
required. In an article referencing the signing of the first AFSC EPA
with Boeing, Mr. Bill Kobren, Director of Logistics & Sustainment
Center at Defense Acquisition University stated, ``this enterprise-
level agreement appears to represent an important PPP initiative,
aligning with the broader partnering vision and industrial integration
strategy articulated in the DOD Weapon System Acquisition Reform:
Product Support Assessment, the Air Force's Product Support Enterprise
Vision, and the overarching Partnering Agreement (PA) construct
discussed in the DOD Public-Private Partnering for Sustainment
Guidebook.'' https://dap.dau.mil/career/log/blogs/archive/2013/11/07/
enterprise-partnership agreement.aspx The AFSC is further engaging with
Industry through 121 PPP workloads, all of which are uniquely
different. Examples include:

F-22 Power Systems (Boeing)
F-22 Storage Management Systems (Boeing)
F-35 Air Vehicle Maintenance (Lockheed Martin)
B-2 Advanced Composites Manufacture/Repair (Northrop
Grumman)
C-130J Depot Activation (Lockheed Martin)
C-17 Airframe and Avionics (Boeing)
C-17 Valves & Actuators (Parker Aerospace)
F117 and F119 Engine Heave Maintenance (Pratt & Whitney)
AE Series Engines (Rolls-Royce)

Sharing Best Practices: The Public Private Partnering (PPP) Metrics
Team. This team, composed of DOD and private industry partnering
experts, established a metrics table that was incorporated into the DOD
Public Private Partnering for Product Support Guidebook in October
2016. These metrics are cross referenced against relevant DOD
Partnering Objectives to identify which metrics best support each
respective objective. Having metrics to gauge partnering performance
that apply to both DOD and Industry is a best practice that assists in
determining partnership effectiveness. (Metrics tables are available in
the DOD Public Private Partnering for Product Support Guidebook, pages
38-46.) The Warner-Robins Air Logistics Complex (WR-ALC) Corrosion
Control team collaborated with Boeing and C-17 System Program Office
(SPO) Engineering to develop a process to chemically strip composite
components resulting in the first ever chemical depaint process for C-
17, reducing depaint flow days at WR-ALC by over 40 percent. The WR-ALC
team visited Boeing paint and depaint operations and worked with Boeing
Production and Management teams and Boeing Quality Assurance (QA) to
share best practices in painting, stenciling, sanding, and various
corrosion control processes resulting in numerous improvements to
equipment, tools, and processes. The joint team developed the resin
application process resulting in a standard process to restore resin-
starved composite surfaces prior to painting. In addition to
establishing a monthly Corrosion Control telecom, the team collaborated
to rewrite work instructions to streamline the wash and lube processes
resulting in more efficient aircraft flow at both locations. Working
Together with Other Services: The Navy MQ-4C Triton and the Army MQ-1C
Gray Eagle platforms. AFSC activated the Power and Discrete Controller
(PDC) for Global Hawk in 2011. In 2015 the Triton Program Manager
approached WR-ALC concerning the organic activation of Triton's PDC.
Both platforms were manufactured by Northrup Grumman. The activation
for the Triton PDC will be able to leverage facilities, equipment,
tooling, training, and tech data from the Global Hawk activation.
Battery Repair for the Air Force Predator/Reaper program expanded to
include Battery Repair for the Army Gray Eagle platform. The concurrent
activation included facilities, equipment, tooling, training, and the
majority tech data needed for the Army workload. As a result, the Army
experienced minimal cost for tech order modification. WR-ALC
Commodities Maintenance Group has initiated agreements with the US Navy
Fleet Readiness Center-Southeast (FRC-SE) in Jacksonville, FL to
establish a formal Continuity of Operations plan for both the WR-ALC
and FRC-SE to share industrial capability/capacity during times of need
(surge requirements, piece of equipment goes down, etc.).

3. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, what impact does aging infrastructure have on
each of the services' ability to increase or sustain readiness?
LTG Wyche. Among the challenges of an aging infrastructure is the
fact that those facilities built for WWII (60 percent of AMC's overall
real property inventory) were not designed for sustaining the Army's
current and future equipment using modern industrial processes. In
older facilities, production lines are often configured to fit the
facility, with the corresponding impacts on efficiency and cost
effectiveness. The Command's vision for the OIB infrastructure is
modern, flexible, and efficient facilities which are designed to enable
current and future industrial best practices. AMC's approach to this
challenge is two-fold. Where older facilities are structurally sound,
but have failing facility components (e.g. HVAC, electrical, roofing,
etc.), the Command seeks opportunities where is more economically
prudent to restore or modernize these facilities vice replacing them.
Using operating funds, this approach often addresses the problem more
quickly and at less cost. The results often reset the service life of
these facilities. In other cases, the cost-effective or operationally-
effective solution is to fully recapitalize the facilities. These
facilities are designed to house modern industrial processes and
facility standards (e.g. Quality of Work Environment improvements such
as fire safety, lighting, HVAC, latrines, etc.), to be adapted quickly
for new or expanded demands, and to reduce overhead costs particularly
in terms of energy. With known demands across the AMC's capabilities,
AMC estimates an annual need for $100 million in Restoration &
Modernization (R&M) and $300 million for MCA. Aging facilities limit
the OIB's ability to ramp-up production to meet the Warfighter's needs.
VADM Grosklags. The age and capability of existing infrastructure
does not support the complexity of new system requirements (i.e.
increased power, HVAC cooling for equipment test benches and larger
servers, security requirements, etc.). The majority of Commander, Fleet
Readiness Center support infrastructure consists of obsolete ``World
War II era'' facilities in support of functions, systems and
technologies for which they were not designed. Approximately 76 percent
of the Depots' production and manufacturing footprint (square footage)
is more than 40 years old (Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) useful
life). Approximately 51 percent of overall facilities footprint is more
than 67 years old (NAVFAC Physical Life). Changes in aircraft size and
complexity over the last 20 years present new challenges. The Super
Hornet is larger than the older F/A-18. The MV-22 replaced the CH-46
and is considerably larger and more complex. The F-35, the multiservice
next generation aircraft, presents new maintenance requirements.
Considering the changes in the aircraft and our dated facilities, many
aspects of maintenance have become more challenging and complex
maintenance tasks are more difficult or limited at best.
VADM Moore. With respect to our Naval Shipyards, the age of
facilities is not a definitive indicator of the ability of a facility
to serve its intended function. Facilities constructed for a use that
is no longer relevant and that are repurposed for other uses can imply
a loss of efficiency to conduct mission. For this response, the term
``aging infrastructure'' refers to buildings no longer used for their
original purpose and have materially degraded due to a lack of
sustainment and recapitalization. Aging facilities, dry docks, and
equipment infrastructure degrade the Shipyards' ability to support
fleet schedule and readiness requirements. Using Navy Figure of Merit
assessment methodology, Naval Shipyard mission-essential facilities are
in worse condition (average score 65) than the overall Navy's shore
infrastructure (average score 80). Naval Shipyard facilities are WWII
vintage and were built for conventional ship construction vice modern
nuclear ship repair processes. The average age of Naval Shipyard
facilities is 62 years, with some up to 200 years old. Average Naval
Shipyard capital equipment (acquisition cost greater than $250K) age is
21 years old and increasing; this is six years greater than the
industry-standard effective service life average age. Naval Shipyard
capital equipment is typically obsolete, unsupported by the original
equipment manufacturers, and at operational risk. Continued reliance on
this significantly aged Naval Shipyard infrastructure increases
submarine and aircraft carrier availability costs and places schedules
at risk. This risk is caused by the mismatch in capacity and workload
at the shipyards, and having aging infrastructure does not help to
increase capacity. This results in passing workaround costs to the
fleet and ultimately impacting Operational Availability when equipment
downtime or degraded facilities impact critical path maintenance
requirements. NAVSEA and the Naval Shipyards are working with CNIC,
NAVFAC, and the fleet to develop an aligned, integrated, and defendable
strategic infrastructure plan for the Naval Shipyards. This study's
objective is to streamline shipyard industrial processes to optimize
availability schedules and execution. The study is expected to be
completed by the end of fiscal year 2017. Shipyard layout, material
handling equipment, logistics flow, new technology insertion, and
overall process density all impact the work efficiency. This analysis
will not be constrained by the current layout of utilities, logistics,
buildings, or equipment and will provide a prioritized, consolidated
list of Naval Shipyard infrastructure investments (MILCON, SRM special
projects, and OPN capital equipment) needed to improve throughput and
return on investment at the Naval Shipyards and their detachments. For
the Regional Maintenance Centers, the private-sector contractor
facilities used are monitored through maintenance of Master Ship Repair
and NAVSEA dry-dock certifications. While private facilities have aging
challenges similar to those of the Naval Shipyards, investment
decisions for maintenance and modernization of these facilities are
funded and executed by the respective private contractors.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-2, Readiness,
defines AF readiness as the ability of United States Air Force forces
to deliver their designed capabilities without unacceptable delay.
Additionally, it states that the AF will effectively manage its
resources by providing for the training, morale, health, and fitness of
its personnel and will provide the equipment, supplies, and
infrastructure required to execute all tasks related to the AF mission.
The average age of AFSC infrastructure now exceeds 40 years. The AF has
primarily funded only New Mission MILCON requirements since fiscal year
2009. With the growing list of unfunded Existing Mission MILCON
requirements and an increasing backlog of facility maintenance, repair,
and construction requirements ($2.5 billion in AFSC alone), management
of aging facilities has become a daunting task of operational risk
management. Commanders at all levels are being forced to forgo facility
projects which may increase morale, improve efficiencies, reduce
customer cost, potentially create energy savings, and increase
readiness in order to ensure work areas are safe, usable, and available
for employees and that basic readiness requirements are being
maintained. AFSC readiness is tied more closely to its infrastructure
than many other AF units. As facilities continue to age without being
modernized or replaced, AFSC has no choice but to rely on these older
facilities which are repair intensive and not as flexible as new
facilities. AFSC Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs) and Air Base Wings
(ABWs) cannot efficiently/effectively function without usable
facilities to support mission/readiness requirements. As facilities
increase in age and funds to sustain/repair them decrease, the number
of backlogged repair requirements increase. Each new unfunded
requirement exponentially increases the risk of mission failure and
decreased readiness. The impact of aging facilities to AFSC readiness
is clearly represented in the following examples: At Oklahoma City Air
Logistics Complex (OC-ALC) an aging boiler deaerator tank, which
supplies steam, chilled water, and compressed air to over 13 depot
maintenance facilities, failed. This single failure shut down critical
chemical cleaning and plating lines, driving a production delay that
cost the ALC $74,000 in indirect time and $20,000 in overtime to make
up for the lost production. At Warner-Robins Air Logistics Complex (WR-
ALC) numerous structural issues identified in a building constructed in
1944 require production personnel to vacate the area when wind speeds
reach 35 knots (40 mph). This joint use facility is a wooden structure
and houses the AF's only aircraft fire bottle overhaul workload. There
have been six (6) evacuations since the initial finding in April 2015
resulting in a work stoppage that affects readiness for both the ALC
and ABW. Bottom line: As facilities continue to age and are not
modernized or replaced, AFSC faces an increasing challenge to comply
with this Directive and deliver capabilities without delay.

4. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, sustainment costs account for greater than 70
percent of the life-cycle costs of a weapon system. Is weapons system
sustainment being adequately incorporated into initial acquisition
planning for new weapon systems to ensure these systems can be
efficiently and effectively maintained over their life cycles?
LTG Wyche. While two primary mechanisms are in place to incorporate
sustainment considerations into early acquisition planning, their
inconsistent application in Army materiel system efforts may sub-
optimize life cycle sustainment. The first mechanism is found in the
current Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, which
contains a mandatory Sustainment Key Performance Parameter (S-KPP) that
includes two primary components (operational availability and materiel
availability) and two supporting Key System Attributes (KSA)
(reliability and operations and support costs). When all elements of
this KPP are applied to a developmental system it should drive higher
reliability and lower sustainment costs. Part of the Army's challenge
is having the ability to see itself and ensure compliance in meeting a
system S-KPP. Although the Army Requirements Oversight Council process
has been reinvigorated in the past few years, the S-KPP has been waived
to a lower KSA (or waived altogether) in several requirements documents
as a means for accelerating the acquisition strategy to deliver needed
capabilities to the Army more expeditiously. The second mechanism is
the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP), which the Army requires for all
acquisition category level Army programs. DOD and Army recognize the
importance of the LCSPs to assess system cost along its lifecycle.
Critical reviews of LCSPs, combined with emerging results of the Army's
Operational and Sustainment Reviews (OSRs), have improved the content
and staffing process of Army LCSPs and emerging results from OSRs are
providing insights into the type of data collection needed within
programs to better inform the life cycle cost picture of Army systems.
Finally, the Army Materiel Command has partnered with the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology to
develop Army policy to clearly define roles, responsibility and
criteria for programs to transition to sustainment. This policy will
enable detailed planning, and forecasting to ensure adequate funding as
programs transition from production and deployment to sustainment.
VADM Grosklags. The Department of the Navy (DON) designed its
acquisition process, commonly referred to as the Navy Gate Review
process, to ensure there is no gap between the Requirements and
Acquisition organizations so that the Navy understands the relationship
between requirements, technical feasibility, and cost. The process
requires the Navy/Marine Corps operational requirements leadership and
acquisition leadership to agree, and repeatedly affirm that agreement
throughout the development, acquisition, and sustainment of a system.
The DON Gate Review process was designed to ensure that cost and
affordability are managed with the same discipline and rigor as
traditional performance requirements. The DON's Program Managers
address the basic principles to get the requirement right, perform to a
stable plan, and make every dollar count at each Gate Review wherever
they are in their program's life cycle so that sustainment and its
associated costs are no longer an afterthought. DON acquisitions
emphasize stable designs as well as modularity and open architecture to
reduce cost, extend service life, and increase acquisition agility,
including a focus on operating and support (O&S) cost early in design.
Earlier engagement on O&S and disposal costs enables Program Managers
to more fully evaluate system affordability and possible trade space
leading to better understanding of Total Cost earlier in the process,
which in turn allows better informed decisions. The DON's Program
Managers are tasked with understanding what drives those costs and
formulating a `should cost' strategy to meaningfully reduce program
cost or risk without substantively impacting key requirements
regardless of what phase the program is in.
VADM Moore. The Department of the Navy (DON) designed its
acquisition process, commonly referred to as the Navy Gate Review
process, to ensure there is no gap between the requirements and
acquisition organizations so that the Navy understands the relationship
between requirements, technical feasibility, and cost. The process
requires the Navy/Marine Corps operational requirements leadership and
acquisition leadership to agree, and repeatedly affirm that agreement
throughout the development, acquisition, and sustainment of a system.
The DON Gate Review process was designed to ensure that cost and
affordability are managed with the same discipline and rigor as
traditional performance requirements. The DON's Program Managers
address the basic principles to get the requirement right, perform to a
stable plan, and make every dollar count at each Navy Gate Review
wherever they are in their program's life cycle so that sustainment and
its associated costs are no longer an afterthought. DON acquisitions
emphasize stable designs as well as modularity and open architecture to
reduce cost, extend service life, and increase acquisition agility,
including a focus on operating and support (O&S) cost early in design.
Earlier engagement on O&S and disposal costs enables Program Managers
to more fully evaluate system affordability and possible trade space
leading to better understanding of total cost earlier in the process,
which in turn allows better informed decisions. The DON's Program
Managers are tasked with understanding what drives those costs and
formulating a ``should cost'' strategy to meaningfully reduce program
cost or risk without substantively impacting key requirements
regardless of what phase the program is in.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy.Yes, the AF Lifecycle Management Center (AFLCMC)
stood up a Logistics (LG-LZ) Directorate that is focused on ensuring
that product support is adequately planned and implemented for all of
our acquisition programs. AFLCMC/LG-LZ has developed and continues to
develop and deploy standard processes, tools, templates, and training
across the 12 product support elements, Lifecycle Sustainment Plans and
Product Support Business Case Analyses (BCAs). The LG-LZ provides
subject matter expert (SME) support to the program offices to assist
them with their product support planning to ensure their plans are
adequate and executable. The LG-LZ also reviews and coordinates on the
Lifecycle Sustainment Plans (LCSPs) that must address all product
support elements in their sustainment planning. AFLCMC also has
assigned Product Support Managers (PSMs) within each of the Programs.
The PSMs report directly to the Program Manager (PM) and are
responsible for product support planning for that specific program.
AFLCMC/LG-LZ also works closely with SAF/AQD to ensure adequate, clear,
and concise policies are in place that require the appropriate product
support planning within the acquisition process. AFLCMC has done a
tremendous job in transitioning from the three previous product centers
focused on acquisition to one integrated Lifecycle Management Center.
civilian personnel
5. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, is the existing OPM hiring process sufficient
to meet your manning needs?
LTG Wyche. No, although there are many existing OPM hiring
authorities such as temporary, term and Schedule A hiring authorities,
Veterans' Recruitment Appointment, and the recently approved NDAA
fiscal year 2017 Direct Hiring Authority (DHA) that allow the Army
Materiel Command (AMC) Defense Industrial Base facilities to meet
manning needs and enhance our ability to attract and hire highly
qualified candidates. However, these authorities cannot always address
an immediate need for a flexible workforce. For example, at
reimbursable sites with a six-year contract, current hiring authorities
can only be used to hire temporary personnel for up to four years.
Therefore, the sites are put in a dilemma to either hire a permanent
workforce and risk having to conduct reduction-in-force at the
conclusion of the workload or be subject to pre-planning within a few
years to rehire and retrain new personnel to fulfill contract
requirements. The largest hurdle for AMC activities is the USAJOBS
application tool, because it is the only existing federal hiring
application system for all job seekers. For the blue collar applicants,
this system is not user-friendly, difficult to navigate, time consuming
and more complex than the skills they are required to have in the
positions for which they are applying. There is also a lengthy process
from the closing of the vacancy announcement to the onboarding date,
including extensive delays due to security clearance requirements. All
of these items impact readiness when trying to meet immediate and
sporadic mission surges.
VADM Grosklags. Yes, the current hiring authorities and
flexibilities authorized by OPM are sufficient.
VADM Moore. Yes, the current hiring authorities and flexibilities
authorized by OPM are sufficient.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. No, the hiring process takes entirely too long.
Hiring actions for the Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) take on
average 150 days for external hires and 80 days for internal hires. AF,
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC),
and AFSC have to drive more process improvements into the hiring
timelines, measure results with 100 percent accuracy (we are still not
there yet), and expand flexibilities within laws, regulations, policy,
etc. Specific areas AFSC is trying to improve are as follows:

1. The AF must take the initiative and work with stakeholders to
map the security clearance process, as it hinders our employees from
performing their workload from hiring date until their clearances are
approved.

2. The AF needs to work with stakeholders to figure out a way to
pay alternative medical facilities to do drug testing and physicals.
Right now the regulation states we can, but Financial Management (FM)
has no methodology to pay those providers directly for services
rendered, as those that are hired are not yet part of the government
system.

3. Funding needs to be available and invested to move on-
boarding and Engineering (EN) recruiting from an enhanced version of an
internal Microsoft capability (SharePoint) onto an acceptable iCloud
for enterprise-wide accessibility. These state-of-the-art designs can
benefit the AF and give significant returns on investment, but are
hindered by lack of Human Resource (HR) system development outside of
the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS) which houses all
civilian personnel documents.

6. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, are your services utilizing the new hiring
authorities in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA?
LTG Wyche. AMC is working closely with the Department of the Army
to review and provide feedback on the implementation guidance on the
following two authorities: Temporary Direct Hire Authority (DHA) for
Domestic Defense Industrial Base Facilities (Sec 1125) and Temporary
Personnel Flexibilities for Domestic Defense Industrial Base Facilities
Civilian Personnel (Sec 1132).
VADM Grosklags. The Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) are not
currently utilizing the new hiring authorities in the fiscal year 2017
NDAA, as we are awaiting implementing guidance. DOD/DoN implementing
guidance is anticipated to be issued in the near future, which would
allow FRCs to utilize the new hiring authorities, potentially in time
for upcoming graduations.
VADM Moore. The Department of the Navy is still creating service-
specific instructions. However, NAVSEA has not been negatively impacted
in its hiring efforts and appreciates Congress' interest and concern on
this matter.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy.AFSC is positioned to use Direct Hiring Authority
(DHA); however, we have not received the delegation of authority from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to actually hire
employees. AF anticipates the OSD delegation will be made available in
June 2017 and subsequent delegations (AF, Major Commands) will follow
soon after.

7. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, what more can Congress do to enable you to
hire the civilians you need to increase readiness?
LTG Wyche. Maintaining and increasing readiness is the Department's
top priority. The Department has numerous human resources flexibilities
at our disposal to attract, recruit, and retain a highly skilled and
diverse workforce, and we continuously review our authorities to ensure
the right workforce planning and development strategies and
flexibilities are in place. Improving personnel practices is a
priority, and the Department will continue to study and pursue
opportunities to streamline processes and reduce recruitment times. The
Department appreciates Congress' interest in assisting in this
endeavor.
VADM Grosklags. The fiscal year 2017 NDAA direct hiring authorities
will provide the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) the ability to reduce
cycle time and improve the time it takes to staff workload
requirements. In considering all depots under the Commander, Fleet
Readiness Centers, FRC-South West (FRC-SW) has experienced the greatest
struggle in being able to adequately staff to support current depot
workload requirements. Recent salary surveys for FRC-SW have indicated
a need to increase the salary rates for several occupational series to
remain competitive with local, private sector employers. The disparity
in pay has resulted in a depletion of local skilled labor candidate
pools. The Naval Air Systems Command has submitted a Federal Wage
System Special Rate Request for San Diego, California, through the
Department of Navy Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR). Approval
of the Federal Wage System Special Rate Request for San Diego would
afford the ability to offer higher starting salaries to candidates;
thereby, increasing the offer acceptance rate of positions directly
supporting fleet readiness.
VADM Moore. With the hiring efforts of the last two fiscal years,
the four Naval Shipyards have processes and procedures in place to
support the recruiting, hiring, onboarding and initial training
necessary to meet the identified mission. As always, the Navy
appreciates the support of the Congress; however, improved Department
of Defense budget stability would help the Naval Shipyards in their
ability to maintain a steady hiring rate, which would allow them to
better manage attrition and fluctuations in workload. Likewise with the
Navy's Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC), improved Department of
Defense budget stability would help to improve the RMCs' ability to
meet their civilian staffing requirements and maintain a steady hiring
rate, which in turn would allow them to better manage attrition and
workload increases. Without a stable budget, the hiring processes for
the RMCs are in a continual state of starts and stops, which hinders
them from reaching their optimal manning levels.

LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.

Lt. Gen. Levy. Maintaining and increasing readiness is the
Department's top priority. The Department has numerous human resources
flexibilities at our disposal to attract, recruit, and retain a highly
skilled and diverse workforce, and we continuously review our
authorities to ensure the right workforce planning and development
strategies and flexibilities are in place. Improving personnel
practices is a priority, and the Department will continue to study and
pursue opportunities to streamline processes and reduce recruitment
times. The Department appreciates Congress' interest in assisting in
the foregoing.

8. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, what is the overall status of staffing at our
depots, shipyards, arsenals, and ammunition plants?
LTG Wyche. Staffing shortfalls at AMC depots, arsenals, and
ammunition plants exist in all areas of our operations. Many sites are
understaffed to support mission requirements due to increased workload,
attrition and challenges in recruiting that have resulted in an
imbalance in the permanent and term workforce composition. Retirements/
separations and time limited appointments leave a knowledge vacuum that
can jeopardize current and future customer support. It is estimated
that approximately 20 percent of the workforce in the top fragile and
critical skill sets are eligible for retirement. Employees on time-
limited appointments that have many years of experience are likely to
seek more stable employment. In many locations, large numbers of
personnel actions are on hold or were paused, due to recruitment
challenges and most recently the hiring freeze and its exemption
process. Many sites are operating at roughly 90 percent of their
onboard strength against their requirements. While management can use
some of the available hiring and retention flexibilities, the inability
to offer more permanent or longer term employment hinders them from
having a more stable workforce.
VADM Grosklags. The following is the status of civilian staffing at
our three aviation depots (Fleet Readiness Centers--FRCs): SITE On
board as of 30 June 2017 (NWCF Only) Target (NWCF Only) Shortfall FRC
Southwest 2,906 3,317--411 FRC Southeast 3,616 3,780--164 FRC East
3,548 3,564--16 TOTAL 10,070 10,661--591 The fiscal year 2017 NDAA
direct hiring authority will be a powerful lever in addressing this
shortfall at FRC SW.
VADM Moore. The four Naval Shipyards are predicted to end fiscal
year 2017 with a total end strength of 34,068 full-time employees
(FTEs). This is above the 33,850 FTEs projected for fiscal year 2017
and allows the Navy to more rapidly increase its Naval Shipyard
workforce to the required 36,100 FTEs by fiscal year 2020. The Navy's
four Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC) have a current end strength of
2,896. With 2,793 civilian personnel currently onboard, the RMCs'
aggressive hiring plans with their processes and procedures that
support the recruiting, hiring, onboarding and initial training
necessary to meet the identified mission have been largely successful,
despite the challenges of uncertain budgets and are currently tracking
to fill by the end of the year.

LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. See chart below:

CIVILIAN MANNING REQUIREMENTS (5 May 2017)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Warner
Ogden Air Oklahoma Robins
Program Element Code City Air Air TOTAL
(PEC) Logistics Logistics Logistics REQS
Center Center Center
(OO-ALC) (OC-ALC) (WR-ALC)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Working Capital Fund (WCF)--
Unit Manning Document (UMD)............... 78211A 8036 10403 7554 25993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other--UMD.................................. Multiple 32 3 4 39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total UMD Authorizations.................... N/A 8068 10406 7558 26032
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WCF Assigned to UMD MPCN.................... 78211A 7549 9441 6723 23713
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Assigned to UMD MPCN.................. Multiple 28 3 4 35
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Assigned to UMD MPCN.................. N/A 7577 9444 6727 23748
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of Assigned vs UMD............... N/A 94% 91% 89% 91%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WCF--Overhire (Psuedo)--78211A.............. 78211A 747 420 197 1364
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Overhire (Psuedo) Assigned............ Multiple 2 2 2 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Overhire (Psuedo) Assigned............ N/A 749 422 199 1370
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Assigned (UMD & psuedo)............... ALL 8326 9866 6926 25118
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DELTA....................................... ALL -258 540 632 914
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of Assigned vs Target w/ N/A 103% 95% 92% 96%
Overhires (OH).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

software maintenance
9. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, how are each of you integrating software
maintenance into your core depot-level maintenance and repair
operations?
LTG Wyche. The Army is currently working initiatives to integrate
software maintenance into our core depot-level maintenance and repair
operations. First, we are in the process of establishing our software
depot maintenance core capability. During this previous budget cycle
for fiscal year 2019-23, we developed a process to determine the depot
maintenance core requirements for software. Our goal is to ultimately
be able to report the needed core hours in the Biennial Core Report to
Congress. This process also includes establishing Army regulatory
guidance on software depot maintenance core capabilities. Second, we
are in Phase III of our manpower initiative to move contractor manpower
needed to support software workload to organic support. Phase I and
Phase II has resulted in 96 authorizations with total cost avoidance of
$103.9 million.
VADM Grosklags. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division and
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division were designated by the
Secretary of the Navy as Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence
(CITE-10USC2474)) which facilitates their ability to partner across
private (and public) sectors to execute depot-level maintenance and
product support for software for the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE).
The NAE initiates its software maintenance planning prior to award of
contract with the conduct of a decision tree analysis for determining
which Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) will generate a Core
sustaining workload (10USC2464). As a part of the request for proposal,
specifically sections L and M of contract and statement of work, we ask
the vendor to identify the enablers e.g. data rights, development and
test environments, test procedures, according to a Software
Sustainability Package (SSP) Data Item Description. The SSP is to be
used in conjunction with a Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) or CLIN
Options to procure the executable software and source files for a CSCI
and is the primary software sustainment document for each CSCI which
could be maintained by non-original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
During the latter stages of program development, a business case
analysis is conducted to determine how each CSCI will be maintained and
by whom, e.g. OEM, organic (Government), third party vendor. A software
support activity is stood-up at one of the Warfare Centers to provide
for the sustainment of the software for both organic development and
acquisition management of CSCIs.
VADM Moore. The Navy integrates software maintenance in accordance
with its Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual that directs all surface ship
and submarine software maintenance be integrated into depot-level
maintenance and repair availabilities. New or updated software updates
are done by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (software developer) in
concert with a designated Naval Warfare Center to ensure proper
integration into Navy platforms.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy.The AF considers software maintenance as a part of
depot level maintenance. As such, the AF has been reporting software as
part of the annual AF 50-50 report, the biennial core logistics
capabilities (CORE) report, and executing the workload within the AF
Working Capital Fund for over 30 years. The Air Force Sustainment
Center (AFSC), with support from Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)
Logistics Directorate and SAF/AQD, continues to review the CORE
software requirements to ensure that the organic enterprise has the
expertise and capacity to support the warfighter. The AF software CORE
requirement for fiscal year 2017 is 4.271 million man-hours with AFSC
estimated to produce 4.888M man-hours across the three Air Logistic
Complexes (ALCs). The ALCs provide subject matter expertise to assist
program offices to design for maintainability and depot activation.
AFSC works with the program offices to embed depot software engineering
personnel with the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) during
Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD) for software intensive
major weapon systems to ensure low risk transitions to organic depot
sustainment by IOC+4. The AF maintains centers of excellence at each
depot focused on the weapon systems that they are assigned. This allows
the AF to build and maintain the knowledge base to support legacy
systems, and build support for new weapon systems as they are developed
and deployed.

10. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, how does each service plan to address the
growing importance of software maintenance on your depot-level
sustainment operations?
LTG Wyche. We are committed to ensuring the Strategic Readiness of
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) solutions through synchronization and
integration of life cycle sustainment priorities with C4ISR Program
Executive Officer/Program Manager requirements. The continued budget
constraints and lack of consistent funding has created concerns when it
comes to emerging and sustaining software requirements. In order to
address some of the concerns, we are combining our Enterprise License
Agreements with higher headquarters in order to reduce costs; working
with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology community to develop sustainable solutions, identify
depot maintenance efforts that are focused on readiness, and working to
grow the organic software maintenance capabilities. In Phase III of our
manpower initiative, we have regionalized some of the support teams
which have resulted in either cost savings or cost avoidances. As we
move forward and new systems come into the portfolio, it is critical
that predicable and consistent funding becomes available. In addition,
The Army's science and technology community is addressing the growing
importance of software maintenance by employing modular open systems
architecture, which will allow for faster, more flexible hardware and
software upgrades for depot-level sustainment operations. This effort
is known as hardware-software convergence. Older systems used single-
purpose hardware and software which lacked flexibility and competed for
limited resources on a given platform. Army depots are updating older
hardware and hardware-based architecture to newer, virtually-replicated
functions in software that will reduce overall lifecycle costs,
increase platform interoperability and reduce platform size, weight,
power and cooling requirements. Modular open systems architectures
enable a ``plug and play'' environment wherein new capabilities can be
seamlessly integrated into older platforms. For example, the Army will
benefit from its incorporation of modular open systems architecture in
the Future Vertical Lift program through reduced burden on Army
aviation depots at Corpus Christi Army Depot. This architecture reduces
Army depot requirements to sustain additional components on platforms
and eliminates redundant Government off-the-Shelf (GOTS) items, saving
time, money and other logistical burdens. Congress' continued attention
to the Defense Department's use of modular open systems architecture is
appreciated.
VADM Grosklags. The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has been
addressing the growing importance of software maintenance as a depot-
level requirement for some time. The Secretary of the Navy designated
our two primary Warfare Centers as Centers of Industrial and Technical
Excellence (CITE-10USC2474) to enhance partnering for depot maintenance
and product support. We have implemented formal policies, processes,
and procedures through Standard Work Packages to ensure thorough life
cycle software sustainment support for our weapon systems, especially
for software. Our Software Engineers are engaged early and upfront in
the development of the software for new weapon systems and typically
stay with that Program through fielding and operational employment.
Software Engineers support the NAVAIR Programs with software
development contract management to ensure the efficient and effective
transition from development to sustainment is planned and can be
executed. We're investing in critical infrastructure to include
laboratories and software support activities to leverage capabilities
and capacity to ensure the most efficient, effective, and responsive
software maintenance support. We continue to invest in the development
of the workforce and have developed and delivered classroom and on the
job training in the areas of open architecture standards,
implementation of the Agile development process, complex algorithm
development, safety and secure coding standards. We're focusing on the
early procurement of technical data/intellectual property and a
software supportability package to enable us to reproduce, recreate, or
recompile critical software for the sustainment of the weapon system.
We continue to emphasize the importance of software maintenance and
sustainment because, unlike hardware, the software is the enabler to
integrating and interoperating among multiple systems and subsystems in
the matrix of our ever evolving battlespace.
VADM Moore. The Navy Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM) outlines
the process and requirements to deliver alterations to the Fleet to
include software maintenance updates and these address the growing
importance of software maintenance on our depot-level sustainment
operations. Navy software Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
developers continue to move to common software libraries that enable
continuous software maintenance in stride with the development of
warfighter capability enhancements. The testing, certification, and
delivery of these software maintenance updates are planned periodic
warfighter improvements to enable a reduction in the overall cost. An
increasing number of Navy OEM software developers have adopted the
Agile software development process that allows for improved government
involvement and engagement in the software development process as well
as improved software quality that reduces software maintenance
requirements.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Software maintenance workload continues to grow
significantly in both new and legacy weapon systems. In order to
sustain our modern weapon systems, Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC)
is institutionalizing the involvement of depot organic software
engineers and computer scientists in all aspects of the Software
Development Lifecycle (SDLC) to include requirements analysis, design,
implementation, integration, and test, including platform level
software integration capability. AFSC's goal is to utilize organic
resources to sustain all sub-systems for CORE workload designated
systems which are projected to experience change throughout the weapon
system's lifecycle. The highly integrated nature of modern systems
requires system architectural knowledge to properly consider impact of
software changes to the overall system. The AF continually evaluates
the right mix of organic and contract support of software centric
systems. The AF works hard to develop effective partnerships with
industry to leverage the strengths of the depots and private industry
to deliver war winning cost effective capability to the war fighter.
AFSC continues to place emphasis on infrastructure investment;
cybersecurity; Scientist, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM)
development and recruitment programs; and industry leading process
methodologies, like the Agile Software Development framework, to ensure
the organic workforce has the resources, capacity, technical
competence, and tools necessary to support emerging weapon systems.
munitions
11. Senator Inhofe. What is your assessment of the state of the
munitions industrial base?
LTG Wyche. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen Dana, and
Lt. Gen. Levy, the munitions industrial base faces significant
challenges in meeting current operational requirements. Mortar,
artillery, missile and bomb requirements pose the greatest challenges.
This is primarily due to facility capacity and workforce capabilities.
Today's organic ammunition facilities and infrastructure were created
during the buildup prior to World War II. Although some modernization
efforts have been accomplished, we need additional modernization
funding in order to maintain and revitalize critical production base
capabilities. Workforce challenges include impacts from sequestration,
which resulted in a loss of corporate knowledge and our inability to
retain certain desired skill sets. The current hiring freeze has
further compounded our workforce challenges.
VADM Grosklags. The Department is concerned about the overall
health of the munitions industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War,
the munitions development and production market has declined. This
decrease has resulted in aggressive competition for a limited number of
new munition program opportunities. Within the munitions sector, two
key prime contractors, Raytheon Missile Systems (a division of the
Raytheon Company) and the Lockheed-Martin Company account for
approximately 85-90 percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD)
munitions procurement funding. While there are small pockets of
progress in expanding the munitions industrial base, as the Department
of the Navy's successful efforts to mature Orbital-ATK from a small
business operation to a prime contractor for the Advanced Anti-
Radiation Guided Missile program, other similar efforts are not on the
horizon. While many industrial sectors that support our national
security requirements are also supported by commercial markets, the DOD
munitions industrial sector is mostly defense-unique. As a result, the
munitions industrial base faces a number of challenges such as
sustaining munition design and engineering teams, and sustaining
munitions sub-tier suppliers. The munitions industrial sector is
routinely impacted by shifts in DOD demand as a result of various
factors, but mostly due to budget fluctuations/constraints, the
initiation or drawdown of conflicts, and the reprogramming of resources
from munitions accounts to pay for other higher priorities due to the
fungibility of munitions accounts. As a result of these concerns (and
others), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing
and Industrial Base Policy (DASD(MIBP)) is initiating a new munitions
industrial base resiliency study. One of the study goals is to inform
the development of a DOD-wide munitions strategy to ensure the
munitions industrial base remains healthy and is poised to meet
warfighter demands in a cost effective and timely manner. The
Department of the Navy (along with all other Services) is participating
in this effort. DASD(MIBP) anticipates this study to complete within
the next twelve months.
VADM Moore. The Department is concerned about the overall health of
the munitions industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, the
munitions development and production market has declined. This decrease
has resulted in aggressive competition for a limited number of new
munition program opportunities. Within the munitions sector, two key
prime contractors, Raytheon Missile Systems (a division of the Raytheon
Company) and the Lockheed-Martin Company account for approximately 85-
90 percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) munitions procurement
funding. While there are small pockets of progress in expanding the
munitions industrial base, as the Department of the Navy's successful
efforts to mature Orbital-ATK from a small business operation to a
prime contractor for the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile
program, other similar efforts are not on the horizon. While many
industrial sectors that support our national security requirements are
also supported by commercial markets, the DOD munitions industrial
sector is mostly defense-unique. As a result, the munitions industrial
base faces a number of challenges such as sustaining munition design
and engineering teams, and sustaining munitions sub-tier suppliers. The
munitions industrial sector is routinely impacted by shifts in DOD
demand as a result of various factors, but mostly due to budget
fluctuations/constraints, the initiation or drawdown of conflicts, and
the reprogramming of resources from munitions accounts to pay for other
higher priorities due to the fungibility of munitions accounts. As a
result of these concerns (and others), the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (DASD(MIBP)) is
initiating a new munitions industrial base resiliency study. One of the
study goals is to inform the development of a DOD-wide munitions
strategy to ensure the munitions industrial base remains healthy and is
poised to meet warfighter demands in a cost effective and timely
manner. The Department of the Navy (along with all other Services) is
participating in this effort. DASD(MIBP) anticipates this study to
complete within the next twelve months.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. In fiscal year 2018, the munitions industrial base
will be funded to produce at their current maximum capacity to help
replenish preferred munitions (Small Diameter Bomb I [SDB-I], Joint
Direct Attack Munition [JDAM], Hellfire) expended in overseas
contingency operations and to increase inventory stockpiles. The DOD is
continuing to take the necessary actions to increase industry
production capacity for weapons with sustained high demand levels.
However, industry still needs a clear demand signal of consistent
funding across the FYDP and strategic investment to continue required
industrial base growth and plan for future production levels of
preferred munitions.

12. Senator Inhofe. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, what is the current ability of the industrial
base to support a rapid buildup of inventories?
LTG Wyche. The ability to ramp up quickly is largely dependent on
the type of parts and the vendors who support those items. We do have
supply chains that are easier to ramp up and respond but the vast
majority of our supply chains are much slower to expansion. Demand
signal and consistent/predictable funding are key inputs to improving
the reaction of the supply chain to requirements. The munitions
industrial base would have significant challenges if required to
support a rapid buildup of inventory. Analysis of the projected
increases to the Army's requirements, based on current planning
guidance, show that we do not have the surge capacity to produce or
procure the required quantity of mortars, artillery, demolition items,
medium caliber munitions, missiles, or bombs. There is also a large
amount of unserviceable ammunition stored in our storage depots, we
need to pursue methods to demilitarize the unserviceable ammunition in
storage. Facility capacity and the availability of additional trained
personnel are both factors that limit our surge capability.
VADM Grosklags. Munitions programs are more readily adaptable to
production line and tooling investments as compared to large aircraft
or ships programs. However, the rapid buildup of munitions inventories
remains challenging because of material lead-times, skilled work-force
development timelines, supply-chain response times and design/
production requirements that ensures our munitions operate effectively
and safely in severe warfighting operating environments (e.g. across
the electromagnetic spectrum, aircraft/shipboard environments, etc.).
The Department of Defense provides resources to the munitions
industrial base to ramp-up production in preparation for Major Combat
Operations and when the Nation is engaged in conflict; DOD quickly
reduces those resources when hostilities diminish or cease. Frequently,
the DOD reprograms resources from munitions accounts to pay for other
higher priorities as these accounts are more `fungible'. This cycle of
rapid ramp-ups followed by declines of demand and production adds risk
and significant capacity management challenges to munitions prime
contractors and their critical sub-tier suppliers. This risk is
exacerbated because many sub-tier suppliers do not have the diversity
of programs or products from other non-defense markets to support their
design and production skills. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (DASD(MIBP)) has attempted
to better manage these industrial base challenges with assessments of
data from their Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) data repository.
S2T2 is a carefully compiled data base of vendor capability, supply
chain issues and manufacturing details regarding the production of
critical components, platforms and technologies. DASD(MIBP) analysis
consistently identifies the munitions sector as being under stress and
at risk to meet the demands of future warfighting requirements.
DASD(MIBP) is initiating a new munitions industrial base resiliency
study in fiscal year 2017. One of the study goals is to inform the
development of a DOD-wide munitions strategy to ensure the munitions
industrial base remains healthy and is poised to meet warfighter
demands in a cost effective and timely manner. The Department of the
Navy (along with all other Services) is participating in this effort.
DASD(MIBP) anticipates this study to complete within the next twelve
months.
VADM Moore. Munitions programs are more readily adaptable to
production line and tooling investments as compared to large aircraft
or ships programs. However, the rapid buildup of munitions inventories
remains challenging because of material lead-times, skilled work-force
development timelines, supply-chain response times and design/
production requirements that ensures our munitions operate effectively
and safely in severe warfighting operating environments (e.g. across
the electromagnetic spectrum, aircraft/shipboard environments, etc.).
The Department of Defense provides resources to the munitions
industrial base to ramp-up production in preparation for Major Combat
Operations and when the Nation is engaged in conflict; DOD quickly
reduces those resources when hostilities diminish or cease. Frequently,
the DOD reprograms resources from munitions accounts to pay for other
higher priorities as these accounts are more `fungible'. This cycle of
rapid ramp-ups followed by declines of demand and production adds risk
and significant capacity management challenges to munitions prime
contractors and their critical sub-tier suppliers. This risk is
exacerbated because many sub-tier suppliers do not have the diversity
of programs or products from other non-defense markets to support their
design and production skills. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (DASD(MIBP)) has attempted
to better manage these industrial base challenges with assessments of
data from their Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) data repository.
S2T2 is a carefully compiled data base of vendor capability, supply
chain issues and manufacturing details regarding the production of
critical components, platforms and technologies. DASD(MIBP) analysis
consistently identifies the munitions sector as being under stress and
at risk to meet the demands of future warfighting requirements.
DASD(MIBP) is initiating a new munitions industrial base resiliency
study in fiscal year 2017. One of the study goals is to inform the
development of a DOD-wide munitions strategy to ensure the munitions
industrial base remains healthy and is poised to meet warfighter
demands in a cost effective and timely manner. The Department of the
Navy (along with all other Services) is participating in this effort.
DASD(MIBP) anticipates this study to complete within the next twelve
months.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. The munitions sector is primarily a defense-unique
industrial sector. This sector is routinely impacted by significant
shifts in DOD demand as a result of various factors, but mostly due to
the initiation or drawdown of conflicts. Resupply of key munitions used
in conflicts, as well as surge requirements for those munitions during
conflicts stress the industrial base. Numerous bottle-necks with
critical sub-tier suppliers preclude a rapid response to these
increases in requirements, causing delays in deliveries and increased
cost to the Department. The munitions industrial base has supported
recent DOD efforts to increase production capacity for high-demand
weapons. However, the time period between identification of a
production requirement and delivery of completed weapons can be from
two to five years. During this interval, funds are programmed into an
upcoming Air Force budget, funds are appropriated, a production
contract is awarded, production commences, and delivery is completed.
This lengthy process limits the industrial base's ability to respond
rapidly to major changes in production requirements. Investments are
being made in the current industrial base to be able to meet projected
munitions requirements over the next few years. However, this capacity
can only be preserved if stable base funding can be maintained.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
hiring freeze
13. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, an exemption to the
Administration's civilian hiring freeze was granted for various
positions including certain positions at our nation's public shipyards?
Can you provide an update on how the waiver process is working and do
you see any residual effects of the hiring freeze which could impact
your ability to continue building a balanced and skilled workforce?
VADM Moore. The hiring freeze waiver process has been working well
for the four Naval Shipyards. The Naval Shipyards have submitted and
been approved for more than 7,500 waivers with no denials. There was an
initial reduction in onboarding of new employees as the Department of
Defense and Navy built and promulgated their hiring freeze waiver
processes and procedures, but at this point any necessary timelines for
waiver approvals have been incorporated into the hiring process, job
offers are moving forward, and the 4 Naval Shipyards are back to
regular onboarding of new employees.
importance of milcon to readiness
14. Senator Hirono. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, each of the Services has requested additional
MILCON funding in the Supplemental Budget Request submitted by the
President. Is the current level of MILCON impacting the Services'
ability build the required capacity to increase readiness; and if so,
what MILCON projects are most important to increase readiness?
LTG Wyche. Current MILCON Army (MCA) funding is not adequate for
meeting the modernization needs of the Army's Organic Industrial Base.
Since Sequestration, budgets have forced the Army to accept risk in
many areas. In terms of MILCON, the past several POM cycles has seen
historic lows in MCA funding. The Army Materiel Command has been
successful in mitigating risk in some cases through the use of major
renovations using R&M funding. But since fiscal year 2010, AMC has
averaged just $70 millionper year in projects. In order to modernize
the capacities and capabilities for the AMC, the Command estimates
needing $300 million in MCA investment per year.
VADM Grosklags. The current level of MILCON funding is limiting the
ability of the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) to increase capability/
capacity to the levels necessary to support customer demands, new
technologies and capabilities of emerging fleet aircraft. FRCs has the
F/A-18 Avionics Repair Facility Replacement, Naval Air Station (NAS)
Lemoore, CA and the F-35B Vertical Lift Fan Test Facility, Marine Corps
Airs Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, NC in the President's Budget
submission for funding in fiscal year 2018.
VADM Moore. The following Naval Shipyard MILCON projects are
planned for fiscal year 2017: Activity Project Number Project
Description Est. Cost ($000) Portsmouth NSY 371 Nuclear Facilities
Utilities Improvements $30,119 Puget Sound NSY & IMF 400 Submarine
Refit Maintenance Support Facility (Phase 2) $21,476 Puget Sound NSY &
IMF 438 Nuclear Environmental Monitoring Facility $6,704 Per title 10
U.S.C. 2476, the Naval Shipyards are funded to meet the statutory 6
percent minimum investment for the Navy's maintenance depots. While
this is adequate to maintain existing mission-essential infrastructure
functionality, it does not provide appreciable productivity
improvements across all four Naval Shipyards. For fiscal year 2018 the
Navy has identified approximately $134 million in MILCON requirements
to positively impact naval shipyard readiness, listed in priority order
below: Activity Project Number Project Description Est. Cost ($000)
Portsmouth NSY 293 Paint, Blast & Rubber Facility Consolidation $61,692
Norfolk NSY 257 CVN and SSN Ship Repair Training Facility $72,990.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. See chart below:
The current level of Military Construction (MILCON) funding forces
Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) leaders to fund new facilities in
support of emerging /new weapon systems before replacing existing
mission facilities. Facilities with unsafe / unusable work areas or
facilities that do not meet basic readiness requirements are often
unfunded, leaving commandersto find Maintenance and Repair (M&R) funds
to keep facilities usable. Funding in this manner increases readiness
as it relates to new mission, but leaves commanders struggling to
sustain or increase readiness of existing mission requirements.
This bias is best represented by MILCON funding related to AFSC's
Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs). Since fiscal year (FY) 2012,
approximately $212 million in funding has been approved for new mission
depot MILCONs. In contrast, there have been zero current mission depot
MILCONs funded in the same timeframe. The Air Base Wings (ABWs) have
not fared much better. Unless a facility is beyond repair (condemned)
or directed by AF Leadership, funding for existing mission requirement
has not been approved.
Annually, AFSC submits approximately 60 combined new and existing
mission MILCON requirements. Most of these requirements have been
submitted multiple years but remain unfunded. Mission accomplishment
and readiness is directly tied to each of these requirements. In many
cases, facilities have declined to non-reparable conditions or workload
has surpassed thefacility's capability to support it. For example,
Ogden Air Logistics Complex (OO-ALC) has submitted a requirement for a
Secure Software Facility since fiscal year 2012. This is the first of
five (5) phases based strictly on known software workload requirements
and has an expected payback of less than 15 months. Because this $29
million MILCON has not been funded, OO-ALC has been forced to lease
temporary facilities and contract workload at an annual cost almost
twice that of the MILCON requirement to meet mission needs/readiness!
AFSC submits its list of MILCON requirements for consideration at
AFMC each year. In the latest MILCON submission for fiscal year 2019,
61 projects were prioritized and submitted for funding. These
requirements support all mission/readiness needs across AFSC's three
ALCs and ABWs. AFSC's top 15 Existing Mission MILCON requirements for
fiscal year 2019 are shown in the following table:

Fiscal Year 2019 Existing Mission MILCON Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
($ in
Priority millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Robins Commercial Truck Gate 9,800
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Tinker Commercial Vehicle 13,400
Visitor Control
Facility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Robins Aircraft Fire Bottle 9,800
Maint Fac
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Robins Control Tower/Base Ops 13,200
Fac
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Hill Consolidated 20,600
Transportation
Facility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Hill F-16 Emergency Power 19,400
Unit Overhaul
Facility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Robins Depot Quality Control 17,700
Lab
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 Hill Install New PCC Apron 9,200
(Hot Pad 8)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 Tinker ADAL Depot Aircraft 8,000
Maint Fuel Dock
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Hill Upgrade Industrial 7,900
Waste Treatment Plant
------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Tinker Upgrade Building 3001 21,000
Infrastructure P4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
12 Tinker Visitor's Quarters 23,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
13 Tinker Natural Gas Main 3,950
Extension
------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Hill Secure Core Software 28,300
Facility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 Robins Add to Software 7,000
Support Fac Bldg 229
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Add/Alter (ADAL), Portland Cement Concrete (PCC)

bottlenecks in the defense industrial base
15. Senator Hirono. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, the industrial base plays an important role in
research and development as well as design, production, delivery, and
maintenance of weapon systems, vehicles, airplanes, and subsystems for
the U.S. military. What types of bottlenecks exist in the defense
industrial base that will make it difficult to increase readiness?
LTG Wyche. The primary bottlenecks continue to be the late release
of funding to the Organic Industrial Base customers. This results in
them providing funds to the Organic Industrial Base activities later in
the fiscal year resulting in decreased throughput and increased
carryover. Carryover should be redefined to remove procurement (3-year
money) and other Department of Defense from annual carryover rules.
Decreased supply availability and backorders will drive the Army to
continue to have excess inventory (serviceable and unserviceable) and
will result in our inability to purchase and store critical repair
parts required to support the joint warfighter. Also, it has been
increasingly difficult to maintain a steady skilled workforce for the
Organic Industrial Base facilities. If Organic Industrial Base sites
were granted permanent direct hiring authority for justifiable
requirements, the hiring of additional skills would alleviate issues in
maintaining the human skills sets of core capabilities. The restricted
ability to realign resources from lesser priority programs will impact
the repair schedule and the inability to meet mission timelines. For
example, the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) equipment at our Combat Training
Centers has been neglected basically since before the war begin in
2003. Their primary vehicles, the Opposing Force Surrogate Vehicle, are
outdated and are a readiness challenge and do not provide our forces a
realistic combat training scenario. In order to improve readiness and
support the increased training intensity the Opposing Force Surrogate
Vehicle must be repaired. This cannot be done under the continued
budget constraints levels. The Army has also determined that there is a
valid need for additional Brigade Combat Teams. The first brigade
combat team to be built is the 15th Armored Brigade Combat Team and
this is generating a requirement to send Paladins (howitzers) and Field
Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (ammunition supply vehicles) to
Anniston Army Depot for maintenance. It is imperative that the Army
rebuilds its combat capability to ensure it can meet the challenges
arising around the globe.
VADM Grosklags. Increasing readiness is not necessarily a result of
industrial base bottlenecks but rather a function of a stable design,
manufacturing, and operation & sustainment programs and budgets. With
resource stability, a trained/high performance work-force, continuity
of operations, and prudent investments in manufacturing and depot
tooling/robotics, the defense industrial base can sustain, and if
necessary, surge to meet current and projected future warfighter
readiness demands.
VADM Moore. Sustained readiness is a function of stable design,
manufacturing, and operation & sustainment programs and budgets. With
resource stability, a trained/high performance work-force, continuity
of operations and prudent investments in manufacturing and depot
tooling/robotics, the defense industrial base can sustain, and if
necessary, surge to meet current and projected future warfighter
readiness demands. The ``bottlenecks,'' or, more accurately, limiting
factors, to the defense industrial base's ability to increase
readiness, especially in the short term, are the size of our highly
skilled, public and private sector repair workforce, ``floor space'' to
perform the work (e.g. dry docks for ships), and the vendor base for
repair parts. All of these factors require years of lead time, and
significant advanced funding, to increase capacity. The funding
uncertainty of continuing resolutions every year exacerbates the
effects of those limiting factors, resulting in reduced private sector
capacity.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. Unpredictability caused by continuing resolutions
and changes in mission inhibits industrial interest in supporting DOD,
thus creating a bottleneck of total defense industrial capacity.
Unstable funding for sustainment and a lack of proper enterprise weapon
systems planning creates bottlenecks in material shortages/obsolescence
issues, as well as provisioning and data rights, which in turn have
significant impacts on future planning and potentially readiness. In
the organic industrial base, AFSC has a robust Diminishing
Manufacturing Sources Material Shortages (DMSMS) management plan for
items highly likely to face obsolescence issues. Pricing is risky on
these items, creating huge spikes in material costs within the
production lead time, which impact profits on certain firm fixed price
contracts, causing some disinterest in getting involved in supporting
the government requirements. In transitioning from acquisition to
sustainment with new weapon systems, initial provisioning and
government ownership of technical data are limiting factors and a
recurring bottleneck to organic sustainment. We can't afford to
continue managing data rights tactically. Air Force doctrine calls for
disparate parts of different functions to be brought together
intelligently to achieve unity of effort and unity of command in order
to obtain the best effects. The government wants to ``own'' the
technical baseline by working to solve the technical data problem at
the strategic level. Within our laws, regulations, and policies, the
disparity of understanding exists in the industrial base as to what
rights we should or should not have or how to go about enforcing our
rights to obtain the correct data packages from our industrial
partners. Creating stable funding for the future and having better
sustainment and acquisition planning early in the lifecycle of weapons
systems will help eliminate bottlenecks and keep our force ready.
ground equipment challenges
16. Senator Hirono. LTG Wyche and LtGen Dana, are there any
specific ground equipment readiness challenges that are impacted by the
defense industrial base?
LTG Wyche. Fiscal uncertainty and lack of a demand signal that
drove us to this poor supply availability makes it difficult to
optimize our processes; resulting in higher operating costs, production
delays and increased carryover. The lack of a demand signal over an
extended period of time, extended contract lead times for critical
items, and obsolescence all impact ground equipment readiness. We
believe we are largely past the major lead time hurdles and we have our
buying activities focused on further reducing lead-times. The Defense
Logistics Agency is pursuing a number of system wide omnibus contracts
with our Original Equipment Manufacturers to reduce lead-times and to
aid with replacement of obsolete parts.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.

17. Senator Hirono. LTG Wyche and LtGen Dana, what is the
operational tempo at your installation depots and do you anticipate a
backlog in Depot level maintenance for any specific reason?
LTG Wyche. The OIB is currently work-loaded to meet requirements
and positioned to surge in support of Contingency Operations. Backlog
is workload that has not yet been funded and the Army does have a
number of unfunded hardware and software requirements. Without proper
depot maintenance funding, the Army will not be able to perform
aviation rebuilds or receive the required missile recertification and
upgrades to system software that are required and critical to ensure
weapon systems communicate on the battlefield. Furthermore, the Army
has other depot maintenance funding requirements generated by
unforeseen/unplanned missions. The restricted ability to realign
resources from lesser priority programs will impact the repair schedule
and the inability to meet mission timelines.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
national guard's role in readiness
18. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Levy, what role can the Air
National Guard play in increasing readiness?
Lt. Gen. Levy. The critical role of the ANG towards our nation's
readiness is well known and acknowledged. Their transition from a
strategic reserve to an operational force that fights seamlessly with
the joint force is an enabling factor in our nation's capabilities.
There is more to be done within the Total Force Association (TFA) arena
in regards to the AFSC's internal readiness and its ability to
strengthen the readiness of the warfighter. The AFSC already benefits
from a limited but highly successful partnering with the ANG. The 126th
Supply Chain Operations Squadron (ANG) at Scott AFB, IL and the 192d
Supply Chain Operations Flight (ANG) at Langley AFB, VA, provide
integral and critical support to the AFSC's 635th Supply Chain
Operations Wing, maintaining the same standards of operational
readiness and cross-component operational capabilities for daily and
surge operations as their Active Duty counterparts. This same kind of
relationship could be explored for our Air Logistics Complexes (ALC).
For instance, establishing associations with ANG Squadrons at each
Depot could leverage the experience and capability of ANG maintainers
in order to provide responsive blue-suit wartime surge capability, help
grow and preserve our critical aircraft maintenance career fields, (a
true core-competency of the ANG), and most importantly, augment our
critical Expeditionary Maintenance (EDMX) and Aircraft Battle Damage
Repair (ABDR) requirements as well as other areas. While not
traditional unit-equipped squadrons, they could be built upon wartime
task-able Unit Type Codes (UTCs) fulfilling requirements of a gaining
Major Command (MAJCOM), necessary for legitimate Air Reserve Command
(ARC) mission establishment. Such a concept, of course, is reliant on
availability of ANG manpower and their willingness to place it
accordingly. The AFSC stands ready to explore this readiness enhancing
potential Total Force partnership with the ANG. In addition, ANG units
also have exceptional field level capabilities that are being explored
to augment AFMC's existing expertise for surge requirements especially
related to legacy aircraft parts and structural repairs.

19. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Wyche, what is your opinion
of the Guard's role in Army readiness?
LTG Wyche. The National Guard plays a vital and integral role in
total Army Readiness with 78 percent of Army Sustainment Force
Structure residing the Reserve Component and much of that Force
Structure is at the National Guard states and territory level. The
National Guard has fully participated in contingency operations for 15
years and is currently ramping up additional Brigade Combat Teams to
make them available for the Chief of Staff of the Army utilization as
needed around the globe. There are challenges to raise and maintain the
Readiness of additional combat forces from the National Guard. The
Total Army Enterprise is working together to ensure those forces are
ready because National Guard Readiness is Army Readiness.
innovation in readiness
20. Senator Hirono. LTG Wyche, VADM Grosklags, VADM Moore, LtGen
Dana, and Lt. Gen. Levy, what steps have each of you taken to work with
industry leaders to bring advanced technologies and manufacturing
techniques back into the Department and integrated those concepts into
the Department of Defense's industrial base?
LTG Wyche. Both the Private Industry and the Organic Industrial
Base are equally critical to providing readiness to the Army and our
partners within the other services. Public-Private-Partnerships improve
capabilities and performance through cooperative agreements. Through
these 200 active partnerships, industry can take advantage of the
critical capabilities and skill sets developed by the Army's Organic
Industrial Base and the Organic Industrial Base can take advantage of
the advanced technologies and manufacturing techniques offered by
industry. Private Industry continues to play a very significant role
providing equipment for our great Army. Our Original Equipment
Manufacturers produced the Abrams Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, AH-64
Apache Helicopter, UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter and more recently the
Mine Resistance Ambush Protected and Route Clearance Vehicles. The
Organic Industrial Base is thoroughly integrated with private industry
and has been properly equipped to sustain each system previously
mentioned. The Headquarters, Army Materiel Command and its LCMCs
regularly conduct Industry Forums with the private industry to discuss
warfighter and industry needs, areas of concern, and collaborate on
future initiatives important to sustaining the joint warfighter.
VADM Grosklags. Efforts to modernize Navy depots and the organic
industrial base are essential to improve readiness. Advanced Digital
Manufacturing (ADM) technologies like 3D printing can accelerate how
maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) activities sustain Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft. Digital manufacturing technologies can shorten
the ``design to production cycle,'' optimize new designs and enable
cost-effective, on-demand manufacture of components or those for which
no parts are available. In the last two years Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) has been developing processes to print 3D metal ``flight-
critical'' components that meet required design and safety criteria.
NAVAIR flew its first metal flight critical component, a titanium
engine nacelle link and attachment on the MV-22B in July of 2016.
NAVAIR is scaling up integration of digital manufacturing with Navy
organic depots and industry counterparts. Integration includes
investments in standards, qualification and certification approaches
for repairs, tooling, support equipment, and end use components. For
example, in March 2017 NAVAIR approved and put into the U.S. Government
supply system a 3D printable H-1 Helicopter Helmet Visor Clip. The
original part, a small clip that supports the helmet visor, was a $200
item that had a month long procurement lead time. It can now be made
``on-demand'' for a recurring cost of $0.75 per unit. The standards
being developed are not unique to NAVAIR. NAVAIR is working across the
Department to align and leverage the work that the Naval Sea Systems
Command, U.S. Marine Corp, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Army are doing to
employ 3D printing and other ADM technologies. Additionally, NAVAIR has
reached out to original equipment manufacturers and commercial vendors
to understand how they are employing 3D/ADM in similar applications.
The standards in development intended to enable use of this technology
across the Department of Defense industrial base. ADM technology does
not stand alone. It requires an investment in digital infrastructure,
digital data, and cyber security to full leverage. Modernizing our
depots and organic industrial base must include the investments in
improving, managing and securing our digital data.
VADM Moore. Efforts to modernize Navy shipbuilding and the organic
industrial base are essential to improve readiness and the Navy has
worked with industry to integrate advanced technologies and
manufacturing techniques into the industrial base. The National
Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP), managed through the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA), provides a collaborative framework for
shipbuilders and maintainers to share best practices and is designed to
reduce the total ownership costs in both the Government and private
sectors. NSRP participants include the five NAVSEA-affiliated Program
Executive Offices, the United States Coast Guard, and 11 major private
shipbuilding firms. The program supports soliciting, selecting and
executing shipbuilding, ship repair and maintenance, and ship
modernization research and development projects. In addition, NSRP
serves a critical role by providing a public forum for industry-wide
networking, technology transfer and discussion of current Navy and
industry areas of interest. The transfer of the technologies and tools
NSRP project teams are developing for both the shipbuilding industry
and the Navy is at the core of the program's mission. Another important
function NSRP serves is fostering strong relationships with industry
and Navy associations and organizations, including the American Society
of Naval Engineers, Marine Machinery Association, Navy League, Naval
Submarine League, ShipTech, and Society of Navy Architects and Marine
Engineers. In addition to NSRP, NAVSEA uses its Small Business
Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR)
Programs to fund innovative small businesses to develop technology,
processes, and products to meet critical warfighter needs, including
maintenance reductions and improvements, total ownership costs, and
obsolescence concerns. The NAVSEA SBIR/STTR Program serves as an on-
ramp for the small business industrial base to participate in NAVSEA
technology development, and NAVSEA has an excellent record of
transitioning SBIR/STTR Phase I and Phase II technology development
efforts to SBIR Phase III and into DOD acquisition programs. The NAVSEA
SBIR/STTR Program conducts outreach events that engage small businesses
and associated organizations, universities and laboratories, and large
prime contractors to expand the country's industrial base. Starting in
August 2015, NAVSEA has hosted a Small Business Industry Day at its
headquarters at the Washington Navy Yard to increase small business
participation and interaction between the command and underserved
companies. NAVSEA is hosting the 2017 Small Business Industry Day on
August 8.
LtGen Dana did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Lt. Gen. Levy. The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) continually
pursues advanced technologies and manufacturing techniques to
incorporate into the sustainment environment by partnering with
industry and academia. There is a structured pipeline through which
promising technologies are developed, manufacturing readiness is
improved, and mature systems are incorporated into the production
environment. The Technology Development and Insertion Process (TDIP)
team collects and prioritizes technology needs from AFSC organizations.
The AFSC TDIP portfolio has over 100 ongoing efforts between industry
and the technology needing organization. These projects vary greatly
from maximizing efficiency, increasing process controls, increasing
safety, developing smarter software, lowering energy or waste of our
process and more. Limited key examples include: Maturation of Advanced
Manufacturing for Low-cost Sustainment (MAMLS): AFSC is a member of the
Sustainment Advisory Committee for this program executed though the
America Makes cooperative agreement. Structured as a public-private
partnership with member organizations from industry, academia,
government, and non-government agencies, America Makes is the national
accelerator for additive manufacturing (AM) and 3D printing (3DP) and
is the nation's leading and collaborative partner in AM and 3DP
technology research, discovery, creation, and innovation to increase
our nation's global manufacturing competitiveness. Laser Depaint:
Exercising commercial off the shelf robotics and lasers in the new
application of aerospace coatings (paint) removal. This multi-year
effort is close to fully operational on F-16s, with follow-on work and
approval for A-10s, missile transport trailers, and munition trailers.
Additionally, handheld lasers developed through this effort are in use
in the field and will be further qualified for depot operations.
Additive Manufacturing: Polymer 3DP capabilities are currently in use
creating tooling, dies, molds, fixtures, drill templates, shop aids,
and prototype parts. Efforts are on-going to bring metal 3DP
capabilities on-line, both organically and through industry partnering.
Immediate implications are to the agility and speed with which parts
and support equipment can be produced to drastically decrease
production time. Robotics: Focused on four major goals--1) remove
personnel from hazardous environments, 2) perform tasks that personnel
cannot do, 3) improve effectiveness/efficiency/quality, and 4) replace
custom-built, one-of-a-kind, proprietary systems. Examples currently
implemented include: 35,000 psi water blasting, High Velocity Oxygen
Fuel (HVOF), Cold Spray, C-130 Prop grinding, Flash-Jet paint removal,
Shot Peening, Plastic Media Blasting, and Low Plasticity Burnishing
(LPB). Advanced Metal Finishing Facility (AMFF): Utilizes remotely
operated computer controlled technology to conduct over twenty metal
finishing operations. These enhancements include production preparation
areas that remove operators from the processing environment; resulting
in a 95 percent reduction in hazardous chemical exposure inherent to
electroplating operations. Smart Manufacturing: Suite of sensors
monitoring production machinery parameters such as pressure, flow,
lubricating oil degradation, and vibration parameters enables
Conditions Based Maintenance. Hailed as a ``success story'' by
professional organizations, this program demonstrated the potential
benefits of ``smart'' manufacturing technologies. Additional Advanced
Technologies Being Pursued: Reconfigurable Machining Centers, Voice
Directed Inspection System, Confined Space Monitoring System, Energy
Conservation Projects, Networked Sensor Systems, Honeycomb Sandwich
Structure Inspection, Automatic Water Stripping, Advanced Corrosion
Resistant Coatings, High Precision X-Ray Plating Technologies/Chromium
Reduction, In-Situ Coating Property Sensor, Plume Opt Powder Injection,
3D Printed Masking for Plasma Spray, Sonic Infrared Crack Detection,
Conforming Anodes and Masking, Strip Solution Optimization, Advance
Machining Process for Shrouded Turbine Blades, Counterfeit Electronics
Detection, Exoskeleton Suit, Advanced Nondestructive Inspection, Laser
Scanning, and Predictive Maintenance systems.
skilled labor on shipyards
21. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, reports show that skilled
welders and technically skilled machinist can make upwards of $300,000
in the private sector. Are you facing a challenge in trying to recruit
and retain these highly skilled team members in the wake of the
outstanding private sector opportunities which are available to them?
Besides the opportunity to serve our country and work on vital national
assets, what are you able to offer these highly qualified and sought
after individuals?
VADM Moore. Yes, it is an issue in terms of technically skilled
mechanics. For example, in the Tidewater area of Virginia, Norfolk
Naval Shipyard (NNSY) has lost skilled mechanics to the private sector,
which offers up to about $34.00 an hour for highly skilled welders
versus about $27.00 an hour for a top-step, nuclear pipe welder at
NNSY. Naval Shipyards will be submitting a request for tiered
incentives (i.e., higher pay levels, special-act awards, incentives,
etc.) based on critical skills and advanced qualifications as a
retention tool and recognition of skill mastery by the end of the
calendar year. Additionally, NNSY has submitted requests for approval
of Direct Hire Authority for targeted skills (i.e., experienced/
journeyman level machinists, welders, et al).
role of private shipyards
22. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, according to Vice Chief of
Naval Operations Admiral Bill Moran, the attack submarine Boise has
been sitting pier side for about 47 months for a maintenance cycle that
usually takes about 24 months to complete. This has led the Navy to
solicit bids from private shipyards for this maintenance cycle. How can
we capitalize on the private sector to help get maintenance back on
schedule?
VADM Moore. For clarification, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Bill Moran's comment was referring to the USS Albany (SSN 753)
Engineered Overhaul (EOH). USS Albany's EOH was planned to complete in
28.3 months, but is now projected to complete in 47.3 months. USS
Boise's (SSN 764) certification for Unrestricted Operations (URO)
expired in June 2016 and she has been moored pier side since then
because Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and the other naval shipyards, lacked
the capacity to perform the EOH. There are two main avenues the Navy
can take to capitalize on the private sector to help get maintenance
back on schedule. First, the Navy can contract out entire
availabilities to the two nuclear qualified private shipyards, General
Dynamics-Electric Boat (GDEB) and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport
News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS), when temporary peaks in workload exceed
the naval shipyards' capacity. The Navy has done this in the past and
is in the process of conducting a limited competition between GDEB and
HII-NNS for USS Boise's EOH. The Navy has recently contracted to the
private sector to conduct the following submarine depot maintenance
availabilities: USS Montpelier (SSN 765) fiscal year 2016 Interim Dry
Docking, awarded to GDEB in May 2015; USS Columbus (SSN 762) fiscal
year 2017 EOH, awarded to HII-NNS in August 2015; and USS Helena (SSN
725) fiscal year 2018 Drydock Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA),
in process for award to HII-NNS, expected July 2017. The private sector
capacity to do this work is limited by their dry dock space and
competing workload from the Navy's CVN and submarine new construction
programs. While more flexible than the government, the private
shipyards face similar challenges as the naval shipyards in rapidly
growing their capacity because of the time required to recruit and
train skilled workers. Second, the Navy can contract out some of the
work on availabilities conducted in the naval shipyards to the private
sector. This is an approach the Navy is starting to use more to address
the workload-to-workforce mismatch over the next few years in parallel
with hiring. It opens up the potential vendor base beyond the two
nuclear qualified shipbuilders and can help address specific skill
shortages in the naval shipyards that would otherwise drive delays.
However, this approach also has drawbacks. The work is more costly than
comparable work performed by the naval shipyards' organic workforce,
and requires additional government resources for contract oversight and
support services.

23. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, what role does the private-
public partnership play in ship maintenance and the Navy's ability to
effectively plan and execute maintenance on ships?
VADM Moore. Public-private partnerships play a critical role in
planning and executing ship maintenance. Naval Shipyards, NAVSEA
introduced the concept of One Shipyard in 2001, describing an
industrial base workload and resource enterprise set up to achieve the
most efficient ship maintenance for the fleet under a ``surge, sustain
and reconstitute'' operational construct. One Shipyard focused on
schedule and quality through standardized processes, resource sharing
among public shipyards, and partnering with private shipyards. Other
vital elements included a corporate approach to material support and
the resolution of critical skill shortages. The concept has matured,
and today the Naval Shipyards and private shipyards effectively partner
to routinely share both work and resources to efficiently deliver fleet
maintenance. Four Naval Shipyards collaborate with one another and with
private industrial organizations to improve industrial processes,
implement best practices and to obtain new technology for industrial
work. Further collaboration occurs through Carrier Team One, Submarine
Team One, National Shipbuilding Research Program, Commercial Technology
for Maintenance Activities, such as the National Centers for
Manufacturing Sciences program, NAVSEA Warfare Centers, Manufacturing
Technology, Repair Technology, and implementation of solutions from
private industry trade shows.

24. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, has the current means and
methods of surface ship maintenance execution in Pearl Harbor supported
the Fleet's requirements for cost, schedule and quality?
VADM Moore. Yes. Surface ship maintenance is moving in the right
direction when it comes to both schedule and cost performance. The
quality of the work meets fleet requirements. The Navy is implementing
contracting, planning and execution processes improvements nationwide
and we are seeing positive results in Pearl Harbor. On-time delivery
performance is on par with our four major homeport areas. Historically,
cost performance at Pearl Harbor as measured by growth and new work has
been higher than CONUS port averages, but has shown significant
improvement with above average performance over the last three years as
evidenced by a cost growth reduction of 33 percent.

25. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, has the current means and
methods of surface ship maintenance execution in Pearl Harbor provided
stability and predictability to the Pearl Harbor industrial base?
VADM Moore. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate
Maintenance Facility (PHNSY & IMF) and the Hawaii Regional Maintenance
Center (HRMC) work closely with Commander, Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT),
Commander Naval Surface Forces, Pacific (CNSP), Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA), and Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance
Center (CNRMC) representatives, on the Fleet Availability Scheduling
Team (FAST) to schedule surface ship maintenance. The FAST projects the
ship operating schedules and estimates the future windows for repair
availabilities according to the Optimized-Fleet Response Plan (OFRP).
The team adjusts the repair periods for individual ships to ensure that
the workload for each port is executable. It also balances the need to
meet O-FRP requirements with the desire to level the workload for the
port as much as possible and, thereby, provide stability for the
industrial base in each port. The FAST product is a workload schedule
that is provided to the Pearl Harbor industrial base for its planning
purposes.

26. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, does the Navy view
industrial base predictability and stability as integral to the
maintenance of surface ships at Pearl Harbor?
VADM Moore. Industrial base stability and workload predictability
are critical to maintaining our ships affordably and in a quality
manner at all of our industrial ports, including Pearl Harbor. Stable
and accurate workload forecasts are key to fostering an environment of
well-planned, well-managed, and well-executed maintenance
availabilities. Maintaining stable workloads also allows for the
necessary number of skilled trade workers to be hired, trained, and
available as needed to support the projected workload. Key to ensuring
a stable workload is maintaining sufficient funding each year to meet
the fleet's maintenance requirements.
long-term tdy requirements.
27. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, in January 2016 your
predecessor Admiral Hilarides wrote a letter to the per diem committee
on behalf of the Navy requesting an immediate waiver for naval shipyard
civilian workers from the change in long term TDY per diem policies. Do
you agree with the waiver request? Some relief was provided by the most
recent NDAA. Can you provide information on how this waiver process is
working? Are waivers being processed in a timely and efficient manner
to support these long term assignments?
VADM Moore. Yes, NAVSEA agrees with the waiver request previously
submitted by VADM Hilarides. Revisions to the Joint Travel Regulations
by the Per Diem, Travel, and Transportation Allowance Committee have
been completed, including the most recent changes authorized in NDAA
2017. With the Acting Secretary of the Navy delegating waiver approval
authority to the 3-star Flag Officer or civilian SES equivalent, NAVSEA
updated its travel instruction accordingly. The Commander, Pacific
Fleet and Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command are in the
process of issuing instructions to their cognizant Naval Shipyards for
waiver requests for full rate per diem. NAVSEA has not received any
waiver requests to day for personnel assigned to the NAVSEA budget
office, but is committed to processing any future requests in a timely
manner.

28. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, how has the implementation
of this policy change impacted the readiness of our fleet, recruiting
and retention at our shipyards and the morale of these important
members of the Navy team?
VADM Moore. Activity Project Number Project Description Est. Cost
($000) Portsmouth NSY 371 Nuclear Facilities Utilities Improvements
$30,119 Puget Sound NSY & IMF 400 Submarine Refit Maintenance Support
Facility (Phase 2) $21,476 Puget Sound NSY & IMF 438 Nuclear
Environmental Monitoring Facility $6,704 Per title 10 U.S.C. 2476, the
Naval Shipyards are funded to meet the statutory 6 percent minimum
investment for the Navy's maintenance depots. While this is adequate to
maintain existing mission-essential infrastructure functionality, it
does not provide appreciable productivity improvements across all four
Naval Shipyards. For fiscal year 2018 the Navy has identified
approximately $134 million in MILCON requirements to positively impact
naval shipyard readiness, listed in priority order below: Activity
Project Number Project Description Est. Cost ($000) Portsmouth NSY 293
Paint, Blast & Rubber Facility Consolidation $61,692 Norfolk NSY 257
CVN and SSN Ship Repair Training Facility $72,990.

29. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Moore, while ensuring that every
taxpayer dollar is used wisely and efficiently should always be a top
priority for government decision makers, can you talk about any
unintended consequences which have resulted as this policy change has
been implemented? This could be related to additional tasking to staff
to work on waivers, processing of travel claims, availability of
willing experts to go work in places over the long term, the cost of
using more people to fill the same long term assignment, morale etc.
VADM Moore. Whenever a Department of the Navy civilian is on travel
for temporary duty (TDY) that extends beyond 30 days, the reduced per
diem rules apply. The employee will receive reduced per diem for Meals
and Incidental Expenses (M&IE) at the rate of 75 percent of locality
per diem rates for the locality of the TDY with a duration of 31-180
days and 55 percent for TDY of 181 days or more. Similarly, the
employee will receive reduced per diem for lodging of 75 percent of the
locality rates for TDY of 31-180 days and 55 percent for TDY of 181
days or more. These reduced per diem rates for long-term travel for
temporary duty (TDY) extending beyond 30 days have resulted in
unintended consequences including required additional administrative
work to process travel orders and travel claims, and to process
waivers. It has also resulted in reduced availability of subject matter
experts to engage in long-term TDY because of the additional cost that
must be borne by the traveler on top of being away from home for
extended periods of time. In the face of a lack of volunteers for long-
term TDY, some union contracts require the Government to first direct
junior personnel to go on the long term travel before directing senior
subject matter experts which can result in the need for additional
personnel to fulfill the assignment to ensure that the work can be
accomplished. All of these unintended consequences increase the cost of
the long-term TDY to the Government and reduce workforce morale.
Specifically with respect to the additional administrative cost of
processing waivers, once reduced per diem applies, there are at least 4
waiver processes that the employee could need that add to the
administrative burden of processing travel orders and travel claims:
(1) If TDY is projected to exceed 180 days, a waiver is required to
permit the TDY to extend beyond 180 days; (2) If the employee cannot
find lodging for the amount of the reduced per diem at the locality to
which the employee will travel, he or she must ask the government
travel service provider (CWTSatoTravel) for assistance. If
CWTSatoTravel cannot find lodging for the employee at the reduced rate,
the employee must seek a waiver of the reduced rate for lodging to
permit reimbursement of actual expenses for lodging for up to the
amount of the locality per diem which ordinarily requires the employee
to provide receipts for actual expenses; (3) The employee may request a
waiver of the reduced per diem for M&IE at the locality to permit the
employee to be reimbursed for actual expenses up to the amount of the
locality per diem rate which ordinarily requires the employee to
provide receipts for actual expenses; and, (4) Under the Fiscal Year
2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the employee may request their
approving three-star flag officer/general officer or above to waive the
need for the employee to keep and submit actual receipts. Specifically
with respect to the lack of volunteers for long-term TDY, before
implementation of the reduced per-diem requirements, the Naval
Shipyards never needed to issue a directed travel letter to their
employees to cover long-term TDY. With the advent of the reduced per-
diem rules, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance
Facility (PSNS & IMF) has discovered that issuing such letters is now a
common occurrence. Based on a recent survey of primary activities with
the need to use long-term TDY, mandatory assignment of employees
(directed travel) to TDY assignments from PSNS & IMF has climbed from 0
percent through 5 percent to as high as 39 percent of those workers
being asked to travel. Because of the lower per-diem allowances,
employees have expressed significant concerns that they risk paying a
portion of expenses out of pocket and, therefore, no longer volunteer
for, or decline, the long-term TDY assignments. The result is that
ordered/directed long-term TDY is now common and negatively impacts
ship maintenance efficiency and employee morale and performance.
Additionally, under some union contracts, ordered travel may impose
reverse seniority rules whereby less experienced junior employees are
sent to perform highly technical work, introducing increased risk to
quality and to scheduled completion dates. This poses a significant
concern as employees selected for temporary duty assignments must have
the qualification and expertise required for successful execution of
maintenance work and is compensated for by sending additional personnel
to accomplish the work. Having a highly qualified team of skilled
experts committed to maintaining Navy readiness is critical to mission
success. The new per diem rules contained in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA
will help alleviate some of these challenges.

[all]

MEMBERNAME	BIOGUIDEID	GPOID	CHAMBER	PARTY	ROLE	STATE	CONGRESS	AUTHORITYID
Wicker, Roger F.	W000437	8263	S	R	COMMMEMBER	MS	115	1226
McCaskill, Claire	M001170	8252	S	D	COMMMEMBER	MO	115	1820
Hirono, Mazie K.	H001042	7913	S	D	COMMMEMBER	HI	115	1844
Donnelly, Joe	D000607	7941	S	D	COMMMEMBER	IN	115	1850
Gillibrand, Kirsten E.	G000555	8336	S	D	COMMMEMBER	NY	115	1866
Shaheen, Jeanne	S001181	8276	S	D	COMMMEMBER	NH	115	1901
Heinrich, Martin	H001046	8056	S	D	COMMMEMBER	NM	115	1937
Blumenthal, Richard	B001277	8332	S	D	COMMMEMBER	CT	115	2076
Cotton, Tom	C001095		S	R	COMMMEMBER	AR	115	2098
Cruz, Ted	C001098		S	R	COMMMEMBER	TX	115	2175
Kaine, Tim	K000384		S	D	COMMMEMBER	VA	115	2176
Fischer, Deb	F000463		S	R	COMMMEMBER	NE	115	2179
Warren, Elizabeth	W000817		S	D	COMMMEMBER	MA	115	2182
Ernst, Joni	E000295		S	R	COMMMEMBER	IA	115	2283
Perdue, David	P000612		S	R	COMMMEMBER	GA	115	2286
Rounds, Mike	R000605		S	R	COMMMEMBER	SD	115	2288
Sasse, Ben	S001197		S	R	COMMMEMBER	NE	115	2289
Sullivan, Dan	S001198		S	R	COMMMEMBER	AK	115	2290
Tillis, Thom	T000476		S	R	COMMMEMBER	NC	115	2291
Graham, Lindsey	G000359	8335	S	R	COMMMEMBER	SC	115	452
Inhofe, James M.	I000024	8322	S	R	COMMMEMBER	OK	115	583
McCain, John	M000303	8253	S	R	COMMMEMBER	AZ	115	754
Nelson, Bill	N000032	8236	S	D	COMMMEMBER	FL	115	859
Reed, Jack	R000122	8272	S	D	COMMMEMBER	RI	115	949

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